HomeOne Level Up Last updated: 25.04.2022

Naval Command Netherlands Antilles 1
Commandement der Zeemacht in de Nederlandse Antillen (CZMNA)



VLOOTCIEAMPNABEWDETNA DDETSUFBEWDETNA HBEWDETNA GBEWDETNA BBEWDETNA ECZMNA(ST)ANTMIL3AGGPstation shipVlb Hato KLuBEWDETNA CBEWDETNA A2AGGPHr.Ms. Wamandai tugboatMBPARBEWDETNA FMSKSAV336 Sqn KLu
  
Unit Main Equipment Location Peace Strength War Strength
Staff Naval Command Netherlands Antilles [a]     Curaçao 13/18/9/25 (65)
25/20/11/25 (81)
   
Station ship [b]     (Afloat) (176-180) (176-180)
Hr.Ms. Wamandai [c]     Curaçao (10) (10)
     
336 Squadron (Royal Air Force) [d] Fokker F.27M  Curaçao (32) (32)
Hato Air Base (Royal Air Force) [e]     Curaçao ? ?
   
2 Amphibious Combat Group [f]     Curaçao, Aruba (305)
3 Amphibious Combat Group [g]     15/147/282 (444)
   
Antillean Militia [h]     Curaçao, Aruba 5/37/106 (148) 5/37/106 (148)
   
Security detachments [i]
Security Detachment Netherlands Antilles A     4/19/75 (98)
Security Detachment Netherlands Antilles B     4/19/75 (98)
Security Detachment Netherlands Antilles C     4/19/75 (98)
Security Detachment Netherlands Antilles D     4/19/75 (98)
Security Detachment Netherlands Antilles E     4/19/75 (98)
Security Detachment Netherlands Antilles F     4/19/75 (98)
Security Detachment Netherlands Antilles G     4/19/75 (98)
Security Detachment Netherlands Antilles H     4/19/75 (98)
   
Naval Base Parera [j]     Curaçao 25/114/206/54 (399) 19/77/126/54 (276)
Fleet Company [k]     Curaçao (± 116) (± 116)
Detachment Suffisant [l]     Curaçao 5/24/77/12 (118) 3/16/25/12 (56)
Marine Barracks Savaneta [m]     Aruba 13/81/138/6 (238) 8/33/40/6 (87)
   
Shore Patrol Division Netherlands Antilles [n]     Curaçao 1/9/20 (30) 1/9/20 (30)
   
Naval Command Netherlands Antilles Peace Strength: (± 960) [o]
Naval Command Netherlands Antilles War Strength: (± 1850) [o]

Notes
   
a. Headed by Naval Commander Netherlands Antilles (Commandant der Zeemacht in de Nederlandse Antillen, CZMNA), headquartered at Naval Base Parera in Willemstad, Curaçao. The staff included bureaus for Intelligence, Operations and Planning, Personnel, and Materiel; also a Head of Logistics, a regional office of the Military Social Service and the Radio Monitoring Service Netherlands Antilles (Radiocontroledienst Nederlandse Antillen, RCDNA). RCDNA was a small, about eleven men strong element of the Naval Intelligence Service (Marineinlichtingendienst, MARID) which collected signals intelligence (SIGINT) through its listening post Sint-Joris on Curaçao. It reported to MARID's Technical Information Processing Centre (Technisch Informatieverwerkingscentrum, TIVC) at Naval Barracks Amsterdam. The CZMNA staff further included a small Royal Army detachment of four sub-officers from the Royal Military Constabulary. These mainly handled criminal investigations and would, if needed, support the Shore Patrols of the Marine Corps (see note n).2 
b. For deterrence (showing the flag) and territorial defence of the Netherlands Antilles the Royal Navy had permanently one frigate stationed in the Antilles, referred to as the station ship (stationsschip). A station ship would serve a rotation of about six months, usually taking part in a number of national and international naval exercises in the Caribbean area. In 1985 station ships were, subsequently, the Kortenaer-class frigates Hr.Ms. Abraham Crijnssen (November 1984-May), Hr. Ms. Bloys van Treslong (May-November) and the Van Speijk-class frigate Hr.Ms. Van Galen (December-May 1986).3
c. Decommissioned on 1 July 1985 because of its decrepid state. Per 26 May 1986 replaced by Hr.Ms. Woerden, a former Dokkum-class coastal minesweeper that had previously served as a diving tender. Hr.Ms. Woerden was refitted in the first months of 1986 to serve as general utility vessel/communication vessel in the Antilles. Its pennant number was changed from M 820 to A 882.4 
d. (Nominal) squadron of the Royal Air Force, under operational command of Naval Commander Netherlands Antilles. Operated from Hato Air Base, Curaçao with two unarmed Fokker F.27M maritime patrol aircraft. Commander 336 Squadron was also Air Base Commander. Tasks comprised surveillance, including (passive) anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and counter drugs operations (CD), search and rescue operations (SAR), and various transport duties. Squadron personnel was a mixture of Royal Air Force, Royal Navy (ten to twelve men) and a small number of Antillean civilian members. Air Force personnel was trained and delivered by 334 Squadron in the Netherlands. The two aircraft (Fokker F.27 Mk 200 Maritime, also: Fokker F.27 MPA) were modified versions of the F.27 'Friendship' civilian turboprop airliner. Modifications included the addition of a Litton LTN-72 navigation system, a Litton AN/APS-503F search radar in a ventral radome, two extra fuel tanks (pylons) of which one with searchlight, observation windows, smoke markers and radio buoys. The aircraft had a crew of six to eight men and could remain airborne for eleven hours.5
e. Small air base of the Royal Air Force under operational command of Naval Commander Netherlands Antilles. Co-located with the civilian Dr. Albert Plesman International Airport in Willemstad, Curaçao. The Air Base Commander was also Commander 336 Squadron.6 
f. Of 2 Amphibious Combat Group of the Marine Corps the following elements were stationed in the Netherlands Antilles: of 20 Staff and Support Company twenty-four men at Naval Base Parera, Curaçao and twenty-five men at Marine Barracks Savaneta, Aruba; the reconnaissance platoon of 25 Combat Support Company, twenty-four men (1/9/14 (24)), at Naval Base Parera; 21 Infantry Company at Naval Base Parera and 22 Infantry Company (both 5/32/79 (116)) at Marine Barracks Savaneta.7 In times of crisis or war in Europe the unit would concentrate in the Netherlands after being relieved by 3 Amphibious Combat Group. In case of crisis or war in the Antilles the unit would concentrate there. See further Marine Corps, Part I, note d, and Operational Roles.
g. 3 Amphibious Combat Group of the Marine Corps would be mobilised in the Netherlands to relieve 2 Amphibious Combat Group in the Netherlands Antilles if that unit would be concentrated in the Netherlands for its (wartime) NATO role in Europe. See further Marine Corps, Part I, note e, and Operational Roles. Of the three company groups that constituted 3 Amphibious Combat Group, 31 and 32 Company Group would be stationed at Naval Base Parera, Curaçao; 33 Company Group would be stationed at Marine Barracks Savaneta, Aruba.8
h. The Antillean Militia consisted of local conscript personnel and a small volunteer cadre. Militiamen served an active-duty period of twelve months. They were trained, clothed and equipped by the Marine Corps as "(conscript) marines, special services Netherlands Antilles" (mariniers van bijzondere diensten (zeemiliciën) Nederlandse Antillen). A Marine Corps training staff, Antillean cadre and two infantry platoons (1st and 2nd Infantry Platoon, strength 1/4/27 (32) each) were based on Curaçao as part of Detachment Suffisant. A small Marine Corps and Antillean training staff and one infantry platoon (3rd Infantry Platoon, 1/10/20 (31)) were based at Marine Barracks Savaneta on Aruba. The three infantry platoons together formed the Antillean Militia Infantry Company (Infanteriecompagnie Antilliaanse Militie) which in times of crisis or war would operate as security infantry in support of the marine units in the Netherlands Antilles (2 or 3 Amphibious Combat Group). It appears the company had no organic company staff; possibly the training staff would function as such, though it seems more likely that the platoons would be attached to Marine Corps units and operate under their commanders. The (politically determined) maximum number of Antillean men to be conscripted each year was two hundred, but this number was not met. In the previous two decades incorporating the Antillean militiamen into the Royal Navy organisation had proved to be problematic. Besides the short service time (in the Netherlands conscripts served fourteen months) cultural differences, a troubled history (slavery), language problems and deficient selection practices by the Antillean government limited the military value of the Militia.9
i. Mobilisable security infantry units consisting of Antillean Militia reservists led by reservist Marine Corps cadre from the Netherlands. The cadre (4/1/0 (5) per security detachment, 32/8/0 (40) in total) would probably be mobilised in the warning phase preceding actual mobilisation and flown in by airline. The eight security detachments would perform object security tasks, guarding naval installations and other vital objects. A 1986 document appears to show that six security detachments would operate from Naval Base Parera, Curaçao and two detachments from Marine Barracks Savaneta, Aruba.10    
j. Naval Base Parera housed the staff of Naval Command Netherlands Antilles and included harbour facilities, intelligence and signals elements, a diving and dismantling group (duik- en demonteergroep) and various logistic support services. The base provided logistic support to the station ship (see note b) and housed parts of 2 Amphibious Combat Group (see note f), which in times of crisis or war in Europe would be replaced by parts of 3 Amphibious Combat Group (see note g).11
k. Contingency security infantry company assembled from Royal Navy ('Fleet') personnel stationed at Naval Base Parera. Organised similar to an infantry company of the Marine Corps, but probably without support weapons. Armament included FN Browning Hi-Power pistols 9 mm, UZI submachine guns 9 mm, FN FAL battle rifles 7.62 mm and FN FALO squad automatic weapons 7.62 mm. The company, formed in 1981, would defend Naval Base Parera in times of crisis or war when Marine Corps units would be deployed elsewhere. It appears the company exercised about thirty days per year and was mainly composed of logistic personnel.12
l. Detachment of Navy Base Parera, until 1978 known as Marine Barracks Suffisant (Marinierskazerne Suffisant, MSKSUF). Marine Detachment Suffisant served as military education and training centre for the Antillean Militia; it included a Marine Corps training staff, and cadre and two infantry platoons of the Antillean Militia (see note h).13
m. Marine Barracks Savaneta housed parts of 2 Amphibious Combat Group (see note f), in times of crisis or war in Europe to be replaced by part of 3 Amphibious Combat Group (see note g).14
n. Shore Patrol Division Netherlands Antilles (Afdeling Marinepatrouilles Nederlandse Antillen, AMPNA) was a Royal Navy military police (MP) unit of the Marine Corps. Regarding its MP duties it was comparable to the Marine Corps Special Assistance Unit / Shore Patrol Division Netherlands; see Marine Corps, Part I, note i. The primary task of AMPNA, however, was securing the Governor of the Netherlands Antilles and his residence, Fort Amsterdam in Willemstad, Curaçao. AMPNA was based in said fort. Three sub-officers had the (civilian) status of special police officer (buitengewone agent van politie, BAVPOL). Besides performing MP patrols tasks included messenger services and providing escorts. Through personnel rotations a small, variable number of AMPNA marines were trained in counterterrorism and close quarters combat, having served with AMPNA's aforementioned sister unit in the Netherlands (seven men in 1982). This was not formalised however; in other words, AMPNA did not have a designated counterterrorism component.15
o. Because the source documents for personnel strengths, Royal Navy crew lists (bemanningslijsten, BL), are not exclusive (i.e. units or parts of units appear on multiple lists), an approximation has been made of the total CZMNA strengths. For the peacetime strength the numbers of the barracks, the station ship (176 men, presuming a Kortenaer-class frigate) and 336 Squadron have been added up; for the wartime strengths the barracks, the station ship, 336 Squadron, 3 Amphibious Combat Group and the security detachments have been counted. The resulting strengths have been rounded to decimals.16 It will be noted that 'wartime' here refers to war in Europe, not to a (territiorial) conflict in the Antilles or the Caribbean area. 

Territorial Defence

In case of a regional conflict that would threaten the territorial integrity of the Netherlands Antilles, reinforcements would be deployed from the Netherlands and placed under operational command of Naval Commander Netherlands Antilles. A 1982 draft of the Royal Navy War Memorandum (Oorlogsmemorandum der Koninklijke Marine) lists these reinforcements as follows: 17 A 1985 Royal Navy concept operational plan for the protection and defence of the Netherlands Antilles adds: 19 These reinforcements appear reasonably adequate, but only on the surface. Both in terms of combat power and reaction speed there were shortfalls. Regarding the Marine Corps, able to deploy reinforcements within days, it is remarkable that both 2 and 1 Amphibious Combat Group would deploy at peacetime strength rather than at wartime strength, i.e. without their mobilisable fourth rifle companies (24 and 14 Infantry Company respectively), even though these elements could be mobilised quickly and be ready for deployment within twenty-four to forty-eight hours. Also remarkable is the absence of 3 Amphibious Combat Group, a mobilisable unit designed for the defence of the Antilles.
   
Regarding the Royal Army and the Royal Air Force, a timely deployment of reinforcements would have been highly uncertain. An armoured infantry battalion would require at least fourteen days to begin deployment, a HAWK squadron would require a full month to deploy to the Antilles. Moreover, in the 1985 concept defence plan Royal Army and Royal Air Force reinforcements are no longer specified but merely listed as "Royal Army and/or Royal Air Force units, sort and number to be determined later". This meant that no such units were earmarked for deployment. For the transportation of their heavy equipment and supplies, cargo ships would have to be chartered, which meant that sea transport was not guaranteed; requisitioning ships for this purpose was apparently not prepared. As for the Royal Navy, the Squadron would probably be able to arrive in the Antilles in about two weeks, but it would take between one-and-a-half and two months to deploy extra helicopters, whilst the existing maintenance problems would have made a deployment of eight helicopters a challenge.20
   
Internal comments on the plans show that Naval Staff and Naval Command Netherlands Antilles were thoroughly underwhelmed. In a note to the 1985 concept plan a naval staff officer referred to the document as "this concoction, about which one has been wrestling for two years", adding that the Royal Army and the Royal Air Force "did not want to commit, as a result of which the availability of means remains woolly." The reticence on the part of the Army and Air Force was probably motivated, at least in part, by the fact that deployment of units to the Antilles would compromise their ability to perform their predominant NATO role in Europe. For the Royal Army backfilling the resulting hole would be problematic, as the UNIFIL deployment of 44 Armoured Infantry Battalion to Lebanon (1979-1983) had shown. For the Royal Air Force backfilling would be impossible, as there was no mobilisable air defence squadron, HAWK or otherwise. Be that as it may, one nonetheless cannot escape the impression that the Royal Army and the Royal Air Force considered the Antilles not their problem.21
   
Possible threats to the territorial integrity of the Netherlands Antilles were identified as coming from Cuba, perceived as an agent of the Soviet Union, and Venezuela, a politically unstable country located shortly off the coasts of Aruba, Curaçao and Bonaire. However, the Naval Intelligence Service (Marineinlichtingendienst, MARID) never found any indications that Venezuela planned, prepared or considered an invasion. In both cases subversive actions were considered more likely than an all-out military assault, though in the case of Venezuela internal turmoil or the outbreak of a world conflict would have the potential to change this.22
   
The 1982 Royal Navy War Memorandum stated that "a regional conflict does not manifest itself overnight" and that "a warning period of increasing tensions" warranted "a response time of two to three months to deploy reinforcements". This seems an overly optimistic assessment. The apparent unwillingness to earmark, let alone deploy units (Royal Army and Royal Air Force), or to activate mobilisable forces (Marine Corps), reflects a general lack of will to allocate resources to the defence of the Antilles, which makes a timely political and, subsequently, military response doubtful. Retaking the islands without substantial involvement of allied forces would have been virtually impossible. The 1985 concept defence plan noted: "Given the proximity of the Venezuelan coast, in case of Aruba hardly thirty kilometers, and given the available military means, a Venezuelan surprise attack is possible. Though preparations for an amphibious operation would take three to four weeks, warning time will probably be significantly shorter. Warning time for an airborne assault would probably be nil. In case of a regional conflict there would likely be no allied help (i.e. from the United States)." 23
   
In case of a world conflict, presumed to be between NATO and Warsaw Pact, Naval Commander Netherlands Antilles would at some point be placed under the US Commander-in-Chief Caribbean (CINCARIB) or a US subordinate commander, probably from said command. If US forces would be deployed to the Antilles for local (territorial) defence at the request of the Netherlands authorities, the respective sizes of the two nations' troop contingents would likely determine whether the combined force would operate under US or Netherlands command. If operationally required, US forces tasked with the defence of the Caribbean area might temporarily be placed under operational control of Naval Commander Netherlands Antilles. At the discretion of Netherlands authorities Royal Navy vessels present in the Antilles might be placed under the US Commander-in-Chief Atlantic for operations in protection of the sea lines of communication (SLOC).24

_________________________________________________
   
1. Organisation: NL-HaNA 2.13.114, inv. nr. 8434, Opheffing functie intendant zeemacht in Nederland d.d. 25 juli 1980, bijlage (organisatieschema). Jaarboeken KM 1983-1987. Van Zwet, Beschermengel, 16. Additional sources are referenced below. Naval Command Netherlands Antilles (CZMNA) was redesignated Naval Command Caribbean (CZMCARIB) on 1 January 1986, as on that date Aruba seceded from the Netherlands Antilles and became a separate country within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Jaarboek KM 1986, 143. Van Dissel en Groen, In de West, 96-97.
2. Staff organisation: NL-HaNA 2.13.114, inv. nr. 8434, op. cit. Ibid., inv. nr. 9625, BL CZMNA d.d. 2 mei 1984. RCDNA: Jensen en Platje, De MARID, 239-241. See also Kluiters, De Nederlandse, Supplement, 120-121. Areas of interest were the military communications of Venezuela, the diplomatic communications of Cuba and the high frequency network of the Soviet Navy. Jensen en Platje, loc. cit. Before and during the Falklands War (1982) RCDNA was able to read Argentinian military and diplomatic communications, of which the encryption had been rigged. Ibid. Jacobs, Maximator, 662-663. Website Marineschepen.nl, Waarom de Russen het Marineterrein in Amsterdam in de gaten hielden. Royal Military Constabulary: NIMH 430, inv. nr. 54 (Slagorde KL stand 1 juli 1985), MVD-KM. Roozenbeek et al., Een krachtig instrument, 195-196. See also Van der Deure, De Koninklijke, 16-17. Both Roozenbeek and Van der Deure report that the Royal Military Constabulary detachment was three rather than four men strong, and that in 1985 two additional sub-officers were deployed to Aruba. 
3. Jaarboek KM 1985, 105, 161. Jaarboek KM 1986, 145.
4. Jaarboek KM 1984, 315. Jaarboek KM 1986, 145. Jaarboek KM 1987, 292-294. According to Van Amstel Hr.Ms. Woerden entered service in the Antilles on 25 April 1986. Van Amstel, De schepen, 152.
5. Helfferich, Squadrons (1983), 132. Helfferich, Squadrons (1994), 219, 220. Tiggelman, 336 Squadron. Marchand, Vervlogen tijden. Website Nederlandse Modelbouw en Luchtvaartsite, Fokker F.27. See also website Aircraft of Dutch Manufacturers, Fokker F27 Mk.400M Maritime Patrol Aircraft ESCi injection kit. Apparently there is a difference of opinion whether Mk.200 or Mk.400 is correct; I followed Taylor, Jane's All The World's Aircraft 1985-86, 170. There is apparently also a difference of opinion whether the plane was fitted with more powerful engines (see for example website Nederlandse Modelbouw en Luchtvaartsite, ibid.), but it appears this was not the case. Taylor, ibid. Perhaps there is confusion with the two Fokker F.60MPA aircraft that performed the same role between 2005 and 2007. Marchand, ibid. Dr. Albert Plesman International Airport is nowadays known as Curaçao International Airport.
6. Tiggelman, ibid
7. NL-HaNA 2.13.141, inv. nr. 772, Reorganisatie opleidingen en 2AGGP d.d. 2 juli 1984. 
8. NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 6071, BL Marinebasis Parera 1982-1983. Ibid., inv. nr. 6104, BL Marinierskazerne Savaneta 1982-1983.
9. NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 6103, BL Detachement Suffisant 1982-1983. Ibid., inv. nr. 6104, BL Marinierskazerne Savaneta 1982-1983NL-HaNA 2.13.112, inv.nr. 873, Reorganisatie Antilliaanse Militie d.d. 29 juli 1985, Bijlage 6 (personeelssterkte ANTMIL). Jaarboek KM 1983, 463. Jaarboek KM 1985, 172. Van Dissel en Groen, In de west, 90-91, 100. Haring, Mariniers 325 jaar, 23, 180. Van Zwet, loc. cit.
10. NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 5909, BL Bewakingsdetachementen Nederlandse Antillen, augustus 1983. NL-HaNA 2.13.112, inv. nr. 856, concept CZMCARIB OPORD 1 d.d. 6 november 1986, Bijlage A. NL-HaNA 2.13.141, inv. nr. 796, voorlopige studie "Reorganisatie mobilisabel personeel Korps Mariniers" d.d. 13 februari 1981, 4, 16, Bijlage 1, Bijvoegsel 5.
11. NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 6071, op. cit.
12. Jaarboek KM 1981, 438. Jaarboek KM 1982, 474. Jaarboek KM 1983, 457. Jaarboek KM 1984, 310. Additional information kindly provided by Marine Sergeant-Major A. Van der Pluijm (Rtd.), November 2021.
13. NL-HaNA, Archiefinventaris 2.13.112, 16. NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 6103, op. cit.
14. NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 6104, op. cit.
15. NL-HaNA 2.13.112, inv. nr. 89, Personeelssamenstelling AMPNA in relatie tot taakuitvoering d.d. 28 juni 1982. Ibid., inv. nr. 367, Reorganisatie AMPNA d.d. 5 juli 1985. NL-HaNA 2.13.141, inv. nr. 272, Halfjaarlijks verslag AMPNA d.d. 26 oktober 1984.
16. For the approximate war strength 3 Amphibious Combat Group has been counted as, for some reason, it is listed but not counted in the war strengths (oorlogsbemanningslijsten, OBL) of Naval Base Parera and Marine Barracks Savaneta. NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 6071, op. cit. Ibid., inv. nr. 6104, op. cit. See also Marine Corps, the lower part of footnote 1.
17. NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 1952, vaststelling en wijzigingen VVKM 162 Oorlogsmemorandum der Koninklijke Marine, 1981-1982, Bijlage 12 (Defensiegrondslagen voor de Nederlandse Antillen).
18. The FIM-92 Stinger entered service with the Royal Air Force in December 1985. Helfferich, Squadrons (1994), 49.
19. NL-HaNA 2.13.112, inv. nr. 854, Concept OPLAN bescherming/verdediging Nederlandse Antillen d.d. 14 januari 1985.
20. NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 1952, op. cit. NL-HaNA 2.13.112, inv. nr. 854, op. cit. Regarding the Royal Air Force there appears to have been no intention to deploy a fighter aircraft squadron; perhaps this was logistically problematic. Requisitioning ships: often referred to as Ships Taken Up From Trade (STUFT). Legally this would have been possible without a State of War (Staat van Oorlog) or Martial Law (Staat van Beleg) being declared. Inkwartieringswet, artikel 5a, 28, 29 en 35. Wattel, Materiële mobilisatievoorbereiding, 475. The Royal Navy Squadron probably arriving in about two weeks: in 1985 the Kortenaer-class frigate Hr.Ms. Bloys van Treslong sailed from Den Helder to Curaçao in twelve days. Jaarboek KM 1985, 105.
21. NL-HaNA 2.13.112, inv. nr. 854, op. cit. (Quotations have been paraphrased.) When 44 Armoured Infantry Battalion was deployed to Lebanon in 1979 for United Nations (UNIFIL) peacekeeping duties, 55 Infantry Battalion (mobilisable), at that time scheduled to be disbanded in the 1974 Defence White Paper, was retained and added to 52 Armoured Infantry Brigade to fill the hole. NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr. 643, Planningsmemorandum Legerplan 162 (Reorganisatie Infanterie) d.d. 1 augustus 1985, 8. 
22. NL-HaNA 2.13.112, inv. nr. 854, op. cit., 1-3. Jensen en Platje, De MARID, 232. See also Van Dissel en Groen, In de West, 102.
23. NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 1952, op. cit. NL-HaNA 2.13.112, inv. nr. 854, op. cit. (Quotations have been paraphrased.) Retaking the islands virtually impossible: given the distance and the lack of the necessary military means, such as amphibious shipping. See Marine Corps, United Kingdom/Netherlands Landing Force
24. NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 1952, op. cit., Bijlage 13 (Memorandum of Guidance for military discussions between the United States Commander-in-Chief Caribbean (CINCARIB) and the Netherlands Antilles military authorities d.d. november 1956). CINCLANT was also Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) in NATO's military command structure. Hirrell, L.P. and McClintock, W.R., United States Atlantic Command Fiftieth Anniversary: 1947-1997 (Norfolk: USACOM, 1998), 7, 54, passim.