Naval
Command Netherlands Antilles
Commandement
der Zeemacht in de Nederlandse Antillen (CZMNA)
Organisation 1 | Territorial Defence
Unit |
Main
Equipment |
Location |
Peace
Strength |
War
Strength |
Staff
Naval Command Netherlands Antilles [a] |
|
Curaçao |
13/18/9/25
(65)
|
25/20/11/25
(81) |
Station ship [b] |
|
(Afloat) |
(176-180) |
(176-180) |
Hr.Ms.
Wamandai [c] |
|
Curaçao |
(10) |
(10) |
336
Squadron (Royal Air Force) [d] |
Fokker
F.27M |
Curaçao |
(32) |
(32) |
Hato
Air Base (Royal Air Force) [e] |
|
Curaçao |
? |
? |
Antillean Militia
[h] |
|
Curaçao, Aruba |
5/37/106
(148) |
5/37/106
(148) |
Security
detachments [i] |
Security
Detachment Netherlands Antilles A |
|
– |
– |
4/19/75
(98) |
Security
Detachment Netherlands Antilles B |
|
– |
– |
4/19/75
(98) |
Security
Detachment Netherlands Antilles C |
|
– |
– |
4/19/75
(98) |
Security
Detachment Netherlands Antilles D |
|
– |
– |
4/19/75
(98) |
Security
Detachment Netherlands Antilles E |
|
– |
– |
4/19/75
(98) |
Security
Detachment Netherlands Antilles F |
|
– |
– |
4/19/75
(98) |
Security
Detachment Netherlands Antilles G |
|
– |
– |
4/19/75
(98) |
Security
Detachment Netherlands Antilles H |
|
– |
– |
4/19/75
(98) |
Naval Base Parera [j] |
|
Curaçao |
25/114/206/54
(399) |
19/77/126/54
(276) |
└ Fleet
Company [k] |
|
Curaçao |
(± 116) |
(± 116) |
└ Detachment
Suffisant [l] |
|
Curaçao |
5/24/77/12
(118) |
3/16/25/12
(56) |
Marine
Barracks Savaneta [m] |
|
Aruba |
13/81/138/6
(238) |
8/33/40/6
(87) |
Shore
Patrol Division Netherlands Antilles [n] |
|
Curaçao |
1/9/20 (30) |
1/9/20 (30) |
Naval Command
Netherlands Antilles Peace
Strength: (± 960) [o] |
Naval Command
Netherlands Antilles War
Strength: (± 1850) [o] |
Notes
a. |
Headed
by Naval Commander Netherlands Antilles (Commandant der Zeemacht in de
Nederlandse Antillen,
CZMNA), headquartered at Naval Base Parera in Willemstad,
Curaçao. The staff
included bureaus for Intelligence, Operations and Planning,
Personnel, and Materiel; also a Head of Logistics, a regional office of
the Military Social Service and the Radio Monitoring Service
Netherlands Antilles (Radiocontroledienst Nederlandse Antillen, RCDNA).
RCDNA was a small, about eleven men strong element of the Naval
Intelligence Service
(Marineinlichtingendienst, MARID) which collected signals
intelligence (SIGINT) through its listening post Sint-Joris on Curaçao.
It reported to MARID's Technical Information Processing Centre
(Technisch Informatieverwerkingscentrum, TIVC) at Naval Barracks Amsterdam. The CZMNA
staff further included a small Royal
Army detachment
of four sub-officers from the Royal
Military Constabulary. These mainly
handled criminal investigations and would, if needed, support
the Shore Patrols of the Marine
Corps (see note n).2
|
b. |
For
deterrence (showing the flag) and territorial defence of the
Netherlands Antilles the Royal Navy
had permanently one frigate
stationed in the
Antilles, referred to as the station ship (stationsschip). A station
ship would serve a rotation of about six months,
usually taking part in a number of national and international naval
exercises in the Caribbean area.
In 1985 station ships were, subsequently, the Kortenaer-class
frigates
Hr.Ms. Abraham Crijnssen (November 1984-May), Hr. Ms. Bloys van
Treslong (May-November) and the Van
Speijk-class frigate Hr.Ms. Van
Galen (December-May 1986).3 |
c. |
Decommissioned
on 1 July 1985 because of its decrepid state. Per 26 May 1986
replaced by Hr.Ms. Woerden, a former Dokkum-class coastal minesweeper
that had
previously served as a diving tender. Hr.Ms. Woerden was
refitted
in the first months of 1986 to serve as general utility
vessel/communication vessel in the Antilles. Its pennant number was
changed
from M 820 to A 882.4
|
d. |
(Nominal)
squadron of the
Royal Air Force, under operational control of Naval Commander
Netherlands Antilles. Operated from
Hato Air Base, Curaçao with two unarmed Fokker F.27M maritime patrol
aircraft. Commander 336 Squadron was also Air Base Commander. Tasks
comprised surveillance, including (passive) anti-submarine warfare
(ASW) and counter drugs operations (CD), search and rescue operations
(SAR), and various transport duties. Squadron personnel was a mixture
of Royal Air Force, Royal Navy (ten to twelve men) and a small number
of Antillean civilian members. Air Force personnel was trained and
delivered by 334 Squadron in the Netherlands. The two
aircraft (Fokker F.27 Mk 200 Maritime, also: Fokker
F.27 MPA)
were modified versions of the F.27 'Friendship' civilian turboprop
airliner. Modifications included the addition of a Litton LTN-72
navigation system, a Litton AN/APS-503F search radar in a ventral
radome, two extra fuel tanks (pylons) of which one with
searchlight, observation windows, smoke markers and radio buoys. The
aircraft had a crew of six to eight men and could remain airborne for
eleven hours.5
|
e. |
Small air base of the Royal Air Force under operational control of Naval Commander Netherlands
Antilles. Co-located with the civilian Dr.
Albert Plesman International Airport in Willemstad,
Curaçao. The
Air Base Commander was also Commander 336 Squadron.6
|
f. |
Of
2 Amphibious Combat Group of
the Marine
Corps the
following elements were stationed in the
Netherlands Antilles: of 20
Staff and Support Company twenty-four men at Naval Base Parera, Curaçao
and twenty-five men at Marine Barracks Savaneta, Aruba; the
reconnaissance platoon of 25 Combat Support Company, twenty-four men (1/9/14
(24)),
at Naval Base Parera; 21 Infantry Company at Naval Base Parera and 22
Infantry Company (both 5/32/79 (116)) at Marine Barracks Savaneta.7
In times of crisis or war in Europe the unit would concentrate in the
Netherlands after being relieved by 3 Amphibious Combat Group. In case
of crisis or war in the Antilles the unit would
concentrate there. See further Marine Corps, Part
I, note d, and Operational Roles. |
g. |
3
Amphibious Combat Group
of the Marine
Corps would be mobilised in the Netherlands to relieve 2
Amphibious Combat
Group in the Netherlands Antilles if that unit would be concentrated in
the Netherlands for its (wartime) NATO role in Europe. See further
Marine
Corps, Part
I, note e,
and Operational Roles. Of
the three company groups that constituted 3 Amphibious Combat Group,
31 and 32 Company Group would be stationed at Naval Base Parera,
Curaçao; 33 Company Group would be stationed at Marine
Barracks Savaneta, Aruba.8
|
h. |
The
Antillean Militia consisted of local conscript
personnel and
a small volunteer cadre. Militiamen served an active-duty period of
twelve months. They were trained, clothed and
equipped
by the Marine
Corps
as "(conscript) marines, special services
Netherlands Antilles" (mariniers van bijzondere diensten (zeemiliciën)
Nederlandse Antillen). A Marine Corps training staff, Antillean cadre
and two infantry
platoons (1st and 2nd Infantry Platoon, strength 1/4/27 (32) each) were
based on Curaçao as part of Detachment Suffisant. A small Marine Corps
and Antillean training
staff and
one infantry platoon (3rd Infantry Platoon, 1/10/20 (31)) were
based at Marine
Barracks Savaneta
on Aruba. The three infantry platoons together formed
the
Antillean Militia Infantry Company (Infanteriecompagnie Antilliaanse
Militie) which in times of crisis or war would
operate as security infantry
in support of the marine units in the Netherlands Antilles (2
or 3 Amphibious Combat Group). It appears the company had no organic
company staff; possibly the training staff would function as such,
though it seems more likely that the platoons would be
attached to
Marine
Corps units and operate under their commanders. The (politically
determined) maximum number of
Antillean men to be conscripted each year was two hundred, but this
number was
not met. In the previous two decades incorporating the Antillean
militiamen into the Royal Navy
organisation had proved to be problematic. Besides the short
service time (in the Netherlands conscripts served fourteen months)
cultural differences, a troubled
history (slavery), language problems and deficient selection practices
by the Antillean government limited the military value of the
Militia.9
|
i. |
Mobilisable
security infantry units consisting of Antillean Militia reservists led
by reservist Marine Corps cadre from the Netherlands.
The cadre (4/1/0
(5) per security detachment, 32/8/0 (40) in total) would
probably be
mobilised in the warning phase preceding actual mobilisation and flown
in by airline. The eight security detachments would perform object
security tasks, guarding naval installations and other vital
objects. A
1986 document appears to show that six security detachments would
operate from Naval Base Parera, Curaçao and two detachments
from
Marine Barracks Savaneta, Aruba.10
|
j. |
Naval
Base Parera housed the staff of Naval Command Netherlands Antilles
and included harbour facilities, intelligence and
signals elements, a diving and dismantling group (duik- en
demonteergroep) and various logistic support services. The base
provided logistic support to the station ship (see note b) and housed
parts of 2
Amphibious Combat Group (see note f), which in times of crisis or war
in Europe would be replaced by parts of 3 Amphibious Combat
Group
(see note g).11
|
k. |
Contingency
security
infantry company assembled from Royal Navy ('Fleet') personnel
stationed at Naval
Base Parera. Organised similar to an infantry company of the Marine
Corps, but probably without support weapons. Armament
included
FN Browning
Hi-Power pistols 9 mm,
UZI submachine
guns 9 mm, FN
FAL battle rifles 7.62 mm and FN FALO squad automatic weapons 7.62 mm.
The company, formed in 1981, would defend Naval Base Parera in times of
crisis or war when Marine Corps units would be deployed elsewhere. It
appears the company exercised about thirty days per year and was mainly
composed of logistic personnel.12
|
l. |
Detachment
of Navy Base Parera, until 1978 known as Marine Barracks Suffisant
(Marinierskazerne Suffisant, MSKSUF). Marine
Detachment Suffisant served as military education and training
centre for the Antillean Militia; it included a Marine
Corps training staff, and cadre and two infantry
platoons
of the Antillean Militia (see note h).13
|
m. |
Marine
Barracks Savaneta housed parts of 2 Amphibious Combat Group (see note
f), in times of crisis or war in Europe to be replaced by part of 3
Amphibious
Combat Group (see note g).14
|
n. |
Shore
Patrol Division
Netherlands Antilles
(Afdeling Marinepatrouilles Nederlandse Antillen, AMPNA) was a Royal
Navy military police (MP) unit of the Marine Corps. Regarding its MP
duties
it was comparable to the Marine Corps Special Assistance Unit /
Shore Patrol Division Netherlands; see Marine Corps, Part
I, note i. The primary task of AMPNA,
however, was securing the Governor of the Netherlands Antilles and his
residence, Fort Amsterdam in Willemstad, Curaçao. AMPNA
was based in said fort. Three sub-officers had the (civilian)
status of special police officer (buitengewone agent van politie,
BAVPOL). Besides performing MP patrols tasks included
messenger
services and providing
escorts. Through personnel rotations a small, variable number of AMPNA
marines were trained in counterterrorism and close quarters
combat, having
served with AMPNA's aforementioned sister unit in the Netherlands
(seven men in 1982).
This was not formalised however; in other words, AMPNA did not have a
designated counterterrorism component.15
|
o. |
Because
the source documents for personnel strengths, Royal Navy crew lists
(bemanningslijsten, BL), are not exclusive (i.e. units or parts of
units appear on multiple lists), an approximation has been made of the
total CZMNA strengths. For the peacetime strength the numbers of the
barracks, the station ship (176 men, presuming a
Kortenaer-class frigate) and 336 Squadron have been added up; for the
wartime strengths the barracks, the station ship, 336 Squadron, 3
Amphibious Combat Group and the security detachments have been
counted. The resulting strengths have been rounded to decimals.16
It will be noted that 'wartime' here refers to war in Europe, not to a
(territiorial) conflict in the Antilles or the Caribbean
area.
|
Territorial Defence
In
case of a regional conflict that would threaten the territorial
integrity of the Netherlands Antilles, reinforcements would be
deployed from the Netherlands and placed under operational command of
Naval Commander Netherlands Antilles. A 1982 draft of the Royal Navy
War
Memorandum (Oorlogsmemorandum der Koninklijke Marine) lists these
reinforcements as follows: 17
- The Squadron, to be composed of
available operational ships, as needed
- Up to eight Westland Lynx helicopters, as
available
- Up to three PC-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft
- The remaining peacetime elements of 2 Amphibious Combat Group
- Marine Corps cadre, to be mobilised, for the eight
security detachments, to be
mobilised locally (see note i above)
- One armoured infantry battalion, either equipped with
YPR-765 armoured infantry fighting vehicles
or YP-408 armoured personnel carriers, from
1
(NL) Corps, Royal
Army
- Three
guided weapon air defence squadrons of the Royal Air Force, equipped
with MIM-23B I-HAWK surface-to-air missile systems and either HSA
Flycatcher radar-guided Bofors 40L70 anti-aircraft autocannons 40 mm or,
if already available, the new FIM-92
Stinger man-portable
air defence systems 18
A 1985 Royal Navy concept operational plan for the protection and
defence of the Netherlands Antilles adds:
19
These reinforcements appear reasonably adequate, but only on the
surface. Both in terms of combat power and reaction speed there were
shortfalls. Regarding the Marine Corps, able to deploy
reinforcements within days, it is remarkable
that both 2 and 1 Amphibious
Combat Group would deploy at peacetime strength rather than at
wartime strength, i.e. without their mobilisable fourth rifle companies
(24 and 14 Infantry Company respectively), even though these
elements could be mobilised quickly and be ready for deployment within
twenty-four to forty-eight hours. Also remarkable is the absence
of 3
Amphibious Combat Group, a mobilisable unit designed
for the defence of the
Antilles.
Regarding the Royal Army and the Royal Air Force, a timely
deployment
of
reinforcements would have been highly uncertain. An armoured infantry
battalion would require at least fourteen days to begin deployment, an
I-HAWK squadron would require a full month to deploy to the Antilles.
Moreover, in the 1985 concept defence plan Royal
Army and Royal Air Force reinforcements are no longer
specified but merely listed as "Royal Army and/or Royal Air Force
units, sort and number to be
determined later". This meant that no such units were earmarked for
deployment. For the transportation of their heavy equipment and
supplies, cargo ships would have to be
chartered, which meant that sea transport was not guaranteed;
requisitioning ships for this purpose was apparently not prepared.
As for the Royal Navy, the Squadron would probably be able to arrive in
the Antilles in about two weeks, but it would take between
one-and-a-half and two months to
deploy extra helicopters, whilst the existing maintenance problems would have made
a deployment of eight helicopters a challenge.20
Internal comments on the plans show that Naval Staff
and Naval Command
Netherlands Antilles were thoroughly underwhelmed.
In a note to the 1985 concept plan a naval staff officer referred to
the
document as "this concoction, about which
one has been wrestling for two years", adding that the Royal
Army
and
the Royal Air Force "did not want to commit, as a result of which the
availability of means remains woolly." The reticence on
the part
of the Army and Air Force was
probably motivated, at least in part, by the fact that
deployment
of
units to the Antilles would compromise their ability to perform their
predominant NATO
role in Europe. For the Royal Army backfilling
the resulting hole would be problematic, as the UNIFIL deployment of 44 Armoured Infantry Battalion to
Lebanon (1979-1983) had shown. For the Royal Air Force
backfilling would
be impossible, as there were no mobilisable air
defence squadrons, I-HAWK or otherwise. Be that as it
may, one nonetheless cannot
escape the impression that
the Royal Army and the Royal Air Force considered the Antilles
not
their problem.21
Possible
threats to the territorial integrity of the Netherlands Antilles were
identified as coming from Cuba, perceived as an agent of the Soviet
Union, and Venezuela, a politically unstable country located
shortly off the coasts of Aruba, Curaçao and Bonaire. However,
the Naval Intelligence
Service (Marineinlichtingendienst, MARID) never found any indications
that
Venezuela planned,
prepared or considered an invasion. In both cases subversive
actions were considered more likely than an
all-out military assault, though in the case of Venezuela internal
turmoil or the outbreak of a world conflict would have the
potential to change this.22
The
1982 Royal Navy War Memorandum stated that "a regional conflict does
not manifest itself overnight" and that "a warning period of
increasing tensions" warranted "a response time of two to three
months to deploy reinforcements". This seems an overly optimistic
assessment. The apparent
unwillingness to earmark, let alone deploy units (Royal Army
and
Royal Air Force), or to activate mobilisable forces (Marine Corps),
reflects a general lack of will to
allocate
resources to the defence of the Antilles, which makes a timely
political and, subsequently, military
response doubtful. Retaking the islands without substantial involvement
of allied forces would have been virtually impossible. The
1985 concept defence
plan noted: "Given the proximity of the Venezuelan coast, in
case
of
Aruba hardly thirty kilometers, and given the available military means,
a
Venezuelan surprise attack is possible. Though preparations for an
amphibious
operation would take three to four weeks, warning time will probably be
significantly shorter. Warning time for an airborne assault would
probably be nil. In case of a regional conflict there would likely be
no allied help (i.e. from the United States)."
23
In case of a world conflict, presumed to be between NATO and Warsaw
Pact, Naval Commander Netherlands Antilles would at some
point be
placed under the US Commander-in-Chief Caribbean (CINCARIB) or a US
subordinate commander, probably from said command. If US forces would
be deployed to the Antilles
for local (territorial) defence at the request of the Netherlands
authorities, the respective sizes of the two nations' troop contingents would likely
determine whether the combined force would operate under US or Netherlands command.
If operationally required, US forces tasked with the defence of the
Caribbean area might temporarily be placed under operational control of
Naval Commander Netherlands Antilles. At the discretion of Netherlands
authorities Royal Navy vessels present in the Antilles might be placed
under the US Commander-in-Chief Atlantic for operations in protection
of the sea lines of communication (SLOC).24
_________________________________________________
1. |
|
Organisation: NL-HaNA
2.13.114, inv. nr. 8434, Opheffing functie intendant zeemacht in
Nederland d.d. 25 juli 1980, bijlage (organisatieschema). Jaarboeken KM
1983-1987. NL-HaNA
2.13.182, inv. nr. 535, NDPP Concept krijgsmachtdeelplan Koninklijke
Marine 1984-1993 d.d. maart 1983, 32, 35, 50-51. Van
Zwet, Beschermengel,
16. Additional sources are referenced below.
Naval Command Netherlands Antilles (CZMNA) was redesignated Naval
Command Caribbean (CZMCARIB) on 1 January 1986, as on that date Aruba
seceded from the Netherlands Antilles and became a separate country
within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Jaarboek KM 1986, 143. Van
Dissel en Groen, In de
West, 96-97.
|
2. |
|
Staff
organisation:
NL-HaNA
2.13.114, inv. nr. 8434, op. cit. Ibid., inv.
nr. 9625, BL CZMNA d.d. 2 mei 1984. RCDNA: Jensen
en Platje, De MARID, 239-241. See also
Kluiters, De Nederlandse,
Supplement,
120-121. Areas
of interest were the military communications of Venezuela, the
diplomatic communications of Cuba and the high frequency network of the
Soviet Navy. Jensen en Platje, loc. cit. Before and during the
Falklands War (1982) RCDNA was able to read Argentinian military and
diplomatic communications, of which the encryption had been
rigged. Ibid. Jacobs, Maximator,
662-663. Website Marineschepen.nl, Waarom de Russen het Marineterrein in
Amsterdam in de gaten hielden. Royal Military Constabulary: NIMH 430,
inv. nr. 54 (Slagorde KL stand 1 juli
1985), MVD-KM. Roozenbeek
et al., Een krachtig
instrument, 195-196. See also Van der Deure, De Koninklijke,
16-17. Both Roozenbeek and Van der Deure report that the Royal
Military Constabulary detachment
was three rather than four men strong, and that in 1985 two additional
sub-officers were deployed to Aruba.
|
3. |
|
Jaarboek
KM 1985, 105, 161. Jaarboek KM 1986, 145. |
4. |
|
Jaarboek
KM 1984, 315. Jaarboek KM 1986, 145. Jaarboek KM 1987, 292-294.
According to Van Amstel Hr.Ms. Woerden entered service in the Antilles
on 25 April 1986. Van Amstel, De schepen, 152. |
5. |
|
Helfferich,
Squadrons
(1983), 132. Helfferich, Squadrons
(1994), 219, 220. Tiggelman, 336
Squadron. Marchand, Vervlogen tijden. Website
Nederlandse Modelbouw en Luchtvaartsite, Fokker F.27. See also website
Aircraft of Dutch Manufacturers, Fokker F27 Mk.400M Maritime Patrol Aircraft
ESCi injection kit. Apparently there is a difference of
opinion whether Mk.200 or Mk.400 is correct; I followed Taylor, Jane's All The World's Aircraft 1985-86,
170. There is apparently also a difference of opinion whether the plane
was fitted with more powerful engines (see for example website
Nederlandse Modelbouw en Luchtvaartsite, ibid.),
but it appears this was not the case. Taylor, ibid. Perhaps there is
confusion with the two Fokker F.60MPA aircraft that performed the same
role between 2005 and 2007. Marchand, ibid. Dr. Albert Plesman
International
Airport is nowadays known as
Curaçao International Airport. |
6. |
|
Tiggelman,
ibid. |
7. |
|
NL-HaNA
2.13.141, inv.
nr. 772, Reorganisatie
opleidingen en 2AGGP d.d. 2 juli 1984. |
8. |
|
NL-HaNA
2.12.56, inv. nr. 6071, BL
Marinebasis Parera 1982-1983. Ibid., inv. nr. 6104, BL
Marinierskazerne Savaneta
1982-1983. |
9. |
|
NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv.
nr. 6103, BL
Detachement Suffisant 1982-1983.
Ibid., inv. nr. 6104, BL
Marinierskazerne Savaneta
1982-1983. NL-HaNA
2.13.112, inv.nr. 873, Reorganisatie
Antilliaanse Militie d.d. 29 juli 1985, Bijlage 6 (personeelssterkte
ANTMIL). Jaarboek
KM 1983, 463. Jaarboek KM 1985,
172. Van Dissel en Groen, In de west,
90-91, 100. Haring, Mariniers 325 jaar,
23, 180. Van
Zwet, loc. cit.
|
10. |
|
NL-HaNA
2.12.56, inv.
nr. 5909, BL Bewakingsdetachementen Nederlandse Antillen, augustus
1983. NL-HaNA 2.13.112, inv. nr. 856, concept CZMCARIB OPORD 1 d.d. 6
november 1986, Bijlage A. NL-HaNA
2.13.141, inv. nr. 796, voorlopige studie "Reorganisatie mobilisabel
personeel Korps Mariniers" d.d. 13 februari 1981, 4, 16, Bijlage 1,
Bijvoegsel 5. |
11. |
|
NL-HaNA
2.12.56, inv. nr. 6071, op.
cit. |
12. |
|
Jaarboek
KM 1981, 438. Jaarboek KM 1982, 474.
Jaarboek KM 1983, 457. Jaarboek KM 1984, 310. Additional information
kindly provided by Marine Sergeant-Major A. Van der Pluijm (Rtd.),
November 2021. |
13. |
|
NL-HaNA,
Archiefinventaris 2.13.112, 16.
NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 6103, op. cit. |
14. |
|
NL-HaNA
2.12.56, inv. nr. 6104, op. cit. |
15. |
|
NL-HaNA
2.13.112, inv. nr. 89, Personeelssamenstelling AMPNA in relatie tot
taakuitvoering d.d. 28 juni 1982. Ibid., inv. nr. 367, Reorganisatie
AMPNA d.d. 5 juli 1985. NL-HaNA 2.13.141, inv. nr. 272, Halfjaarlijks
verslag AMPNA d.d. 26 oktober 1984. |
16. |
|
For the approximate war strength 3
Amphibious Combat Group has been counted as, for some reason, it is
listed but not counted in the war strengths (oorlogsbemanningslijsten,
OBL) of Naval Base Parera and Marine Barracks Savaneta. NL-HaNA
2.12.56, inv. nr. 6071, op.
cit. Ibid.,
inv. nr. 6104, op.
cit. See also Marine
Corps, the lower part of footnote 1.
|
17. |
|
NL-HaNA
2.12.56, inv. nr. 1952, vaststelling en wijzigingen VVKM 162
Oorlogsmemorandum der Koninklijke Marine, 1981-1982, Bijlage 12
(Defensiegrondslagen voor de Nederlandse Antillen). |
18. |
|
The
FIM-92 Stinger entered service with the Royal Air Force in December
1985. Helfferich, Squadrons
(1994), 49. |
19. |
|
NL-HaNA
2.13.112, inv. nr. 854,
Concept OPLAN bescherming/verdediging Nederlandse Antillen d.d. 14
januari 1985. |
20. |
|
NL-HaNA
2.12.56, inv. nr. 1952,
op.
cit. NL-HaNA 2.13.112, inv. nr. 854, op. cit. Regarding the Royal Air Force there appears to have been no intention to deploy a fighter
aircraft squadron; perhaps this was logistically problematic.
Requisitioning ships: often referred to as Ships Taken Up From
Trade (STUFT). Legally this would have been possible without a State of
War (Staat van Oorlog) or Martial Law (Staat van Beleg) being declared.
Inkwartieringswet, artikel 5a, 28, 29 en 35. Wattel, Materiële
mobilisatievoorbereiding, 475. The Royal
Navy Squadron probably arriving in about two weeks: in 1985
the Kortenaer-class
frigate Hr.Ms. Bloys van Treslong sailed from Den Helder
to Curaçao in twelve days. Jaarboek KM 1985, 105. |
21. |
|
NL-HaNA
2.13.112, inv. nr. 854, op. cit. (Quotations
have been paraphrased.) When 44
Armoured
Infantry Battalion was deployed to Lebanon in 1979 for United Nations
(UNIFIL) peacekeeping duties, 55 Infantry Battalion (mobilisable),
at that time scheduled to be disbanded in the 1974 Defence White Paper,
was retained
and added to 52 Armoured Infantry Brigade to fill
the hole. NL-HaNA
2.13.182, inv. nr. 643, Planningsmemorandum Legerplan 162
(Reorganisatie Infanterie) d.d. 1 augustus 1985, 8. |
22. |
|
NL-HaNA
2.13.112, inv. nr. 854, op. cit., 1-3. Jensen en
Platje, De MARID,
232. See
also Van Dissel en Groen, In
de West, 102. |
23. |
|
NL-HaNA
2.12.56, inv. nr. 1952, op.
cit. NL-HaNA
2.13.112, inv. nr. 854, op. cit. (Quotations have been paraphrased.)
Retaking the islands virtually impossible: given the distance and the
lack of the necessary military means, such as amphibious shipping. See
Marine Corps, United Kingdom/Netherlands Landing Force. |
24. |
|
NL-HaNA
2.12.56, inv. nr. 1952,
op.
cit., Bijlage 13 (Memorandum of Guidance for military discussions
between the United States Commander-in-Chief Caribbean (CINCARIB) and
the Netherlands Antilles military authorities d.d. november 1956).
CINCLANT was also Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
(SACLANT) in NATO's military command structure. Hirrell, L.P. and
McClintock, W.R., United
States Atlantic Command Fiftieth Anniversary: 1947-1997
(Norfolk: USACOM, 1998), 7, 54, passim. |
|