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Marine Corps 1
Korps Mariniers (KMARNS)

Part I | Part II | Part III | Force Profile | Operational Roles | UK/NL Landing Force | Mobilisable Reserve 


Unit Location Peace Strength War Strength
Headquarters Marine Corps Rotterdam 21/20/8/13 (62)
22/32/28/13 (95)

Amphibious Section [a] Den Oever 2/15/8 (25) 2/15/8 (25)

Whiskey Infantry Company [b] Doorn 5/32/79 (116) 5/32/79 (116)
1 Amphibious Combat Group [c] Doorn 39/277/382 (698) {711} 5 44/309/461 (814) {821} 5
2 Amphibious Combat Group [d] [d] 26/41/529 (596) {560} 5 44/309/461 (814) {821} 5
3 Amphibious Combat Group [e] 15/147/282 (444)

1 Logistic Support Group [f] 3/32/67 (102)
2 Logistic Support Group [g] 3/32/67 (102)

Boat Company Group [h] Texel 1/13/20 (34) 1/13/20 (34)

Marine Corps Special Assistance Unit /
Shore Patrol Division Netherlands
Doorn, Den Helder 4/30/40 (74) 4/30/40 (74)
Shore Patrol Company Netherlands [j] 7/147/107 (261)


a. Until 14 March 1985 based on barracks ship A 891 Hr.Ms. Soemba, thereafter on the new 'boatel' A 887 Hr.Ms. Thetis. Composed of para, commando and arctic-trained frogmen specialised in amphibious reconnaissance, sabotage and maritime counterterrorism operations. Partly winterised and integrated in the Special Boat Squadron (SBS) of the British Royal Marines (RM) as 7 (NL) Special Boat Section (7 (NL) SBS), which was earmarked for wartime deployment to northern Norway as part of the United Kingdom/Netherlands Landing Force (UK/NL LF) under Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT). For certain counterterrorism operations, notably concerning offshore oil and gas installations (oil platforms) in the North Sea, part of the section would be detached to the Marine Corps Special Assistance Unit (BBE-M).2 
b. Specialised in mountain and arctic warfare. In principle the entire company was para-trained. Considered "probably one of the most expert NATO arctic warfare units [...] equal to the best RM units in this type of warfare". During training periods and exercises Whiskey Infantry Company was fully integrated into 45 (UK) Commando Group RM, forming this unit's fourth rifle company, and was earmarked to be deployed as such to northern Norway in wartime as part of UK/NL LF. The company was attached to 45 (UK) Commando Group RM for the larger part of the year, and about three months a year were spent on joint exercises.3
c. Trained in mountain and arctic warfare and earmarked to be deployed to northern Norway in wartime as part of UK/NL LF. For this role 1 Amphibious Combat Group trained with the (UK) Royal Marines in the United Kingdom (predominantly Scotland) and northern Norway for twelve to fifteen weeks a year. When deployed as part of UK/NL LF, or as needed, elements of the Amphibious Section and the Boat Company Group would be attached. On mobilisation the unit would be brought up to war strength by adding a fourth infantry company, which would for the most part be formed from surplus personnel ("bovenrol") from the Royal Naval Institute in Den Helder (Koninklijk Instituut voor de Marine, KIM), Van Braam Houckgeest Barracks and, predominantly, Van Ghent Barracks. The specified unit strengths are from 1982-1983; the added total strengths between {braces} are undated, probably dating from ± 1984-1989 (peacetime) and from July 1984 (wartime) respectively.4 5
d. Partly dispersed over naval bases and installations in the Netherlands and in the Netherlands Antilles (NA), and partly mobilisable. The specified unit strengths are from 1981-1983; the added total strengths between {braces} are from July 1984. In that year, after internal rationalisations to increase the unit's operational readiness, 255 men were stationed in the Netherlands, 305 men in the Netherlands Antilles, and 261 men were mobilisable (32 percent of total wartime strength). For furher specification, see Unit Organisation and Equipment, 2 Amphibious Combat Group. In peacetime those elements stationed in the Netherlands fell under Naval Command Netherlands, with the exception of the combat group staff which fell under Commander, Marine Corps; those elements stationed in the Netherlands Antilles fell under Naval Command Netherlands Antilles. For the territorial defence of the Netherlands Antilles 2 Amphibious Combat Group could be concentrated there; for its NATO role under SACLANT the unit would be concentrated in the Netherlands. It could be assigned to UK/NL LF, but only for deployment in non-arctic areas. In such case, or as needed, elements of the Amphibious Section and the Boat Company Group would be attached. Personnel of 2 Amphibious Combat Group periodically carried out jungle warfare training in French Guyana.5 6 
e. Mobilisable unit, to be deployed to the Netherlands Antilles and placed under Naval Command Netherlands Antilles to relieve 2 Amphibious Combat Group if that unit would be concentrated in the Netherlands for its NATO role. To maintain proficiency parts of 3 Amphibious Combat Group were periodically called up for a four-week refresher training, probably once every four years.7
f. Mobilisable unit, would support 1 Amphibious Combat Group.8
g. Mobilisable unit, would support 2 Amphibious Combat Group.8
h. Provided limited amphibious movement capability (ship to shore, both tactical and logistical), operating ten Landing Craft Assault (LCA). Integrated in 539 (UK) Assault Squadron RM. Part of the Boat Company Group, referred to as LCA-detachment (LCADET) was winterised and earmarked for wartime deployment to northern Norway as part of the UK/NL LF. Besides the LCAs the unit also held and/or operated a number of Landing Craft Rubber Motorised (LCMR).9
i. Double-roled as counterterrorism/navy policing unit. As Marine Corps Special Assistance Unit (Bijzondere Bijstandseenheid Mariniers, BBE-M, also BBE-MARNS) it was one of three high-readiness Special Assistance Units (Bijzondere Bijstandseenheden, BBE) available to the Minister of Justice for counterterrorism operations in peacetime. BBE-M was specialised in close quarters combat and was operational in both peace and wartime. We may assume that in wartime the unit would operate under military command. In wartime (part of) BBE-M might be deployed as part of a regular marine combat unit, for instance 1 Amphibious Combat Group. Staff, training and one platoon (Alert Platoon BBE/1st MP Platoon) were located at Van Braam Houckgeest Barracks in Doorn. A second platoon (Reserve Platoon BBE/2nd MP Platoon) was based at Naval Barracks Willemsoord in Den Helder, from where it could deploy quickly to counter hostile actions against the naval base in Den Helder or offshore oil and gas installations in the North Sea. For the latter type of operations, or as needed, part of the Amphibious Section would be attached. BBE-M was deployed several times during the 1970s. Direct-action operations were executed in October 1974 to free hostages taken by terrorist/criminal prisoners in Scheveningen prison; in June 1977 to free hostages from a train near De Punt and, simultaneously, from a primary school in Bovensmilde held by South Moluccan terrorists; and in March 1978 to free hostages from Drenthe Province Hall (provinciehuis) in Assen, again taken by South Moluccan terrorists. Apart from regularly exercising with its two sister units BBE-M regularly cross-trained with foreign counterterrorism units such as SAS (UK), GSG 9 (GE) and US special forces. As Shore Patrol Division Netherlands (Afdeling Marinepatrouilles Nederland, AMPNED) the unit performed limited military policing duties, messenger services and ceremonial duties within the Royal Navy. It seems likely that in wartime these duties would, at least in part, be taken over by the mobilisable Shore Patrol Company Netherlands.10 12
j. Mobilisable unit, tasked to guard wartime headquarters of the Royal Navy in the Netherlands, probably in addition to its normal policing role. Its platoons would be mobilised at different locations (see the table above, second column, mouseover) and the company would probably not operate as a single unit.11 12

Part I | Part II | Part III | Force Profile | Operational Roles | UK/NL Landing Force | Mobilisable Reserve 


Unit Location Peace Strength War Strength
Van Ghent Barracks [a] Rotterdam 23/87/80/6 (196) 22/69/89/6 (186)
Van Braam Houckgeest Barracks [b] Doorn 36/165/142/9 (352) 30/118/137/9 (294)
Joost Dourlein Barracks [c] Texel 5/33/53/1 (92) 5/30/57/1 (93)
Marine Barracks Savaneta [d] Aruba (NA) 13/81/138/6 (238) 8/33/40/6 (87)
Detachment Suffisant [d] Curaçao (NA) 5/24/77/12 (118) 3/16/25/12 (56)
Marine Detachment at Naval Barracks Amsterdam [e] [f] Amsterdam 4/17/30 (51) 5/19/31 (55)
Marine Detachment at Naval Barracks Den Haag [e] Den Haag –/5/23 (28) 1/8/32 (41)
Marine Detachment at Naval Barracks Vlissingen [e] [f] Vlissingen 1/16/28 (45) 1/17/32 (50)
Marine Detachment Den Helder, Division Willemsoord [e] [g] Den Helder 6/59/52 (117) 8/63/80 (151)
Marine Detachment Den Helder, Division De Kooy [e] [f] [h] Den Helder 1/17/34 (52) –/7/21 (28)
Marine Detachment at Naval Air Station Valkenburg [e] [f] [h] Valkenburg 6/44/87 (137) 4/21/49 (74)
Marine Band of the Royal Navy [i] Rotterdam 3/54/6/2 (65)
Marine Corps Drummers and Fifers [j] Rotterdam –/11/3 (14) –/1/– (1)

a. Van Ghent Barracks was the centre for military education and training of both professional and conscript personnel. It also housed the Marine Band and part of the Marine Corps Drummers and Fifers.13
b. Van Braam Houckgeest Barracks was the centre for unit training and various advanced and specialist courses. It also included the Centre for Physical Training and Sport (Centrum voor Fysieke Training en Sport, CFTS). Whiskey Infantry Company, 1 Amphibious Combat Group, the staff of 2 Amphibious Combat Group, and the Alert Platoon BBE-M/1st MP Platoon of the Marine Corps Special Assistance Unit / Shore Patrol Division Netherlands were based here.13
c. Joost Dourlein Barracks provided all amphibious training for the Royal Navy and the Marine Corps, and was the home base of the Boat Company Group. Also regularly training here were the Belgian Para-Commando Regiment. Until 17 May 1983 the barracks were known as Amphibious Training Camp (Amfibisch Oefenkamp, AOK).14 
d. Under the operational authority of Naval Commander Netherlands Antilles in peace and wartime; see Naval Command Netherlands Antilles.15
e. Under the operational authority of Naval Commander Netherlands in peace and wartime.15
f. The peacetime strengths of these detachments as given here, per 1982-1983, include elements of 2 Amphibious Combat Group. As in 1984 those elements were concentrated on two rather than four main locations (at Naval Air Stations Valkenburg and De Kooy), these peacetime strengths are not correct for 1985.
g. Strengths include the Reserve Platoon BBE-M/2nd MP Platoon of the Marine Corps Special Assistance Unit / Shore Patrol Division Netherlands (see Part I, note i), and a detachment of the Marine Corps Drummers and Fifers, the latter with a strength of  –/3/8 (11) in peacetime and –/3/7 (10) in wartime.
h. In peacetime these detachments included elements of 2 Amphibious Combat Group (see Part I, note d).
i. The Marine Band of the Royal Navy was composed of professional musicians with limited military training. In wartime band members would serve in mobilisation centres and security detachments; it appears that a large portion of them were trained in NBC reconnaissance (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical) and would be deployed in such a role as part of the security detachments (see Part III).16    
j. Contrary to the Marine Band of the Royal Navy, the Marine Corps Drummers and Fifers were fully trained marines serving in various operational (combat) units, naval installations, barracks and on ships; in 1982 four sub-officers of the Drummers and Fifers served with 20 Staff and Support Company of 2 Amphibious Combat Group.16

Part I | Part II | Part III | Force Profile | Operational Roles | UK/NL Landing Force | Mobilisable Reserve 


Security detachments [a]
Unit Location Peace Strength War Strength
Security Detachment A 4/23/76 (103)
Security Detachment B 4/23/76 (103)
Security Detachment C 4/23/76 (103)
Security Detachment D 4/23/76 (103)
Security Detachment E 4/23/76 (103)
Security Detachment F 4/23/76 (103)
Security Detachment G 4/23/76 (103)
Security Detachment H 4/23/76 (103)
Security Detachment I 4/23/76 (103)
Security Detachment J 4/23/76 (103)
Security Detachment K 4/23/76 (103)
Security Detachment L 4/23/76 (103)
Security Detachment M 4/23/76 (103)
Security Detachment N 4/23/76 (103)
Security Detachment O 4/23/76 (103)
Security Detachment P 4/23/76 (103)
Security Detachment Q 4/23/76 (103)
Security Detachment R 4/23/76 (103)
Security Detachment S 4/23/76 (103)
Security Detachment T 4/23/76 (103)
Security Detachment U 4/23/76 (103)
Security Detachment V 4/23/76 (103)
Security Detachment W 4/23/76 (103)
Security Detachment X 4/23/76 (103)
Security Detachment Y 4/23/76 (103)
Marine Corps Peace Strength: 254/1184/1512 (2950) [b]
Marine Corps War Strength: ± 555/2206/6889 (9650) [c]

a. When mobilised these security detachments would fall under the operational authority of Naval Commander Netherlands, guarding and securing naval bases and installations. They would probably operate under his regional or local subcommanders; see Naval Command Netherlands, notably Part III. The location of their mobilisation centres (see the table above, second column, mouseover) probably gives a good indication of where they would deploy: eight detachments would be mobilised in Den Helder, three in Amsterdam, three in Valkenburg, two in Den Haag, six in Rotterdam, and three in Vlissingen.17
b. Peacetime personnel strength as given is per 31 December 1985. The 254 officers include 28 officer cadets and 10 reserve officer cadets (adelborsten).18
c. For the approximate wartime strength the 1981 strengths of the mobilisable reserve have been added: 301/1022/5377 (6700); see Mobilisable Reserve.
Force Profile

The Marine Corps, established in 1665, constituted the principal Dutch out-of-area capability.19 It was a small but versatile force, contrary to developments in the Royal Army composed of armed men rather than manned arms. As we have seen, its main specialisations (amphibious operations, mountain and arctic warfare, antiterrorism) comprised many sub-specialisms, often concentrated in very small units or subunits. Though the Marine Corps declined to be referred to as an elite force, the Amphibious Section, Whiskey Infantry Company, the reconnaissance platoons of 1 and 2 Amphibious Combat Group, and the Marine Corps Special Assistance Unit could certainly be labeled as such.20 
In 1985 authorised peacetime strength was 2,830 men, of which 85 percent professionals and 15 percent conscripts.
Conscript marines served fourteen months. They had to meet the same selection standards as applicants for professional careers. These standards were high: in 1989 only 503 out of 3,512 conscripts that requested to serve in the Marine Corps were accepted into basic training (14,3 percent), during which another 48 men were found unable to meet the requirements. In the same year 167 out of 815 men applying to serve as professionals were accepted (20,5 percent), of which 31 did not make it through basic training.21 This means that in 1989 a mere 13,6 percent of applicants entered service.
Readiness of the first-line units (see Part I) was high: 1 Amphibious Combat Group was classed as a NATO A1 unit, which meant that it was available for operational deployment within forty-eight hours. This classification must have also applied to Whiskey Infantry Company, the Amphibious Section, and probably to the Boat Company Group as well. Given its role t
he high-readiness Marine Corps Special Assistance Unit was most likely not assigned or earmarked to NATO. Because of its dislocation and responsibilities in the Netherlands Antilles, 2 Amphibious Combat Group was classed as a NATO B-3 unit: available for operational deployment between five and fifteen days (see further below).22
By 1985 the close working relationship between Dutch and British marines, dating back to the early 1970s, had led to a deep integration in terms of organisation, operations, logistics and materiel. In 1972 a Joint Marine Corps Sub-Committee had been set up to "advise on the necessary measures to enable the Korps Mariniers within the limits of available manpower and money, to standardise their organisation, training, equipment and tactics with the Royal Marine Commandos". One year later a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the Netherlands and United Kingdom ministries of defence, in which it was agreed that Marine Corps units would operate with 3 (UK) Commando Brigade Royal Marines (3 Cdo Bde RM) as an immediate reaction force for the flanks of NATO, earmarked to SACLANT. The joint amphibious landing force that was the result of this was designated the United Kingdom/Netherlands Landing Force.23 <   

Operational Roles 24

The operational roles of the Marine Corps can be divided into three main categories: NATO, National, and United Nations.
1. NATO: providing amphibious-trained combat units for a maritime contingency force, more in particular a Maritime Contingency Force Atlantic (MARCONFORLANT), to be formed and deployed by SACLANT for the execution of one of several contingency plans, referred to as Maritime Contingency Force Plans (MARCONFORPLANS). These plans were meant to enable a direct and measured response to threats or acts of aggression against NATO territory through the manifestation of sea power, including amphibious operations. In 1983 the following contingency plans issued by SACLANT involved deployment of Marine Corps units:
  • OPLAN 108-YR: "Amphibious support to AFNORTH [Allied Forces Northern Europe] in contingency situations (Ketch Rig)". This plan involved landings to reinforce NATO's northern flank, both in Norway and in the straits of the Baltic Sea.
  • OPLAN 109-YR: "SACLANT amphibious and reinforcement support of AFNORTH in major contingency situations (Rough Bark)." As OPPLAN 108-YR, but one step higher on the escalation ladder, involving a larger MARCONFORLANT. 
  • OPLAN 113-YR "Support of island commanders (Main Mast)". This plan involved operations, including landings, to reinforce the military position of the islands in the NATO area excluding Iceland, such as Greenland, the Faroe Islands, the Azores, Madeira, and Bermuda.
Further there was an "Agreement between SACLANT and SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander Europe] concerning amphibious operations in support of SACEUR", which arranged that SACLANT could deploy amphibious forces of the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States in support of SACEUR for the execution of contingency plans as well as plans to be executed on a higher level of escalation (NATO Reinforced Alert). According to this agreement the United Kingdom/Netherlands Landing Force was earmarked to be deployed in the AFNORTH area of responsibility: Norway, Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein. SACEUR's contingency plans relevant to the Marine Corps were:
  • OPLAN 10002 "Rapid Reinforcement Plan for Allied Command Europe (Jump Fast)". This plan included strengthening NATO's northern flank through deployment of the United Kingdom/Netherlands Landing Force (UK/NL LF).
  • OPLAN 10720 "SACEUR's contingency operation plan for employment of amphibious forces in the northern region of ACE [Allied Command Europe]". This plan enabled a deterrent response to actions of Warsaw Pact forces against said region through the deployment of multinational reinforcements. These reinforcements included amphibious forces from the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (UK/NL LF) assigned to SACLANT and from the United States (probably a US Marine Amphibious Brigade or Force (MAB/MAF)) assigned to SACEUR. The plan arranged for a joint deployment in the form of a Combined Landing Force, which would operate under the authority of SACLANT up to the landing operations, during which SACEUR would take over operational command. 
Assigned to the NATO role were 1 Amphibious Combat Group, Whiskey Infantry Company, the 3rd Amphibious Group of the Amphibious Section (7 (NL) SBS) and the LCA-detachment (LCADET) of the Boat Company Group. These units would operate as integrated parts of UK/NL LF. Since 1983 2 Amphibious Combat Group was also earmarked to SACLANT as UK/NL LF component for operations in non-arctic areas, provided its national role allowed it. This meant that it would become available to SACLANT only after it had been relieved in the Netherlands Antilles by 3 Amphibious Combat Group, which had to be mobilised first. Another prerequisite was the availability of the means to deploy the unit; amphibious lift capacity was scarce.
2. National: providing amphibious-trained combat troops for contingency operations and territorial defence in the Kingdom, more in particular 
the Netherlands Antilles (2 and 3 Amphibious Combat Group); providing combat units for (peacetime) military assistance to the civil authorities (1 and 2 Amphibious Combat Group, Whiskey Infantry Company), and for antiterrorism operations (Marine Corps Special Assistance Unit); and providing operational units for guarding and securing naval bases and barracks in the Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles (Marine Detachments, Security Detachments, Shore Patrol Company Netherlands). For military assistance in the Netherlands between one and five company-sized General Military Assistance Units (Algemene Militaire Bijstandseenheden, AMBE) could be formed with personnel from the operational combat units.25 
3. United Nations: providing operational amphibious infantry units for military assistance during peacekeeping operations. For this role a unit of ± 300 men strong could be formed at twenty-four hours' notice; a second unit of similar size could be made ready for deployment within two or three days. These units, also to be formed from the operational combat units, were referred to as QPO units or contingents (QPO-1 and QPO-3), after the Marine Corps' motto "Qua Patet Orbis" ("As Far As The World Extends").25
In addition to these three main roles the Corps provided marines for service on warships and naval bases and installations; provided physical and infantry training for fleet personnel; and handled transport, messenger, ceremonial and internal policing duties throughout the 
Royal Navy (Shore Patrol Division Netherlands, Marine Band, Marine Corps Drummers and Fifers). <

United Kingdom/Netherlands Landing Force

The joint United Kingdom/Netherlands Landing Force (UK/NL LF) was basically 3 (UK) Commando Brigade Royal Marines with the abovementioned NATO-roled Marine Corps units integrated. The organisational chart below shows the likely composition of the Landing Force for deployment to northern Norway.26
United Kingdom/Netherlands Landing Force, 1985 (Norway deployment)
Support CompanyY CompanyX CompanyZ Company59 Independent Commando Squadron RECondor Troop, 59 Independent Commando Squadron RE539 Assault Squadron RMSpecial Boat Squadron RMCommando Logistic Regiment RM42 Commando RM7 "Sphinx" Battery, 29 Commando Light Regiment RA29 Commando Light Regiment RA3 Commando Brigade Headquarters and Signals Squadron RM45 Commando Group RMUK/NL LF 3 Commando Brigade Air Squadron RMHeadquarters Company, 45 Commando RMLCADET, CIEBOOTGPW Company (WINFCIE)1LOGOSTGRP1AGGP7 (NL) SBS (3 AMFGP, AMFSIE)

Some particulars and observations:
  • To optimise integration 1 and 2 Amphibious Combat Group had been organised and equipped similarly to the Royal (UK) Marine Commandos. Notable differences: a RM commando had three rather than four rifle companies and its combat support company had 18 x MILAN rather than M47 Dragon antitank guided missile system (atgm). Peacetime strength of a RM commando was 700 men, wartime strength 800 men. 
  • 45 (UK) Commando RM was reinforced with Whiskey Infantry Company, 7 "Sphinx" Battery of 29 (UK) Commando Light Regiment Royal Artillery and Condor Troop of 59 (UK) Independent Commando Regiment Royal Engineers. This configuration, designated 45 (UK) Commando Group RM, also existed in peacetime.27 
  • 3 (UK) Commando Brigade Air Squadron RM had 12 x SA 341 AH 1 Gazelle helicopter for observation, reconnaissance, liaison and evacuation; and 4 x Lynx AH 1 antitank helicopter, each armed with 8 x TOW atgm. 
  • The (UK) Headquarters and Signals Squadron RM incorporated an air defence troop, here probably equipped with 8 x Blowpipe man-portable air defence system; during operations the anti-aircraft section of 1 Amphibious Combat Group (with 4 x FIM-92 Stinger) would probably be placed directly under brigade command as well.28
  • 29 (UK) Commando Light Regiment Royal Artillery had three gun batteries of six 105 mm L118 Light Guns each (with one battery detached to 45 Cdo Gp RM, as noted). 
  • 539 (UK) Assault Squadron RM had a complement of 4 x Landing Craft Utility (LCU), 8 x Landing Craft Vehicles & Personnel (LCVP), 30 x Rigid Raiding Craft (RRC), and 38 x Inflatable Raiding Craft (IRC). 
  • Although the Landing Force, with a wartime strength of approximately 5,400 men, was a light force in military terms, it still had a considerable logistic footprint: when deployed it would field some 1,050 wheeled vehicles and 620 trailers. For Norway deployment the Force had 296 x Volvo Bv 202 over-snow vehicle, of which 60 from the Marine Corps; nearly all of these were forward-stored in Norway.29
The Landing Force, together with the ships, landing craft and helicopters required to transport the force to the area of operations and enable it to land in a tactical posture, was referred to as the United Kingdom/Netherlands Amphibious Force (UK/NL AMF). In tems of naval support the Royal (UK) Navy had available one light aircraft carrier (HMS Invincible or HMS Illustrious), two Royal Fleet Auxiliary replenishment ships, and a number of escort ships (destroyers/frigates). The Royal Navy had earmarked three submarines, four P-3C Orion long-range maritime patrol aircraft, and one escort group for UK/NL AMF. An escort group would either comprise one Tromp-class command frigate, six Kortenaer and/or Van Speijk-class frigates and one Poolster-class fast combat support ship; or five Kortenaer and/or Van Speyk-class frigates.30
As has been noted above, amphibious lift was scarce
: the Royal Navy had no amphibious shipping capacity, whilst the Royal (UK) Navy's organic capacity was not even sufficient for 3 (UK) Cdo Bde RM alone. To deploy the Landing Force one amphibious assault ship (HMS Fearless or HMS Intrepid) and five logistic landing ships were available. Out of necessity the light aircraft carrier mentioned above would also mainly operate to provide lift, deploying RM commando forces inland with helicopters before being assigned to its primary role of anti-submarine warfare. Additional sealift would be provided through the requisitioning of no less than ten civilian roll-on/roll-off ferries: Ships Taken Up From Trade (STUFT). The 1973 Memorandum of Understanding had already stipulated that the Royal (UK) Navy could not guarantee lift for the entire Landing Force, so the Royal Navy would need to resort to STUFT as well, to be drawn from the Dutch merchant fleet. It appears that plans were indeed made for this.31
Before deployment UK/NL LF would concentrate in the United Kingdom (predominantly in the Plymouth area), which meant that the Marine Corps units,
with all their vehicles and equipment, would first have to be ferried across the Channel via Hoek van Holland.32 The larger part of their war supplies (War Maintenance Reserves, WMR) were stockpiled in the UK, however.33 Because of the risks involved with opposed landings, and the probable lack of adequate naval support once war would have started, NATO doctrine strongly favoured UK/NL LF to deploy to the area of operations prior to the outbreak of hostilities, preferably even ahead of NATO alert measures. The lack of sufficient amphibious shipping further necessitated the need for early deployment. It was estimated that UK/NL LF could deploy to northern Norway in seven to ten days using sealift.34   
The threat a Soviet occupation of northern Norway would pose to NATO's war effort was described as "deadly" by
SACLANT in 1984: the North Atlantic sea lines of communications (SLOC), vital to the survival of the Central Front, would be severely compromised.35 Although UK/NL LF was earmarked for the AFNORTH area, the British Ministry of Defence in 1979 objected, with success, to the fact that a draft of SACEUR's Rapid Reinforcement Plan (OPLAN 10002) showed the Force as dedicated to the Tromsø area: "While MOD (UK) welcome the opportunity to declare North Norway as the most likely deployment option for the arctic trained element of the UK/NL Amphibious Force, MOD (UK) would not support total dedication as this negates the inherent flexibility of amphibious forces." 36 Other deployment options, as outlined in the contingency plans, remained on the table. So did a possible deployment on NATO's southern flank: Greece and Turkey, although this was considered less likely.37 <

Mobilisable Reserve

The Marine Corps had a large pool of reservists that in wartime would mainly serve as territorial security forces for the Royal Navy (see Part II and Part III above). In fact, there were many more reservists than were needed for this. In 1981 Commander, Marine Corps produced an preliminary study on the operational potential of his mobilisable reserve vis a vis its wartime role.38 The study, apparently requested by the Minister of Defence, charted the possibility to relieve the Corps of its security duties and use the pool of reservists to form battalion-sized combat units that would be able to operate in an expeditionary role. From this interesting document we learn that 
  • on mobilisation the Marine Corps could dispose over 301/1022/5377 (6700) reservists, bringing the Corps' war strength to 9,650 men;
  • of these 6,700 reservists 968 men (50/305/613) were needed to bring 12 and 3 Amphibious Combat Group up to war strength, whilst
  • 3,028 men (149/732/2147) would be needed for the various marine detachments, the security detachments and the Shore Patrol Company. The study concludes that this leaves 
  • 2,816 mobilisable men (102/-/2714) who were neither needed nor assigned to units.39
After noting that this last group could be regarded as the Marine Corps' actual mobilisable reserve, the report observed that
  • the larger part of high-grade and well-trained personnel available on mobilisation was not assigned to first or even second-line combat units; that
  • 90 percent of mobilisable marines were younger than 35 years, and more than half of those were younger than 30 years; and that 
  • in terms of personnel a fourth amphibious combat group could already be formed in the first mobilisation phase.
Clearly it was realised that using 3,000+ marines for security infantry duties was not an effective way to use the Corps' combat potential, not to speak of the 2,800+ reservists for which there was no direct purpose. The report found that it would be possible to form up to three mobilisable amphibious combat groups which, to keep costs low, could be equipped with previously phased-out support weapons (M40A1 recoilless rifles rather than M48 Dragon antitank guided missiles and M2 .50 inch machine guns rather than FIM-92 Stinger man-portable air defence systems). By adding a staff company these three units could be organised into a mobilisable marine brigade, which might be used for reinforcing vital points in the Atlantic Ocean (see OPLAN 113-YR above), or for territorial defence.
Nothing, however, came of this.40 Apart from certain operational challenges (such as mobilisation speed, the availability of sealift/amphibious lift and host nation/logistic support), for such a plan to be realised the security role would have to be taken over by other forces, and these were not at hand. Last but not least we can safely assume that the defence budget offered no room for the investments needed: these were estimated at ƒ28,550,000 (€12,955,425) per amphibious combat group and ƒ3,600,000 (€1,633,608) for a brigade staff company, bringing the estimated total costs of a mobilisable marine brigade to ƒ89,250,000 (about €69,168,780 in today's money 41)
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1. As apparently no comprehensive, official order of battle of the Marine Corps survives (if indeed one ever existed), the data on this page was compiled from a variety of sources. For the corps organisation the following sources were used: NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr. 366, NDPP Krijgsmachtdeelplan Koninklijke Marine [concept] d.d. december 1979, 39, 87-88. Ibid., inv. nr. 535, NDPP Concept krijgsmachtdeelplan Koninklijke Marine 1984-1993 d.d. maart 1983, 32-33, 72-74. NL-HaNA 2.13.141, inv. nr. 796, voorlopige studie "Reorganisatie mobilisabel personeel Korps Mariniers" d.d. 13 februari 1981, 4, Bijlagen 1 en 3. Anonymus, Mariniers van vandaag, 13-17. Teitler en Homan, Het Korps Mariniers, 48-56. Hakkert, Het Korps Mariniers, 464-467. Unless noted otherwise, all unit strengths have been derived from tables of organisation (bemanningslijsten, BL) and drafts of field manuals (verzamelingen verordeningen voor de Koninklijke Marine, VVKM) residing in the National Archives (Nationaal Archief) in Den Haag, as follows: NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nrs. 6095 (BL Hoofdkwartier Korps Mariniers 1982-1983), 2498 (VVKM De amfibische sectie 1979), 6085 (BL Amfibische Sectie 1982-1983), 6080 (BL Whiskey Infanteriecompagnie 1982-1983), 2506 (VVKM De amfibische gevechtsgroep 1982), 6081 (BL Eerste Amfibische Gevechtsgroep 1982-1983), 6094 (BL Tweede Amfibische Gevechtsgroep 1982-1983), 6099 (BL Derde Amfibische Gevechtsgroep 1982-1983), 5960 (BL Eerste Logistieke Ondersteuningsgroep 1982), 6089 (BL Tweede Logistieke Ondersteuningsgroep 1982-1983), 5963 (BL Compagniesbootgroep 1982), 5961 (BL Bijzondere Bijstandseenheid Korps Mariniers/Afdeling Marinepatrouilles Nederland 1982), 5961 (BL Marinepatrouillecompagnie 1982-1983), 6090 (BL Van Ghent Kazerne 1982-1983), 6098 (BL Van Braam Houckgeestkazerne 1982-1983), 6091 (BL Amfibisch Oefenkamp [Joost Dourlein Kazerne] 1982-1983), 6104 (BL Marinierskazerne Savaneta 1982-1983), 6087 (BL Detachement Mariniers Marinekazerne Amsterdam 1982-1983), 6066 (BL Detachement Mariniers Marinekazerne Den Haag 1982-1983), 6086 (BL Detachement Mariniers Marinekazerne Vlissingen 1982-1983), 6096 (BL Detachement Mariniers Den Helder/Afdeling Willemsoord 1982-1983), 6088 (BL Detachement Mariniers Marinevliegkamp Valkenburg), 6097 (BL Detachement Mariniers Den Helder/Afdeling De Kooy 1982), 6103 (BL Detachement Suffisant 1982-1983), 6071 (BL Marinebasis Parera 1982-1983), 192 (Administratieve organisatie Marinierskapel 1945-1981), 5958 (BL Tamboers en Pijpers 1982), 5975 (BL Bewakingsdetachement A 1982-1983), 5976 (BL Bewakingsdetachement B 1982-1983), 5909 (BLen Bewakingsdetachementen Nederlandse Antillen 1981, 1983); NL-HaNA 2.13.112 inv. nrs. 144 (BL Tweede Amfibische Gevechtsgroep 1980-1983), 145 (BL Derde Amfibische Gevechtsgroep 1982-1983). The locations of mobilisation centres were taken from NL-HaNA 2.12.56 inv. nr. 1876, VVKM 38.1 Mobilisatievoorschrift der Koninklijke Marine, deel 1: Personeel, Bijlage 5 d.d. 26 oktober 1983. It will be observed that all tables of organisation date from 1982-1983 (most of these coming into effect per 1 January 1983), which means that unit strengths may not be completely accurate for 1985. It should also be noted that the personnel strengths given in Part II in some cases include units or parts of units already listed in Part IThe aforementioned tables of organisation, called "bemanningslijsten" (crew lists) throughout the Royal Navy, are fairly complicated documents, and units or parts of units often appear on more than one crew list. The Marine Corps Special Assistance Unit / Shore Patrol Division Netherlands (BBE/MP) for instance appears on both the peacetime and wartime crew lists of Van Braam Houckgeest Barracks and Marine Detachment Den Helder, Division Willemsoord, as well as on their own peacetime and wartime crew lists. 1 Amphibious Combat Group on the other hand does not appear on the crew lists of their barracks, neither peace or wartime, and the same goes for Whiskey Infantry Company and the Marine Band of the Royal Navy. The wartime crew list of Marine Barracks Savaneta, as another example, includes part of 3 Amphibious Combat Group (mobilisable), but this personnel is not counted in the wartime strength of those barracks. All this means that separating unit strengths from barrack strengths to draw up accurate total strengths would be an extremely labourious task, boiling down to counting heads, which I decided to decline respectfully. Additional sources are referenced below.   
2. NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 2498, VVKM 412 Voorschrift betreffende de organisatie, de uitrusting en de tactiek van de amfibische sectie d.d. 18 oktober 1979, 1-1 t/m 1-2. Ibid., inv. nr. 5961, BL 4230 - BBE/MP d.d. 3 november 1982, 9. Van Dijk en Klein Essink, De mariniers, 193-194. Hakkert, op. cit., 466.  193-194. See also Teitler en Homan, op. cit., 53.
3. NL-HaNA 2.13.141, inv. nr. 338, Affiliation of W Company RNLMC to 45 Commando Group d.d. 4 July 1973. Ibid., Directive to the commanding officer 45 Commando Group defining his responsibilities to W Company Royal Netherlands Marine Corps d.d. 5 June 1974. Beaver, Today's Royal Marines, 55. Teitler en Homan, op. cit., 51-52. Hakkert, op. cit., 465. Citation: Isby and Kamps, Armies, 344. 45 Commando RM further included X-Ray, Yankee and Zulu rifle companies, hence the name Whiskey Infantry Company. Beaver, loc. cit. From 1972 to 1990 Whiskey Infantry Company was at the forefront of Anglo-Dutch marine integration; on 7 June 1990 the company was disbanded. Its personnel was reassigned to other units within the Corps, predominantly to 23 Infantry Company, 2 Amphibious Combat Group. Haring, Mariniers 325 jaar, 33. Wesselingh en Van Willigenburg, Whiskey Compagnie, 5, 68, 105.
4. UK/NL LF role: Haring, op. cit., 31. Teitler en Homan, op. cit., 48. Hakkert, loc. cit. Mountain and arctic warfare training: four to five weeks of mountain warfare training in the United Kingdom, followed by eight to ten weeks of arctic warfare training in northern Norway in the period January-March. This was rounded off with a tactical exercise in Norway, once per two years with the United Kingdom Amphibious Force (UK/NL AF). Van Dijk en Klein Essink, op. cit., 113, 117-119. Haring, op. cit., 35, 58-59, 83. Teitler en Homan, op. cit., 45-46. Wesselingh en Van Willigenburg, op. cit., 60-61. Hakkert, loc. cit. Elements attached: NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 6081, BL 4301 - 1AGGP d.d. 23 maart 1983, 54. NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr. 535, op. cit., 74. Formation fourth rifle company: NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 6081, op. cit., 40-47, 54.
5. Regarding the unit strengths of 1 and 2 Amphibious Combat Group some remarks are necessary. A document on 2 Amphibious Combat group from July 1984 shows that by that time total wartime strength had risen to 821 men, which is why that number is added between {braces} for both units, which had identical organisations. Undated handwritten corrections in regulations from 1982 present in the library of the Marine Museum in Rotterdam (Mariniersmuseum, MM) indicate a rise to a total peacetime strength of 711 men for 1 Amphibious Combat Group and a wartime strength of 827 men for both 1 and 2 Amphibious Combat Group. All increases took place in the staff and support company. Peacetime locations, personnel strengths and internal rationalisations of 2 Amphibious Combat Group in 1984: NL-HaNA 2.13.141, inv. nr. 772, Reorganisatie opleidingen en 2AGGP d.d. 2 juli 1984. Amphibious Combat Group unit strengths with undated corrections: MM, inv.nr. 60172, VVKM 407 Voorschrift betreffende de Amfibische Gevechtsgroep d.d. 23 november 1982, 1-1 t/m 1-3. It should be noted that the specified peacetime strength of 2 Amphibious Combat Group is given as officers/sub-officers/corporals and soldiers, so corporals are not counted as sub-officers here, even though in the Royal Navy they had this status (unlike in the Royal Army); Royal Navy documents are regrettably inconsistent in this respect. It should also be noted that this peacetime strength is somewhat doubtful; it comes from a 1981 document on mobilisable marine units, which on another page suggests, after some necessary calculations, a peacetime strength of 23/34/437 (494). NL-HaNA 2.13.141, inv. nr. 796, op. cit., 4, 10. Regarding the internal rationalisations to increase 2 Amphibious Combat Group's operational readiness: these included optimising training programmes, relocating subunits based in the Netherlands and improving the effectiveness of its command and logistic support structure. It is remarkable that these improvements, which were budget-neutral, were not initiated by the Marine Corps but resulted from criticisms in the 1983 annual report of the Court of Audit (Algemene Rekenkamer). HTK 1983-1984, kamerstuknr. 18313 ondernr. 2, 108-110
6. Peacetime authority and Netherlands Antilles / NATO roles: NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr. 535, op. cit., 32-34,72-73. Hakkert, op. cit., 464, 465-466. See also Teitler en Homan, op. cit., 53. Elements attached: NL-HaNA 2.13.112, inv. nr. 144, BL 4310 - 2AGGP d.d. 22 augustus 1983, voetnoten. NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr. 535, op. cit., 74. On 1 December 1989 2 Amphibious Combat Group became part of ACE Mobile Force (Land). Haring, op. cit., 37-38. Jungle warfare training was carried out piecemeal, by detachments of ± 30 men or less, and was introductory only. The training, which was perhaps held four times a year, was given by personnel of the French Foreign Legion and apparently lasted between one and two weeks. It was observed that there were remarkable similarities with the first stage of arctic warfare training. NL-HaNA 2.13.141, inv. nr. 773, Informatiebulletin Commandant Korps Mariniers d.d. 22 november 1982, 17. Qua Patet Orbis nr. 110 (november 1982), 47-50. Qua Patet Orbis nr. 111 (februari 1983), 59-60. See also Haring, op. cit., 159-161. 
7. Role: NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr. 535, op. cit., 35,73. Hakkert, op. cit., 466. See also Teitler en Homan, op. cit., 53. Haring, op. cit., 34, reports that 3 Amphibious Combat Group would become available to SACLANT after mobilisation; it should be noted however that this pertains to the situation in 1990. Refresher training: NL-HaNA 2.13.141, inv. nr. 796, op. cit., 19. Hakkert, op. cit., 464, 466. There is uncertainty about the location of the mobilisation centre(s) for 3 Amphibious Combat Group: tables of organisation (bemanningslijsten, BL) from November 1982 and January 1983 indicate Van Ghent Barracks in Rotterdam and Van Braam Houckgeest Barracks in Doorn respectively; the one from August 1983 does not indicate any location. NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 6099 (Bemanningslijsten 3 Amfibische Gevechtgroep, 1982-1983). 
8. NL-HaNA 2.13.141, inv. nr. 796, op cit., 8, 10. NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr. 535, op. cit., 74. It is not  unambiguously clear under whose operational command these units would fall; probably they would, at least initially, be attached to 1 and 2 Amphibious Combat Group respectively. See Unit Organisation and Equipment, 1 Amphibious Combat Group, footnote 3.
9. NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 5963, BL 4325 - CIEBOOTGP d.d. 17 november 1982. Anonymus, op. cit., 15. Haring, op. cit., 31. Hakkert, loc. cit., 466. See also Teitler en Homan, op. cit., 53-54. 
10. NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 5961, BL 4230 - BBE/MP d.d. 3 november 1982. NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr. 535, op. cit., 73-74. Teitler en Homan, op. cit., 54, 57-58, 63-66. Van Dijk en Klein Essink, op. cit., 174. See also Hakkert, op. cit., 466. Possible wartime deployment: NL-HaNA 2.13.141, inv. nr. 923, Verbindingsmateriaal BBE MARNS/MP in Nederland d.d. 25 oktober 1979. Ibid., inv. nr. 986, Operatiebevel CKMARNS 1/83 d.d. 14 februari 1983, 1, 2. The two other Special Assistance Units were sniper/precision shooter units (langeafstandsschutters / precisieschutters): the Armed Forces Special Assistance Unit (Bijzondere Bijstandseenheid Krijgsmacht, BBE-K) and the State Police Special Assistance Unit (Bijzondere Bijstandseenheid Rijkspolitie, BBE-RP). HTK 2014-2015, kamerstuknr. 34000 VI ondernr. 19, Bijlage 2014D42636 (Onderzoeksrapport De Punt 1977), 41-42. See also Van der Spek, Een wapen, 10, 13, 59; Teitler en Homan, op. cit., 57. Reasons to base the Reserve Platoon BBE-M/2nd MP Platoon at Den Helder: NL-HaNA 2.13.141, inv. nr. 923, Reorganisatie BBE-MARNS d.d. 26 april 1978. Until 1979-1980 BBE-M was composed of personnel of 11 Infantry Company, 1 Amphibious Combat Group. The subsequent integration of the counterterrorism and navy policing roles in the permanent BBE/MP unit, effective per 1 September 1980, and the somewhat isolated location of the Reserve Platoon were, at least initially, not without problems: negative effects on training, readiness and unit cohesion were observed. Ibid. NL-HaNA 2.13.141, inv. nr. 923, Reorganisatie BBE-MARNS d.d. 1 november 1979. Ibid., inv. nr. 637, Reorganisatie BBE/MP d.d. 15 januari 1980. Ibid., Reorganisatie BBE/MP d.d. 10 juni 1980.  Ibid., Accomodatie 2e Peloton BBE/MP te Den Helder  d.d. 7 november 1980. See also NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 8567, Reorganisatie BBE/MP per 011079 d.d. 19 september 1979. Ibid., Reorganisatie BBE/MP d.d. 7 mei 1980. In later years the messenger services, part of their MP duties (see footnote 12), were reassigned to the Naval Security Guard Corps (Marinebewakingskorps, MBK). Jensen en Platje, De MARID, 151. Attachment from the Amphibious Section: NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 5961, op. cit., 9. Direct action operations: "Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions by special operations forces to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or materiel." US Department of Defense Dictionary, 130. The aforementioned 2014 report (HTK 2014-2015, op. cit.) not only provides a detailed reconstruction of the 1977 operation against the hijacked train near De Punt (Hoofdstuk 4), but also describes the command structure in which the Special Assistance Units operated (33-38) and outlines the history of the formation of these units in the early 1970s (39-42). An animated reconstruction of the operation, released with the report, can be viewed here.
11. NL-HaNA 2.13.141, inv. nr. 796, op. cit., Bijlage 1, 5. 
12. Shore Patrol units (Marinepatrouilles, MP) formed the Royal Navy's internal policing force, comparable to Shore Patrol (SP) units in the US and Royal (UK) Navies. Their duties involved supervising the conduct and dress of navy personnel on shore, investigating unauthorised absence of personnel, operating a messenger service for collecting and delivering classified mail, and performing ceremonial duties. Shore Patrol had no legal competence; suspects of disciplinary or criminal offenses would be handed over to the Royal Military Constabulary or the regular (civil) police. NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 8567, Circulaire voor de zeemacht D64 Voorschrift betreffende de Bijzondere Bijstandseenheid van het Korps Mariniers - Marinepatrouille in Nederland (BBE-MP) d.d. 6 oktober 1983.
13. NL-HaNA 2.13.141, inv. nr. 772, op. cit. Hakkert, op. cit., 465-466. Marine Corps military education and training programmes are described in some detail in ibid., 467-470, and more extensively in Teitler en Homan, op. cit., 39-47. 
14. Hakkert, op. cit., 466. Anonymus, op. cit., 17. Name change: Jaarboek KM 1983, 392.
15. NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr. 535, op. cit., Hoofdstuk III. 
16. NL-HANA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 192, Taakomschrijving Marinierskapel en Tamboers en Pijpers d.d. 21 augustus 1981, Bijlage 1 en 2. Teitler en Homan, op, cit., 56. Hakkert, op. cit., 467. Marine Band unit strength: NL-HANA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 192, Voorstel administratieve organisatie Marinierskapel der Koninklijke Marine d.d. 3 juni 1980, 2. Wartime NBC reconnaissance role: in NL-HaNA I have only found tables of organisation for Security Detachments A and B, each with two Marine Band members forming an NBC reconnaissance team as part of the detachment's staff section. If the other security detachments were identical in this respect then the majority of Marine Band personnel would have served in this role in wartime. NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 5975, BL 4410 - BEWDET A d.d. 1 juni 1983. NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 5976, BL 4411 - BEWDET B d.d. 1 juni 1983. See also Anonymus, op. cit., 16. 
17. Ibid. Unit strength: NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 5975, op. cit. Ibid., inv. nr. 5976, op. cit. Mobilisation locations: ibid., inv. nr. 1876, loc. cit. Unit strength and role: NL-HaNA 2.13.141, inv. nr. 796, op. cit., 16, Bijlage 1, 5; Bijlage 3, 1. Royal Army Colonel G.J. Felius (Rtd.), when assigned to the staff of National Territorial Command from 1977 to 1980, noticed that the Royal Navy had "a large number of mobilisable marine battalions", "far more than necessary to secure their objects". Felius, Einde Oefening, 207. Felius, email 29.12.2007. I have found no record of such units for the mid-1980s; it may be that the security detachments were (or had earlier been) grouped into battalions for administrative or logistical reasons, for instance per location or operational area. 
18. Jaarboek KM 1985, 53.
19. Isby and Kamps, op. cit., 343.
20. Armed men rather than manned arms: Hakkert, op. cit., 467. Not an elite force: see for example Van Dijk en Klein Essink, op. cit., 19-20 and Haring, op. cit., 23.
21. Peacetime strength: NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 6149, Verhoging korpssterkte/arbeidsduurverkorting d.d. 3 januari 1985. Professional/conscript ratio: Hakkert, op. cit., 464. Selection data for 1989: Haring, op. cit., 18. Conscript service duration: Hakkert, loc. cit. 
22. NATO readiness category for 1 Amphibious Combat Group: NL-HaNA 2.13.141, inv. nr. 796, op. cit., 7; for 2 Amphibious Combat Group: ibid., 9 and NL-HaNA 2.13.141, inv. nr. 772, op. cit., Toekomstige rol 2AGGP d.d. 16 februari 1984, 1 t/m 2. NATO Maritime Forces Readiness Standards (MARFORSTANS ) are described in more detail in NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr. 535, op. cit., 43-44. 
23. NL-HaNA 2.13.141, inv. nr. 338, Draft Joint Marine Sub-Committee Background, 4 May 1973. Ibid., Memorandum of Understanding between the Netherlands Ministry of Defence and the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, 9 May 1973. Beaver, op. cit., 28-29. Haring, op. cit., 56, 58. Teitler en Homan, op. cit., 48.   
24. NL-HaNA 2.13.141, inv. nr. 495, Verslag oefening "Blauwe baret" 1982. Ibid., inv. nr. 772, loc. cit. Ibid., inv. nr. 987, Voorstel wijziging BDZ-OPORD 9 d.d. 9 september 1982. NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr. 366, op. cit., Deel 1, Hoofdstuk III. Ibid., inv. nr. 535, op. cit., Deel 1, Hoofdstuk III t/m VII. Teitler en Homan, op. cit., 48 t/m 56. Hakkert, op. cit., 464 t/m 467. Lund, Don't Rock the Boat, 61-64. 
25. Regarding military assistance in the Netherlands (national role), formation of General Military Assistance Units would only be possible if the operational combat unit(s) needed were not deployed elsewhere (e.g. winter training). NL-HaNA 2.13.141, inv. nr. 987, op. cit. It would seem that the same provision would also influence the minimum formation time of QPO units (United Nations role). No General Military Assistance Units or QPO units were ever deployed.
26. 3 (UK) Cdo Bde RM: SOHB 1985, 12. Beaver, op. cit., 40-46, 51-55, 64-71, 79-82. Isby and Kamps, op. cit., 255-256. 40 (UK) Commando RM, normally part of the brigade, would likely not deploy to north Norway as it was not trained in mountain and arctic warfare. SOHB 1985, loc. cit. Beaver, op. cit., 51-55. The (UK) Special Boat Section (SBS) is usually not shown as part of 3 (UK) Cdo Bde RM or UK/NL LF, but its role in this force can be gathered from, for instance, Beaver, op cit., 80; also Isby and Kamps, op. cit., 255, lists SBS as part of 3 (UK) Cdo Bde RM. Marine Corps units integrated in UK/NL LF: NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr. 535, op. cit., 84, 72. As noted before, it is not clear whether 1 Logistic Support Group would remain under command of 1 Amphibious Combat Group; it seems likely that the unit would, at least to some degree, be integrated into (UK) Commando Logistic Regiment during operations. See Unit Organisation and Equipment, 1 Amphibious Combat Group, footnote 3.
27. This task organisation appears to indicate a spearhead role, or a more or less separate deployment for this unit. It may however simply be the consequence of the fact that 45 (UK) Cdo Gp RM was based in Arbroath, Scotland whilst the rest of 3 (UK) Cdo Bde RM was based in Plymouth, England. Isby and Kamps, op. cit., 255-256. Website British Army units from 1945 on. For what it is worth, an official RM document from 1976 describes 3 (UK) Cdo Bde RM as comprising "three commando groups" rather than three commandos, which suggests that the formation of such groups was not unique to 45 (UK) Cdo RM. NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 2467, Concept of Operations for the Amphibious Landing Force in the 1980s/1990s d.d. 12 October 1976, 1.
28. From 1986 Blowpipe was replaced by the Javelin portable air defence system. Beaver, op. cit., 46, 103. In 1985 the air defence troop of 3 (UK) Cdo Bde RM had twelve air defence systems, probably 4 x for each RM commando. The anti-aircraft section of 1 Amphibious Combat Group operating directly under brigade command: at least this was the case in 1991. Van Egmond, 15e Ondersteuningscompagnie, 13.  
29. SOHB 1985, 39. Beaver, op. cit., passim. For 3 (UK) Cdo Bde RM, SOHB 1985 reports 311 officers and 4904 men (war establishment), including 40 Cdo RM; and 1,010 wheeled vehicles and 623 trailers. Here these numbers have been cross-referenced with personnel strengths and vehicle numbers of 1 Amphibious Combat Group and Whiskey Infantry Company. The Dutch Bv 202 over-snow vehicles were stockpiled at Kilbotn, the British probably at Bjerkvik. NL-HaNA 2.13.141, inv. nr. 341, Opslag sneeuwvoertuigen van het Korps Mariniers te Noorwegen d.d. 21 januari 1980 (Dutch). Ibid., Minutes of the fifteenth meeting of the Joint Marine Corps Sub-Committee d.d. 18 December 1979, 13 (British).
30. UK/NL Landing Force/Amphibious Force: NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 2467, op. cit., 1, 4. See also Haring, op. cit., 29. Royal Navy commitments for MARCONFORPLANS involving amphibious support: NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr. 535, op. cit., 84. See also Moore, Jane's Fighting Ships, 348. Royal (UK) Navy ships available for UK/NL AMF: Hekman, Amfibische strijdkrachten, 2318.
31. Scarcity of amphibious lift and the need to employ STUFT: NL-HaNA 2.13.141, inv. nr. 337, 14e Meeting of the joint marine corps sub-committee d.d. 25 oktober 1978 (letter from Commander, Marine Corps dated 29 maart 1979). Ibid., inv. nr. 338, Memorandum of Understanding between the Netherlands Ministry of Defence and the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, 9 May 1973, 1. NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr. 535, op. cit., 73. See also Hekman, op. cit., Discussie and Lund, op. cit., 62. Available Royal (UK) Navy amphibious shipping: Hekman, op. cit., 2318. Envisioned role of HMS Illustrious or HMS Invincible in UK/NL AMF: Beaver, op. cit., 85. Regarding Royal Navy plans to requisition civilian shipping NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr. 535, loc. cit. somewhat cryptically states that there were plans to provide for "part of" the necessary lift capacity. The Marine Corps would only get its own amphibious lift well after the end of the Cold War, with the commissioning of Landing Platform Dock Hr. Ms. Rotterdam in 1998. 
32. Van Dijk en Klein Essink, op. cit., 200. Haring, op. cit., 37. The movement of Marine Corps units to the United Kingdom was a Netherlands responsibility. See footnote 23, Memorandum of Understanding. See also website Marineschepen, Zr.Ms. Rotterdam LPD, Het Korps Mariniers vecht voor een eigen schip. Concentration predominantly in the Plymouth area: in 1973 it was agreed that Whiskey Infantry Company would concentrate with 45 (UK) Commando Group RM in Arbroath. NL-HaNA 2.13.141, inv. nr. 338, Draft Joint Marine Sub-Committee Background, 4 May 1973, 10. It seems likely that this remained so through the 1980s. See also footnote 27.
33. NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 3413, Rationalisation of RNLMC WMR storage in UK d.d. 11 november 1980. Ibid., WMR mariniers d.d. 27 mei 1981.
34. NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 2467, op. cit., 11. Beaver, op. cit., 31. Beaver notes that although STUFT could be used in a "limited, undeclared war" such as the Falklands campaign (1982), "such ships could not be expected to be used in a 'hot' war against the current NATO potential enemy of the Warsaw Pact." Beaver, op. cit., 85. Another disadvantage of STUFT was that these required harbours, which could easily be blocked even in peacetime. Hekman, op. cit., Discussie, 2320. Concerns about UK/NL AMF's assault capacity being compromised by shortfall in amphibious shipping are expressed in Lamers, De militaire situatie, 2497-2498. On a similar note, the chairman of the Joint Marine Corps Sub-Committee in 1979 observed that "a fine, well equipped landing force would be rendered ineffective if it were not to have the amphibious shipping to deploy it in war or to exercise it in peace." NL-HaNA 2.13.141, inv. nr. 341, Minutes of the fifteenth meeting of the Joint Marine Corps Sub-Committee d.d. 18 December 1979, 4. Estimated time to deploy to northern Norway: NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 2467, op. cit., 7. Johnson, The Impact, 55. Lund, op. cit., 62. Vaessen, De vreemdste grens, 343. 
35. Hekman, op. cit., 2317. For the importance of the northern flank to NATO in wartime, see also Martin, Before the Day After, 31-33; Lamers, op. cit.; Lund, op. cit., 1-3; Pruijs, De verdediging.
36. Quoted from the minutes of the fifteenth meeting of the Joint Marine Corps Sub-Committee, see footnote 34.
37. Beaver, op. cit., 30-31. Haring, op. cit., 34. NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr. 535, op. cit., mentions two SACEUR contingency plans concerning NATO's southern flank: SACEUR OPLAN 10710 "SACEUR's contingency operation plan for maritime contingency force amphibious operations in the southern region (Flaming Henna)" and SACEUR OPLAN 10730 "SACEUR’s contingency operation plan for employment of amphibious force in the southern region of ACE". The outline descriptions only include the deployment of US Marine Corps forces and local (i.e. Italian, Greek, Turkish) NATO forces.
38. NL-HaNA 2.13.141, inv. nr. 796, op. cit.
39. The attentive reader will note that these numbers do not add up to 6,700:  968 + 3028 + 2816 = 6812, which leaves a negative discrepancy of 112 men. Assuming that the numbers needed to bring units up to war strength are correct, there is probably an error in the number of  'surplus' reservists. The number of men "neither needed nor assigned" may therefor be read as 102/-/2617 (2,719). This still leaves a shortage of 15 men, but one may also note that there was apparently a shortage of 15 sub-officers. The study does, as it happens, show another negative discrepancy, of 6 men (sub "Marinier verbindingen"), which I have assumed to be 3 sub-officers and 3 enlisted. NL-HaNA 2.13.141, inv. nr. 796, op. cit., 4. 
40. Whilst I have not found an official rejection of the plan, I have not found any indication that it, or elements of it, were ever realised.
41. Website International Institute of Social History, Value of the Guilder/Euro, calculated 28.03.2016.