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Royal Army
Koninklijke Landmacht (KL)

Part I | Part II | Part III | Part IV | Part V

Korpsco LASSie AZ BLS [SAZ]Niet-mindeel LASOorlogsstaf BLSCcieBcieAcieStdet Korpsco MINDEF LaKorpsco MINDEF La

Unit Location Peace Strength War Strength
Army Staff (Non-Ministerial Part) [a] Den Haag 113/76/31/130 (350)
14/7/7/60 (88)
War Staff Commander-in-Chief of the Army [b]
180/163/201/97 (641)
Army Staff Corps Command [c] [d] Den Haag 3/16/35/14 (68) 4/22/125/13 (164)
Ministry of Defence Corps Command (Army) [d] [e]
Staff Detachment
Ministry of Defence Corps Command (Army)
Den Haag 3/10/2/6 (21) 3/10/3/6 (22)
A Company Den Haag 1/6/2/1 (10)
B Company Den Haag 1/6/2/1 (10) 2/6/3/2 (13)
C Company [f] Den Haag 1/4/1/2 (8) 2/6/2/2 (12)
    6/26/7/10 (49) 7/22/8/10 (47)
General Affairs Section [g] Wassenaar 4/-/-/27 (31) 16/15/- (31)

a. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army (Bevelhebber der Landstrijdkrachten, BLS) was also Chief of Staff of the Army (Chief of the Army Staff) (Chef Landmachtstaf, CLAS). The staffs of both functions were referred to as, respectively, the Non-Ministerial and the Ministerial Part of the Army Staff (Landmachtstaf, LAS). The Non-Ministerial Part was concerned with the operational effectiveness of the Royal Army's military units and installations, the Ministerial Part handled the underlying operational policies of the Royal Army.1 See Ministry of Defence, where the Ministerial Part of the Army Staff is indicated in the organisational chart by the Chief of Staff of the Army. It was co-located with the Non-Ministerial Part of the Army Staff in Den Haag and had a peacetime strength of 106/32/20/139 (297), and a wartime strength of 26/17/7/77 (127).
b. For eighty-six percent filled by personnel from the general pool of mobilisable reserves (vrij-indeelbaar bestand) that had fulfilled their active-duty period in relevant functions up to eight and a half years prior to mobilisation.2 It seems likely, however, that at least part of the peacetime personnel of the Army Staff (Non-Ministerial and/or Ministerial) would go to the War Staff. Personnel strength is from December 1985; in June 1985 strength was 180/161/124/96 (561). The increase may be linked to the disbandment of Army Staff Corps Command (see note c).   
c. Filled out by personnel from the general pool of mobilisable reserves (vrij-indeelbaar bestand) that had fulfilled their active-duty period in relevant functions up to eight and a half years prior to mobilisation.2 Disbanded between June and December 1985. After disbandment its tasks were probably transferred to Ministry of Defence Corps Command (Army) and perhaps to the War Staff.
d. Contrary to what their names suggest these two "corps commands" had nothing to do with 1 (NL) Corps. It appears they exercised administrative control over, and provided service support to the various staff and administrative organisations under the authority of the Non-Ministerial Part of the Army Staff (Army Staff Corps Command) and the Ministerial Part of the Army Staff (Ministry of Defence Corps Command (Army)).3      
e. Organisation and strengths from December 1985. In June 1985 this was a peacetime-only unit, comprising Staff Detachment (4/14/1/22 (41)), A Company (2/6/2/4 (14)) and B Company (2/6/4/4 (16)), total strength 8/26/7/30 (71).
f. Formed between June and December 1985.
g. General Affairs Section (Sectie Algemene Zaken, SAZ. In army documents abbreviated as Sie AZ BLS) was the purposefully bland name for the "I" or Intelligence branch of the Netherlands secret stay-behind organisation (SBO). The mission of the Netherlands SBO was to facilitate, organise and direct resistance under wartime enemy occupation and maintain communications with Netherlands authorities in non-occupied territory, i.e. the government in exile. The "I" branch was tasked with gathering and communicating military, economic and political intelligence and counterintelligence. It would also organise the infiltration and exfiltration of persons and goods across the borders. SAZ formed the staff of the "I" network, comprising a section head and eight bureaus: A (secretariat), B-l (logistics), B-2 (intelligence), B-3 (infiltration and exfiltration), C (communications), D (accountancy), E (technique and development), and PC (project coordination). In the 1970s and 1980s SAZ ran a covert network or 'field organisation' of some 125 carefully selected and trained voluntary agents which would be activated if the country would come under enemy occupation. SAZ was co-located with the Foreign Intelligence Service in Wassenaar (Inlichtingendienst Buitenland, IDB) and effectively used that service as a screen for its own activities. The other branch of the Netherlands SBO was the "O" or Operations branch, tasked with psychological warfare, stimulating mental resistance and executing limited sabotage actions in this context. Whereas "I" had an official, albeit disguised presence in SAZ, "O" did not exist officially. Like "I" it comprised a small staff running a covert or 'sleeping' field organisation of carefully selected and trained voluntary agents. The agents of both branches led normal lives in society, doing their training and preparatory work in their own time. Though often jointly referred to as O&I, also I&O, these were to a high degree separate organisations. SAZ or "I" fell under the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, "O" fell under the Prime Minister's own Ministry of General Affairs (Ministerie van Algemene Zaken). In peacetime the activities of both branches were coordinated by the head of the "O" branch, in his coordinating role referred to as 'delegate', who was appointed by the Minister of Defence in consultation with the Prime Minister. This delegate answered to the Minister of Defence. The Netherlands SBO was not integrated in any NATO command structure but in peacetime preparatory arrangements were made with the United Kingdom and the United States in what was referred to as the Tripartite Consultation. In wartime SAZ and the staff of "O" would evacuate to a location in unoccupied territory from which they would run their activated field organisations by radio. This location would be an underground facility in the United States referred to as the Allied Clandestine Base (ACB). There both staffs would be integrated into a single Netherlands National Clandestine Service (NCS), but in occupied Netherlands the two field organisations would continue to work separately as much as possible to maximise operational security. This emphasis on damage limitation through compartmentalisation was borne from traumatic experiences in World War II (Englandspiel) and was maintained throughout the organisation. Both branches preferred to work with single agents ("I") and independent operative cells ("O") whilst they would use their own code materials and encryption methods which would not be shared with US or other Allied organisations. The Netherlands NCS would remain under national control at all times, though it would participate in the Allied Consultative Coordinating Group (ACCG) at NATO level. The CIA reportedly considered SAZ to be the best stay-behind organisation in (Western) Europe. The official Royal Army order of battle and unit filling schemes show that at some point after mobilisation all or nearly all SAZ personnel would be replaced by personnel from the general pool of mobilisable reserves (vrij-indeelbaar bestand) that had fulfilled their active-duty period in relevant functions up to eight and a half years prior to mobilisation. This can be explained by the fact that the active SAZ element would relocate to the United States; the mobilised SAZ element in the Netherlands would probably run operations as long as possible or necessary and clean up before enemy occupation would come into effect. The evacuation of the active SAZ element and the staff of "O" would be the responsibility of the aforementioned Bureau PC of SAZ. In 1992, motivated by the end of the Cold War, the government ordered the Netherlands SBO to be disbanded. The disbandment of SAZ was completed in 1996.4 

Part I | Part II | Part III | Part IV | Part V

Unit Location Peace Strength War Strength
1 (NL) Corps [a] Apeldoorn 2375/6305/24053/83 (32816)
5659/13867/67727/266 (87519)
National Territorial Command Gouda 379/1647/2545/5465 (10036) 2423/6071/31184/3211 (42889)
National Logistic Command Deventer 113/514/311/3472 (4410) 604/1712/9889/3361 (15566)
Royal Army Signal Command Den Haag 118/312/1116/505 (2051) 176/562/2592/488 (3818)
Royal Army Medical Command Deventer 20/15/3/14 (52) 968/1161/4881/149 (7159)
Royal Army Training Command /
Army Training and Replacement Command [b]
Amersfoort 894/3428/2583/1102 (8007) 798/2520/9951/218 (13487)
Royal Military Constabulary [c] Den Haag 101/1397/1801/132 (3431) 129/1500/4753/88 (6470)
Mobile Columns Corps Laren NH 23/69/28/59 (179) 855/1851/14114/51 (16871)


a. Peacetime organisation. In wartime under operational command of NATO's Northern Army Group (NORTHAG).
b. On mobilisation Royal Army Training Command (COKL) would close down and most of its personnel would go to their mobilisation destinations in first-line units, whilst the remaining personnel would form Army Training and Replacement Command (COAL).5
c. Wartime organisation. In peacetime the Royal Military Constabulary (KMAR) was under command of the Minister of Defence.

Part I | Part II | Part III | Part IV | Part V

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Unit Location Peace Strength War Strength
Royal Military Academy [a] Breda 76/54/24/159 (313)
Higher War School [b] Den Haag 36/7/1/16 (60)

Buildings, Works and Sites Directorate [c]
Buildings, Works and Sites Directorate
Den Haag 9/-/1/6 (16)
9/-/1/6 (16)
Engineer Advisory Bureau Den Haag 5/-/4/10 (19)
5/-/4/10 (19)
Bureau Preparations of Provisions to
Artificial Structures
Utrecht 4/8/5/25 (42)
4/8/5/25 (42)
Directorate North Holland Amsterdam 7/5/4 (16) 7/5/4 (16)
Directorate South Holland Leiden 10/5/5 (20) 10/5/5 (20)
Directorate Utrecht Amersfoort 7/4/3 (14) 7/4/3 (14)
Directorate Gelderland Apeldoorn 12/6/6 (24) 12/6/6 (24)
Directorate Overijssel Deventer 6/4/4 (14) 6/4/4 (14)
Directorate North Netherlands Assen 7/5/4 (16) 7/5/4 (16)
Directorate South West Netherlands Breda 10/6/6 (22) 10/6/6 (22)
Directorate Brabant Breda 8/5/5 (18) 8/5/5 (18)
Directorate Limburg Roermond 5/4/3 (12) 5/4/3 (12)
Directorate Germany Greven (GE) 7/5/4 (16) 7/5/4 (16)
Materiel Inspection Office Utrecht 6/53/4/6 (69)

Freight Transport Bureau USA [d] Dundalk (US) -/2/-/3 (5)
-/2/-/3 (5)
Inspection of Royal Army Medical Services [e] Den Haag 46/36/5/112 (199) 29/16/5/106 (156)
Military Health Service [f] Utrecht 3/9/11/35 (58) 7/1/7/24 (39)
Dr. A. Matthijsen Military Hospital [f] [g] Utrecht 103/112/53/719 (987) 208/141/101/702 (1152)
Central Military Pharmacy [f] Amsterdam 8/6/-/29 (43) 8/6/-/29 (43)
Medical Services Depot and
Repair and Collection Point [f]
Amsterdam 3/11/5/82 (101) 3/10/6/82 (101)
Military Blood Transfusion Service and
Central Blood Bank Laboratory [f] [g]
Amsterdam 6/9/3/12 (30) 10/15/30/12 (67)
841 Topographic Service [h] Emmen -/-/-/211 (211)
2/-/-/209 (211)
Royal Army Audiovisual Service [i] Den Haag 1/6/2/22 (31)

Arnhem District Court-Martial Arnhem 9/-/2 (11)
9/-/2 (11)
General Mobile Court-Martial [j]
30/15/24 (69)

a. Provided the "A programme" or "First Way" to become an officer in the Royal Army or the Royal Air Force (primary officer schooling). Open for candidates with the proper pre-university education (vwo).6 For the "B programme" or "Second Way", see Royal Army Training Command, Special Officer Training Centre.
b. Provided the secondary military education programme for commissioned officers in the rank of captain. The main components were the Staff Course (Stafdienst) and the subsequent Higher Military Education study (Hogere Militaire Vorming, HMV), the latter being for those found eligible during the Staff Course. HMV formed the highest schooling available to Royal Army officers. In 1985 a tertiary education level was under consideration, which would be introduced in 1987.7
c. Wartime organisation. In peacetime under Directorate-General Materiel of the Ministry of Defence.8
d. Wartime Organisation. In peacetime under command of the Ministerial Part of the Army Staff (see Part I, note a). Located in Dundalk, Baltimore (US). Bureau Aan- en Afvoer Goederen was previously known as Bureau Goederenvervoer (BGVV). The name change may indicate a functional change. In 1983 the Bureau, then located in New York City under its former name, operated as a coordinating agent for the shipment of military materiel acquired in the United States for the Netherlands armed forces.9
e. Wartime organisation. In peacetime under command of Director of Personnel Royal Army, Ministry of Defence.
f. These were so-called "special organisation units" (bijzondere organisatie eenheden, BOE) of the Director of Personnel Royal Army, permanently attached to the Inspection of Royal Army Medical Services (see note e).10
g. Filled (out) by personnel from the general pool of mobilisable reserves (vrij-indeelbaar bestand) that had fulfilled their active-duty period in relevant functions up to twelve and a half years prior to mobilisation.2
h. Also known as Topografische Dienst (TDN). Produced military maps for the armed forces. Some 40 personnel were based in Delft as an auxiliary branch.11 Storage and distribution of maps was handled by 402 Map Storage and Distribution Group and 401 Map Distribution Platoon.
i. Previously known as Leger Film- en Fotodienst (LFFD).
j. Filled by personnel from the general pool of mobilisable reserves (vrij-indeelbaar bestand) that had fulfilled their active-duty period in relevant functions up to eight and a half years prior to mobilisation.2

Part I | Part II | Part III | Part IV | Part V

450 CidetCensdet Rotterdam451 CidetCensdet 's-GravenhageCensdet AmsterdamINCD893 VldpcensdetNL Det SinaiInfcie (VN)KLpers tbv St UNIFIL449 CidetNCD860 Det KMAR BLSG MareskMPC Nieuwersluis

Unit Location Peace Strength War Strength
Military Penitentiary Centre Nieuwersluis Nieuwersluis 4/53/7/2 (66) 4/56/7/2 (69)
860 Military Constabulary Detachment
for Commander-in-Chief of the Army [a]
1/10/62 (73)
G Military Constabulary Squadron [b] 2/22/38 (62)
449 Counterintelligence Detachment [c] Arnhem 7/17/1/7 (32)
8/21/2/7 (38)
450 Counterintelligence Detachment [d] Alphen a/d Rijn 7/20/2/7 (36) 8/25/3/7 (43)
451 Counterintelligence Detachment [e] Breda 9/13/1/8 (31) 10/21/2/8 (41)
Netherlands Censorship Service [f]
Inspection Netherlands Censorship Service Harderwijk 1/-/- (1) 41/11/13 (65)
Censorship Detachment Amsterdam 148/68/65 (281)
Censorship Detachment Den Haag 113/57/57 (227)
Censorship Detachment Rotterdam 86/52/44 (182)
    1/-/- (1) 388/188/179 (755)
893 Fieldpost Censorship Detachment [g]
8/55/96 (159)
Royal Army Personnel for Staff UNIFIL [h] Naquoura (LE) 3/3/2 (8)
Infantry Company (UN) [i] Haris (LE) 12/32/110/1 (155)
Netherlands Sinai Detachment [j] El Gorah (EG) 7/17/54 (78) (107)

a. Filled by personnel from the general pool of mobilisable reserves (vrij-indeelbaar bestand) that had fulfilled their active-duty period in relevant functions up to twelve and a half years prior to mobilisation.2
b. Temporary unit, to be activated on mobilisation. Filled by professional personnel on active duty from Royal Military Constabulary District Utrecht (KMAR District Utrecht) and equipped with DAF YP-408 armoured personnel carriers. In documents the wartime mission of G Squadron was neutrally described as "to carry out assignments issued directly by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army" but it has been public knowledge for some time that its mission was to secure and evacuate the Royal Family in case of an enemy attack. The squadron exercised this several times per year. On completion of its wartime mission the squadron would be disbanded, its personnel going back to their units in KMAR District Utrecht and its materiel going to other units or back into the war reserve stock (oorlogsreserve); the YP-408s would go to armoured infantry units. Such, at least, was the war planning up until ± 1984. In 1980 Beatrix of Orange-Nassau had succeeded her mother Juliana as Queen of the Netherlands, and since Beatrix had taken up residency in Den Haag the squadron's location near Juliana's residence in Soestdijk (Baarn), some 88 kilometres to the east, had become less than practical. Moving the squadron to KMAR District South Holland was problematic because the necessary materiel infrastructure was not available there. From about 1984 the larger, multiple-day exercises ceased. In March 1986 the squadron's YP-408s were disposed of as part of the general phasing-out of the YP-408. After that the squadron employed M113A1 armoured personnel carriers, possibly borrowed from the high-readiness Armoured Car Platoon 2.6 based in Den Haag (Royal Military Constabulary District South Holland) or coming from the war reserve stock.12
c. Under operational control of the Head of the Intelligence and Security Division of the Army Staff (Afdeling Inlichtingen en Veiligheid van de Landmachtstaf), who was also Head of the Army Intelligence Service (Landmachtinlichtingendienst, LAMID) which fell under the Ministry of Defence. Area of responsibility: the provinces of Groningen, Friesland, Drenthe and Overijssel. Would handle offensive and defensive counterintelligence tasks; provide counterintelligence support, both requested and unrequested, to various military authorities, staffs and installations of the Royal Army and the Ministry of Defence; and provide counterintelligence support to NATO staffs, units or organisations present in the detachment's area of responsibility.13
d. See note c. Area of responsibility: the provinces of North Holland, South Holland and Utrecht.13
e. See note c. Area of responsibility: the provinces of Zeeland, North Brabant and Limburg.13
f. Filled by personnel from the general pool of mobilisable reserves (vrij-indeelbaar bestand) that had fulfilled their active-duty period in relevant functions up to eight and a half years prior to mobilisation.2 This included some 350 reserve officers. After the proclamation of a State of War (Staat van Oorlog) and Martial Law (Staat van Beleg) the Netherlands Censorship Service would not only work to prevent the leaking of any information considered to be of importance to the interests and security of the State, it would also collect or enable the collection of such information for intelligence purposes, and pass it on to the appropriate institutions. The three censorship detachments would censor all PTT communications, whilst a number of (probably senior) civil servants of the PTT would work to facilitate the operations of the Service.14
g. Filled by personnel from the general pool of mobilisable reserves (vrij-indeelbaar bestand) that had fulfilled their active-duty period in relevant functions up to eight and a half years prior to mobilisation.2 Responsible for military censorship within the Royal Army and the Royal Air Force.15
h. Most of this personnel was withdrawn to the Netherlands a few days after Dutch Infantry Company returned home (see note i).16
i. Under operational control of United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon (UNIFIL). The company performed peacekeeping duties in South Lebanon from November 1983 to October 1985. Its official United Nations (UN) designation was Dutch Infantry Company (DIC), usually shortened to Dutchcoy. It comprised a company staff, three rifle platoons (each with 2 x Carl Gustav rclr 84 mm, 3 x FN MAG gpmg 7.62 mm and 3 x mortar 2 inch), a signal group and a service support platoon. Apart from standard personal gear, armament, and telex equipment the company used UN-owned equipment, including vehicles. The company was withdrawn to the Netherlands on 24 October 1985 and disbanded on arrival.17
j. Part of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) deployed in the Sinai peninsula to oversee the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty. Main component was an interservice signals company which maintained internal MFO communications from company level upwards, and external communications with MFO Headquarters in Rome and with Cairo and Tel Aviv. Apart from Royal Army personnel (including Royal Military Constabulary) the detachment also included personnel from the Royal Navy (including Marine Corps) and the Royal Air Force. In the table above only Royal Army personnel is counted; in 1986 overall strength of the Netherlands Detachment was 107 men and women.18 

Part I | Part II | Part III | Part IV | Part V


Unit Location Peace Strength War Strength
Army Attaché Washington Washington (US) 3/2/-/3 (8)
3/2/-/3 (8)
Army Attaché Bonn Bonn (GE) 2/1/-/1 (4) 2/1/-/1 (4)
Army Attaché London London (UK) 1/1/-/1 (3) 1/1/-/1 (3)
Army Attaché Paris Paris (FR) 1/1/-/1 (3) 1/1/-/1 (3)
Army Attaché Warschau Warschau (PL) 1/2/- (3) 1/2/- (3)
Army Attaché Belgrade Belgrade (YO) 1/1/-/2 (4) 1/1/-/2 (4)
Army Attaché Cairo Cairo (EG) 1/1/-/1 (3) 1/1/-/1 (3)
Army Attaché Damascus Damascus (SY) 1/1/-/1 (3) 1/1/-/1 (3)
Army Attaché Paramaribo Paramaribo (NS) 1/1/-/1 (3) 1/1/-/1 (3)
Army Attaché Jakarta Jakarta (ID) 1/1/- (2) 1/1/- (2)
Netherlands Liaison Mission to SHAPE [a] [b] Casteau (BE) 3/1/1 (5)
6/3/3 (12)
Royal Army Personnel for SHAPE [b] Casteau (BE) 20/18/24 (62) 22/17/29 (68)
Netherlands Administrative Corps SHAPE [b] Casteau (BE) 1/6/5/1 (13) 1/5/7/1 (14)
Royal Army Personnel for HQ AFCENT [b] [c] Brunssum 25/58/69 (152) 27/63/80 (170)
Netherlands Administrative Corps AFCENT Brunssum 3/14/16/2 (35) 3/7/4/2 (16)
Royal Army Personnel for HQ NORTHAG [b] [d] Rheindahlen (GE) 27/16/64 (107)
41/22/126 (189)
Royal Army Personnel for HQ TWOATAF [b] [e] Rheindahlen (GE) 2/4/3 (9) 2/4/4 (10)
Netherlands Administrative Corps
Rheindahlen (GE) 6/17/27/2 (52) 7/24/67/2 (100)
Netherlands Signal Squadron [f] Rheindahlen (GE) 4/18/95 (117) 4/23/183 (210)
Various foreign-country positions Den Haag 9/-/-/1 (10)
Royal Army Peace Strength: 4706/14486/33158/12502 (64852)
Royal Army War Strength: 12789/30292/146515/9260 (198856)

a. SHAPE: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
b. Filled by personnel from the general pool of mobilisable reserves (vrij-indeelbaar bestand) that had fulfilled their active-duty period in relevant functions up to six and a half years prior to mobilisation.2
c. AFCENT: Allied Forces Central Europe.
d. NORTHAG: Northern Army Group.
e. TWOATAF: Second Allied Tactical Air Force.
f. Wartime strength probably filled out by personnel on Short Leave.19 Operational in peace and wartime. As part of NORTHAG Signal Group (NSG) the company would set up and sustain communications for Headquarters, NORTHAG. NSG further included Belgian, British and West German signal companies, each of which operated a specific part of the communications system. The Netherlands Signal Squadron (NATO abbreviation: NSSQ) provided a messenger service and layed all cables and lines.20

1. NL-HaNA, archiefinventaris 2.13.110, 11.  
2. NIMH 205A/10, Aflossing van mobilisabele eenheden en -aanvullingen d.d. 27 mei 1980. Ibid., d.d. 11 november 1983. Ibid., d.d. 17 juni 1985.
3. NL HaNA 2.13.110, inv. nr. 111, Organisatieonderzoek Korpscommando MvD d.d. 30 juni 1976. Ibid., inv. nr. 133 (Korpscommando Landmachtstaf, 1973-1979). NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr. 84, Wijziging org Korpsco MvD (La) d.d. 6 februari 1970. Ibid., inv. nr. 896, Voorlopig plan opheffen Korpsco MvD La (1e termijn) d.d. 6 november 1991. These documents do not contain an exact description of the tasks of both commands, but they do provide a good overall impression.    
4. Bekker, Geschiedenis, Hoofdstuk VI, VII, VIII (internal SAZ history). PIVOT 166 (Engelen, De Nederlandse stay behind-organisatie). Engelen, Lessons Learned. Kluiters, De Nederlandse, 306-317. Schoemaker, De Nederlandse. For a historical overview in English and details about operational methods and equipment, see website Crypto Museum, Operatiën en Inlichtingen. Purposefully bland name: "General Affairs Section" might of course also be interpreted literally, as being a section of the Ministry of General Affairs placed under military command, in which case the name would be less bland. When the name was adopted in 1949 the official explaination was that SAZ would handle affairs that could not be assigned to the other sections of the Army Staff (then called General Staff). PIVOT 166, 30-31. O&I: because of increasing attention by the press the names of the "O" and "I" branches were changed to "A" and "B" respectively in 1986. Bekker, op. cit., Hoofdstuk VIII, 128. Kluiters reports that "O" comprised a staff of ± 20 persons and a field organisation of 100-150 trained agents. Kluiters, op. cit., 308. Foreign Intelligence Service (Inlichtingendienst Buitenland, IDB): like "O" this service fell under the Ministry of General Affairs. Kluiters, op. cit., 201. IDB as screen for SAZ: De Graaff en Wiebes, Villa Maarheeze, 53, 215. Contrary to Schoemaker's claim in op. cit., 28, the staff of "O" was not co-located with IDB and SAZ in Wassenaar. Bob de Graaff, co-author of Villa Maarheeze, lecture in Villa Maarheeze, Wassenaar, 15.09.2019. Also, such a co-location would be inconsistent with the separation between "I" and "O". Psychological warfare: "The planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives." US Department of Defense Dictionary, 349-350. In this case for "hostile foreign groups" may just as much be read "the Dutch population". The best in Europe: De Graaff en Wiebes, op. cit., 324. Unit refilling after mobilisation: see footnote 2. Disbandment: PIVOT 166, 69. Many thanks to Royal Army Brigadier-General J.R. Mulder (Rtd.) for pointing out the role of SAZ and providing additional information. In 1996 he was Head of the Intelligence and Security Division of the Army Staff (see Part IV, note c) and handled the disbandment of the last remnants of SAZ (emails 27.08.2019, 03.09.2019, 13.09.2019). 
5. VS 2-1050/1A, VI-17 t/m 19.
6. Groen en Klinkert, Boekenwijsheid. Sinterniklaas, Officiersopleidingen. Sorrell, Je maintiendrai, 53-54.
7. Hoffenaar en Schoenmaker, Met de blik, 442. Sorrell, loc. cit. The Higher War School (sometimes and perhaps more fittingly translated as Army Staff College) is discussed in detail in Bosch en Smits, Herziening.
8. The NL-HaNA archive inventory of the directorate contains a remarkably extensive organisational history: NL-HaNA, archiefinventaris 2.13.96, 7-32.
9. Anonymus, Andere werkwijzen.
10. NL-HaNA, archiefinventaris 2.13.125, 17.
11. Tabak, Ze kunnen, 7-9.
12. NL-HaNA 2.13.110, inv. nr. 1338, Reorganisatie Maresk (G) orgtnr. 25.1013.02 d.d. 12 september 1978. NL-HaNA 2.13.175, inv. nr. 140, Stafstudie d.d. 16 juni 1980. Website DAF YP-408 Forgotten Hero, G-Eskadron Koninklijke Marechaussee. Ibid., Fotoalbum Peter Nijmeijer. Additional information kindly provided by Peter Nijmeijer who served with the squadron from 1974 to 1985 (emails 19.03.2019, 30.03.2019 and 01.04.2019). The order for the 'Royal' evacuation mission was known as "Operatieve instructie nr. 4 van de BLS". NL-HaNA 2.13.110, inv. nr. 1338, Aantekeningen bij ontwerp otas Marechaussee-eskadron G d.d. 1 maart 1978, Aantekening HOPNA. The DAF YP-408 armoured personnel carrier was originally designed for this mission (in 1956-1958) before it was adopted as armoured personnel carrier for the armoured infantry of 1 (NL) Corps. Website DAF YP-408 Forgotten Hero, De DAF YP 408, een koninklijk voertuig by S. Ruys. G Squadron was deployed twice in 1975: in March to secure Soestdijk Palace against a (thwarted) plan by South Moluccan terrorists to take Queen Juliana hostage, and in December when South Moluccan terrorists occupied the Indonesian consulate in Amsterdam. Website DAF YP-408 Forgotten Hero, G-Eskadron Koninklijke Marechaussee. YP-408 replaced by M113A1: Gaasbeek, Verplaatsing, 19. Given its location Armoured Car Platoon 2.6 is a likely candidate, also because after Queen Beatrix took up residence in Den Haag there was talk within G Squadron that its mission might be transferred to that unit. Peter Nijmeijer, email 19.03.2019. On the other hand, the official Royal Army orders of battle from 1988 to 1991 list Complex Zeisterspoor in Soesterberg and later Mobilisation Complex Soesterberg as the squadron's equipment storage location, which might indicate that M113A1s would be taken from the war reserve stock. NIMH 430, inv. nrs. 60 t/m 68 (Slagordes KL 1988-1991).
13. NL-HaNA 2.13.110, inv. nr. 1308 (Operationele instructies voor commandanten van contra-inlichtingendetachementen, 1978). It appears that there was a considerable overlap between the Intelligence and Security Division of the Army Staff and the Army Intelligence Service, i.e. many personnel worked for both organisations. Kluiters, De Nederlandse, Supplement, 127. Army Intelligence Service falling under the Ministry of Defence: Kluiters, loc.cit
14. NL-HaNA, archiefinventaris 2.13.111, 7-9. This article also mentions a core staff (kernstaf) which is not indicated in the official orders of battle (NIMH 430, inv. nr. 54 (Slagorde KL stand 1 juli 1985). Ibid., inv. nr. 55 (Slagorde KL stand 23 december 1985)). It appears this core staff was part of the Inspection Netherlands Censorship Service. Ibid., 15. PTT: the national postal, telegraph, and telephone service (Posterijen, Telegrafie en Telefonie).
15. NL-HaNA, archiefinventaris 2.13.111, 8-9.
16. Schoenmaker en Roozenbeek, Vredesmacht, 385, 417.
17. SSA-MvD, Archief Chef Landmachtstaf/Bevelhebber der Landstrijdkrachten 1980-1989, gerubriceerd, inventarisnummer 4002e, Memorandum Realisatie Legerplan 92-4-A (Uitzending zelfstandige Infanteriecompagnie VN naar Libanon) d.d. 7 november 1983. Schoenmaker en Roozenbeek, op. cit., 379, 383-385, 417.
18. Hoffenaar en Schoenmaker, op. cit., 370-371. Van den Anker, De Multinational, 74, 75, 80. Hakkert, Het Korps Mariniers, 467.
19. The company is not included in the Royal Army unit filling schemes (see footnote 2).
20. Elands et al., Van telegraaf, 155. Hoffenaar and Krüger, Blueprints, 56.