Army
Training and Replacement Command
Commando
Opleidingen en Aanvullingen Landmacht (COAL)
Part
I | Part II |
Operational Role:
Wartime Personnel Replacement
| Unit |
Location |
Peace
Strength |
War
Strength |
Staff
and Staff Company
Army
Training and Replacement Command [a] |
Amersfoort |
– |
22/25/57
(104) |
| 811
Replacement Depot [b] |
Staff
and Support Company
811
Replacement Depot |
– |
– |
21/115/32/33
(201) |
| A Company |
– |
– |
11/67/312
(390) |
| B Company |
– |
– |
15/42/342
(399) |
| C
Company |
– |
– |
15/42/342
(399) |
| D Company |
– |
– |
15/42/342
(399) |
| E
Company |
– |
– |
8/39/321
(368) |
| F
Company |
– |
– |
6/37/256
(299) |
| G Company |
– |
– |
– |
| H Company |
– |
– |
– |
| I Company |
– |
– |
– |
| J Company |
– |
– |
– |
| K Squadron |
– |
– |
– |
| L Squadron |
– |
– |
– |
|
|
91/384/1947/33
(2455) |
| 812
Replacement Depot [b] |
Staff
and Support Company
812
Replacement Depot |
– |
– |
9/44/13/17
(83) |
| A Company |
– |
– |
11/66/299
(376) |
| B Company |
– |
– |
15/42/342
(399) |
| C
Company |
– |
– |
– |
| D Company |
– |
– |
– |
|
|
35/152/654/17
(858) |
| 813
Replacement Depot [b] |
Staff
and Support Company
813
Replacement Depot |
– |
– |
14/78/24/23
(139) |
| A Company |
– |
– |
15/42/342
(399) |
| B Company |
– |
– |
11/67/312
(390) |
| C
Company |
– |
– |
15/42/342
(399) |
| D Company |
– |
– |
11/66/299
(376) |
| E
Company |
– |
– |
– |
| F
Company |
– |
– |
– |
| G Company |
– |
– |
– |
| H Company |
– |
– |
– |
|
|
66/295/1319/23
(1703) |
| 814
Replacement Depot [b] |
Staff
and Support Squadron
814
Replacement Depot |
– |
– |
13/69/18/21
(121) |
| A Squadron |
– |
– |
10/28/185
(223) |
| B Squadron |
– |
– |
10/28/185
(223) |
| C Squadron |
– |
– |
16/57/242
(315) |
| D Squadron |
– |
– |
16/69/282
(367) |
| E Squadron |
– |
– |
– |
| F Squadron |
– |
– |
– |
| G Squadron |
– |
– |
– |
| H Squadron |
– |
– |
– |
|
|
65/251/912/21
(1249) |
| 815
Replacement Depot [b] |
Staff
and Support Battery
815
Replacement Depot |
– |
– |
11/60/16/20
(107) |
| A Battery |
– |
– |
62/105/237
(404) |
| B Battery |
– |
– |
62/105/237
(404) |
| C Battery |
– |
– |
– |
| D Battery |
– |
– |
– |
| E Battery |
– |
– |
– |
| F Battery |
– |
– |
– |
|
|
135/270/490/20
(915) |
| 816
Replacement Depot [b] |
Staff
and Support Company
816
Replacement Depot |
– |
– |
9/41/12/16
(78) |
| A Company |
– |
– |
6/44/300
(350) |
| B Company |
– |
– |
– |
| C
Company |
– |
– |
– |
| D Company |
– |
– |
– |
|
|
15/85/312/16
(428) |
| 817
Replacement Depot [b] |
Staff
and Support Company
817
Replacement Depot |
– |
– |
11/57/16/24
(108) |
| A Battery |
– |
– |
8/22/128
(158) |
| B Company |
– |
– |
18/40/62
(120) |
| C
Company |
– |
– |
– |
| D Company |
– |
– |
– |
| E
Company |
– |
– |
– |
| F
Company |
– |
– |
– |
|
|
37/119/206/24
(386) |
| 818
Replacement Depot [b] |
Staff
and Support Company
818
Replacement Depot |
– |
– |
10/48/14/18
(90) |
| A Company |
– |
– |
2/-/52 (54) |
| B Company |
– |
– |
– |
| C
Company |
– |
– |
– |
| D Company |
– |
– |
– |
| E
Company |
– |
– |
– |
| F
Company |
– |
– |
– |
| G Company |
– |
– |
– |
| H Company |
– |
– |
– |
|
|
12/48/66/18
(144) |
Note
| a. |
Wartime
organisation. Formed on mobilisation from the remaining
personnel of Staff, Royal Army Training
Command after the disbandment
of that command, and filled out under the GRIM
system by
mobilisable subunits that had fulfilled their
active-duty period in said staff unit between four and
twenty
months prior to mobilisation.1
8 |
| b. |
It
will be noted that all replacement depots include empty companies. The
reason of this is not clear to me. It may be that there was an
administrative backlog or that the depots would only be filled out
completely on mobilisation. Together the depots were to be
filled
with some 11,000 initial replacements.2 |
Part
I | Part
II | Operational
Role: Wartime Personnel Replacement
| Unit |
Location |
Peace
Strength |
War
Strength |
| 819
Replacement Depot [a] |
Staff
and Support Company
819
Replacement Depot |
– |
– |
8/31/11/13
(63) |
| A Company |
– |
– |
-/16/56/
(72) |
| B Company |
– |
– |
– |
| C
Company |
– |
– |
– |
|
|
8/47/67/13
(135) |
| 820
Replacement Depot [a] |
Staff
and Support Company
820
Replacement Depot |
– |
– |
9/41/12/15
(77) |
| A Company |
– |
– |
22/12/230
(264) |
| B Company |
– |
– |
– |
| C
Company |
– |
– |
– |
| D Company |
– |
– |
– |
|
|
31/53/242/15
(341) |
| 821
Replacement Depot [a] |
Staff
and Support Company
821
Replacement Depot |
– |
– |
9/37/14/14
(74) |
| A Company |
– |
– |
4/20/288
(312) |
| B Company |
– |
– |
– |
| C
Company |
– |
– |
– |
| D Company |
– |
– |
– |
|
|
13/57/302/14
(386) |
| 202
Personnel Replacement Battalion [b] |
Staff
and Support Company
202 Personel Replacement
Battalion |
– |
– |
70/162/236/4
(472) |
| A Company |
– |
– |
15/42/342
(399) |
| B Company |
– |
– |
15/42/342
(399) |
| C
Company |
– |
– |
15/42/342
(399) |
| D Company |
– |
– |
14/64/312
(390) |
| E
Company |
– |
– |
14/63/289
(366) |
| F
Company |
– |
– |
8/37/356
(401) |
| G Battery |
– |
– |
58/89/280
(427) |
| H Company |
– |
– |
19/85/275
(379) |
| I Company |
– |
– |
16/68/289
(373) |
| J Company |
– |
– |
24/40/314
(378) |
|
|
268/734/3377/4
(4383) |
| 56 Infantry
Battalion [c] |
Staff
and Support Company
56 Infantry Battalion |
– |
– |
– |
| A Company |
– |
– |
– |
| B Company |
– |
– |
– |
| C
Company |
– |
– |
– |
| Combat Support
Company |
– |
– |
– |
|
|
– |
| Army
Training and Replacement Command Peace Strength: – |
| Army
Training and Replacement Command War
Strength: 798/2520/9951/218 (13487) |
Notes
| a. |
See Part
I, note b. |
| b. |
Filled
by personnel from the
general pool of mobilisable
reserves
(vrij-indeelbaar bestand) that had fulfilled their active-duty
period up to five and a half years prior to
mobilisation. In case of mobilisation however this inactive
period may have been much shorter.3 |
| c. |
For some reason 56
Infantry Battalion, the last mobilisable infantry battalion to be
disbanded in the context
of the 1974 Defence White Paper, still lingered in the 1985 Royal Army
order of battle as a purely administrative entity. No personnel or
equipment was assigned.4 |
Operational Role: Wartime Personnel Replacement
5
Army
Training and Replacement Command, formed on mobilisation from Royal
Army Training Command,
was responsible for compensating combat losses of
Royal Army
units by providing replacement personnel. The wartime
personnel replacement
system may be summarised as follows: 202 Personnel Replacement
Battalion would
replenish 1 (NL)
Corps units via 101
Personnel Replacement Battalion (Corps
Logistic Command). 202 Replacement Battalion would
also replenish Royal Army units present in the Rear Combat Zone, for
example National Logistic Command
units. The replacement
depots would refill 202 Personnel
Replacement Battalion and, in addition, replenish the
remaining Royal Army units
directly.6
At the replacement depots the replacements
would receive refresher training and/or a shortened training programme.
The replacements themselves, finally, were
drawn from the large general pool of mobilisable reserves, which held
reservists without a mobilisation
destination (i.e. reservists who were not assigned to an
operational unit).
The
Command was designed to maintain a replacement reserve comprising
the equivalent of fifteen combat day
losses, based on an estimated general attrition rate of 800
men per combat day (dead and wounded) for the entire Royal Army. Of
these fifteen combat day equivalents, five would be held by 202
Personnel
Replacement Battalion and ten by the replacement depots. The estimated
attrition rate however dated from 1966 and was therefore completely
behind the times by 1985. In 1981 the Army had produced a new
study of
the expected
casualty rates, resulting in an updated and more detailed
attrition estimate that predicted significantly higher losses,
especially in the first combat days:
| Combat
Day |
Losses
1 (NL) Corps
and Rear Combat Zone |
Losses
other
Royal Army Units |
Losses
Total |
| 1 |
1330
men |
315 men |
1645 men |
| 2 to 8 |
2265 men |
315 men |
2580 men |
| 9 to 22 |
1158 men |
210 men |
1368 men |
| After day 22 |
701 men |
158 men |
859 men |
For
the wartime personnel replacement system these numbers were to be
corrected downwards because, for example, a number of the wounded would
return to their
units after (ambulatory) medical treatment. After correction the
estimated required replacement
capability of the system looked like this:
| Combat
Day |
Replacements
for
1 (NL) Corps and
Rear Combat Zone |
Replacements
for other
Royal Army Units |
Replacements
Total |
| 1 |
1175
men |
280 men |
1455 men |
| 2 to 8 |
2000 men |
280 men |
2280 men |
| 9 to 22 |
1020 men |
190 men |
1210 men |
| After day 22 |
620 men |
140 men |
760 men |
In
1985 a complete compensation of the expected losses would not
be
possible. In September 1984 the maximum capacity of the
replacement system was reported
to be 800 men per day for 1 (NL) Corps, 25 men per day
for the Rear Combat Zone,
and some 300 men per day for other Royal Army units. Not only had the
estimated attrition rate been outdated, the entire system was
in
urgent need of modernisation and restructuring. Already by the end of
the 1970s it had become clear that it would not function
properly:
procedures were slow, internal coordination was inadequate and
the system would take too long to
become fully operational once mobilisation was declared. In 1983,
whilst a new wartime personnel replacement system was under study, an
emergency
plan was implemented to address the most pressing
deficiencies.
Budgetary constraints however meant that no fundamental changes could
be made. In April 1985 the Army
Board approved the following additional
measures, revealing rather fundamental shortcomings:
- Automation of personnel data processing at all
necessary levels (partly realised in 1985)
- Increasing
the number of replacements in the system and restructuring
the replacement flows to meet the 1981 attrition rate
estimate
- Increasing the number of transport vehicles
- Issuing to each replacement a personal weapon,
(additional) standard personal gear and NBC kit upon call-up
- Increasing
the Command's training capacity to guarantee that each
replacement
would have the (minimum) necessary training before being sent to an
operational unit
- Partly integrating the personnel and materiel
replacement systems (vehicles or weapon systems with crews)
- Advancing elements of the Command in the mobilisation
sequence to improve readiness
As
the Army Board did not approve the financial consequences it would seem
that only some of these measures were (partly) effectuated in
the
period 1985-1988. In 1988 the new wartime personnel replacement system
was still
in the planning phase, scheduled to become operational in
1989.
The automation project was completed in 1988 and tested during the 1
(NL) Corps Field Training Exercise (FTX) Free Lion.7
<
_________________________________________________
| 1. |
|
VS
2-1050/1A, VI-18. NIMH 205A/10,
Aflossing van
mobilisabele eenheden en
-aanvullingen d.d. 11 november 1983 en 17
juni 1985. |
| 2. |
|
The
empy companies are mentioned, but not explained, in NL-HaNA 2.13.182,
inv. nr. 629, Memorandum betreffende de personeelsaanvulling in
oorlogstijd binnen de Koninklijke Landmacht d.d. 9 april 1985
(drawn up in September 1984), 12. Number of initial replacements: ibid. |
| 3. |
|
NIMH
205A/10, loc. cit. shows that the battalion was filled with new
reservists every three years. There were however ways to assign
"fresher" reservists on mobilisation: before passing on to a
mobilisable unit reservists would be administratively
collected
during the formation period of that mobilisable unit (up to two years);
during that period they would be avaiable for the wartime personnel
replacement system. NL-HaNA 2.1.182, inv. nr.
755, Planningsmemorandum personeelsaavullingssysteem in
oorlogstijd binnen de Koninklijke Landmacht d.d. 6 juli 1988,
11.
|
| 4. |
|
NL-HaNA 2.13.182,
inv. nr. 643, Planningsmemorandum Legerplan 162 (Reorganisatie
Infanterie) d.d.
1 augustus 1985,
8. When 44 Armoured Infantry Battalion was deployed to Lebanon in 1979
for United Nations (UNIFIL) peacekeeping duties, 55 Infantry Battalion
(mobilisable),
also scheduled to be disbanded in the 1974 Defence White
Paper, was retained and added to 52
Armoured Infantry Brigade
to fill the gap. After 44 Armoured Infantry
Battalion returned in October 1983, 55 Infanty
Battalion was
added to 101
Infantry Brigade. Ibid. |
| 5. |
|
NL-HaNA
2.13.110, inv. nr. 1468, Concept-eindrapport van de Werkgroep
Personeelsaanvullingssysteem in Oorlogstijd d.d. 7 december
1979. NL-HaNA 2.13.182,
inv. nr. 629, Memorandum betreffende de personeelsaanvulling in
oorlogstijd binnen de Koninklijke Landmacht d.d. 9 april 1985
(drawn up in September 1984), met Aantekening voor de
Legerraad. |
| 6. |
|
The
non-combattant Mobile Column Corps however had its own
replacement depot. |
| 7. |
|
NL-HaNA
2.13.182, inv. nr. 755, Planningsmemorandum
personeelsaavullingssysteem in
oorlogstijd binnen de Koninklijke Landmacht d.d. 6 juli 1988, met nota
voor de Legerraad.
|
| 8. |
|
RIM was
the Dutch acronym for Direct Influx into Mobilisable Units (Rechtstreekse
Instroming in Mobilisabele Eenheden). GRIM was a variant of
this system, meaning "Largely RIM" (Grotendeels
Rechtstreekse Instroming in Mobilisabele Eenheden).
For a survey of the
Royal Army's unit filling and reserve system see Gijsbers, Blik
in de smidse, 2222-2231;
Selles,
Personele
vulling;
Berghuijs, Opleiding,
14-23. In English: Isby and Kamps, Armies,
341-343; Sorrell, Je
Maintiendrai, 94-96; Van
Vuren, The
Royal Netherlands Army Today, Military Review April 1982, 23-28. |
|