Light Aircraft Group
Groep
Lichte Vliegtuigen (GPLV) 1
Unit |
Main
Equipment |
Location |
Peace
Strength |
War
Strength |
Staff
and Staff Squadron
Light Aircraft Group |
|
Deelen |
26/45/38
(109)
|
28/65/63
(156) |
298
Light Aircraft Squadron |
24 x
Alouette III |
Soesterberg |
48/45/60
(153) |
56/50/77
(183) |
299
Light Aircraft Squadron [a] |
24 x BO-105C |
Deelen |
48/45/60
(153) |
56/50/77
(183) |
300
Light Aircraft Squadron |
18 x
Alouette III
|
Deelen |
31/42/51
(124) |
38/39/65
(142) |
302
Light Aircraft Squadron [b] |
18 x
Alouette III |
– |
– |
44/43/74
(161) |
Maintenance
and Materiel Squadron |
|
Soesterberg |
6/95/70
(171) |
6/100/98
(204) |
Light
Aircraft Group Peace Strength: 159/272/279
(710) |
Light
Aircraft Group War Strength: 228/347/454
(1029) |
Note
a. | Between
October 1986 and February 1990 the squadron's helicopters were upgraded
with low-light intensifying night vision goggles and navigation and
stabilisation equipment for nighttime operations. This changed the
helicopter type to BO-105CB.2 |
b. |
Filled by mobilisable
personnel that had
served in 299 Light
Aircraft Squadron up to eight and a half years prior to mobilisation.3
The pilots would be Royal Air Force reservists, as much as
possible still active as helicopter pilots in civilian life. |
Operational
Role 4
The
GPLV helicopter fleet, comprising thirty BO-105C and sixty-six
Alouette III
helicopters, was operated by the Royal Air Force and
owned
by the Royal Army.5 The helicopters were
unarmed. In peacetime GPLV fell under the
Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, who delegated command to Commander Tactical Air Force. The squadrons operated from Deelen Air Base and Soesterberg Air Base. Pilots and flight-technical
personnel belonged to the Royal Air Force, the onboard
spotters/observers and other personnel belonged to the Royal Army. GPLV's operational role was to
fly scouting, liaison and light transport missions for Commander 1 (NL)
Corps, under whose command they would fall
in
wartime. The scouting role would comprise missions for tactical control,
surveillance and combat intelligence
purposes as well as directing artillery fire or close air support (Airborne Forward
Control, AFAC). The helicopters could also function as airborne radio relay
stations. In
the scouting role the helicopters would often fly extremely low, making
use of
terrain cover as much as possible. The entire group was fully
mobile and would in wartime operate from the field rather than from air
force bases. In the warning phase or first mobilisation phase (NATO Military Vigilance or Simple Alert) the group would deploy to its operational location(s) in West-Germany, likely situated in the Corps Rear Area or the Rear Combat Zone.5
In
peacetime 300
Squadron operated with twenty-four rather than eighteen Alouette III
helicopters, providing the Helicopter Type and
Theatre Conversion, the Elementary Tactical Helicopter Course and the
Advanced Tactical Helicopter Course for 298 and 299 Squadron.
On mobilisation the six Alouette III helicopters shed by 300 Squadron
supplemented with fifteen machines pulled from the maintenance reserve
would be used to equip the mobilisable 302 and 301
Squadron. The
group's reserve further included six BO-105C helicopters.6
_________________________________________________
1. |
|
In some
Army documents the somewhat cumbersome abbreviation "Gpltvltgn"is used. |
2. | | Helfferich,
Squadrons
(1994), 117-118. |
3. |
|
NIMH 205A/10,
Aflossing van
mobilisabele eenheden en
-aanvullingen d.d. 27 mei 1980. Ibid., d.d. 11 november 1983.
Ibid., d.d. 17
juni 1985. |
4. |
|
For this
section and the distribution of helicopters: NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr.
663, Concept krijgsmachtdeelplan
Koninklijke Luchtmacht 1987-1996 d.d. 20 december 1985,
58-59. Helfferich, Nederlandse
Koninklijke, 50,
127-135. Helfferich,
Squadrons
(1983), 71. Helfferich, op. cit., 109-128. De Jong, Vlucht, 215,
279-286,
395-396. Van Loo, Crossing, 232-233. De Winter, Een
eeuw, 150-151. |
5. | | Deployment
in wartime: on telegram N command would pass from the
Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force to Commander 1 (NL) Corps. NIMH
430, inv. nr. 54 (Slagorde KL stand 1 juli 1985),
Blad E en S2.
Depending the circumstances telegram N would invoke the warning phase
or the first mobilisation phase of the Royal Army's mobilisation plan.
VS 2-1050/1A, II-7. This would correspond with NATO Military Vigilance
or, at the latest, NATO Simple Alert. NL-HaNA 2.13.148, inv.
nr. 694, Alarmboek LLC
d.d. 17 februari 1987, Deel I, Hoofdstuk 2. | 6. | | On
2 October 1985 a BO-105C crashed, which brought the total number of
machines down to twenty-nine, and the reserve presumably to five.
Helfferich, op.cit., 119. |
|