41
Armoured Brigade
41
Pantserbrigade (41 Pabrig)
Force Profile
| Operational
Role: The Corps Covering Force
| Unit |
Main
Equipment |
Location |
Peace
Strength |
War
Strength |
Staff
and Staff Company
41 Armoured Brigade |
|
Seedorf
(GE) |
26/34/116
(176)
|
31/35/148/2
(216) |
| 41 Tank Battalion |
Leopard 2 |
Hohne
(GE) |
38/95/407 (540) |
37/98/443/2 (580) |
| 43 Tank
Battalion |
Leopard 2 |
Langemannshof
(GE) |
38/95/407
(540) |
37/98/443/2
(580) |
| 42
Armoured Infantry Battalion |
YPR-765 |
Seedorf
(GE) |
39/126/699
(864) |
43/126/716/2
(887) |
| 41 Armoured
Engineer Company [a] |
|
Seedorf
(GE) |
8/25/132
(165) |
7/27/182
(216) |
| 41
Armoured Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battery [b] |
PRTL,
Stinger |
Langemannshof
(GE) |
9/33/104
(146) |
10/42/133
(185) |
| 41 Field
Artillery Battalion [c] |
M109A2/A3 |
Seedorf
(GE) |
41/96/332
(469) |
30/94/436/2
(562) |
| 41
Brigade Supply
Company |
|
Seedorf
(GE) |
5/20/142
(167) |
7/27/265
(299) |
| 828
Transport Detachment [d] |
|
Seedorf
(GE) |
2/5/50
(57) |
1/5/50
(56) |
| 41
Brigade Repair
Company [e] |
|
Seedorf
(GE) |
11/72/273
(356) |
6/49/194
(249) |
| 611 Materiel Support Platoon
Leopard 2 [f] |
|
Seedorf
(GE) |
1/7/24 (32) |
1/7/23 (31) |
| 125 Repair Company
(Corps) [f] |
|
Hohne
(GE) |
6/38/115
(159) |
8/41/151
(200) |
| 503 Materiel Support Platoon PRTL
[f] |
|
Hohne
(GE) |
1/8/19 (28) |
1/12/29 (42) |
| 41
Brigade Medical Company |
|
Seedorf
(GE) |
12/19/118
(149) |
19/21/144/2
(186) |
| 41
Armoured Brigade Peace Strength: 237/673/2938
(3848) |
| 41
Armoured Brigade War Strength: 217/575/2971/12
(3775) |
Notes
| a. |
Brought up to (near)
war strength in January 1986 by placing the Short Leave
platoon on active duty, which increased
peace strength to 8/28/166 (202).1 |
| b. |
Peacetime
organisation; under command of 15 Armoured Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion in wartime. |
| c. |
A
Battery was not stationed in Seedorf (GE) but in Oirschot
(NL), serving as School Battery for B and C Battery.2 |
| d. |
Peacetime
organisation; under command of 105 Transport
Battalion, Corps
Logistic Command in wartime. Under
direct command
of the Brigade in June 1985, by December 1985 placed under the command
of 41 Brigade Supply
Company. |
| e. |
Unit
strengths shown are per July 1985; by December 1985 peace
strength had dropped to 8/52/192 (252) and war
strength to
8/47/173 (228). |
| f. |
Peacetime
organisation; under command of Corps Logistic Command
in wartime. 125 Repair Company (Corps) (in full: 125 Repair
Company Corps Support Battalion) was formed in September 1985 and had
taken 503 Materiel Support
Platoon PRTL
under command by December 1985. At that time 41 Brigade
Repair
Company
likewise had taken 611 Materiel Support
Platoon Leopard 2 under its
command.
Hitherto these two materiel support platoons had
been under direct command of the Brigade. |
Force
Profile
Together
with 103
Reconnaissance Battalion
and 41
Engineer Battalion, 41
Armoured Brigade (reinforced) constituted the forward-deployed
element of 1
(NL) Corps
in West Germany.
In
terms of fire power, materiel, readiness and unit cohesion the
brigade was the Royal Army's most
capable
fighting force.3
The Leopard 2 main battle tank was arguably the best operational main
battle
tank
available, whilst the YPR-765, thought perhaps
dismissible as
"the poor man's Bradley", was nonetheless a veritable infantry fighting
vehicle rather than an armoured personnel carrier like the
M113
or the YP-408.4
The brigade's officers and sub-officers were kept
knowledgeable about Warsaw Pact
military
organisation and tactics and periodically reconnoitered
the deployment areas, which had been charted in
detail for their
suitableness to support defensive, counter-offensive and
engineer operations.5
Conscript personnel serving in
Germany were picked more selectively
than those
serving in the Netherlands: for each batch of one hundred and twenty
conscripts needed to
fill a line company of 42 Armoured Infantry Battalion for
instance two hundred were selected (after the regular selection,
which accepted about three men out of four),6
who
would go through a further sifting process during the four months
of basic training.7
Readiness
was high, with units permanently kept on a six hour
alert
status and
the
main body of the brigade brought up to near war
strength: 42 Armoured Infantry Battalion, 41 and 43 Tank Battalion and
41 Armoured Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battery had no
subunits on Short
Leave, whilst 41 Armoured Engineer Company was likewise brought up to
near war strength in January 1986.8
The selective intake of personnel and the distance
from home, combined with a restricted
system of leave, created a sense of unity and interdependence that was
felt to be greater than in units based in the Netherlands.9
All this seems to have payed off at
least to some degree, as in both national
and international military competitions it were often the Germany-based
units
that
performed best.10
<
Operational
Role: The Corps Covering Force
In
case of an actual or impending attack by Warsaw Pact forces,
41 Armoured
Brigade was to cover the approach march
and deployment of the rest of
1 (NL) Corps to its sector in West Germany and, if
necessary, fight an aggressive delaying battle to win
time: the covering force battle. Following the Royal Army's tactical
doctrine and established modus operandi the brigade would not fight in
the organic
order of battle displayed above, but form combined-arms battle groups,
as
illustrated in Unit Organisation and Equipment, Mixed Battalions and Company Teams.
In this role the brigade
formed the nucleus of the covering force (CF),
the
composition of which changed over time as concepts of operation
evolved and reorganisations were implemented.11
A permanent factor in the
covering force however was the assistance of 3 (GE) Armoured Division,
necessitated by the maldeployment
of 1 (NL) Corps. In case of alarm this German division would
take 41 Armoured
Brigade, 103
Reconnaissance Battalion
and 41
Engineer Battalion under command and secure the
Dutch corps sector until the bulk of 1 (NL) Corps would
arrive, which would take at least forty-eight hours, but
probably longer. Until relieved the reinforced 3 (GE)
Armoured Division
would operate under the command of 1 (NL) Corps.12
In 1979 Commander, 1 (NL) Corps had felt confident to give the
mobilisable 5 Division, recently mechanised and improved in readiness,
a
prominent
role in the
covering force battle.13
As soon
as possible 5 Division was to relieve 3 (GE)
Armoured Division by
taking 41 Armoured Brigade under command and reinforcing
it with 13 Armoured
Brigade and 52 Armoured
Infantry Brigade,
which together would then form the covering force. Whether these
reinforcements would
arrive from the Netherlands in time, and whether they would be able
to effectively fight the
important and tactically difficult covering force battle remained
questionable however,
especially regarding the
mobilisation-dependent components
from 5 Division.14
Covering Force, 1 (NL) Corps Sector, 1979-1985
15
In
July 1985 Commander, 1 (NL) Corps implemented a new concept of
operations which reflected a more realistic view on the readiness of
its formations and that of 5 Division in particular. Taking into
account the possibility of a surprise attack by the Warsaw
Pact's
large standing forces,16
it was
recognised that 5 Division, given its maldeployment and mobilisable
status, would unlikely be able to play any effective role in
the
covering force operations. The new covering force, once again under
the
operational command of 3 (GE) Armoured Division, would now
comprise 103 Reconnaissance Battalion, 3 (GE) Reconnaissance Battalion,
41 Armoured Brigade and 2 (US) Armored Division (Forward).17
This force was to fight the delaying
battle between the Inner German Border and the
Elbe-Seitenkanal (the Covering Force Area)
for at least twenty-four hours in order to enable the active-duty formations of
1 (NL) Corps, notably 1 and 4 Division, to deploy to their
battle
positions.18
After
being relieved by the main defensive forces 41 Armoured
Brigade would be taken into reserve to recuperate and take
part in
subsequent counteroffensive actions; see 1 (NL) Corps, Operational
Role. <
Covering Force, 1 (NL) Corps Sector, 1985-1989
_________________________________________________
| 1. |
|
NIMH 430, inv. nr. 55
(Slagorde KL stand 23 december 1985). SSA-MvD,
CLAS/BLS 7643,
Memorandum Realisatie Legerplan 120-1B d.d. 22 maart 1985. < |
| 2. |
|
A Battery
serving as school battery: website 41AFDVA.NET, Geschiedenis van de 41e Afdeling
Veldartillerie and other pages. < |
| 3. |
|
For a
somewhat wistful retrospect, see Matser, Untergang,
556-557. < |
| 4. |
|
At this
time the American M1 Abrams was still armed with a 105 mm
rather
than a 120 mm
gun, whilst the British
Challenger had serious problems with its
fire control system. Zaloga, Abrams, 11.
Dunstan, Challenger,
16-23. "Bradley" refers to the American M2 Bradley infantry fighting
vehicle. For an overview of the YPR-765 in Royal Army service
see
Staarman, De
YPR-765. < |
| 5. |
|
Elands et
al., 250 jaar,
201. Felius,
Einde
Oefening,
306. Hoffenaar, Van der Meulen en De Winter, Confrontatie en ontspanning,
139.
<
|
| 6. |
|
Van de
Worp, 42 Schoolcie,
36. Three men out of four: HTK 1982-1983, kamerstuknr. 176000 X ondernr. 2, 35.
< |
| 7. |
|
Van de
Worp, loc. cit. The first
four months of basic training were handled by School Company 42
Armoured Infantry Battalion in Oirschot (NL). < |
| 8. |
|
Hoffenaar, Van der Meulen en De Winter, loc. cit. Additional measures to increase the readiness of the
troops in
Germany were underway: the Short Leave company of 41 Engineer Battalion
would be placed on active-duty in September 1986 (SSA-MvD,
CLAS/BLS 7643, op. cit.), and in October 1986 the
storage of materiel for the Short Leave
components of 103 Reconnaissance Battalion and 41 Field Artillery
Battalion would be centralised in Seedorf. SSA-MvD, CLAS/BLS 7643,
Memorandum Realisatie Legerplan
120-3B d.d. 22 maart 1985. < |
| 9. |
|
Asbeek, Griffioen Special,
14, 39,
41. NIMH, D1499 DPL
in BRD (army
information film, 1988). Restricted system
of leave: in cycles of ten weeks
there was one long and one short period of leave (long
period: ten days,
including two weekends; short period: from
Friday to Monday). During
weekends, which began on Saturday at noon, readiness was ensured by
roll calls. Asbeek, op. cit., 23. Hoffenaar, Van der Meulen en De Winter, loc. cit. < |
| 10. |
|
In
1985 A Squadron, 43 Tank Battalion won
the Canadian
Army Trophy (CAT), a biennial international tank
gunnery competition
amongst the armoured forces of NATO countries in Western
Europe.
In the next edition (CAT '87) C
Squadron, 43 Tank Battalion ended in fourth place overall whilst
achieving the highest score of the Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) participants.
At CAT '89 the trophy was won by A
Squadron, 41 Tank Battalion. Rens, Het Regiment Huzaren,
253. Zaloga,
Tank War,
51. Website
43 Tankbataljon, Canadian Army Trophy. Website
Mihalko, Canadian Army Trophy Competition
(lists all CAT scores from 1963 to 1991). In
1985 a team from 103 Reconnaissance Battalion became third in the
Boeselager Trophy, a German competition for reconnaissance units, out
of twenty-two participating teams from nine countries. Anonymus, 103 Verkenningsbataljon,
32. Teams from that
battalion came second in 1984, third in 1980, fourth in 1983 and fifth
in 1981 and 1987 (website http://run.to/boreel, now defunct). Felius
reports that 42 Armoured Infantry Battalion "nearly
always" won the Generaal Bartelsbeker, the
national competition
for armoured infantry units. Felius, op. cit.,
232. < |
| 11. |
|
The
covering force was to "observe, intercept, engage, delay, disorganise
and deceive the enemy before he can attack the main force". North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Allied Training Program 35, Land Forces
Doctrine (Brussels: NATO, 1981), xiii; quoted in Golden, Clark and
Arlinghaus, Conventional
Deterrence, 138. Dutch
designation for covering force:
beveiligende strijdmacht (bsm). VS 2-1120/2, II-6. VS 2-7200 (1983),
toelichting bij Bijlage 1 en 2, Bijlage 1-3. Elands,
Van Gils en Schoenmaker, Geschiedenis
1 Divisie,
213. < |
| 12. |
|
Elands et al., op.
cit.,
227. 3
(GE) Armoured Division temporarily under command of 1
(NL) Corps:
information kindly provided by O.W. Dragoner, author of Bundeswehr,
Teil 2.1, which contains a
detailed order
of battle of this division in 1989 (59-65). Dragoner reports that
the temporary subordination to 1 (NL) Corps was agreed upon in the
middle of the 1980s, perhaps earlier,
and further that from 1986 the German division would, after its Covering Force mission, not be
resubordinated to 1 (GE) Corps, but form a reserve
corps for NORTHAG together with 7 (GE) Armoured Division and a
British division, enabling Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Europe (CINCENT) to use III (US) Corps as a theater level reserve. Thanks to O.W. Dragoner (email 15.02.2013). For the
involvement of German engineer units in the necessary defensive
preparations, see 101 Engineer Combat Group, Operational
Role. When interviewed in 1995 (about the formation of 1 GE/NL
Corps),
Lieutenant-General G.L.J. Huyser (Rtd.), Commander of 1 (NL) Corps from
1981 to 1983, stated in retrospect that "during NATO's large-scale
autumn
exercises the integrated performance with the German corps was an
example to our allies. The third German armoured division was more a
Dutch than a German formation, and the Dutch 41st Brigade appeared to
belong more to the third German armoured
division than to its
Dutch division." Goudriaan, Het
legerkorps. < |
| 13. |
|
5
Division was mechanised and restructured between 1975 and
September 1979 (Operatie Omega). The new
mobilisation plan of 1979 advanced its mobilisation
by calling up one brigade in each of the three mobilisation phases,
rather than mobilising all three brigades in the last phase. Hoffenaar
en Schoenmaker, Met de
blik, 346. De Jong en Hoffenaar, Op herhaling, 115.
Schoenmaker, 5
Divisie, 304-305. < |
| 14. |
|
Hoffenaar
en
Schoenmaker, op. cit., 355. Elands, Van Gils en Schoenmaker, loc. cit. Elands et al., op.
cit.,
227.
De Jong en Hoffenaar, op. cit., 115. For
a description of 41 Tank Battalion's role in the
covering force battle plans in 1982, see Westerhuis, Een
tankeskadron, 13-14. < |
| 15. |
|
As it seems unlikely
that the two
added brigades would deploy without any ground-based air defence I
have attached an armoured anti-aircraft artillery battery from 101 Anti-Aircraft Artillery Group
to each brigade. It should also be noted that
up to 1983 each brigade included a brigade reconnaissance squadron
(zelfstandig verkenningseskadron, ZVE), not shown here. These were
equipped with M113 C&V armoured reconnaissance
vehicles (with
KBA-B autocannon 25 mm) and AMX-13 light tanks (with 105 mm gun). See
Isby and Kamps, op. cit., 329; Rens, Huzaren van Boreel,
383-398; website Kronieken 13 ZVE, 013-016, passim.
< |
| 16. |
|
See 1 (NL)
Corps, footnote
18.
<
|
| 17. |
|
This was the official
designation of 3 Brigade, 2 (US) Armored Division in its role as
forward-deployed element of III (US) Corps. Isby and Kamps, op. cit., 373, 455.
Website U.S. Army in Germany, 2nd Armored Division (Forward). In 1989 the American
brigade was withdrawn from the covering force. Elands,
Van Gils en Schoenmaker, op. cit., 250. For a detailed order
of battle of 2 (US) Armored Division (Forward)
in 1989, see Dragoner, Die Streitkräfte der USA,
51-53.
< |
| 18. |
|
For this
paragraph: Hoffenaar
en Schoenmaker, op. cit., 384. Elands,
Van Gils en Schoenmaker, op. cit., 249. De Jong en
Hoffenaar, op. cit., 115-116. It will be observed that the protruding shape of the covering force area
made the covering force vulnerable to envelopment by advancing
enemy forces, especially if the main defensive forces would not yet be
in place. See also Golden, Clark and Arlinghaus, op. cit., 112, where
the phrase "indefensible pocket" has some relevance to this situation.
To the north the covering force area was to a degree protected by the Elbe river, but the river crossings in Hamburg and in
particular the bridges at Geesthacht and Lauenburg were
susceptible to being seized in a surprise attack because of their
proximity to the Inner German Border and the relative weakness of NATO forces north of the Elbe.
Elands et al., op. cit., 230-231.
Meanwhile, actual war plans of the East German army (Nationale Volksarmee, NVA)
for offensive operations against 1
(NL) Corps are discussed in some detail in Lautsch,
Zur Planung, 25-27. < |
|