1 (NL) Corps Artillery
1
Legerkorpsartillerie (1 Lka)
Operational Command Structures:
The Field Artillery Groups | Dual Capable Artillery
Unit |
Main
Equipment |
Location |
Peace
Strength |
War
Strength |
Staff
and Staff Battery
1 (NL) Corps Artillery |
|
Stroe |
20/18/50
(88)
|
21/17/65/2
(105) |
Staff
and Staff Battery
101 Field Artillery Group |
|
Arnhem |
7/11/35 (53)
|
13/14/60
(87) |
Staff
and Staff Battery
102 Field Artillery Group |
|
Harderwijk |
7/11/35 (53)
|
13/14/60
(87) |
Staff
and Staff Battery
103 Field Artillery Group [a] |
|
– |
–
|
13/14/58
(85) |
Staff
and Staff Battery
104 Field Artillery Group [b] |
|
– |
–
|
13/14/58
(85) |
44 Field
Artillery Battalion [c] |
M109A2/A3 |
– |
– |
30/90/437/2
(559) |
107 Field
Artillery Battalion [d] |
M107 |
't
Harde |
26/78/258
(362) |
28/83/390/2
(503) |
108
Field Artillery Battalion [e] |
M110A2 |
– |
– |
28/83/395/2 (508) |
117
Field Artillery Battalion [f] |
M110A2 |
– |
– |
28/83/395/2 (508) |
118 Field
Artillery Battalion [e] |
M110A2 |
– |
– |
28/83/395/2 (508) |
104 Field
Artillery Battalion [g] |
M114A1 |
– |
– |
30/90/466/2
(588) |
114 Field
Artillery Battalion [h] |
M114A1 |
– |
– |
30/90/466/2
(588) |
124 Field
Artillery Battalion [g] |
M114A1 |
– |
– |
30/90/466/2
(588) |
134 Field
Artillery Battalion [h] |
M114A1 |
– |
– |
30/90/466/2
(588) |
144 Field
Artillery Battalion [g] |
M114A1 |
– |
– |
30/90/466/2
(588) |
244 Field
Artillery Battalion [h] |
M114A1 |
– |
– |
30/90/466/2
(588) |
19
Field
Artillery Battalion [i] |
M110A2 |
't
Harde |
27/74/297
(398) |
27/75/340/2
(444) |
Royal
Army Detachment to
23rd (US) Custodial Detachment [j] |
|
't
Harde |
2/3/33 (38) |
1/1/27 (29) |
8
Ammunition Supply Platoon [l] |
|
Darp |
2/9/43 (54) |
2/7/49 (58) |
1
(NL) Corps Artillery Peace Strength: 158/421/1583
(2162) |
1
(NL) Corps Artillery War Strength: 511/1425/6875/28
(8839) |
Notes
a. |
Filled
by mobilisable
personnel that had fulfilled their active-duty period
in Staff and
Staff Battery, 101 Field Artillery Group up to six and a half years
prior to mobilisation.1 |
b. |
Filled by mobilisable
personnel that had fulfilled their active-duty period
in Staff
and Staff Battery, 102 Field Artillery Group up to six and a half years
prior to mobilisation.1 |
c. |
Active-duty
unit until November 1984.2 RIM battalion, filled by
mobilisable batteries that had fulfilled their active-duty
period in 43 Field
Artillery Battalion between four and
twenty months prior to mobilisation.1 24 |
d. |
Transitioned from M107
to M110A2 in 1986.3 |
e. |
Filled by mobilisable
personnel that had fulfilled their active-duty period
in 19
Field Artillery Battalion up to eight and a half years prior to
mobilisation.1 |
f. |
RIM battalion, filled by
mobilisable batteries that had fulfilled their active-duty
period in 107 Field Artillery
Battalion between four and twenty months prior to
mobilisation. After 107 Field Artillery Battalion had completed its
transition to M110A2 (see note d), 108 Field Artillery
Battalion was to become that unit's RIM-counterpart.4 24 |
g. |
Filled by mobilisable
personnel that had fulfilled their active-duty period
in 44
Field Artillery Battalion up to eight and a half years prior to
mobilisation.1 |
h. |
Filled by mobilisable
personnel that had fulfilled their active-duty period
in 43 Field
Artillery Battalion up to
eight and a half years prior to mobilisation.1 |
i. |
Dual
capable unit.5 6
US nuclear warheads for 19 Field Artillery Battalion were stored at
Special Ammunition Storage (SAS) 't Harde (Doornspijk)
under
the
custody of 23rd US
Army Field Artillery Detachment (23rd USAFAD).7
See
also notes j and m. |
j. |
Apparently
usually referred to as 23 KL
(US) Detachement, this unit provided general
support to the
custodial
23rd US Army Field Artillery Detachment in peacetime. Its
commander was responsible
for the intricate security system of SAS 't Harde and was also site
commander. In
wartime the detachment would provide transport of
US nuclear warheads for 19 Field Artillery Battalion.7 8 |
k. |
Dual
capable unit.5
9 US nuclear warheads
for 129 Field Artillery Battalion were stored at SAS Darp
(Havelterberg) under the custody of 8th US Army Field
Artillery Detachment (8th
USAFAD). In peacetime the battalion provided general support to that
detachment.7 See
also note n. |
l. |
Would transport,
store, maintain
and secure a reserve nuclear ammunition stock for NORTHAG
dual capable artillery units in wartime, deploying an
Ammunition Supply Point
(designated ASP-A) in the Rear
Combat Zone together with 162nd (US) Ordnance Company and 436
Mobile Security Infantry Company. The platoon would
remain under the command of Commander, 1 (NL) Corps Artillery. In peacetime the
platoon commander was responsible for the intricate security
system of SAS Darp and was also site commander.10
|
m. |
Would
support 19 Field Artillery Battalion in wartime, securing
the transport and field storage of nuclear warheads.11 |
n. |
Would
support 129 Field Artillery Battalion in wartime, securing
the transport and field storage of nuclear warheads.12 |
o. |
GRIM
company, largely filled by mobilisable platoons that had filled 437 Mobile
Security Infantry Company during
their four
to six-month Short Leave period, having previously
fulfilled their active-duty period in 425
and/or 434 Mobile Security Infantry Company.1 13
24 Would
secure (the deployment of) ASP-A (see
note l).
|
p. |
Mobilisable company
filled by personnel from 425 and/or 434 Mobile Infantry
Security Company on Short
Leave.13 Would
remain under operational control of Commander, 1 (NL) Corps Artillery
to serve as reinforcement or quick reaction force.14 |
Operational
Command Structures: The Field Artillery Groups
The command
structure of 1 (NL) Corps Artillery was similar to the divisional command structure, with
units assigned to tactical headquarters as circumstances
required. During operations Commander, 1
(NL) Corps
would order the formation of mission-tailored field artillery groups,
and if necessary place a number of artillery battalions under direct
operational command of Commander, 1 (NL) Corps Artillery. Each field
artillery group could be allocated to a division
or kept under the operational command of Commander, 1
(NL) Corps Artillery, again as circumstances required. Four field
artillery groups could be formed (101, 102, 103 and 104 Field Artillery
Group), each comprising a staff and staff battery and a
variable number of artillery battalions, in principle up to a
maximum of six battalions per group. A field artillery group
could further be allocated a mortar locating radar platoon, a
sound ranging platoon and/or a terrain survey platoon, as
needed, which units would be detached from 101 Artillery Survey Battalion for
such purpose.
As an illustration the chart below shows a possible
operational configuration of 102 Field Artillery Group, attached to 4
Division: 15
<
Dual
Capable Artillery
As can be
gathered from notes i and k above, the nuclear warheads
for the dual capable 5 batteries
of 19
and 129
Field Artillery Battalion were property of the United States
and would remain under US Army custody until the moment a
nuclear mission would be executed, at which point the
battery or batteries would effectively fire the
warhead(s).
Any request for the use of nuclear artillery, for instance
by Commander, 1 (NL) Corps,
had to go
up through the chain of command to Supreme Allied Commander Europe
(SACEUR) before, ultimately, being decided upon by the President of the
United States.16
The chain of planning and execution of a nuclear mission involving
Netherlands dual capable artillery is illustrated in the chart below:
17
During
a nuclear deployment the field artillery battalion concerned would
be placed under direct command of Commander,
1
(NL) Corps Artillery.18
The deployment area, with its Field Storage Sites (FSS) for
the
nuclear warheads,19
would be secured by a mobile security infantry company (see
notes m-n above), which would operate under the
command of
the field artillery battalion commander.20
In wartime the security infantry companies were expected to come up
against Warsaw Pact
airborne and/or special forces such as Soviet Spetsnaz units,
aiming to neutralise NORTHAG's
means of nuclear delivery.21
In
peacetime the custodial 8th and 23rd US Army Field
Artillery Detachments guarded the inner security ring of
SAS Darp and SAS 't Harde, the outer security ring
of these sites being guarded by detachments from 1
(NL) Corps units on a rotational basis.22
During nuclear deployment the US custodial detachments would likewise
guard the inner security ring of the FSS.23
<
_________________________________________________
1. |
|
NIMH
205A/10,
Aflossing van mobilisabele eenheden en -aanvullingen d.d. 27 mei 1980.
Ibid., d.d. 11 november 1983. Ibid., d.d. 17 juni 1985. < |
2. |
|
Hoffenaar
en Schoenmaker, Met de
blik, 391. < |
3. |
|
Anonymus,
Charliebatterij,
1. Langhenkel, Veger en Ueberschaer, FOFA, 577. Website 107
Afdva, Geschiedenis. <
|
4. |
|
NIMH
430, inv. nr. 54 (Slagorde KL stand 1 juli 1985),
Blad H. Ibid.,
inv. nr. 55 (Slagorde KL stand 23 december 1985), Blad H. NIMH
205A/10, Aflossing van mobilisabele eenheden en
-aanvullingen d.d. 27 mei 1980, Bijlage 1.
Website 107 Afdva, 117
Afdva. It is worth
noting here that the operation of the M110A2 howitzer was identical to
that of the M107 gun, the type used by 107 Field Artillery
Battalion. Information kindly provided by Rob Meinen of 107afdva.nl
(email 30.01.2012). Regarding the available source material it should
be noted that the
1983 and 1985 unit filling schemes for mobilisable units and
replacements show 108 Field Artillery Battalion as being the
RIM-counterpart of 107 Field Artillery
Battalion, I believe prematurely; moreover in these documents the
latter unit is,
certainly prematurely, shown as being equipped with
the M110A2 (see
note d and footnote 3). NIMH
205A/10,
Aflossing van mobilisabele eenheden en -aanvullingen d.d. 11 november
1983, Bijlage 1. Ibid., d.d. 17 juni 1985, Bijlage A. < |
5. |
|
Dual
capable: "A nuclear certified delivery unit capable of executing both
conventional and nuclear missions." US
Department of Defense Dictionary,
139. < |
6. |
|
Hoffenaar,
Van Hoof en De Moor, Vuur
in beweging, 159, 186. < |
7. |
|
Bevaart
et al., Vijftig jaar, 96-97. Website
U.S. Army in Germany, I (NE) Corps Nuclear Artillery Timeline
(1960-1978). The 8th
and 23rd US Army Field Artillery Detachments (also referred to as
Missile Detachments) were part of 552nd US Army Artillery
Group (552nd USAAG) in
Sögel (GE), subordinate to 59th (US) Ordnance Brigade, headquartered in
Pirmasens (GE),
which brigade was responsible for the US Army's nuclear
weapons in Europe. Hoffenaar,
Van Hoof en De Moor, op. cit.,
159-160. Oosterboer, Kernwapenopslag,
115. Website
U.S. Army in Germany, 59th Ordnance Brigade. Website
8th
Missile Detachment, Our History, 23rd
Missile Detachment. In the Netherlands military
the SAS sites were neutrally designated munitiemagazijnencomplex
(mmc; MMC 't Harde, MMC
Darp). VS 2-1120/2
(1989), II-23. Information kindly
provided
by artillery Lieutenant-Colonel H. Molman (Rtd.) (email
22.07.2014). In
1982 it was thought that about twenty nuclear warheads were stored at
SAS 't Harde (W33, 8 inch, for 19 Field Artillery Battalion) and
about fifty at SAS Darp (W70, Lance, for 129 Field Artillery Battalion), with an
additional number of spare warheads at both locations.
Anonymus, Opslag en
transport, 22-23, 25. Peacetime support to 8th USAFAD:
Molman, email 16.06.2014. < |
8. |
|
Role
23 KL (US) Detachement: VS 6-101, A-1-2. Hoksbergen
en Kroon, Nederlandse Artillerie, 88. Oosterboer,
op. cit., 93, 114. Website 425 Mob Cie
van Heutsz, post by Pieke van der Schaaf, 17.11.2006,
post by Willem Lensink, 31.10.2007. < |
9. |
|
Hoffenaar,
Van Hoof en De Moor, op. cit., 226. < |
10. |
|
Hoksbergen
en Kroon, loc. cit. Oosterboer,
op. cit., 93. Essential additional information on this unit's wartime
role kindly provided
by artillery Lieutenant-Colonel H. Molman (Rtd.) (various
emails, May and June 2014).
Until 436 Mobile Security Infantry Company (mobilisable) would become
available, an armoured infantry company of 45 Armoured Infantry Battalion would
fill in. 162nd (US) Ordnance Company, subordinate to 552nd US
Army Artillery Group in
Sögel (GE),
provided technical support for ASP-A, receiving, checking
and maintaining the nuclear ammunition.
The ASP's nuclear stock included both Lance and 8 inch ammunition.
Molman, various emails, June 2014. < |
11. |
|
Website 425
Mob Cie van Heutsz. Bevaart
et al., op. cit., 95-97, 119. Hoffenaar,
Van Hoof en De Moor, op. cit.,
160. It would appear that the security infantry
companies of 1 (NL) Corps Artillery, though maintaining a high standard of operational readiness, were not
entirely immune to the personnel problems that impaired many of the
security infantry companies of National Territorial Command. See National Territorial Command,
footnote 17. In 1988 425 Mobile Security Infantry Company found itself
similarly affected, rarely being able to operate at authorised
strength. Information kindly provided by J.W. van de Langemheen,
conscript sergeant in 425 Mobile Infantry Security Company in 1988
(email 30.12.2013). < |
12. |
|
Website 434 Infbevcie Mobiel. Bevaart
et al., loc. cit. Hoffenaar,
Van Hoof en De Moor, loc. cit. < |
13. |
|
Short Leave: see Unit Organisation and
Equipment, Short Leave. < |
14. |
|
Information
kindly provided
by artillery Lieutenant-Colonel H. Molman (Rtd.) (email
16.06.2014).
See also Dorrestijn, Vuur geëindigd,
168; Hoffenaar, Van Hoof en De Moor, loc. cit;
Hoksbergen en Kroon, op.cit., 88-90. <
|
15.
|
|
Operational
Corps Artillery command structure and field artillery group
configuration: VS 6-20/1, 3-1 t/m 3-2, 3-4 t/m 3-6. < |
16. |
|
Hoffenaar,
Van Hoof en De Moor, op. cit., 159-160. Hoksbergen
en Kroon, loc. cit.
The prime minister of the other nuclear power in NATO, the United
Kingdom, would also be involved in the decision; the North
Atlantic Council (NATO) would be consulted. Hoffenaar,
Van Hoof en De Moor, loc. cit. Depending on the circumstances the
president of France would probably also be involved in some
way;
France, also a nuclear power, was however not part of the NATO
integrated military structure. The nuclear request sequence is
described in more detail in: Anonymus, Oorlogsvoorbereidingen,
11-15. See also US Army FM 100-5 (1976), 10-6 to
10-9.
The latter document shows this sequence to take (at least) twenty-four
hours, from an initial request at corps
level to the execution of a tactical nuclear mission. Oosterboer
however claims that the entire release procedure, including
consultations with the NATO countries directly
involved,
would take twice that time, and that it was feared that under pressure
the US president would act alone. Oosterboer, op.
cit., 35. On that note, in May 2020 a US State Department document from 1961 published by the National Security Archive
shows that, at least at that time, the US president could unilaterally
order the use of nuclear weapons stored in the Netherlands. < |
17. |
|
Based on
a chart made by Lieutenant-Colonel H.
Molman (Rtd.) for the Netherlands
Artillery Museum. 59th
(US) Ordnance Brigade would be placed under the operational
control of SACEUR in
wartime, and as such would have liaison with 1
(NL) Corps. Website U.S. Army in Europe, 59th Ordnance Brigade. Molman,
email 22.07.2014. < |
18. |
|
VS
6-20/1, 3-3. VS 6-101, A-1-1. Dorrestijn, op.
cit., 183. < |
19. |
|
In
the case of 19
Field Artillery Battalion, one FSS
for each battery. VS 6-101, A-1-7. < |
20. |
|
VS 6-101,
A-1-2. VS 6-42, 1-2. Bevaart
et al., op. cit., 96. Loukes, Afdeling Lance, 37-38. See also
Unit Organisation and Equipment, 19
Field Artillery Battalion, Nuclear Deployed and 129
Field Artillery Battalion, Nuclear Deployed. < |
21. |
|
Information
kindly provided by J.W. van de Langemheen,
conscript
sergeant in 425 Mobile Infantry
Security Company in 1988 (email 28.12.2013). VS 30-1, 14-13, 14-15. The
East German Fallschirmjägerbataillon 40 also prepared for such
operations. Dissberger et al., Vom
Himmel,
62, 90. < |
22. |
|
Bevaart
et al., op. cit., 96, 119. Hoffenaar,
Van Hoof en De Moor, loc. cit.
Hoffenaar en Schoenmaker, op.cit., 376. Hoksbergen en Kroon, loc. cit.
Oosterboer, op. cit., 93.
After 1986 the guard
duties on the outer security
rings of SAS Darp and SAS 't Harde were transferred to eleven security
infantry companies of National
Territorial Command, for which purpose five
mobilisable companies were placed on
active-duty. Bevaart
et al., op. cit., 124. Engbersen
en Oosting, Infanteriebeveiliger,
324.
< |
23. |
|
VS 6-101,
A-1-4.
< |
24. |
|
RIM was
the Dutch acronym for Direct Influx into Mobilisable Units (Rechtstreekse
Instroming in Mobilisabele Eenheden). GRIM was a variant of
this system, meaning "Largely RIM" (Grotendeels
Rechtstreekse Instroming in Mobilisabele Eenheden).
For a survey of the
Royal Army's unit filling and reserve system see Gijsbers, Blik
in de smidse, 2222-2231;
Selles,
Personele
vulling;
Berghuijs, Opleiding,
14-23. In English: Isby and Kamps, Armies,
341-343; Sorrell, Je
Maintiendrai, 94-96; Van
Vuren, The
Royal Netherlands Army Today, Military Review April 1982, 23-28.
< |
|