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1 (NL) Corps Artillery
1 Legerkorpsartillerie (1 Lka)

Operational Command Structures: The Field Artillery Groups | Dual Capable Artillery


434 Infbevcie Mbl437 Infbevcie Mbl436 Infbevcie MblKL Det bij 23 Custdet [23 KL (US) Det]8 Munbevopel425 Infbevcie Mbl101 AmaStstbt 102 Vagp118 Afdva134 Afdva19 Afdva144 Afdva114 Afdva107 Afdva44 AfdvaStstbt 101 Vagp244 Afdva124 AfdvaStstbt 104 Vagp108 Afdva104 AfdvaStstbt 103 Vagp129 Afdva117 AfdvaStstbt 1 Lka1 Lka

Unit Main Equipment Location Peace Strength War Strength
Staff and Staff Battery
1 (NL) Corps Artillery
                  Stroe 20/18/50 (88)
21/17/65/2 (105)
 
Staff and Staff Battery
101 Field Artillery Group
                  Arnhem 7/11/35 (53)
13/14/60 (87)
Staff and Staff Battery
102 Field Artillery Group
                  Harderwijk 7/11/35 (53)
13/14/60 (87)
Staff and Staff Battery
103 Field Artillery Group [a]
                 
13/14/58 (85)
Staff and Staff Battery
104 Field Artillery Group [b]
                 
13/14/58 (85)
 
101 Artillery Survey Battalion               't Harde 21/78/219 (318)
30/120/370 (520)

44 Field Artillery Battalion [c] M109A2/A3 30/90/437/2 (559)

107 Field Artillery Battalion [d] M107 't Harde 26/78/258 (362) 28/83/390/2 (503)

108 Field Artillery Battalion [e] M110A2 28/83/395/2 (508)
117 Field Artillery Battalion [f] M110A2 28/83/395/2 (508)
118 Field Artillery Battalion [e] M110A2 28/83/395/2 (508)

104 Field Artillery Battalion [g] M114A1 30/90/466/2 (588)
114 Field Artillery Battalion [h] M114A1 30/90/466/2 (588)
124 Field Artillery Battalion [g] M114A1 30/90/466/2 (588)
134 Field Artillery Battalion [h] M114A1 30/90/466/2 (588)
144 Field Artillery Battalion [g] M114A1 30/90/466/2 (588)
244 Field Artillery Battalion [h] M114A1 30/90/466/2 (588)

19 Field Artillery Battalion [i] M110A2 't Harde 27/74/297 (398) 27/75/340/2 (444)
Royal Army Detachment to
23rd (US) Custodial Detachment [j]
                  't Harde 2/3/33 (38) 1/1/27 (29)
 
129 Field Artillery Battalion [k] MGM-52C Lance Darp 30/77/271 (378) 30/81/296/2 (409)

8 Ammunition Supply Platoon [l]                   Darp 2/9/43 (54) 2/7/49 (58)
 
425 Mobile Security Infantry Company [m]                 't Harde 8/31/171 (210) 7/27/172 (206)
434 Mobile Security Infantry Company [n]                     Darp 8/31/171 (210) 7/27/172 (206)
436 Mobile Security Infantry Company [o]                     6/26/170 (202)
437 Mobile Security Infantry Company [p]                   6/26/170 (202)

1 (NL) Corps Artillery Peace Strength: 158/421/1583 (2162)
1 (NL) Corps Artillery War Strength: 511/1425/6875/28 (8839)

Notes

a. Filled by mobilisable personnel that had fulfilled their active-duty period in Staff and Staff Battery, 101 Field Artillery Group up to six and a half years prior to mobilisation.1
b. Filled by mobilisable personnel that had fulfilled their active-duty period in Staff and Staff Battery, 102 Field Artillery Group up to six and a half years prior to mobilisation.1
c. Active-duty unit until November 1984.2 RIM battalion, filled by mobilisable batteries that had fulfilled their active-duty period in 43 Field Artillery Battalion between four and twenty months prior to mobilisation.1 24
d. Transitioned from M107 to M110A2 in 1986.3
e. Filled by mobilisable personnel that had fulfilled their active-duty period in 19 Field Artillery Battalion up to eight and a half years prior to mobilisation.1 
f. RIM battalion, filled by mobilisable batteries that had fulfilled their active-duty period in 107 Field Artillery Battalion between four and twenty months prior to mobilisation. After 107 Field Artillery Battalion had completed its transition to M110A2 (see note d), 108 Field Artillery Battalion was to become that unit's RIM-counterpart.4 24
g. Filled by mobilisable personnel that had fulfilled their active-duty period in 44 Field Artillery Battalion up to eight and a half years prior to mobilisation.1 
h. Filled by mobilisable personnel that had fulfilled their active-duty period in 43 Field Artillery Battalion up to eight and a half years prior to mobilisation.1 
i. Dual capable unit.5 6 US nuclear warheads for 19 Field Artillery Battalion were stored at Special Ammunition Storage (SAS) 't Harde (Doornspijk) under the custody of 23rd US Army Field Artillery Detachment (23rd USAFAD).7 See also notes j and m.
j. Apparently usually referred to as 23 KL (US) Detachement, this unit provided general support to the custodial 23rd US Army Field Artillery Detachment in peacetime. Its commander was responsible for the intricate security system of SAS 't Harde and was also site commander. In wartime the detachment would provide transport of US nuclear warheads for 19 Field Artillery Battalion.7 8
k. Dual capable unit.5 9 US nuclear warheads for 129 Field Artillery Battalion were stored at SAS Darp (Havelterberg) under the custody of 8th US Army Field Artillery Detachment (8th USAFAD). In peacetime the battalion provided general support to that detachment.7 See also note n.
l. Would transport, store, maintain and secure a reserve nuclear ammunition stock for NORTHAG dual capable artillery units in wartime, deploying an Ammunition Supply Point (designated ASP-A) in the Rear Combat Zone together with 162nd (US) Ordnance Company and 436 Mobile Security Infantry Company. The platoon would remain under the command of Commander, 1 (NL) Corps Artillery. In peacetime the platoon commander was responsible for the intricate security system of SAS Darp and was also site commander.10 
m. Would support 19 Field Artillery Battalion in wartime, securing the transport and field storage of nuclear warheads.11
n. Would support 129 Field Artillery Battalion in wartime, securing the transport and field storage of nuclear warheads.12
o. GRIM company, largely filled by mobilisable platoons that had filled 437 Mobile Security Infantry Company during their four to six-month Short Leave period, having previously fulfilled their active-duty period in 425 and/or 434 Mobile Security Infantry Company.1 13 24 Would secure (the deployment of) ASP-A (see note l). 
p. Mobilisable company filled by personnel from 425 and/or 434 Mobile Infantry Security Company on Short Leave.13 Would remain under operational control of Commander, 1 (NL) Corps Artillery to serve as reinforcement or quick reaction force.14 

Operational Command Structures: The Field Artillery Groups

The command structure of 1 (NL) Corps Artillery was similar to the divisional command structure, with units assigned to tactical headquarters as circumstances required. During operations Commander, 1 (NL) Corps would order the formation of mission-tailored field artillery groups, and if necessary place a number of artillery battalions under direct operational command of Commander, 1 (NL) Corps Artillery. Each field artillery group could be allocated to a division or kept under the operational command of Commander, 1 (NL) Corps Artillery, again as circumstances required. Four field artillery groups could be formed (101, 102, 103 and 104 Field Artillery Group), each comprising a staff and staff battery and a variable number of artillery battalions, in principle up to a maximum of six battalions per group. A field artillery group could further be allocated a mortar locating radar platoon, a sound ranging platoon and/or a terrain survey platoon, as needed, which units would be detached from 101 Artillery Survey Battalion for such purpose. As an illustration the chart below shows a possible operational configuration of 102 Field Artillery Group, attached to 4 Division: 15 <


Ststbt 102 Vagpmorpel102 Vagptmdpel107 Afdva44 Afdva114 Afdva104 Afdvagmdpel4 Div

Dual Capable Artillery
As can be gathered from notes i and k above, the nuclear warheads for the dual capable 5 batteries of 19 and 129 Field Artillery Battalion were property of the United States and would remain under US Army custody until the moment a nuclear mission would be executed, at which point the battery or batteries would effectively fire the warhead(s). Any request for the use of nuclear artillery, for instance by Commander, 1 (NL) Corps, had to go up through the chain of command to Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) before, ultimately, being decided upon by the President of the United States.16 The chain of planning and execution of a nuclear mission involving Netherlands dual capable artillery is illustrated in the chart below: 17


1 (NL) Corps1 LkaAllied Forces Central EuropeNorthern Army Group129 Afdva19 AfdvaUnited States Army Europe8 Munbevopel23rd USAFAD8th USAFAD59th Ord Bde552nd USAAGAllied Command Europe (Supreme Allied Commander Europe)162nd Ord Co
 
During a nuclear deployment the field artillery battalion concerned would be placed under direct command of Commander,
1 (NL) Corps Artillery.18 The deployment area, with its Field Storage Sites (FSS) for the nuclear warheads,19 would be secured by a mobile security infantry company (see notes m-n above), which would operate under the command of the field artillery battalion commander.20 In wartime the security infantry companies were expected to come up against Warsaw Pact airborne and/or special forces such as Soviet Spetsnaz units, aiming to neutralise NORTHAG's means of nuclear delivery.21

In peacetime the custodial 8th and 23rd US Army Field Artillery Detachments guarded the inner security ring of SAS Darp and SAS 't Harde, the outer security ring of these sites being guarded by detachments from 1 (NL) Corps units on a rotational basis.22 During nuclear deployment the US custodial detachments would likewise guard the inner security ring of the FSS.23 < 

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1. NIMH 205A/10, Aflossing van mobilisabele eenheden en -aanvullingen d.d. 27 mei 1980. Ibid., d.d. 11 november 1983. Ibid., d.d. 17 juni 1985. <
2. Hoffenaar en Schoenmaker, Met de blik, 391. <
3. Anonymus, Charliebatterij, 1. Langhenkel, Veger en Ueberschaer, FOFA, 577. Website 107 Afdva, Geschiedenis. <   
4. NIMH 430, inv. nr. 54 (Slagorde KL stand 1 juli 1985), Blad H. Ibid., inv. nr. 55 (Slagorde KL stand 23 december 1985), Blad H. NIMH 205A/10, Aflossing van mobilisabele eenheden en -aanvullingen d.d. 27 mei 1980, Bijlage 1. Website 107 Afdva, 117 Afdva. It is worth noting here that the operation of the M110A2 howitzer was identical to that of the M107 gun, the type used by 107 Field Artillery Battalion. Information kindly provided by Rob Meinen of 107afdva.nl (email 30.01.2012). Regarding the available source material it should be noted that the 1983 and 1985 unit filling schemes for mobilisable units and replacements show 108 Field Artillery Battalion as being the RIM-counterpart of 107 Field Artillery Battalion, I believe prematurely; moreover in these documents the latter unit is, certainly prematurely, shown as being equipped with the M110A2 (see note d and footnote 3). NIMH 205A/10, Aflossing van mobilisabele eenheden en -aanvullingen d.d. 11 november 1983, Bijlage 1. Ibid., d.d. 17 juni 1985, Bijlage A. <
5. Dual capable: "A nuclear certified delivery unit capable of executing both conventional and nuclear missions." US Department of Defense Dictionary, 139. <
6. Hoffenaar, Van Hoof en De Moor, Vuur in beweging, 159, 186. <
7. Bevaart et al., Vijftig jaar, 96-97. Website U.S. Army in Germany, I (NE) Corps Nuclear Artillery Timeline (1960-1978). The 8th and 23rd US Army Field Artillery Detachments (also referred to as Missile Detachments) were part of 552nd US Army Artillery Group (552nd USAAG) in Sögel (GE), subordinate to 59th (US) Ordnance Brigade, headquartered in Pirmasens (GE), which brigade was responsible for the US Army's nuclear weapons in Europe. Hoffenaar, Van Hoof en De Moor, op. cit., 159-160. Oosterboer, Kernwapenopslag, 115. Website U.S. Army in Germany, 59th Ordnance Brigade. Website 8th Missile Detachment, Our History23rd Missile Detachment. In the Netherlands military the SAS sites were neutrally designated munitiemagazijnencomplex (mmc; MMC 't Harde, MMC Darp). VS 2-1120/2 (1989), II-23. Information kindly provided by artillery Lieutenant-Colonel H. Molman (Rtd.) (email 22.07.2014). In 1982 it was thought that about twenty nuclear warheads were stored at SAS 't Harde (W33, 8 inch, for 19 Field Artillery Battalion) and about fifty at SAS Darp (W70, Lance, for 129 Field Artillery Battalion), with an additional number of spare warheads at both locations. Anonymus, Opslag en transport, 22-23, 25. Peacetime support to 8th USAFAD: Molman, email 16.06.2014. <
8. Role 23 KL (US) Detachement: VS 6-101, A-1-2. Hoksbergen en Kroon, Nederlandse Artillerie, 88. Oosterboer, op. cit., 93, 114. Website 425 Mob Cie van Heutsz, post by Pieke van der Schaaf, 17.11.2006, post by Willem Lensink, 31.10.2007. <
9. Hoffenaar, Van Hoof en De Moor, op. cit., 226. <
10. Hoksbergen en Kroon, loc. citOosterboer, op. cit., 93. Essential additional information on this unit's wartime role kindly provided by artillery Lieutenant-Colonel H. Molman (Rtd.) (various emails, May and June 2014). Until 436 Mobile Security Infantry Company (mobilisable) would become available, an armoured infantry company of 45 Armoured Infantry Battalion would fill in. 162nd (US) Ordnance Company, subordinate to 552nd US Army Artillery Group in Sögel (GE), provided technical support for ASP-A, receiving, checking and maintaining the nuclear ammunition. The ASP's nuclear stock included both Lance and 8 inch ammunition. Molman, various emails, June 2014. <
11. Website 425 Mob Cie van Heutsz. Bevaart et al., op. cit., 95-97, 119. Hoffenaar, Van Hoof en De Moor, op. cit., 160. It would appear that the security infantry companies of 1 (NL) Corps Artillery, though maintaining a high standard of operational readiness, were not entirely immune to the personnel problems that impaired many of the security infantry companies of National Territorial Command. See National Territorial Command, footnote 17. In 1988 425 Mobile Security Infantry Company found itself similarly affected, rarely being able to operate at authorised strength. Information kindly provided by J.W. van de Langemheen, conscript sergeant in 425 Mobile Infantry Security Company in 1988 (email 30.12.2013). <
12. Website 434 Infbevcie Mobiel. Bevaart et al., loc. cit. Hoffenaar, Van Hoof en De Moor, loc. cit. <
13. Short Leave: see Unit Organisation and Equipment, Short Leave. < 
14. Information kindly provided by artillery Lieutenant-Colonel H. Molman (Rtd.) (email 16.06.2014). See also Dorrestijn, Vuur geëindigd, 168; Hoffenaar, Van Hoof en De Moor, loc. cit; Hoksbergen en Kroon, op.cit., 88-90. <
15. Operational Corps Artillery command structure and field artillery group configuration: VS 6-20/1, 3-1 t/m 3-2, 3-4 t/m 3-6. <
16. Hoffenaar, Van Hoof en De Moor, op. cit., 159-160. Hoksbergen en Kroon, loc. cit. The prime minister of the other nuclear power in NATO, the United Kingdom, would also be involved in the decision; the North Atlantic Council (NATO) would be consulted. Hoffenaar, Van Hoof en De Moor, loc. cit. Depending on the circumstances the president of France would probably also be involved in some way; France, also a nuclear power, was however not part of the NATO integrated military structure. The nuclear request sequence is described in more detail in: Anonymus, Oorlogsvoorbereidingen, 11-15. See also US Army FM 100-5 (1976), 10-6 to 10-9. The latter document shows this sequence to take (at least) twenty-four hours, from an initial request at corps level to the execution of a tactical nuclear mission. Oosterboer however claims that the entire release procedure, including consultations with the NATO countries directly involved, would take twice that time, and that it was feared that under pressure the US president would act alone. Oosterboer, op. cit., 35. On that note, in May 2020 a US State Department document from 1961 published by the National Security Archive shows that, at least at that time, the US president could unilaterally order the use of nuclear weapons stored in the Netherlands. <
17. Based on a chart made by Lieutenant-Colonel H. Molman (Rtd.) for the Netherlands Artillery Museum. 59th (US) Ordnance Brigade would be placed under the operational control of SACEUR in wartime, and as such would have liaison with 1 (NL) Corps. Website U.S. Army in Europe, 59th Ordnance Brigade. Molman, email 22.07.2014. <
18. VS 6-20/1, 3-3. VS 6-101, A-1-1. Dorrestijn, op. cit., 183. <
19. In the case of 19 Field Artillery Battalion, one FSS for each battery. VS 6-101, A-1-7. <
20. VS 6-101, A-1-2. VS 6-42, 1-2. Bevaart et al., op. cit., 96. Loukes, Afdeling Lance, 37-38. See also Unit Organisation and Equipment, 19 Field Artillery Battalion, Nuclear Deployed and 129 Field Artillery Battalion, Nuclear Deployed. <
21. Information kindly provided by J.W. van de Langemheen, conscript sergeant in 425 Mobile Infantry Security Company in 1988 (email 28.12.2013). VS 30-1, 14-13, 14-15. The East German Fallschirmjägerbataillon 40 also prepared for such operations. Dissberger et al., Vom Himmel, 62, 90. < 
22. Bevaart et al., op. cit., 96, 119. Hoffenaar, Van Hoof en De Moor, loc. cit. Hoffenaar en Schoenmaker, op.cit., 376. Hoksbergen en Kroon, loc. cit. Oosterboer, op. cit., 93. After 1986 the guard duties on the outer security rings of SAS Darp and SAS 't Harde were transferred to eleven security infantry companies of National Territorial Command, for which purpose five mobilisable companies were placed on active-duty. Bevaart et al., op. cit., 124. Engbersen en Oosting, Infanteriebeveiliger, 324. <
23. VS 6-101, A-1-4. <
24. RIM was the Dutch acronym for Direct Influx into Mobilisable Units (Rechtstreekse Instroming in Mobilisabele Eenheden). GRIM was a variant of this system, meaning "Largely RIM" (Grotendeels Rechtstreekse Instroming in Mobilisabele Eenheden). For a survey of the Royal Army's unit filling and reserve system see Gijsbers, Blik in de smidse, 2222-2231; Selles, Personele vulling; Berghuijs, Opleiding, 14-23. In English: Isby and Kamps, Armies, 341-343; Sorrell, Je Maintiendrai, 94-96; Van Vuren, The Royal Netherlands Army TodayMilitary Review April 1982, 23-28. <