Home | One Level Up Last updated: 05.09.2023
Air Force Tactical Command 1
Commando Tactische Luchtstrijdkrachten (CTL)
Part I | Part II | Part III | Part IV | Part V | Part VI | Part VII | Part VIII
   
Detachement NoordvaarderDetachement VliehorsSAR-vlucht585 Objbewpel [KL]583 Objbewpel [KL]582 Objbewpel [KL]515 Objbewsq [KL]323 SqLB pel (4x)514 Objbewsq [KL]71 AFUSHORAD119 Sq30 LB SqVlb LW322 SqSHORADOnhmatsqCTL221 Sq73 AFU510 Objbewsq [KL]Vlb SSB10 LB Sq298 Sq511 Objbewsq [KL]334 SqSt CTLLB pel (7x)    
Unit Location Peace Strength War Strength
Staff Air Force Tactical Command [a] Zeist ?
 ?
   
(Staff) COMTWOATAF [b] Mönchengladbach-Rheindahlen (GE) ?
 ?
   
Unit Main Equipment Air Combat Role Peace Strength War Strength
Soesterberg Air Base [c]
32 (US) Tactical Fighter Squadron [d]
 16 x F-15C, 2 x F-15D AD ?
 ?
334 Squadron [e]
 12 x F-27    
 ?
 ?
298 Squadron [f] 24 x Alouette III    
 48/45/60 (153) 56/50/77 (183)
Maintenance and Materiel Squadron [f]
        
 6/95/70 (171) 6/100/98 (204)
   
221 Squadron [g]
└ 73 Assault Firing Unit 3 x I-HAWK    
 (30-35) (±100)
└ SHORAD flight 3 x Flycatcher, 9 x 40L70    
 (30-35) (±100)
   
10 Air Force Security Squadron [h]  

2/21/110 (133)
 5/19/143 (167)
Air Force Security Platoon x 7  

– 1/4/41 (46) x 7
510 Object Security Squadron [Royal Army] [i]    
– 5/15/105 (125)
511 Object Security Squadron [Royal Army] [i]    
– 5/15/105 (125)
   
Leeuwarden Air Base [j]
322 Squadron [k]
 16 x F-16A, 2 x F-16B 29 FBA/AD  ?
 ?
323 Squadron [l] 16 x F-16A, 2 x F-16B 29 FBA/AD  
 ?
 ?
Transition and Conversion Division F-16 [m] 4 x F-16A, 3 x F-16B    
 ?
 ?
Search and Rescue Flight [n] 4 x Alouette III    
 ?
 ?
Detachment De Vliehors [o]  
   
 ?
 ?
Detachment Noordvaarder [o]  
   
 ?
 ?
   
119 Squadron [g]
└ 71 Assault Firing Unit 3 x I-HAWK    
 (30-35) (±100)
└ SHORAD flight 3 x Flycatcher, 9 x 40L70    
 (30-35) (±100)
     
30 Air Force Security Squadron [p] [q]  

1/15/62 (78)
 5/18/139 (162)
Air Force Security Platoon x 4 [q]  

– 1/4/41 (46) x 4
514 Object Security Squadron [Royal Army] [q] [r]    
– 5/15/105 (125)
515 Object Security Squadron [Royal Army] [q] [r]    
– 5/15/105 (125)
582 Object Security Platoon [Royal Army] [q] [r]    
– 1/4/33 (38)
583 Object Security Platoon [Royal Army] [q] [r]    
– 1/4/33 (38)
585 Object Security Platoon [Royal Army] [q] [r]    
– 1/4/33 (38)

Notes
a. Peacetime organisation. Headed by Commander Tactical Air Force (Commandant Tactische Luchtstrijdkrachten, CTL). Comprising a War Preparations and Plans Bureau and four sections: Personnel, Operations, Logistics and Economic Management. On mobilisation the staff of Air Force Tactical Command would merge with those elements of the staff of Logistic and Training Command (Commando Logistiek en Opleidingen, CLO) that were responsible for logistic support, forming the Tactical Air Force War Staff (Oorlogsstaf Tactische Luchtstrijdkrachten, OS/TL). Nearly all units subordinate to CLO would in wartime fall under the Tactical Air Force War Staff; see Logistic and Training Command, note a. Commander Tactical Air Force would head the War Staff. The War Staff would mainly comprise five divisions (afdelingen): Operations, Materiel Logistics, Personnel Logistics, Communications and Electronics, Medical Affairs; and a Staff Element (for) Automation. The Medical Affairs Division, handling second echelon medical care, would comprise four mobilised medical groups, in Harmelen, Goirle, Deventer and Hesepe (GE) respectively, which would together have thirteen mobilised field dressing stations under, probably, administrative control: in Rijswijk and Werkhoven (Medical Group Harmelen); Gemert, Hilvarenbeek, Sint Oedenrode and Riel (Medial Group Goirle); Bolsward, Boekelo, Wychen and Ede (Medical Group Deventer); Schwagstorf (GE), Borghorst (GE) and Eidinghausen (GE) (Medical Group Hesepe (GE)). These field dressing stations would include mobilised Royal Army medical detachments; see Royal Air Force, note i.2 
b. Commander Second Allied Tactical Air Force (COMTWOATAF) had operational control over all units and bases of Air Force Tactical Command in peace and wartime, unless noted otherwise. Operational control was delegated by Commander Allied Air Forces Central Europe (COMAAFCE), who held operational command.3 
c. Soesterberg Air Base (Vliegbasis Soesterberg, Vlb SSB) was, in NATO terms, a Main Operating Base (MOB) as well as a Collocated Operating Base (COB); for the latter see note d.4 Simplified organisation; for a more comprehensive, generic depiction of the air base organisation click the blue unit symbol in the organisational chart above.
d. 32 (US) Tactical Fighter Squadron was detached from US Air Forces Europe (USAFE) and fell under operational command of COMTWOATAF in peace and wartime. The squadron operated with sixteen F15C (single seat) and two F15D (two seat) fighter aircraft in a tactical air defence role (AD). Two aircraft were permanently, round-the-clock, on standby for all-weather quick reaction alert sorties (QRA). Accommodation and logistic support were provided by the Royal Air Force. In times of crisis or war 32 (US) TFS would be reinforced by a second USAF F-15 squadron, which would also operate from Soesterberg Air Base (in its capacity as COB). This second squadron would presumably also operate in an AD role.5  
e. 334 Squadron operated with nine Fokker F-27 Mk 300M Troopships and three Fokker F-27 Mk 100 Friendships, primarily in a logistic support role. In wartime, after NATO General Alert, the squadron would for six days be busy flying national transport missions. If ACE Mobile Force (AMF) would be deployed, which would be in the early stages of an emerging conflict, preferably ahead of NATO General Alert, the squadron would transport personnel and war consumables for 314 Squadron, which was assigned to AMF. 334 Squadron would further fly transport missions for 1 (NL) Corps, the Royal Navy, and the Royal Air Force air bases in the Netherlands and the guided weapons squadrons in West Germany. Depending the circumstances the transport tasks might include dropping paratroops (Whiskey Infantry Company and 104 Observation and Reconnaissance Company). After these six days the squadron would be made available to Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). By 1985 the Fokker F-27 aircraft, though reliable, were becoming technically obsolete. Moreover their maximum operating radius and payload were hardly sufficient for the aforementioned tasks. The transport requirements for 314 Squadron in its AMF-role for example "could only be marginally met". Pilots were mostly experienced former fighter or helicopter pilots who chose to end their flying careers with 334 Squadron.6
f. Peacetime organisation. Part of the Light Aircraft Group (Groep Lichte Vliegtuigen, GPLV), 1 (NL) Corps, Royal Army. See also Part IV, note h. Under operational command of Commander 1 (NL) Corps in wartime.7
g. Simplified organisation; for a comprehensive depiction click the blue squadron symbol in the organisational chart above. SHORAD: short range air defence.
h. Peacetime and wartime strengths include a security dog group (hondengeleiders) of -/5/16 (21).8
i. Filled by mobilisable personnel from 14 Armoured Infantry Battalion (RIM) after their fourteen to sixteen-month RIM period in that unit had expired, up to eight and a half years prior to mobilisation.9 
j. Leeuwarden Air Base (Vliegbasis Leeuwarden, Vlb LW) was a Main Operating Base (MOB).4 Simplified organisation; for a more comprehensive, generic depiction of the air base organisation click the blue unit symbol in the organisational chart above. 
k. 322 Squadron was operational in a fighter-bomber attack role (FBA) and a tactical air defence (AD) role, the latter further specified as clear weather intercept (CWI). These roles were weighed as 70 % FBA and 30% AD. The squadron had two aircraft permanently on standby for clear weather quick reaction alert sorties (QRA), day and night. In other weather conditions the QRA flight of 32 (US) Tactical Fighter Squadron would be called upon (see note d). In wartime the squadron's first operational mission, the 'Option Alpha' assigned to the air base, would be to bomb one or more predetermined East German air force bases.10 
l. 323 Squadron was operational in a fighter-bomber attack role (FBA) and a tactical air defence (AD) role, the latter further specified as clear weather intercept (CWI). These were weighed as 30% AD and 70 % FBA. Between 6 March 1986 and the end of 1991 the FBA role would be suspended because of the integration of the Transition and Conversion Division, see note m. The squadron had two aircraft permanently on standby for clear weather quick reaction alert sorties (QRA), day and night. In other weather conditions the QRA flight of 32 (US) Tactical Fighter Squadron would be called upon (see note d). In wartime the squadron's first operational mission, the 'Option Alpha' assigned to the air base, would be to bomb one or more predetermined East German air force bases.10  
m. The Transition and Conversion Division F-16 (Transitie- en Conversieafdeling, TCA) handled the retraining of F-104G Starfighter pilots to fly the F-16 Fighting Falcon. With six instructors and three F-16B (two seat) and four F-16A (single seat) aircraft TCA retrained three classes of nine to twelve pilots per year. The course lasted about five months and comprised ground school (four weeks), the conversion phase in which pilots learned to fly the aircraft solo (ten flying missions), and the transition phase in which pilots relearned the basics of operational flying (fifteen air-to-air missions and ten air-to-ground missions). TCA further included the 'Ready Team' which comprised a small number of experienced instructors who coached F-16 squadrons during their working-up to operational status. In warime the unit would probably be disbanded and/or move to the United States to complete retraing there. On 6 March 1986 TCA was integrated into 323 Squadron (see note l). Between 1986 and 1991 TCA would, as part of 323 Squadron, handle the transition from the Canadair NF-5 Freedom Fighter to the F-16.11  
n. The Search and Rescue flight (SAR), also referred to as SAR and Photo Flight (SAR- tevens fotovlucht) and SAR and Communications Flight of the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force (SAR- tevens communicatievlucht BDL) was, in peacetime, responsible for the NATO-mandated task of rescuing fighter pilots who had ran into trouble above the firing and bombing ranges (Air Combat Areas) on the Wadden Islands of Vlieland and Terschelling (see note o), or in other areas. The flight would also perform civilian rescues. Rescue missions were coordinated from the Rescue Coordination Centre (Reddingscoördinatiecentrum) at Naval Air Station Valkenburg. The four Alouette III helicopters were available for rescue missions from dawn until dusk. On workdays one helicopter was stationed at Terschelling. Whenever necessary the Flight performed non-mandatory medical emergency or medical evacuation sorties for the inhabitants of the Wadden Islands; this was the SAR Flight's predominant (and self-imposed) peacetime task. Other tasks were flying light transport and communications sorties for the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, flying aerial photography sorties for the Royal Air Force or external parties such as State Water Management (Rijkswaterstaat), and, in wartime, flying airfield damage reconnaissance sorties.12
o. Vliehors and De Noordvaarder were firing and bombing ranges, referred to as Air Combat Areas, used by the tactical fighter-bomber squadrons of the Royal Air Force. Both ranges were also used by squadrons of NATO's 2 and 4 Allied Tactical Air Force (TWOATAF and FOURATAF) and the French Air Force. The ranges were located at the Wadden Islands of, respectively, Vlieland and Terschelling. Their operational names were, respectively, Cornfield Range and Jackpot Range. Vliehors also included a main battle tank firing range of Royal Army Training Command: the Cavalry Gunnery Range (Cavalerieschietkamp, CSK).13
p. Peacetime and wartime strengths include a security dog group (hondengeleiders) of -/4/12 (16).8  
q. These security infantry units would also secure Radar Post North, which was part of the base security area of Leeuwarden Air Base. 
r. Filled by mobilisable personnel from 16 Armoured Infantry Battalion (RIM) after their fourteen to sixteen-month RIM period in that unit had expired, up to eight and a half years prior to mobilisation.9 


Part I | Part II | Part III | Part IV | Part V | Part VI | Part VII | Part VIII

Vlb PEL77 AFU421 SqSHORADLB pel50 LB Sq502 Objbewsq [KL]306 Sq312 SqSHORADVlb VKL420 Sq523 Objbewsq [KL]40 LB SqLB pel (4x)504 Objbewsq [KL]503 Objbewsq [KL]311 Sq501 Objbewsq [KL]76 AFU

Unit Main Equipment Air Combat Role Peace Strength War Strength
Volkel Air Base [a]
306 Squadron [b]
 9/18 x F-16(R) RECCE ?
 ?
311 Squadron [c]
 16 x F-16A, 2 x F-16B 29 FBA/S ?
 ?
312 Squadron [d] 18 x F-16 from 01.10.1985 FBA/S  
 ?
 ?
   
420 Squadron [e]
└ 76 Assault Firing Unit 3 x I-HAWK    
 (30-35) (±100)
└ SHORAD flight 3 x Flycatcher, 9 x 40L70    
 (30-35) (±100)
   
40 Air Force Security Squadron [f]  

4/49/263 (316)
 5/22/155 (182)
Air Force Security Platoon x 4  

– 1/4/41 (46) x 4
501 Object Security Squadron [Royal Army] [g]    
– 5/15/105 (125)
502 Object Security Squadron [Royal Army] [g]    
– 5/15/105 (125)
503 Object Security Squadron [Royal Army] [g] [h]    
– 5/15/105 (125)
504 Object Security Squadron [Royal Army] [g] [h]    
– 5/15/105 (125)
523 Object Security Squadron [Royal Army] [g]    
– 5/15/105 (125)
   
De Peel Air Base [i]
421 Squadron [e]
└ 77 Assault Firing Unit 3 x I-HAWK    
 (10-15?) (±100)
└ SHORAD flight 3 x Flycatcher, 9 x 40L70    
 (10-15?) (±100)
   
50 Air Force Security Squadron [j]  

-/7/19 (26)
 5/15/131 (151)
Air Force Security Platoon  

– 1/4/41 (46)

Notes
   
a. Volkel Air Base (Vliegbasis Volkel, Vlb VKL) was a Main Operating Base (MOB).4 Simplified organisation; for a more comprehensive, generic depiction of the air base organisation click the blue unit symbol in the organisational chart above. 
b. 306 Squadron was the Royal Air Force's tactical photo reconnaissance squadron. The aircraft of the squadron were regular F-16A/Bs, not specialised reconnaissance versions, hence the designation F-16(R). Under the fuselage, on the centerline pylon, they carried the Orpheus day/night reconnaissance pod developed by Oldelft (Oude Delft) and built by Fokker. The self-contained pod had five TA-8M photo cameras, an infrared line scanner and a radar altimeter. With the pod the aircraft could still carry air-to-air missiles and the squadron operated in pairs for increased self defence. Besides the reconnaissance role (RECCE) the squadron also trained the air defence (AD) and fighter-bomber attack (FBA) roles, the latter presumably without the Orpheus pod. Because of this 306 Squadron dubbed itself "NATO's Only Fighting Eyes" and it was the first squadron to apply the swing-role concept that the Royal Air Force developed from the mid 1980s to the early 1990s. In 1985 the squadron was not yet fully operational, flying nine F-16(R)s (9 UE, nine units equipped) because the transition from the RF-104G Starfighter, which began in 1983, was not yet fully completed. In May 1986 the squadron was fully operational with 18 UE. In wartime the squadron would operate from De Peel Air Base (see note i).14   
c 311 Squadron was dual capable in the conventional fighter-bomber attack role (FBA) and in the nuclear strike role (S). In 1986 the squadron was also meant to be operational in the clear weather intercept role (CWI), but this was not implemented due to personnel shortages, probably pilot shortages in particular. The US nuclear bombs for the squadron were stored at the air base under custody of 7362 (US) Munitions Support Squadron (7362 MUNSS), which reportedly had a strength of about 100 men. The nuclear bombs were probably of the B61 type with a variable yield of 0.3 to 170 kilotons (Mod 3, produced since 1979), or 10 to 150 kilotons (Mod 2, since 1975), or 10 to 340 kilotons (Mod 1, since 1969). The number of nuclear bombs stored at Volkel Air Base was estimated to be between thirty-six and seventy-two. The squadron, but probably 311 and 312 Squadron together, reportedly had three F-16 aircraft on permanent, round-the-clock standby, each armed with one nuclear bomb (Quick Reaction Alert, QRA). The nuclear release sequence was probably similar to that of the dual capable artillery of 1 (NL) Corps; ultimately the decision to deploy any US nuclear weapon lay with the President of the United States.15  
d. 312 Squadron was not operational ("non-ops") up to 1 October 1985 due to the transition from the F-104G Starfighter, which began on 1 July 1984. From 1 October 1985 the squadron was dual capable in the conventional fighter-bomber attack role (FBA) and the nuclear strike role (S). For the nuclear role, see note c.16 Like the other F-16 squadrons 312 Squadron had sixteen F-16A single seat and two F-16B two-seat aircraft.29
e. Simplified organisation; for a comprehensive depiction click the blue squadron symbol in the organisational chart above. SHORAD: short range air defence.
f. Peacetime and wartime strengths include a security dog group (hondengeleiders) of -/8/28 (36).8  
g. Filled by mobilisable personnel from 14 Armoured Infantry Battalion (RIM) after their fourteen to sixteen-month RIM period in that unit had expired, up to eight and a half years prior to mobilisation.9 
h. 503 and 504 Object Security Platoon may have been intended for deployment to De Peel Air Base.17
i. De Peel Airbase (Vliegbasis De Peel, Vlb PEL) was a Dispersion Operating Base (DOB).4 Simplified organisation. In peacetime it was a 'sleeping base' with minimal personnel, except during exercises. De Peel was, however, seen as an operational air base and, like other air bases, it had command facilities, bunkers and concrete aircraft shelters. If the readiness of 77 AFU can be taken as a measure (operational within twelve hours) it seems likely the base could be operational within twenty-four hours or less. In wartime 306 Squadron would operate from this base (see note b). Both in peace and wartime the base was under control of Volkel Airbase; in wartime the deputy commander of Volkel Airbase would probably move to De Peel and act as local subcommander.18  
j. Peacetime and wartime strengths include a security dog group (hondengeleiders) of -/1/4 (5).8


Part I | Part II | Part III | Part IV | Part V | Part VI | Part VII | Part VIII

LB pel (3x)SHORAD74AFU60 LB Sq422 Sq314 SqVlb EHV509 Objbewsq [KL]508 Objbewsq [KL]507 Objbewsq [KL]LB pel (4x)SHORAD75AFU70 LB Sq121 Sq316 SqVlb GZRY

Unit Main Equipment Air Combat Role Peace Strength War Strength
Gilze-Rijen Air Base [a]
316 Squadron
 18 x NF-5A, 3 x NF-5B 29 FBA  ?
 ?
     
121 Squadron [b]
└ 75 Assault Firing Unit 3 x I-HAWK    
 (30-35) (±100)
└ SHORAD flight 3 x Flycatcher, 9 x 40L70    
 (30-35) (±100)
   
70 Air Force Security Squadron [c]  

1/18/100 (119)
 5/16/167 (188)
Air Force Security Platoon x 4  

– 1/4/41 (46) x 4
507 Object Security Squadron [Royal Army] [d]    
– 5/15/105 (125)
508 Object Security Squadron [Royal Army] [d]    
– 5/15/105 (125)
509 Object Security Squadron [Royal Army] [d]    
– 5/15/105 (125)
   
Eindhoven Air Base [e]
314 Squadron [f]
 18 x NF-5A, 3 x NF5B 29 FBA  ?
 ?
   
422 Squadron [b]
└ 74 Assault Firing Unit 3 x I-HAWK    
 (30-35) (±100)
└ SHORAD flight [g] 2 x Flycatcher, 6 x 40L70    
 (20-25) (±75)
   
60 Air Force Security Squadron [h]  

1/15/52 (68)
 5/18/144 (167)
Air Force Security Platoon x 3  

– 1/4/41 (46) x 3

Notes
   
a. Gilze-Rijen Air Base was a Main Operating Base (MOB), a Collocated Operating Base (COB), and a reserve Lines of Communications airfield (LOC).4 Simplified organisation; for a more comprehensive, generic depiction of the air base organisation click the blue unit symbol in the organisational chart above. In July 1982 the base had been merged organisationally with Eindhoven Air Base as a cost-cutting measure. The commander of the joined Eindhoven-Gilze-Rijen Air Base organisation resided at Gilze-Rijen Air Base, the deputy commander resided at Eindhoven Air Base and some services were integrated. The merge did not work out well, but would nonetheless persist until July 1995. In times of crisis or war two USAF F-15 squadrons would operate from Gilze-Rijen Air Base in its capacity as COB.19 
b. Simplified organisation; for a comprehensive depiction click the blue squadron symbol in the organisational chart above. SHORAD: short range air defence.
c. Peacetime and wartime strengths include a security dog group (hondengeleiders) of -/8/34 (42).8
d. Filled by mobilisable personnel from 14 Armoured Infantry Battalion (RIM) after their fourteen to sixteen-month RIM period in that unit had expired, up to eight and a half years prior to mobilisation.9 
e. Eindhoven Air Base (Vliegbasis Eindhoven, Vlb EHV) was a Main Operating Base (MOB).4 Simplified organisation; for a more comprehensive, generic depiction of the air base organisation click the blue unit symbol in the organisational chart above. Organisationally merged with Gilze-Rijen Air Base, see note a.
f. 314 Squadron was assigned to the Air component of Allied Command Europe Mobile Force, ACE Mobile Force for short. AMF was one of NATO's multinational reaction forces, to be deployed in times of emerging international crises on the flanks of NATO. See further NATO Commands, Multinational Forces. 314 Squadron could be deployed to NATO's northern and southern flanks, but the emphasis was clearly on the northern flank: the squadron was deployed to Denmark or Norway at least three weeks a year to exercise with other AMF units. Bodø Air Force Base in Norway was a frequent destination for training and exercises. In October 1988 the AMF role was passed on to 315 Squadron, which by then was equipped with F-16 fighter aircraft.20 
g. The SHORAD flight of Eindhoven had, at least until the end of 1987, two rather than three Flycatcher/40L70 combinations. See further Unit Organisation and Equipment, The Active Air Defence Squadron. 
h. Peacetime and wartime strengths include a security dog group (hondengeleiders) of -/4/17 (21).8


Part I | Part II | Part III | Part IV | Part V | Part VI | Part VII | Part VIII

581 Objbewpel [KL]518 Objbewsq [KL]517 Objbewsq [KL]313 SqLB pel (4x)20 LB SqSHORAD72 AFU222 Sq315 SqVlb TW513 Objbewsq [KL]512 Objbewsq [KL]LB pel90 LB SqVlb DLGPLV

Unit Main Equipment Air Combat Role Peace Strength War Strength
Twenthe Air Base [a]
313 Squadron [b]
 11 x NF-5A, 10 x NF-5B 29 FBA  ?
 ?
315 Squadron [c]
 18 x NF-5A, 3 x NF-5B 29 FBA  ?
 ?
     
222 Squadron [d]
└ 72 Assault Firing Unit 3 x I-HAWK    
 (30-35) (±100)
└ SHORAD flight 3 x Flycatcher, 9 x 40L70    
 (30-35) (±100)
   
20 Air Force Security Squadron [e]  

1/15/57 (73)
 5/18/139 (162)
Air Force Security Platoon x 4  

– 1/4/41 (46) x 4
517 Object Security Squadron [Royal Army] [f]    
– 5/15/105 (125)
518 Object Security Squadron [Royal Army] [f]    
– 5/15/105 (125)
581 Object Security Platoon [Royal Army] [f]      
– 1/4/33 (38)
   
Unit Main Equipment Peace Strength War Strength
Deelen Air Base [g]
Light Aircraft Group [h] 24 x BO-105C, 36 x Alouette III 105/132/149 (386)
 166/197/279 (642)
   
90 Air Force Security Squadron [i] [j]  
1/14/48 (63)
 5/17/135 (157)
Air Force Security Platoon [j]  
– 1/4/41 (46)
512 Object Security Squadron [Royal Army] [j] [k]     – 5/15/105 (125)
513 Object Security Squadron [Royal Army] [j] [k]     – 5/15/105 (125)

Notes
   
a. Twenthe Air Base (Vliegbasis Twenthe, Vlb TW) was a Main Operating Base (MOB).4 Simplified organisation; for a more comprehensive, generic depiction of the air base organisation click the blue unit symbol in the organisational chart above.
b. 313 Squadron provided the Theatre Operational Conversion Course (TOCC) for recently licensed NF-5 pilots trained in the United States and Canada, as well as the subsequent Advanced Operational Course (AOC). In peacetime these demanding training tasks were predominant for the squadron. Because of this it had a larger complement of aircraft, with more two-seaters. Unlike the NF5-B two-seaters of other squadrons, those of 313 Squadron were combat-capable.29 In wartime the squadron would operate in the Fighter-Bomber Attack role. From April to August 1985 the squadron operated from Soesterberg Air Base because of a runway renovation at Twenthe Air Base.21 
c. 315 Squadron would start transitioning to the F-16 on 6 January 1986, on which date a first group of pilots moved to TCA F-16 at Leeuwarden Air Base (see Part I). From 21 to 30 October 1985 the squadron had its last NATO rotation with the NF-5, deploying to the Italian Air Force Base Grosetto (rotation with 9º Gruppo, 4º Stormo).22 
d. Simplified organisation; for a comprehensive depiction click the blue squadron symbol in the organisational chart above. SHORAD: short range air defence.
e. Peacetime and wartime strengths include a security dog group (hondengeleiders) of -/4/12 (16).8
f. Filled by mobilisable personnel from 14 Armoured Infantry Battalion (RIM) after their fourteen to sixteen-month RIM period in that unit had expired, up to eight and a half years prior to mobilisation.9 
g. Deelen Air Base (Vliegbasis Deelen, Vlb DL) would serve as a Reserve Airfield in wartime.4 Simplified organisation; for a more comprehensive, generic depiction of the air base organisation click the blue unit symbol in the organisational chart above. Note that the air base had no active air defence squadron.
h. Peacetime organisation. See also Part I, note f. In wartime the Light Aircraft Group (Groep Lichte Vliegtuigen, GPLV) would fall under operational command of Commander 1 (NL) Corps, Royal Army and deploy to its operational field location(s) in West-Germany.7
i. Peacetime and wartime strengths include a security dog group (hondengeleiders) of -/3/8 (11).8
j. The air base security infantry elements would not deploy with the Light Aircraft Group in wartime (see note h) but remain at the air base.8 
k. Filled by mobilisable personnel from 16 Armoured Infantry Battalion (RIM) after their fourteen to sixteen-month RIM period in that unit had expired, up to eight and a half years prior to mobilisation.9 


Part I | Part II | Part III | Part IV | Part V | Part VI | Part VII | Part VIII

NL det Kreta336 SqVlb Hato594 Objbewpel [KL]593 Objbewpel [KL]521 Objbewsq [KL]520 Objbewsq [KL]110 LB Sq100 LB SqVlb YB

Unit Main Equipment Peace Strength War Strength
Ypenburg Air Base [a]
100 Air Force Security Squadron [b]  
-/16/30 (46)
 5/13/126 (144)
110 Air Force Security Squadron [b]  
– 5/13/126 (144)
   
520 Object Security Squadron [Royal Army] [c]     – 5/15/105 (125)
521 Object Security Squadron [Royal Army] [d]     – 5/15/105 (125)
593 Object Security Platoon [Royal Army] [d]     – 1/4/33 (38)
594 Object Security Platoon [Royal Army] [d]     – 1/4/33 (38)
   
Hato Air Base [e]
336 Squadron [e] 2 x Fokker F.27M 
(32)
 (32)
     
Netherlands Detachment Crete [f]     –
 ?

Notes
   
a. Ypenburg Air Base (Vliegbasis Ypenburg, Vlb YB) was a Reserve Airfield and a Lines of Communications Airfield (LOC).4 Part of the Air Force Staff Corps was based here; the air base commander was also commander of said corps. The Air Force Staff School was located here.23 
b. In peacetime Ypenburg Air Base had an Air Force Security unit (Luchtmacht Beveiliging, LB) with a strength of one platoon. Presumably this was 100 Air Force Security Squadron, to be brought up to war strength on mobilisation and reinforced by the mobilised 110 Air Force Security Squadron. Remarkably, neither squadron had a security dog group, at least in 1980.8 
c. Filled by mobilisable personnel from 16 Armoured Infantry Battalion (RIM) after their fourteen to sixteen-month RIM period in that unit had expired, up to eight and a half years prior to mobilisation.9 
d. Filled by mobilisable personnel from 14 Armoured Infantry Battalion (RIM) after their fourteen to sixteen-month RIM period in that unit had expired, up to eight and a half years prior to mobilisation.9 
e. 336 Squadron was based on Hato Airbase, Curaçao, Netherlands Antilles. Both elements were under operational control of Naval Commander Netherlands Antilles in peace and wartime. See Royal Navy, Naval Command Netherlands Antilles, note d and e.
f. Netherlands Detachment Crete in some way facilitated live firing exercises of Royal Air Force MIM-23B I-HAWK, MIM-14C Nike Hercules missile crews and probably, from 1984 or 1985, FIM-92 Stinger instructors at the extensive NATO Missile Firing Installation (NAMFI) at Souda Bay on the island of Crete, Greece. Royal Army MGM-52C Lance crews of 129 Field Artillery Battalion and Stinger instructors also held live firing exercises here, so it seems likely that the detachment included Royal Army personnel as well. The detachment, to be disbanded in wartime, was not under NATO operational control in peacetime (see Part I, note b).24


Part I | Part II | Part III | Part IV | Part V | Part VI | Part VII | Part VIII

LUMETC78 AFUSHORADRPN557 Objbewpel [KL]556 Objbewpel [KL]LB pel (2x)CRC/MilATCCLVMG519 Objbewsq [KL]LB pel (3x)SHORAD

Unit Location Peace Strength War Strength
Control and Reporting Centre / Military Air Traffic Control Centre [a]
 Nieuw Milligen ? ?
     
Unit Location Main Equipment Peace Strength War Strength
Radar Post North [a] Wier  
?
 ?
└ 78 Assault Firing Unit [b] – 3 x I-HAWK ? (±100)
└ SHORAD-flight [b] – 3 x Flycatcher, 9 x 40L70 ? (±100)
SHORAD-flight [c] Nieuw Milligen 3 x Flycatcher, 9 x 40L70 (30-35) (±100)
Air Force Security Platoon x 3 [d] –  
-/9/11 (20) 1/4/41 (46) x 3
519 Object Security Squadron [Royal Army] [e]  –  
– 5/13/126 (144)
     
Unit Location Peace Strength War Strength
Air Force Signal and Meteorological Group [f]
 Hilversum ? ?
     
Air Force Meteorological Centre [f]
 Hilversum ? ?
     
Unit Location Peace Strength War Strength
Air Force Security Platoon x 2 [g] Hilversum -/6/30 (36) 1/4/41 (46) x 2
556 Object Security Platoon [Royal Army] [e] – – 1/4/33 (38)
557 Object Security Platoon [Royal Army] [e] – – 1/4/33 (38)

Notes
   
a. The combined Control and Reporting Centre/Military Air Traffic Control Centre (CRC/MilATCC) was the Royal Air Force's single radar station, air traffic control centre, and air defence direction centre, operational in peace and wartime. It was located in Nieuw Milligen and operated from an underground bunker. The Control and Reporting Centre (CRC) had one external radar post located in Wier: Radar Post North (Radarpost Noord, RPN). RPN was located in the base security area of Leeuwarden Air Base and would in wartime be secured by (mobilised) security infantry units of that base. The responsibilities of CRC comprised producing a 'recognised air picture' (detecting, identifying, tracking); exerting tactical control over the guided weapon groups, the Assault Firing Units (AFU) and the air defence-roled aircraft squadrons; operating as Alternate Mission Control Centre (AMCC) for West German Nike Hercules surface-to-air missile units if MCC Brockzetel (GE) would become non-operational; and carry out NATO alerting tasks. RPN served to guarantee a good radar coverage of the North Sea area, which was important since this area was not already covered by the West German CRCs in Brockzetel, Visselhövede and Breckendorf. Together with these CRCs, CRC Nieuw Milligen (including RPN in Wier) controlled the airspace above and around the Netherlands and the northern part of West Germany, operating under the direction of NATO Sector Operations Centre 1 (SOC 1) in Brockzetel. All this was part of the NATO Air Defence Ground Environment System (NADGE), the integrated air defence system that protected NATO airspace against intruders. In peacetime CRC Nieuw Milligen operated with four limited crews to meet the 'minimum readiness posture' set by Commander Second Allied Tactical Air Force (COMTWOATAF). In wartime the CRC would be operational around the clock, operating with three complete crews. The collocated Military Air Traffic Control Centre (MilATCC), call sign 'Dutch Mil', did not only control military air traffic, but also civilian air traffic in a large part of Dutch airspace. In times of crisis or war all air traffic would come under control of MilATCC. Responsibilities included collecting and distributing aeronautical information, alerting Search and Rescue services (SAR) and initiating SAR-sorties. MilATCC was operational round the clock in peace and wartime, with three limited crews in peacetime and two complete crews in wartime. Wartime tasks included producing a complete air traffic picture of the Netherlands area of flight intelligence and directing aircraft to their home base or to an alternate base ('recovery/diversion service').25 
b. The mobilisable 78 Assault Firing Unit (78 AFU) and Short Range Air Defence flight (SHORAD) were earmarked for the air defence of Radar Post North in wartime. In peacetime their equipment was in use (and possibly partly stored) with the Guided Weapons Training School (Geleide Wapen Opleidingsschool) located at Twenthe Air Base. 78 AFU would be operational within twenty-four hours from mobilisation; the SHORAD flight would be operational within, at the most, forty-eight hours from mobilisation but, given the response time of 78 AFU, probably within twenty-four hours as well. Both units would fall under administrative command of 119 Squadron of nearby Leeuwarden Air Base, which base would likely also provide logistic support. With a maximum range of some thirty-five kilometres the MIM-23B missiles of 78 AFU could easily contribute to the air defence of said air base if needed; and vice versa for Leeuwarden's 77 AFU.26 
c. This SHORAD flight was responsible for the air defence of CRC/MilATCC.27
d. Peacetime and wartime strengths include a security dog group (hondengeleiders) of -/2/11 (13).8
e. Filled by mobilisable personnel from 16 Armoured Infantry Battalion (RIM) after their fourteen to sixteen-month RIM period in that unit had expired, up to eight and a half years prior to mobilisation.9 
f. The Air Force Signal and Meteorological Group (Luchtmacht Verbindings- Meteorologische Groep, LVMG) formed the Royal Air Force's meteorological service and meteorology-related communication service. The collocated Air Force Meteorological Centre (Luchtmacht Meteorologisch Centrum, LUMETC) was part of LVMG and formed its operational meteorological element. LVMG was not under NATO operational control in peacetime (see Part I, note b). Schooling and training of LVMG personnel was carried out by Air Force Meteorological Squadron.28
g. The two mobilisable Air Force Security platoons earmarked for LVMG had, at least in 1980, no security dog group.8


Part I | Part II | Part III | Part IV | Part V | Part VI | Part VII | Part VIII

GHK/GOCGHK/GOC590 Objbewpel [KL]589 Objbewpel [KL]579 Objbewpel [KL]578 Objbewpel [KL]577 Objbewpel [KL]570 Objbewpel [KL]584 Objbewpel [KL]569 Objbewpel [KL]568 Objbewpel [KL]567 Objbewpel [KL]Stingerteam x 3Stingerteam x 3501 SqStingerteam x 3502 Sq328 SqStingerteam x 3327 SqStingerteam x 3503 SqStingerteam x 3LB pel (5x)Stingerteam x 3326 Sq566 Objbewpel [KL]500 Sq5 GGWStingerteam x 3565 Objbewpel [KL]LB pel (5x)324 Sq3 GGW

Unit Location Main Equipment Peace Strength War Strength
3 Guided Weapons Group [a]
Group Headquarters/Group Operations Centre [b] Blomberg (GE)  
?
 ?
324 Squadron [c] Laatzen (GE) 6 x I-HAWK (±60)
 (130-150)
└ Stinger team x 3 [d] Laatzen (GE) 6 x Stinger -/1/4 (5) x 3 -/1/4 (5) x 3
326 Squadron [c] Velmerstot (GE) 6 x I-HAWK (±60)
 (130-150)
└ Stinger team x 3 [d] Velmerstot (GE) 6 x Stinger -/1/4 (5) x 3 -/1/4 (5) x 3
327 Squadron [d] Goldbeck (GE) 6 x I-HAWK (±60)
 (130-150)
└ Stinger team x 3 [d] Goldbeck (GE) 6 x Stinger -/1/4 (5) x 3 -/1/4 (5) x 3
328 Squadron [c] Schwalenberg (GE) 6 x I-HAWK (±60)
 (130-150)
└ Stinger team x 3 [d] Schwalenberg (GE) 6 x Stinger -/1/4 (5) x 3 -/1/4 (5) x 3
Air Force Security Platoon x 5 [e] [locations above]  
-/32/98 (130) 5/23/213 (241)
565 Object Security Platoon [Royal Army] [f]  –  
– 1/4/33 (38)
566 Object Security Platoon [Royal Army] [f]  –  
– 1/4/33 (38)
567 Object Security Platoon [Royal Army] [f]  –  
– 1/4/33 (38)
568 Object Security Platoon [Royal Army] [f]  –  
– 1/4/33 (38)
569 Object Security Platoon [Royal Army] [f]  –  
– 1/4/33 (38)
584 Object Security Platoon [Royal Army] [f]  –  
– 1/4/33 (38)
   
5 Guided Weapons Group [a]
Group Headquarters/Group Operations Centre [b] Stolzenau (GE)  
?
 ?
500 Squadron [c] Borstel (GE) 6 x I-HAWK (±60)
 (130-150)
└ Stinger team x 3 [d] Borstel (GE) 6 x Stinger -/1/4 (5) x 3 -/1/4 (5) x 3
501 Squadron [c] Winzlar (GE) 6 x I-HAWK (±60)
 (130-150)
└ Stinger team x 3 [d] Winzlar (GE) 6 x Stinger -/1/4 (5) x 3 -/1/4 (5) x 3
502 Squadron [c] Hoysingausen (GE) 6 x I-HAWK (±60)
 (130-150)
└ Stinger team x 3 [d] Hoysinghausen (GE) 6 x Stinger -/1/4 (5) x 3 -/1/4 (5) x 3
503 Squadron [c] Reinsdorf (GE) 6 x I-HAWK (±60)
 (130-150)
└ Stinger team x 3 [d] Reinsdorf (GE) 6 x Stinger -/1/4 (5) x 3 -/1/4 (5) x 3
Air Force Security Platoon x 5 [e] [locations above]  
-/32/98 (130) 5/23/213 (241)
570 Object Security Platoon [Royal Army] [g]  –  
– 1/4/33 (38)
577 Object Security Platoon [Royal Army] [g]  –  
– 1/4/33 (38)
578 Object Security Platoon [Royal Army] [g]  –  
– 1/4/33 (38)
579 Object Security Platoon [Royal Army] [g]  –  
– 1/4/33 (38)
589 Object Security Platoon [Royal Army] [f]  –  
– 1/4/33 (38)
590 Object Security Platoon [Royal Army] [g]  –  
– 1/4/33 (38)

Notes
   
a. Simplified organisation. 3 and 5 Guided Weapons Group (Groep Geleide Wapens, GGW) were each responsible for a sector of the Low Missile Engagement Zone (LOMEZ) in the NATO surface-to-air missile belt which ran across the eastern parts of NATO territory. These sectors lay in the corps rear areas of I (GE) Corps and 1 (BR) Corps. Both groups were fully mobile and able to operate independently. They were under operational command of NATO's Second Allied Tactical Air Force (TWOATAF) in peace and wartime, through, subsequently, the Air Defence Operations Centre (ADOC) in Maastricht, Sector Operations Centre 2 (SOC 2) in Uedem (GE) and Control and Reporting Centre (CRC) Auenhausen (GE). If needed this chain of command could be shortened by bypassing intermediate command levels or delegating operational command to one of the lower command levels.30
b. The Group Headquarters (Groepshoofdkwartier, GHK) was collocated with the Group Operations Centre (Groepsoperatiecentrum, GOC), often referred to by the US Army designation Battalion Operations Centre (BOC). GOC was the group's primary fire coordination centre.31 32 
c. Ground-based mobile air defence squadron equipped with MIM-23B I-HAWK medium range surface-to-air-missile systems. The squadron would operate in two firing platoons, referred to as the 'main' launching section and the Platoon Command Post launching section (PCP).32 The 'main' launching section comprised Battery Control Central (= squadron control central) / Information and Coordination Central (BCC/ICC) equipped with Identification Friend or Foe (IFF), Pulse Acquisition Radar (PAR), Continuous Wave Acquisition Radar (CWAR) and High-Power Illumination Radar (HIPIR). BCC/ICC operated as fire control element. The 'main' launching section had three M192 mobile launchers, each with three missiles mounted. The Platoon Command Post launching section comprised the PCP, equipped with IFF, CWAR, HIPIR and again three M192 launchers with each three missiles mounted. Usually both sections (platoons) would be directed simultaneously from BCC/ICC, but they could operate independently and separately if necessary. Within a section the launchers were positioned at about ninety to one hundred meters from the Platoon Command Post. The distances between the equipment elements were a compromise between security, maximum spread and cable lengths. The squadron could operate at a distance of up to twenty kilometres from the Group Operations Centre (see note b). It had operational and logistical support which included communications, power generators, fuel supply, transport, maintenance and materiel support, medical support and a field kitchen group. The squadron had one full reload for each launcher, so another eighteen missiles, which brought the squadron's basic load to thirty-six missiles in total. Behind this there was virtually no stock, which made prolonged operations very unlikely. It was however thought that, in wartime, the chance a squadron would be able to fire all its missiles, and survive unscathed, was small. In peacetime the squadrons of 3 and 5 GGW maintained a constant high readiness status in accordance with Allied Command Europe Forces standards: of each GGW one squadron could be ready to fire within twenty minutes, a second squadron within three hours and the two remaining squadrons within twelve hours.33 
d. Deployed at a distance of about six kilometres from the deployment area of the I-HAWK squadron to which they were attached, the three Stinger teams, each equipped with 2 x FIM-92 Stinger man-portable air defence system, covered the dead corners of the squadron's I-HAWK systems. They also provided air (self) defence during redeployments of the squadron. Targets had to be identified visually. A Stinger team comprised one commander (sergeant) and two sections, each section comprising one spotter and one gunner (corporals/soldiers). The team had 1 x ¾-tonne Land Rover with trailer, radios, tents, camouflage nets, eleven missiles and victuals for several days. Stinger teams were formed from Air Force Security personnel (Luchtmacht Beveiliging, LB), for the larger part conscripts. The FIM-92 Stinger entered service with 3 and 5 Guided Weapons Group in December 1985; they replaced the M55 Quad anti-aircraft heavy machine gun .50 inch.34 
e. Peace and wartime strengths include a security dog group (hondengeleiders) of -/3/8 (11). In peacetime this personnel was probably organised in five Air Force Security (Luchtmachtbeveiliging, LB) detachments. After mobilisation five LB platoons would be formed, filled out with mobilised personnel. One platoon would secure the Group Headquarters/Group Operations Centre, the four remaining platoons would each be assigned to one of the four I-HAWK squadrons.8 35 
f. Filled by mobilisable personnel from 16 Armoured Infantry Battalion (RIM) after their fourteen to sixteen-month RIM period in that unit had expired, up to eight and a half years prior to mobilisation.9 36 After mobilisation each of these four platoons would be assigned to one of the four I-HAWK squadrons.35 The two remaining platoons would probably secure the Group Headquarters/Group Operations Centre.
g. Filled by mobilisable personnel from 14 Armoured Infantry Battalion (RIM) after their fourteen to sixteen-month RIM period in that unit had expired, up to eight and a half years prior to mobilisation.9 36 After mobilisation each of these four platoons would be assigned to one of the four I-HAWK squadrons.35 The two remaining platoons would probably secure the Group Headquarters/Group Operations Centre.


Part I | Part II | Part III | Part IV | Part V | Part VI | Part VII | Part VIII

575 Objbewpel [KL]574 Objbewpel [KL]SHORAD-vlucht (x2)SHORAD-vlucht (x2)LB pel (5x)118 SqGHK/GOC573 Objbewpel [KL]572 Objbewpel [KL]220Sq571 Objbewpel [KL]563 Objbewpel [KL]562 Objbewpel [KL]561 Objbewpel [KL]12 GGW

Unit Location Main Equipment Peace Strength War Strength
12 Guided Weapons Group [a]
Group Headquarters/Group Operations Centre [b] Hesepe (GE)  
?
 ?
118 Squadron [c] Vörden (GE) 9 x Nike Hercules (± 240)
 (± 300)
└ SHORAD section x 2 Vörden (GE) 2 x Flycatcher, 6 x 40L70 (20-25) (± 75)
220 Squadron [c] Schöppingen (GE) 9 x Nike Hercules (± 240)
 (± 300)
└ SHORAD section x 2 Schöppingen (GE) 2 x Flycatcher, 6 x 40L70 (20-25) (± 75)
Air Force Security Platoon x 5 [d] [locations above]  
4/34/208 (246) 5/38/237 (280)
561 Object Security Platoon [Royal Army] [e]  –  
– 1/4/33 (38)
562 Object Security Platoon [Royal Army] [e]  –  
– 1/4/33 (38)
563 Object Security Platoon [Royal Army] [e]  –  
– 1/4/33 (38)
571 Object Security Platoon [Royal Army] [e]  –  
– 1/4/33 (38)
572 Object Security Platoon [Royal Army] [e]  –  
– 1/4/33 (38)
573 Object Security Platoon [Royal Army] [e]  –  
– 1/4/33 (38)
574 Object Security Platoon [Royal Army] [e]  –  
– 1/4/33 (38)
575 Object Security Platoon [Royal Army] [e]  –  
– 1/4/33 (38)

Notes
   
a. Simplified organisation. 12 Guided Weapons Group (12 Groep Geleide Wapens, 12 GGW) was responsible for a sector of the High Missile Engagement Zone (HIMEZ) of the NATO surface-to-air missile belt which ran across the eastern parts of NATO territory. This sector lay in the rear combat zone behind the corps areas of I (GE) Corps and 1 (BR) Corps. Unlike 3 and 5 Guided Weapons Group, 12 GGW was not mobile and bound to fixed, fairly extensive launching areas. The group was under operational command of NATO's Second Allied Tactical Air Force (TWOATAF) in peace and wartime, through, subsequently, the Air Defence Operations Centre (ADOC) in Maastricht, Sector Operations Centre 2 (SOC 2) in Uedem (GE) and Control and Reporting Centre Uedem (CRC Uedem). If needed this chain of command could be shortened by bypassing intermediate command levels or delegating operational command to one of the lower command levels. By 1985 the MIM-14C Nike Hercules surface-to-air missile systems, with which the group was equipped, had become obsolete and were being phased out by the Royal Air Force in anticipation of the new mobile MIM-104 Patriot surface-to-air-missile system. Nike Hercules had its technical roots in the late 1940s; its rate of fire was low, the system could only engage one target at a time and its tactical immobility made it vulnerable to enemy attack. Besides this the operational use of Nike Hercules, targeting large enemy bomber formations, had also become outdated. 12 GGW initially had four squadrons; 120 and 223 Squadron had been disbanded in March 1983 and June 1984 respectively. 118 and 220 Squadron would follow in March 1988 and Juli 1987 respectively; finally 12 GGW would be disbanded in April 1988. 502 Squadron of 5 GGW was the first to become operational with Patriot, in April 1987.37
b. The Group Headquarters (Groepshoofdkwartier, GHK) was collocated with the Group Operations Centre (Groepsoperatiecentrum, GOC), often referred to by the US Army designation Battalion Operations Centre (BOC). GOC was the group's primary fire coordination centre.31 32 
c. Ground-based air defence squadron equipped with non-mobile MIM-14C Nike Hercules long range, medium and high altitude surface-to-air-missile systems. The squadron comprised the commander and his staff, a service support and administrative flight, a technical flight, a ground-operations (security) flight and an operations flight. The operations flight comprised a small command element and three combat crews, each led by a Battery Control Officer (BCO). The three combat crews each comprised a fire control section and a launching section with three launchers. The three launching sections were numbered A(lpha), B(ravo) and C(harlie). Each had a minimum strength of twenty men. The fire control section, with a minimum strength of nine men, had a Battery Control Trailer (BCT), Radar Control Trailer (RCT), Identification Friend or Foe (IFF), High Power Acquisition Radar (HIPAR), Low Power Acquisition Radar (LOPAR), Missile Tracking Radar (MTR), Target Tracking Radar (TTR) and Target Ranging Radar (TRR). At full strength a combat crew had a strength of about thirty-five men. The squadron operated from three main areas: the Integrated Fire Control area (IFC), the launching area (Launching Control Area, LCA or LA for short) and the administrative area. The distance between IFC and LCA was between 900 to 5400 metres, the administrative area could be located several kilometres from IFC and LCA. Both 118 and 220 Squadron were dual capable up to a few months prior to their deactivation and disbandment in 1988 and 1987 respectively (see note a). For a nuclear fire mission one or more Nike Hercules missiles would be fitted with a W31 nuclear warhead, which reportedly had a yield of 2 kilotons (version BXS: NIKE type B, Special, Small). These warheads were property of the United States and stored with the Alpha and Bravo launching sections in the Launching Control Area, under custody of 509 US Army Artillery Detachment (509 USAAD), which had a strength of 125 men and was subordinate to 5 US Army Artillery Group (5 USAAG) in Büren (GE). Around the Alpha and Bravo launching sections there was a security ring that was permanently guarded by Air Force Security troops (Luchtmacht Beveliging, LB). The nuclear release sequence was probably similar to that of the dual capable artillery of 1 (NL) Corps. Ultimately the decision to deploy any US nuclear weapon lay with the President of the United States. Nuclear fire missions could be directed at air targets, envisioned as enemy bomber formations and, in a secondary role, against ground targets such as enemy troop concentrations or enemy military infrastructure. Conventional fire missions would target enemy aircraft formations only. Alpha and Bravo launching section were each equipped with five nuclear (BXS) missiles and six conventional missiles (version BHE: NIKE type B, High Explosive), Charlie Section was equipped with eleven conventional BHE missiles, bringing the squadron's basic load to ten nuclear and twenty-three conventional missiles; thirty-three missiles in total. Behind this there was virtually no stock, which made prolonged operations very unlikely. It was however thought that, in wartime, the chance a squadron would be able to fire all its missiles, and survive unscathed, was small. In peacetime the two squadrons of 12 GGW maintained a constant high readiness status in accordance with Allied Command Europe Forces standards: one squadron could be ready to fire within thirty minutes, the second squadron within three hours or, in case of monthly maintenance, within twelve hours.38 
d. Distribution of personnel may have been as follows: in peacetime organised in two platoons or detachments; one, 2/14/104 (120) strong, securing the Group Headquarters/Group Operations Centre and 118 Squadron. The other, 2/14/92 (108) strong, securing 220 Squadron. In peace and wartime these three elements probably each had one security dog group (hondengeleiders) of -/2/4 (6) strong. After mobilisation five platoons would be formed. One platoon, at the standard organic strength of 1/4/41 (46), would secure the Group Headquarters/Group Operations Centre, whilst 118 and 220 Squadron would each be secured by two platoons, each 1/7/46 (54) strong. The five platoons would be assigned to the units they secured.8 39
e. Filled by mobilisable personnel from 16 Armoured Infantry Battalion (RIM) after their fourteen to sixteen-month RIM period in that unit had expired, up to eight and a half years prior to mobilisation.9 After mobilisation these eight security infantry platoons would probably be assigned as follows: three to each Nike Hercules squadron, and two to the Group Headquarters/Group Operations Centre.

_________________________________________________
   
1. Organisation: NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr. 663, Concept krijgsmachtdeelplan Koninklijke Luchtmacht 1987-1996 d.d. 20 december 1985, 88-89. NIMH 430, inv. nr. 54 (Slagorde KL stand 1 juli 1985), Blad E en S2. NIMH 723, inv. nr. 75, Organisatie en organisatieschema's m.b.t. de KLu d.d. 1 augustus 1984, 22. HTK 1983-1984, kamerstuknr. 18169 ondernr. 2 (Defensienota 1984-1993), 133. Fighter-bomber squadrons aircraft strength: see footnote 29. Air base ground-based air defence units: NL-HaNA, 2.13.182, inv. nr. 663, op.cit., 53-54. Helfferich, Squadrons (1994), passim. Van Loo, Crossing, 342. De Winter, Een eeuw, 160. Air Force Security and Object security units: NL-HaNA 2.13.113, inv. nr. 814, Indeling LB/OB-eenheden d.d. 18 februari 1980, Bijlagen A, C, D en E. NIMH 430, loc. cit. It should be noted that on this page the organisational charts do not show strictly operational command relations, but rather locational and/or administrative relations; aircraft squadrons for example were not under operational command of air base commanders but fell under (subcommands) of NATO's Second Allied Tactical Air Force (TWOATAF); see Part I, note b; see also Unit Organisation and Equipment, The Active Air Defence Squadron, last paragraph.   
2. NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr. 663, op.cit., 85. NIMH 723, inv. nr. 75, op. cit., 27, 35-36.
3. Ibid., 85, 86, 88-89. 
4. Ibid., 55-56. Main Operating Base (MOB): air base permanently housing one or more NATO-assigned aircraft squadrons. Reserve Airfield: to be operational within three days on order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, enabling one combat aircraft squadron to operate from the air base under wartime conditions. Reserve Airfields were seen purely as emergency facilities. Dispersion Operating Base (DOB): air base without aircraft squadrons permanently stationed in peacetime, housing at least one combat aircraft squadron in times of crisis or war. Collocated Operating Base (COB): air base that could accommodate one or more allied combat aircraft squadrons in times of crisis or war. This was laid down in bilateral agreements (Netherlands-US and Netherlands-UK). Ibid. Lines of Communications airfield (LOC): airfield or air base earmarked to receive and transfer allied reinforcements in the form of personnel, equipment or supplies coming in from the United States and possibly the UK. LOC airfields would be opened on NATO Simple Alert, or sooner if bilaterally agreed. Ibid, 55-57, 61, 117-118.
5. Ibid., 60, 117. Helfferich, Nederlandse Koninklijke, 157, 158. De Winter, op.cit., 204-205. 
6. NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr. 663, op.cit., 55, 112. Helfferich, Squadrons (1994), 209, 212. Van Loo, op. cit., 356, 358.   
7. NIMH 430, loc. cit. NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr. 663, op.cit., 88-89. 
8. NL-HaNA 2.13.113, inv. nr. 814, op. cit., Bijlagen D en E. 
9. NIMH 205A/10, Aflossing van mobilisabele eenheden en -aanvullingen d.d. 27 mei 1980. Ibid., d.d. 11 november 1983. 
10. Helfferich, Squadrons (1994), 168-169, 176-177, 180, 185-186, 281-282. De Jong et al., Voor vriend, 102-103, 106-107. 
11. Helfferich, ibid, 185-186, 281-282. De Jong et al., ibid., 102-103. 
12. NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr. 663, op. cit., 59, 66, 68, 80-81. De Jong et al., op. cit., 89-90, 126, 172-175. Helfferich, Squadrons (1994), 279-280. 
13. Helfferich, Nederlandse Koninklijke, 46. Smit, Leopard 1, 64. 
14. Helfferich, Squadrons (1994), 130-132. Relocation to De Peel in wartime: Helfferich, Nederlandse Koninklijke, 36. Swing role concept: developed from the multi-role capabilities of the F-16. Swing role meant that an aircraft could switch tasks (roles) during a mission, for example from Fighter-Bomber Attack to Air Defence. Van Loo, op. cit., 148.    
15. NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr. 663, op. cit., 50. Helfferich, Squadrons (1994), 135-138. Anonymus, Opslag en transport, 4, 30, 70. Website The Nuclear Weapon Archive, Complete List of All U.S. Nuclear Weapons. Wikipedia, B61 nuclear bomb. Dual capable: "A nuclear certified delivery unit capable of executing both conventional and nuclear missions." US Department of Defense Dictionary, 139. For reference: the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945 had a yield of 15 to 16 kilotons.
16. Helfferich, Squadrons (1994), 140-142. 
17. A 1980 document on the distribution of security infantry units shows these units assigned to De Peel Airbase. NL-HaNA 2.13.113, inv. nr. 814, op. cit., Bijlage B. The 1985 Royal Army order of battle shows them assigned to Volkel Air Base. NIMH 430, op. cit., Blad S2. This may be because De Peel Airbase was a subcommand of Volkel Air Base. Their mobilisation location, Erp, was close to both air bases.
18. NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr. 663, op. cit., 75. Website 306 Squadron, Dagboeken, 306 artikelen, passim. Primary information kindly provided by Royal Air Force Lieutenant-Colonel R. Dorenbos (Rtd.) (emails 27.05.2023 and 19.06.2023).
19. Organisational merge: Van Loo et al., 100 jaar, 127-128. Merge not working out well: there were persistent unclarities, and sometimes frictions between both locations. Ibid. USAF F-15 squadrons n wartime: NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr. 663, op. cit., 117.
20. Helfferich, Squadrons (1983), 90. Helfferich, Squadrons (1994), 151-154, 156.
21. Helfferich, Squadrons (1994), 144, 146-147. De Winter, op. cit., 157.
22. Helfferich, Squadrons (1994), 156, 158.
23. Information kindly provided by Royal Air Force Lieutenant-Colonel R. Dorenbos (Rtd.) (email 21.06.2023). Beeldbank NIMH, obj. nrs. 2157_048625 and 2157_022121. Website VOFE Ypenburg, Calendarium vliegveld Ypenburg, 3.
24. Nederlof, Blazing Skies, 228-229, 319, Bijlage I. Van Loo et al., Verenigd, 244. Nederlof appears to suggest that the detachment was only six men strong, being part of the NAMFI international (NATO) Scoring and Evaluation Section (S&E). Apart from this section NAMFI was an entirely Greek organisation. The firing programme was a responsibility of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). Nederlof, op. cit., 229. Not under NATO operational control: NL-HaNA, 2.13.182, inv. nr. 663, op. cit., 89.
25. NL-HaNA, 2.13.182, inv. nr. 663, op. cit., 35, 54, 57, 63, 76. Van Loo, op. cit., 127-131. RPN secured by security infantry of Leeuwarden Air Base: NL-HaNA 2.13.113, inv. nr. 814, op. cit., Bijlagen B en D.
26. NL-HaNA, 2.13.182, inv. nr. 663, op.cit., 53-54, 75-76. 78 AFU: Van Loo et al., op. cit., 259. Website Grondgebonden luchtverdediging, GGW's. Further information kindly provided by Royal Air Force Lieutenant-Colonel R. Dorenbos (Rtd.) (emails 08.04.2023 and 28.05.2023). Van Loo, op. cit.,782 notes that Radar Post North never had a SHORAD-flight, but the author appears to have overlooked mobilisable units; he also does not mention 78 AFU. Ibid., 341. The readiness of these mobilisable units meant that Radar Post North would be virtually without ground-based air defences for up to twenty-four hours after mobilisation, with only fighter aircraft for protection.
27. Given its vital importance it seems remarkable that CRC/MilATCC had no Assault Firing Unit to provide medium range air defence.
28. Van Loo, op. cit., 131-132. See also website Vereniging Officieren Verbindingsdienst, Intercom nr. 2 2017, R.H. Rijntalder: Krijgsmacht Telefoon- en Telegraafbureau, Deel 2, 68. Not under NATO operational control: NL-HaNA, 2.13.182, inv. nr. 663, op. cit., 89.
29. Fighter-bomber squadron standard operational strength in peace and wartime: eighteen aircraft (18 UE). NL-HaNA, 2.13.182, inv. nr. 663, op.cit., 50. Starink, Gevechtsvliegtuigen voor de KLu, Deel 5: Beschouwing, 114. F-16 squadron strengths: Ibid., Deel 4: MRCA-75 en F-16, 79. F-16A/B: single/two seat. The F-16B two-seater was combat capable. Ibid. NF-5 squadron strengths: Starink, op. cit., Deel 3: Het NF-5 project, 29. NF5A/B: single/two seat. The NF-5B was for training only, except those of 313 Squadron which were combat capable. Ibid. 313 Squadron aircraft strength: ibid.  
30. NL-HaNA, 2.13.182, inv. nr. 663, op.cit., 52. Website Grondgebonden luchtverdediging, Command & Control geleide wapens. For the NATO air defence belt, see website Grondgebonden luchtverdediging, Doctrine geleide wapens and Introductie geleide wapens. Note that the map displayed there shows the belt in West Germany in the mid-1960s, when the Royal Air Force still had five guided weapon groups stationed there. Since 1975 this had become three guided weapon groups. Ibid., GGW's. Similar and more detailed maps can be found in Nederlof, op. cit, 63, 87 and Van Loo et al., Verenigd, 223. The latter work notes that in wartime the NATO air defence belt was estimated to last forty-eight hours at the most. Ibid., 222. 
31. Nederlof, op. cit., Bijlage I, Het Hawk-wapensysteem. 
32. The mixed usage of Royal Air Force and US Army nomenclature (the latter no doubt caused by the integration in a NATO chain of command) is, to the outsider, confusing and also somewhat peculiar: on the one hand the Royal Air Force was keen to avoid Royal Army designations like 'bataljon', 'compagnie' and 'peloton', on the other hand equivalent US Army designations were frequently used.
33. Nederlof, op. cit., 206-207, Bijlage I, Het Hawk-wapensysteem. Royal Air Force Lieutenant-Colonel R. Dorenbos (Rtd.), emails 08.04.2023, 10.04.2023. Readiness: NL-HaNA, 2.13.182, inv. nr. 663, op.cit., 75.
34. Van Loo et al., op. cit., 250-251. Nederlof, op. cit., Bijlage I, De Stinger. M55 Quad: in 1967 the Royal Air Force had acquired seventy M55's from the Royal Army, so in theory each HAWK squadron may have had eight M55s before December 1985; however, three seems more likely.    
35. Royal Air Force Lieutenant-Colonel R. Dorenbos (Rtd.), email 13.06.2023. 
36. In the organisational charts (structuurschema's) of the official July 1985 Royal Army order of battle, 589 and 590 Object Security Platoon (sub 5 Guided Weapons Group) are erroneously numbered 580 and 596 respectively. Those units did not exist. NIMH 430, op. cit.
37. See footnote 30. Dorenbos, The Nike Hercules, 4-5. (This ebook provides a detailed historical and technical description of 12 Guided Weapons Group and its Nike Hercules missile systems. A version in Dutch can be found here.) 
38. Dorenbos, op. cit., 4-8, 23, 28-29. Nederlof, op. cit., Hoofdstuk 12, Bijlage I, Het Nike-wapensysteem. Anonymus, Opslag en transport, 71. Additional information kindly provided by Royal Air Force Lieutenant-Colonel R. Dorenbos (Rtd.), emails 08.04.2023 and 10.04.2023. Dual capable: "A nuclear certified delivery unit capable of executing both conventional and nuclear missions." US Department of Defense Dictionary, 139. Nederlof, op. cit., 284, reports that the nuclear W31 warhead in its BXS version had a yield of one, rather than two kilotons. The author also mentions the BXL version (NIKE type B, Special, Large) with a yield of five kilotons. Ibid. Dorenbos, op. cit., 23, reports a twenty kiloton yield for the BXL version, but also notes that this version had been phased out by 1981. For reference: the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945 had a yield of 15 to 16 kilotons. Readiness: NL-HaNA, 2.13.182, inv. nr. 663, op.cit., 75. Dorenbos, op. cit., 67.
39. It should be noted that the primary source for this (see footnote 8) dates from 1980, at which time 12 GGW still had four squadrons and, in wartime, nine Air Force Security platoons. The unit strengths given here have been derived by subtracting four platoons (two for each disbanded squadron) and one security dog group. This may not be completely accurate for 1985.