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NATO Commands
Command Structure | Multinational Forces
| Northern Army Group | Formal Alert System and
Counter-Surprise System
Command Structure 1
The
organisational chart above outlines the NATO
military command structure
in 1985. Pointing
your mouse to a field will display the name of the command in full,
with the nationality of its commander in parentheses, abbreviated in
the contemporary two-letter NATO country code. Some fields
have a drop shadow, which indicates the presence
of subordinate commands
or forces not shown here. The
fields with a double outline mark NATO's three major military
commands:
- Allied
Command Atlantic (ACLANT), headed by Supreme Allied Commander
Atlantic (SACLANT) and headquartered in Norfolk, United States;
- Allied
Command Europe (ACE), headed by Supreme
Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), whose headquarters,
designated Supreme
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), were located in Casteau,
Belgium;
- Allied
Command Channel (ACCHAN),
headed by Commander-in-Chief Channel (CINCHAN), headquartered
in Northwood, United Kingdom. CINCHAN was also
Commander-in-Chief Eastern Atlantic Area
(CINCEASTLANT). The subordinate Benelux Subarea Channel Command
(BENECHAN), also known as Benelux Channel Command, was held by Naval Commander Netherlands, who in
wartime would command Dutch and Belgian naval forces as Admiral Benelux.2
The
four Allied Tactical Air Forces (ATAFs)
would support the Allied
ground forces indicated by the upward arrows. It will
further be noted that the army corps provided by the United Kingdom was
designated '1st British Corps', abbreviated '1 (BR)
Corps'
rather
than '1 (UK) Corps'.
The
highest military authority in NATO was the Military Committee (MC). It
was composed of the chiefs-of-staff of the member nations (with the
exception of Iceland and France);3
for the Netherlands this was the Chief of the Defence Staff (Chef
Defensiestaf).4
The chiefs-of-staff would meet at least twice a year, or whenever
deemed necessary. To enable the MC to function on a continuous basis
with effective powers of decision, each chief-of-staff appointed a
permanent military representative in the rank of
lieutenant-general or equivalent rank.5
The chairman of the MC was elected by the chiefs-of-staff for a period
of three years; in 1985 this was a Netherlands general.6
The International
Military Staff (IMS) formed the executive
agency of the MC. It was headed by a
director in the rank of lieutenant-general or
equivalent rank, selected from the member nations. The
director was assisted by a secretary and six
assistant-directors, each heading one of
six divisions: Intelligence; Plans
and Policy; Operations; Logistics and
Resources; Command, Control and Communication Systems; and
Armaments, Standardisation and Interoperability. <
Multinational Forces
The armed
forces of member countries normally remained
under national command in peacetime, with the exception of air
defence forces and four integrated multinational forces, displayed in
purple in the chart above:
- Standing
Naval Force Atlantic
(STANAVFORLANT);
- ACE
Mobile Force (AMF);
- NATO
Airborne Early Warning Force (NAEWF);
- Standing
Naval Force Channel
(STANAVFORCHAN).
STANAVFORLANT,
AMF
and STANAVFORCHAN were the Immediate Reaction Forces of the three major
military commanders SACLANT, SACEUR and CINCHAN respectively. They were
meant
to provide a
quick military response to emerging crises as well as
providing a permanent display of Allied solidarity, vigilance
and military
integration.7
STANAVFORLANT
was a permanent peacetime naval squadron that usually included five
destroyers
or frigates, one each from the navies of Canada, West Germany,
the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, with
periodic
additions from Belgium, Denmark, Norway and Portugal. In wartime the
squadron would be disbanded.8 The
Netherlands
contribution to STANAVFORLANT in 1985 comprised, subsequently, the
Kortenaer-class
frigates Hr.Ms. Jan van Brakel and Hr.Ms.
Pieter Florisz.9
STANAVFORLANT normally
fell under the command of SACLANT but was detached to CINCEASTLANT when
operating in European waters.10
Squadron
command rotated annually between the regular contributing
navies, passing from a West German to a British captain in
April 1985.11
AMF was
an on-call task force, comprising a land and an air
component, AMF(L) and AMF(A) respectively. It was primarily
intended for deployment at ACE's northern
and southern flanks: northern Norway and Denmark; and Italy,
Greece and Turkey respectively. Though available at relatively short
notice, most units assigned to AMF were stationed in their home
countries and would, following
a request from SACEUR, first
have to assemble and move to the deployment
area. The
brigade-sized land component consisted chiefly of light
infantry battalions from Belgium, Canada, West Germany, Italy,
Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and the United States, most of which
were specialised in airborne operations and mountain or arctic warfare.12
Command
over AMF(L) normally rotated every three years, being held by
a Canadian major-general in 1985.13
The air
component did not have a permanent commander or headquarters;
when activated in support of AMF(L) it would be
placed under the operational control of the local ATAF or
Regional Air Commander. AMF(A) consisted of seven squadrons, one
each from the Belgian, Canadian, West German,
Italian, Netherlands, British
and United States air
forces.14
The Netherlands contribution to AMF(A) was 314 Squadron,
equipped
with NF-5 fighter aircraft. It was deployed to Denmark
or Norway at
least three weeks a year to exercise with other AMF units.15
NAEWF was
a multinational force operating a fleet of 18 Boeing E-3A Airborne
Warning and Control System aircraft (AWACS), the command position of
which was held alternately by the West German and United
States
air forces; in 1985 the Force Commander was a West German major-general.16
Operational
command over NAEWF was shared between SACEUR, SACLANT and CINCHAN, with
SACEUR acting as executive agent.17
STANAVFORCHAN
was a permanent naval squadron consisting of
mine-countermeasure vessels of the Belgian, West German, Netherlands
and British navies, with occasional contributions from
Denmark, Norway and the United States.18
In 1985 the Netherlands contribution to STANAVFORCHAN subsequently
comprised the mine countermeasures vessels Hr.Ms.
Ommen and Hr.Ms. Sittard, Hr.Ms.
Delfzijl, and Hr.Ms. Haarlem.19
Command rotated annually between the Belgian, British and Netherlands
navies, passing from the
British to the Netherlands navy in May 1985.20
<
Northern Army Group 21
The
Northern Army Group (NORTHAG), headed by Commander, Northern Army Group
(COMNORTHAG), was part
of Allied
Forces Central Europe
(AFCENT), headed by Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central
Europe (CINCENT), which in turn fell under the ACE major military
command. COMNORTHAG's area of military
responsibility comprised the northern half of West Germany, as shown on
the map below. For the defence of this area the following forces would
be placed under his operational command in wartime, from north to south:
- The Netherlands army corps, 1 (NL) Corps,
headquartered in Apeldoorn, Netherlands;
- One American brigade, 2 (US) Armored Division (Forward), the
forward-deployed element of an American army corps, III (US) Corps. 2 (US) AD (Fwd) was headquartered
in Garlstedt, in the Netherlands corps
sector;
- One West German army corps, I (GE) Corps,
headquartered in Münster;22
- The British army corps, 1 (BR) Corps, headquartered
in Bielefeld;23
- The Belgian army corps, 1 (BE) Corps, headquartered
in Junkersdorf, near Köln.
III
(US) Corps, headquartered in Fort Hood, Texas,
was earmarked for deployment to the
NORTHAG area
as strategic reserve for AFCENT. This corps would
deploy 2
(US)
Armored Division in
the rear of 1 (NL) Corps
as reserve force for NORTHAG. Its headquarters had a forward-deployed
element in Maastricht: Headquarters 3rd (US) Corps Forward.24
COMNORTHAG
was a
British general who was also commander-in-chief of the British Army of
the Rhine (BAOR), of which 1 (BR) Corps was the main component.25
BAOR headquarters was co-located with that of NORTHAG in Mönchengladbach-Rheindahlen,
West Germany. The Second Allied Tactical Air Force (TWOATAF), which
would support the operations of NORTHAG, was also
headquartered in Mönchengladbach-Rheindahlen.26
The map
below shows the NORTHAG area of responsibility, with its four national
corps sectors and the peacetime locations of the relevant
major headquarters. In the north the Netherlands corps sector
formed the left flank of both NORTHAG and AFCENT, bordering
with Allied Land Forces
Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland (LANDJUT), a joined Danish-German
command that fell under Allied Forces Baltic
Approaches (BALTAP), which was subordinate to Allied Forces
Northern
Europe (AFNORTH). In the south NORTHAG bordered with AFCENT's Central
Army Group (CENTAG).
The four
national corps sectors together constituted NORTHAG's Forward Combat
Zone. The area
between the Forward Combat Zone and the Netherlands and Belgian borders
formed the Rear Combat Zone, which fell under the responsibility
of Northern Territorial Command (Territorialkommando Nord)
(GE),
headquartered in Mönchengladbach-Windberg.
The national territories of the
Netherlands and Belgium comprised AFCENT's Communications Zone, vital
for
all logistic support operations and reinforcements, both from those
countries and from overseas.27 <
NORTHAG Area of Responsibility in
West Germany,
1985 28
In the
1980s concerns over the forces available to COMNORTHAG had led
the United States to undertake measures to improve the reaction
speed of III (US) Corps. Being
based in the
United States (apart from
the aforementioned forward-deployed
element in
Garlstedt) this corps would need to
be transported across the Atlantic Ocean with all its heavy equipment
before it would become
available to CINCENT: a time-consuming and, once war would
have broken out, hazardous
affair. To counter this problem the US Army began to
pre-position materiel in West Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands
according to the POMCUS concept (Preposition of Materiel
Configured in Unit Sets). This
allowed troops to be flown in
with airliners in a matter of hours, rather than having to travel by
sea
for ten days or more.29
During 1980-1981 a division's worth of equipment had been
pre-positioned in Mönchengladbach,
West-Germany and in
the following years two more
Division Sets were emplaced: one in Belgium and one
in the Netherlands. The purpose-built,
NATO-funded storage sites were known as POMS sites or POMSS
(Pre-positioned
Organizational Materiel Storage (Site)). In the
Netherlands five POMSS were built: at Ter Apel,
Coevorden, Vriezenveen, Brunssum and Eygelshoven. These were or
became operational in 1985; see National Territorial Command, Part
III. The POMCUS concept was integrated
in SACEUR's Rapid Reinforcement Plan ("Jump Fast")
and practiced annually in the
REFORGER exercises (Return of Forces to Germany).30
Not the least of the concerns about the strength of NORTHAG was
the maldeployment
and high mobilisation-dependency of the Netherlands army
corps; see 1 (NL) Corps, Maldeployment.
<
Formal Alert System and Counter-Surprise System 31
To enable a
timely and accurate response to military aggression, NATO used
two schemes of increasing military readiness to bring its
forces on a war footing: the Formal Alert System and the
Counter-Surprise System. The Formal Alert System comprised three
progressive stages, each subsequent stage including the measures of the
previous one. These stages were preceded by the state of
- Military Vigilance (MV): this was the lowest alert
stage, designed to be implemented in a period of low-level but
increasing international tension. It comprised precautionary military
measures which could be maintained for a longer period of time
without serious political, military or economic
effects. Military Vigilance could be declared by major NATO commanders
(SACLANT, SACEUR, CINCHAN) and was meant to facilitate a transition to
the Formal Alert System or the Counter-Surprise System.
The Formal Alert System comprised the following progressive alert
stages:
- Simple Alert (SA): would put NATO-assigned
forces, such as the active part of 1 (NL) Corps,
at maximum readiness and place them under operational command
of major NATO and subordinate commanders. Member nations were
advised to bring their NATO-earmarked forces, such as the
mobilisable parts of 1 (NL) Corps, to maximum readiness as well. Simple
Alert
could be declared by major NATO commanders, but
only after member governments had given their approval via the
North
Atlantic Council, NATO's highest political decision-making
body. In case of an emergency, where delay might endanger
their forces, major NATO commanders could call Simple
Alert on their own authority, provided previous authority to do so had
been given by the governments concerned.
- Reinforced Alert (RA): would put all NATO forces at
maximum readiness and place NATO-earmarked forces
under operational command of major NATO commanders as soon as possible.
Reinforced Alert
would be declared by the North Atlantic Council, but could, in
case of
emergency, be declared by major NATO commanders in consultation with
the
governments concerned.
- General Alert (GA): would be declared by the North
Atlantic Council when war had begun or was considered imminent, though
in theory it could be declared in a period of tension. Major
NATO commanders would execute their emergency deployment plans insofar
these had not already started under a previous alert state.
The Formal Alert System was meant for a scenario in which a more or
less gradual increase of international tension would result in
hostilities. The need for political consultation and the many national
caveats meant that the Formal Alert System could not adequately respond
to 'bolt from the blue' military aggression: an
enemy attack with little or no warning. A scenario that was
considered possible was a Warsaw Pact attack emerging from large-scale
exercises near the Inner German Border or from an internal military
action against a dissident Warsaw Pact nation. To enable NATO
forces
to survive and retain operational capability under
such circumstances the Counter-Surprise System had been devised. It
gave major NATO
and subordinate commanders the authority to take
immediate action if their forces were under attack or when an attack
was clearly imminent within hours. The Counter-Surprise System
comprised two states:
- State Orange (SO) for an expected enemy attack within
hours, and
- State Scarlet (SS) for an enemy attack in progress or
expected within one hour.
Military Vigilance, the Formal Alert System and the Counter-Surprise
System were complementary and could be combined to meet the changing
circumstances of an emerging crisis. The measures these
systems
comprised
were intricate and extremely comprehensive, involving not only
the defence ministries but most civil
ministries as well: entire national infrastructures would be directed
to accommodate the requirements of both military and civil defence.
All member nations had their own mobilisation plans and sets
of measures to achieve the military readiness that the various stages
of the NATO alert systems called for. Synchronisation, however, could
be sketchy. For the Royal
Army, with 1 (NL) Corps maldeployed in the
Netherlands and a
high dependency on mobilisation in general, there was an
operational need to start taking measures ahead of the Formal Alert
System. In the Netherlands a
NATO-declared state of Military Vigilance, meant as a series
of relatively unobtrusive military preparations, would have seen the
activation and deployment of the National Reserve Corps and the
recall of Short Leave elements to bring the
active army units up to war strength. In addition 1 (NL) Corps might,
depending on the estimated urgency of the situation, have begun
deployment to its corps sector in West Germany, whilst
the activation of the first of three mobilisation phases would have
been be
another real possibility. Whether such
not so unobtrusive measures would indeed have been taken remains a
question; it would have depended on the
government and their evaluation of the situation. In the end such
decisions remained in the domain of national sovereignty.
<
_________________________________________________
| 1. |
|
NATO
Facts and Figures (1984),
101, 105, 107, 109. NATO
Handbook,
35-39, 56-58. Cordesman,
Central
Region Forces, 14, 20, 24-25. Helfferich,
Nederlandse
Koninklijke,
140, 142. Isby and
Kamps, Armies,
29, 32, 80, 86-87. Martin, Before
the Day After, 12-15. Mechtersheimer und Barth, Militarisierungsatlas,
16-21. Miller, Cold War,
47-51, 238-240, 297. Bautista
Jiménez, Los Mandos Operativos,
1121-1134. Pedlow, NATO
Command Structure, 4, 9-11. < |
| 2. |
|
CINCHAN
was assisted by the advisory
and consultative Channel
Committee (CHANCOM) which consisted of the naval
chiefs-of-staff
of Belgium, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. NATO Facts and
Figures
(1984), 111. < |
| 3. |
|
France
left the NATO integrated military structure in 1966, Iceland
had no military forces. However, France was represented by the Chief of
the French Military Mission to the MC, and Iceland could be represented
by a civilian. NATO
Handbook, 35. Miller,
op. cit., 45-46. < |
| 4. |
|
In 1985
this was General G.L.J. Huyser (Royal Army). HTK
1985-1986,
Aanhangsel handelingen Tweede Kamer nr. 501.
< |
| 5. |
|
For the
Netherlands this was Lieutenant-General B. Mus (Royal
Air Force) in 1985. NATO
Handbook, 9. < |
| 6. |
|
General
C. de Jager
(Royal Army). Ibid. Miller, op. cit., 403. < |
| 7. |
|
NL-HaNA
2.13.182, inv. nr. 535, NDPP Concept krijgsmachtdeelplan Koninklijke
Marine 1984-1993 d.d. maart 1983, 42, 64, 65. NATO Facts
and Figures
(1984), 140. NATO
Handbook, 36-39.
Isby and Kamps, op. cit., 32. Miller, op. cit.,
172. There was also a Naval On-Call Force Mediterranean
(NAVOCFORMED) which as the name implies was not a permanent force,
its ships remaining under national command between
exercises.
In 1989 the regular contributors to this force were Greece, Italy,
Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. NATO
Facts and Figures
(1989), 352. <
|
| 8. |
|
Schoonoord,
Pugno,
215. < |
| 9. |
|
Jaarboek
KM 1985,
21, 109-111. < |
| 10. |
|
Miller, op. cit., 172-173. < |
| 11. |
|
Jaarboek
KM 1984,
169. Smith, Thursday
War. < |
| 12. |
|
NATO
Facts and Figures
(1989), 351-352. Creasy, ACE
Mobile Force, 17-19. Schultze, Freedom's Thunderbolt,
3. Regarding reaction speed, deployment of AMF(L) to Norway was
estimated to take between two and six days. Lund, Don't
Rock the Boat, 66. < |
| 13. |
|
Anonymus, NATO
Senior Officials 1949-2001, 7. < |
| 14. |
|
Creasy, ACE
Mobile Force, 17. Note that this describes the
situation in 1975; I have as yet not been able to retrieve more
contemporary data. < |
| 15. |
|
Helfferich,
Nederlandse
Koninklijke,
143. Helfferich, Squadrons
(1983), 90. The squadron was frequently deployed to Bodø Air Force Base
in Norway. In October 1988 the AMF role was passed on to 315
Squadron, by then equipped with F-16 fighter aircraft.
Helfferich, Squadrons
(1994), 152, 154, 156. < |
| 16. |
|
Cordesman,
op. cit., 113. Helfferich,
Nederlandse
Koninklijke, 151. Miller, op. cit.,
296. West German NAEWF Commander in 1985: the position of NAEWF's E-3A
Component Commander likewise alternated between a West German and
American, but in reverse order to the position of NAEWF Commander (Van
Harmelen en Hop, AWACS,
253); in 1985 the E-3A Component Commander was an American
brigadier-general. NATO
website, E-3A Component Commanders since 1981.
< |
| 17. |
|
NATO
Facts and Figures
(1989), 346. NATO
Handbook, 37. < |
| 18. |
|
NATO
Facts and Figures
(1984), 110-111, 140. NATO
Facts and Figures
(1989), 352. Cordesman,
op. cit., 25. Hoole, Stan's
Navy. Martin, op. cit., 14.
Miller, op. cit.,
173. These sources all disagree on which countries
were
the regular contributors to STANAVFORCHAN; after comparing
I chose
what seems most likely (Miller). < |
| 19. |
|
Jaarboek
KM 1985,
21-22, 124-126, 129-130. Jaarboek
KM 1984,
217. During
the NATO exercise Ocean Safari '85
(in September of that year) Hr.Ms. Maassluis, Hr.Ms. Naaldwijk and
Hr.Ms. Naarden
were added to
STANAVFORCHAN. Jaarboek
KM 1985,
21-22. < |
| 20. |
|
Hoole, op. cit.
It may be that the West German navy participated in
the command rotations as well,
being a
regular contributor to the force. The
Netherlands commander taking over in May
1985 was Commander D.B. Sluijter. Jaarboek KM
1985, 22.
< |
| 21. |
|
Dragoner,
Bundeswehr,
Teil 2.1, 35. Isby
and Kamps, op. cit., 29, 70, 195, 256, 373, 377-378, 455.
Miller, op.
cit., 238-240. < |
| 22. |
|
For a detailed order
of battle of I
(GE) Corps in 1989, see Dragoner, op.
cit.,
Teil 2.1, 36-89. < |
| 23. |
|
For a detailed order
of battle of 1
(BR) Corps in 1989, see Louis Vieuxbill, BAOR
Order of Battle July 1989 (ebook, 2013). < |
| 24. |
|
Isby
and Kamps, op. cit., 455. Miller, op. cit., 239-240. For 2 (US) Armored
Division (Forward) see also 41
Armoured Brigade,
footnote 17. Headquarters 3rd (US) Corps Forward in Maastricht:
information kindly provided by Royal Army Brigadier-General J.R. Mulder
(Rtd.) (emails 17.08.2019, 22.08.2019). < |
| 25. |
|
Anonymus,
British Army
Pocket Guide, 14-15. BAOR
further included a small number of supporting units and the Berlin
Infantry Brigade (stationed in West Berlin). Isby and Kamps, op. cit.,
236, 256. 1
(BR) Corps was commanded by a General Officer Commanding-in-Chief who
would serve in this role for about two years. From 1980 the CINCs 1
(BR) Corps would subsequently be
assigned Commander-in-Chief BAOR
/ Commander NORTHAG for a similar period.
Watson and Rinaldi, British
Army in Germany, 143-144. < |
| 26. |
|
Anonymus,
British Army
Pocket Guide, 14. Dragoner, op.
cit.,
Beiheft Standortverzeichnis, 270-271. Isby and
Kamps, op. cit, 256. Miller,
op. cit., 238, 297. < |
| 27. |
|
Communications
Zone: "Rear part of theater of operations (behind but contiguous to the
combat zone) which contains the lines of communications, establishments
for supply and evacuation, and other agencies required for the
immediate support and maintenance of the field forces." US
Department of Defense Dictionary, 91. The
Dutch term was "etappegebied". VR 2-1386, I-25. The
role of the Netherlands and Belgian territories as AFCENT's
Communications Zone became paramount when France left the
NATO integrated military structure in 1966. Miller,
op. cit., 246-247. Territorialkommando Nord responsible for NORTHAG's
Rear Combat Zone: Isby and Kamps, op. cit., 228. Miller, op. cit., 240.
For a
detailed order of battle of this
command see Dragoner,
op. cit.,
Teil 2.2, 38-126. < |
| 28. |
|
NL-HaNA
2.13.182, inv. nr. 584, slide D-24 "Bondgenootschappelijk vastgestelde
verdedigingsgebieden", d.d. april 1984. British Army, SOHB 1988, 2.
Hoffenaar en Schoenmaker, Met
de blik, 164, 356. Isby and Kamps, op. cit., 15. < |
| 29. |
|
Isby and
Kamps, op. cit., 455.
Transport
by readily available sealift ships was estimated
to take twelve to twenty-two days; transport by non-readily
available ships
(including requisitioned civilian ships) would take twenty-one to a
hundred days.
Martin, op. cit., 52. Under the POMCUS system transport by
airliners was
estimated to take one to three days, and eight to twelve days including
warning time, preparation and
deployment. Martin, loc. cit. Isby and
Kamps, op. cit., 455. < |
| 30. |
|
Roozenbeek,
In dienst, 202.
Hoffenaar
en Schoenmaker, op. cit., 347. "Jump Fast": see also Marine
Corps, Operational Roles.
< |
| 31. |
|
North Atlantic
Military Committee, Study on Alert Measures in Support of Berlin
Contingency Plans d.d. 18 October 1962. Miller, op. cit.,
320-324. High dependency on mobilisation: more than seventy percent of
the Royal Army's wartime personnel strength had to be
mobilised. Selles,
Personele
vulling, 456. Royal Army measures
under Military Vigilance: NL-HaNA 2.13.148, inv.
nr. 694, Alarmboek LLC
d.d. 17 februari 1987, Deel I, Hoofdstuk 1 en 2. < |
|