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United States-Netherlands Bicentennial . . . see pages 2-28

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

The Bicentennial logo for the commemoration of the 200th anniversary of the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the United States and the Netherlands has been constructed of several symbolic elements.

The logo's basis is the American five-pointed star which passes to the right into a flying, striped banner.

Apart from imparting a generally festive air, the seven bars of the banner stand for the seven provinces which constituted the Netherlands in 1782.

The undulant motion symbolizes the ocean and the vast distance that separated the two countries two centuries ago.

The 13 five-pointed stars in the circle are the 13 states that together formed the United States of America in 1782.

The circle itself expresses the friendship that has bound the two countries without interruption for two centuries.

The colors applied in the logo—red, white and blue—correspond to the traditional colors of both the American and Dutch flags.

Articles to Watch For:

The Operational Art of the AirLand Battle
Lieutenant Colonel John S. Doerfel, US Army

■

Maneuver in the Deep Battle
Lieutenant Colonel L. D. Holder, US Army

■

The Iron(ic) Horse From Nikolsk
Harold B Hayes III

The United States and the Netherlands Celebrate Bicentennial

From 19 April to 8 October 1982, the United States and the Netherlands will jointly commemorate the 200th anniversary of the establishment of this country's oldest, continuously peaceful, diplomatic relationship.

One year to the day after John Adams informed the States General of the Dutch Republic of his appointment as the United States' minister plenipotentiary "to reside near" them, that sovereign body formally recognized his mission.

Having thus obtained, on 19 April 1782, diplomatic recognition of the United States as an independent nation, Adams also succeeded in bringing about—on 8 October 1782—the first Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the two countries.

In observance of those significant events from the early days of this nation, we highlight two special articles in this issue. The first recounts the long association between the United States and the Netherlands, while the other describes the Royal Netherlands Army of today.—Editor.

Two Hundred Years of American-Dutch Relations

Major Hans L. Zwitzer, Royal Netherlands Army

Introduction

THE purpose of this article is to focus attention on the 200-year-old relationship that has existed between the United States and the Netherlands. The subjects discussed will be partly historical and partly of topical interest, with special attention being given to their military aspects.

Some background information is necessary for the historical section since, although prominent American historians have occupied themselves extensively with Dutch history, the average American reader cannot be expected to be familiar with it in all its details. John Lothrop Motley, for instance, comes to mind. His four-volume *The History of the United Netherlands*, written more than a century ago, is still very readable. Also recognized are present-day historians like Robert R. Palmer and Herbert H. Rowen, the latter of whom published an important biography several years ago of Jan de Witt, one of the greatest Dutch statesmen in the 17th century.

An interesting aspect of Dutch history

is that, after they renounced the Spanish King Philip II as their sovereign in 1581, the United Provinces had a republican form of government for more than 200 years, which had both federal and confederal features. The Dutch Republic had retained important institutions and functions from the monarchial past such as the office of provincial stadholder. In this office, members of the House of Orange-Nassau played a major role as leaders in the revolt against Spain and as army commanders in the Eighty Years' War which was a consequence of the revolt. Afterward, although the appointment was an anomaly, the stadholders constituted an important and powerful factor in the republican system of government.

Their involvement in Dutch history was so great that, after the fall of Napoleon in 1813, there were no longer any obstacles to proclaiming the last stadholder's son sovereign prince and, two years later, king. Apart from the monarchial element, there were, at first sight, certain significant parallels between the Republic of the United Netherlands and the United States which did not go unobserved by the rebels in America. Thomas Paine did not hide his admiration of the republic although he held the office of stadholder in no high esteem. It was especially those Americans who were opposed to a strongly centralized state who pointed to the Dutch example. This was the case, for instance, during the debates on a new constitution at the 1787 and 1788 conventions.

There was also no lack of warnings, however, about following the Dutch example. "For the federalists," a Dutch historian recently wrote, "the history of Holland was an example of the tragic failure of a Republic. . . ." What was wrong with the Dutch Republic, as they saw it, was "its eternal dissension, the extreme individualism of its inhabitants, the putting of local above national interest, the usurpation of power by small oligarchies." This referred precisely to those matters which, among other things, led ultimately to the downfall of the republic in 1795, after which a new state arose that aligned itself with revolutionary France.

The Dutch revolutionaries, who called themselves "Patriots," did not, however, draw their inspiration only from France. The American example, too, had an important role in the debates on the constitution of the new Batavian Republic. This is illustrated by the fact that, at the opening of the National Assembly in The Hague in 1796, the Dutch, French and American flags were flown alongside one another.

The Dutch Republic— An Ally of the Rebellious American Colonies

On 20 December 1780, Britain declared war on the Republic of the United Netherlands. This act was closely related to the position adopted by the republic in the armed conflict which had broken out five years previously between Britain and its North American colony. At the outset, the Netherlands had tried to derive as many trading advantages as possible from the conflict. The American rebels were supplied on a large scale with arms, ammunition and other items indispensable for the conduct of war. An important intermediate station in these activities, which the British regarded as pernicious smuggling, was the Dutch possession of St. Eustatius, a small island in the Caribbean. This was the center of Dutch trade with America.

As early as 1776, the governor of the

island, Johannes de Graaff, caused an incident which greatly irritated the British when he had a salute of 11 guns fired for the American ship *Andrew Doria* that had put into St. Eustatius for cargo. Great Britain arrogantly demanded satisfaction, and the affair was smoothed over by the temporary recall of de Graaff whose portrait, incidentally, hangs in the New Hampshire Capitol. However, there was no reduction of tension between Britain and the republic. What finally led to war was the imprisonment by the British, in September 1780, of the American, Henry Laurens, who had been appointed US chargé d'affaires in the republic.

The ship in which Laurens was traveling to the Netherlands, the *Mercury*, was seized by the British. In his baggage, Laurens had the draft of a trade agreement between Amsterdam merchants and the United States. Although he had the presence of mind to throw the box containing the documents overboard, the British retrieved it from the water. Great was the indignation of the government in London. The Republic, however, had no wish to give satisfaction to the British, and war with Britain became a fact. This was at its height when John Adams, one of the leaders of the American Revolution, presented his credentials as ambassador in The Hague on 22 April 1782, thus making the Netherlands the second country—France was the first—to recognize the United States as an independent state.

By sending no less person than Adams to the Netherlands, the United States showed that it greatly valued, and was concerned in maintaining good relations with, the republic. Here, there was a great deal of money which the rebellious Americans would be delighted to borrow. By then, however, it had already lost its position as a great power—a fact that Adams

Courtesy of author

himself had shrewdly perceived. The small area of the Netherlands—it was, and still is, not much larger than Maryland—and its population which did not exceed two million at the end of the 18th century (it is now 14 million) were decisive factors in reducing the republic to the status of a minor power. The short-lived union with Belgium during 1815-30 scarcely changed the situation.

When the two countries finally separated in 1839, it was obvious that the Netherlands, as a minor power, would pursue a policy of neutrality. This policy was maintained until the Netherlands was overrun in May 1940 by Nazi Germany and its government was forced to leave the country and go to London. There was, however, a paradoxical aspect to the Netherlands' position. The kingdom of the Netherlands, which had been

established in the 19th century, had inherited a large overseas empire from the republic of the 17th and 18th centuries, and this made it the third most important colonial power in the world. It is notable that, after a period of calm of almost 200 years following the establishment of relations between the Netherlands and the United States, it was the Dutch colonies in Asia that brought the two countries into close alliance.

The Netherlands' Overseas Empire and the United States

When, after a short war with Spain in 1898, the Philippines became an American possession, the Dutch East Indies acquired the United States as a neighbor in Southeast Asia. In view of Japan's increasing influence, it was possible that the Netherlands and the United States would be placed in the position of having to defend interests of a similar kind. This became evident in the 1930s when Japan began its advance in Asia, culminating in its attack on Pearl Harbor. At the beginning of December 1941, it was already apparent in the Dutch East Indies that the Japanese would shortly take action. The intelligence service of the Royal Netherlands Indies army had intercepted and decoded Japanese signals to this effect.

As a result of these signals—which were immediately transmitted to Washington by the American military attaché in the Dutch East Indies, Lieutenant Colonel Elliott Raymond Thorp—the Dutch East Indies air force was mobilized one week before the attack on Pearl Harbor. Although Japanese action was not directed against Dutch East Indies territory, the Dutch government, in exile in London, decided immediately to declare war on Japan. This was the result in part of developments in previous months which had brought the Netherlands, Britain and the United States closer together regarding their policy vis-à-vis Japan. There was, however, still no alliance. This was not formed until after Pearl Harbor.

The ABDA (American, British, Dutch, Australian) Command, established in January 1942 under British General Archibald P. Wavell and headquartered in Java, was unable to prevent the Japanese from achieving one success after another. The Java Sea Battle, at the end of February 1942, in which the American heavy cruiser *Houston* and four American destroyers—*Edwards, Ford, Jones* and *Alden*—took part, ended in a heavy defeat for the Allied fleet. This sealed the fate of Java. The Japanese needed only a week to conquer the island. Among the Allied troops taken into captivity were tens of thousands of Dutchmen, 4,000 Britons and 500 Americans of the 2d Battalion, 131st Field Artillery Regiment, from Texas. The Americans had originally been intended as reinforcements for the Philippines and had ultimately gone to Java.

Due to their reduced strength, Dutch military units were able to play only a subordinate role for the rest of the war in the Pacific. Of considerable assistance was the use of Jackson Air Base in Texas. Beginning in April 1942, the base was used to train several hundred Dutch aircrew trainees who had managed to leave Java in time. A Dutch brigade of marines also underwent training in America, but this was not completed in time for them to be deployed against the Japanese.

There was also close military collaboration between the Netherlands and the United States in the 1950s, during the Korean War, when a Dutch infantry battalion was assigned to the 38th Infantry

Courtesy of author

Participants at the first meeting of the ABDA Command at the house of Vice Admiral Conrad E. L. Helfrich, Royal Netherlands Navy, at Batavia

Regiment of the 2d US Infantry Division. The US Presidential Unit Citation was conferred upon this battalion for its service in the Houngson-Wonju Battle of 12-15 February 1951 and in the Soyang River Battle of 16-22 May of the same year. The United States awarded individual Dutch servicemen 14 Silver Stars, four Legions of Merit and 62 Bronze Stars. In all, 3,972 Dutch troops served in Korea, of whom 120 lost their lives and 645 were wounded.

The United States and the Liberation of the Netherlands

During World War II, the Americans came into contact with the Dutch in the European theater after landing in Normandy in June 1944 when the Allied armies began to drive the Germans to the north and east. At the beginning of September 1944, the front stabilized along both the Belgian-Dutch border and the Siegfried line. The British 21st Army Group was on the Allied northern flank, while the American 12th and 6th Army Groups were operating on the eastern flank. The two main efforts of Allied action in the northeastern part of the theater of operations were the struggle for the port of Antwerp and attempts to break through the Siegfried line near Aix-la-Chapelle.

Although Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery failed in September 1944 to force a breakthrough in the Ruhr by gigantic airborne landings near Arnhem —Operation *Market Garden*—the Germans were driven out of the Scheldt estuary in November, and the port of Antwerp became available for Allied transport. In this month, the front finally came to a definite halt along the Meuse and the Rhine from the North Sea to Aix-la-Chapelle. This situation lasted until February 1945, with the result that it was possible to liberate only the southern part

of the Netherlands in 1944. It was here especially that various American Army units, such as the 104th and 30th Infantry Divisions, the 101st and 82d Airborne Divisions, and the 2d and 7th Armored Divisions, played an important part. Space does not permit mention of all the units involved.

In order to assist Montgomery in driving the Germans out of the Scheldt estuary, the 104th Infantry Division was placed under the command of the Canadian First Army. With Major General Terry Allen in command, the division took up positions on 23 October 1944 along the Dutch-Belgian border on both sides of the Antwerp-Breda motorway. After heavy fighting, it succeeded in breaking through the German lines and continued the advance into Dutch territory in the direction of the Meuse which was reached on 4 November. Having successfully completed its mission, the division was then withdrawn from the Netherlands to take part once again in the battle near Aix-la-Chapelle in Germany.

The troops of the 81st and 101st Airborne Divisions were deployed on 17 September 1944 as part of Operation *Market Garden* against German positions in the south of the Netherlands. Their most important mission was to capture a large number of bridges intact in order to give the XXX Corps of the British Eighth Army an opportunity to reach Arnhem, where the British 1st Airborne Division had landed, in two days. The fact that Operation *Market Garden* was ultimately a failure had nothing to do with the two American units that carried out their mission very successfully.

The 82d Airborne Division landed near Nijmegen and Grave, and the 101st to the north of Eindhoven. A Dutch eyewitness recorded in his diary: "Americans everywhere. Fine young chaps. Not at all nervous. They walk through the town here (Grave) as if they were at home."

Thanks partly to the excellent leadership of the commander of the 82d Division, Major General James M. Gavin, all the counterattacks by the German units, which had meanwhile been reorganized, were repulsed. The 101st Airborne Division's action in the Netherlands clearly indicated that this division would acquit itself exceedingly well in Bastogne during the German Ardennes offensive at the

Lieutenant General Sir Miles C. Dempsey and then Brigadier General James M. Gavin confer during Operation *Market Garden*



end of 1944. A British army corps commander said quite rightly at the end of the campaign in the Netherlands: "I have commanded four corps during my army career, but the 101st Airborne Division is the fightingest outfit I ever had under my command."

In September 1944, the boundary between the British 21st Army Group and the American 12th Army Group ran just to the south of "the Peel," an extensive marshy area on the border of the Dutch provinces of Limburg and North Brabant. On 22 September 1944, Montgomery managed to persuade General Dwight D. Eisenhower to shift the line in such a way that it would be for the Americans to capture the Peel. On 30 September, the 7th Armored Division started the attack, but German resistance was more fierce than had been anticipated. A week later, the American offensive was hopelessly stuck

near the village of Overloon.

The British then resumed the attack while the Americans were assigned a covering task in the southern part of the area. They were not given much peace. On 27 October, two German divisions of the XLVII *Panzerkorps* began to attack near Meijel. However, by offering stubborn resistance and carrying out a large number of counterattacks, the 7th Armored Division was able to halt the German offensive. On 5 November, the American division was relieved by the British 15th Highland Division. The 7th Armored Division was to acquire great fame in the end at the battle near Saint Vith during the German offensive in the Ardennes.

On the extreme left flank of the American First Army was the XIX Army Corps which had been stopped by the Germans near the Albert Canal during its advance through Belgium. On 12 September, the Americans of the 2d Armored and 30th Infantry Divisions resumed the attack and advanced toward Maastricht, the southernmost town of the Netherlands where they were received by a joyful population. The Germans withdrew behind the Siegfried line, after which the American advance came temporarily to an end.

Many American soldiers lost their lives in the liberation of the Netherlands, and the war cemetery at Margraten in the Dutch province of Limburg provides most impressive evidence of this. A significant number of Americans also received the highest Dutch award for valor, the *Militaire Willems-Orde*, in recognition of their share in the struggle to liberate the Netherlands and of their action in the Allied war against Japan. Their names are listed in the accompanying chart. The Grand Cross of this same order was conferred posthumously on President Franklin D. Roosevelt by Queen Wilhelmina.

Postwar Developments

Following the liberation in 1945, the revolutionary situation in the Dutch East Indies, where the Netherlands bore the brunt of the postwar process of decolonization, demanded most of the country's military effort. When, in 1949, the Netherlands was admitted to NATO and its former overseas territory in Asia became the independent Republic of Indonesia—a development in which America played an important mediatory role—it was possible to devote military expenditures to building up the Dutch armed forces in Europe. The American Mutual Defense Assistance Program was of great importance in this.

Immediately after the war, the Dutch army had acquired British war equipment which, for the most part, had then been used up in Indonesia. As the army, which had been built up since the beginning of the 1950s, was to be based on the US Army as far as organization and equipment were concerned, the retraining of regular and conscript personnel now had to be undertaken. Ambitious plans for the Dutch army to take part in NATO defense arrangements with various army corps had to be set aside since the Nazi occupying forces had literally ransacked the country, and a great deal of money was necessary for postwar reconstruction.

In the end, the country's contribution to NATO had to be limited to one army corps. Originally, in the event of a conflict, this was to maintain the Issel-Rhine defensive line. However, when the Federal Republic of Germany joined NATO, the defense area was shifted to the east, and Dutch troops were stationed in Germany.

List of American servicemen who, in recognition of their deeds of courage, conduct and loyalty during World War II, were appointed Knight 4th class in the *Militaire Willems Orde*, the highest Dutch order for valor.

NAME	RANK	
Billingslea, Charles	Colonel US Army	Action against the Germans near Nijmegen 17 September—4 October 1944
Binford Thomas Howell	Commander US Navy	Naval action Lombok Strait, Netherlands East Indies, 19—20 February 1944
Blenkenship, Robert C	First Lieutenant US Army	Action against the Germans near Nijmegen 17 September—4 October 1944
Chappuis Steve Archie	Colonel US Army	Action against the Germans near Best 1944
Chase, Charles Henry	Lieutenant Colonel US Army	Action against the Germans near Uden 25 September 1944
Cook, Julian A	Lieutenant Colonel US Army	Action against the Germans near Nijmegen 17 September—4 October 1944
Elam, Daniel Frank	Major US Army Air Corps	Airborne landing near Son 17 September 1944
Fulmer Edward Simons	Second Lieutenant US Army Air Corps	Airborne landing near Eindhoven, 18 September 1944
Harris Wesley D	Captain US Army	Action against the Germans near Nijmegen 17 September—4 October 1944
Jonas Glenn	Sergeant US Army	Action against the Germans near Nijmegen 17 September—4 October 1944
Kero, William E	Sergeant US Army	Action against the Germans near Nijmegen 20 September 1944
Kinnard Harry William Osborn	Colonel US Army	Airborne landing near Eindhoven 17 September 1944
Lester Paul T	Private First Class US Army	Action against the Germans near Nijmegen 17 September—4 October 1944
Myers Joseph F	First Lieutenant US Army	Action against the Germans near Nijmegen 30 September 1944
Parker Edward N	Lieutenant Commander US Navy	Naval action Lombok Strait Netherlands East Indies 19—20 February 1942
Rooks, A H	Captain US Navy	Java Sea Battle 27 February 1942 naval action in Bantam Bay 28 February 1942
Schulman Herbert Edgar	Second Lieutenant US Army Air Corps	Airborne landing near Nijmegen 17 September 1944
Taylor, Maxwell Davenport	Major General US Army	Action against the Germans near Eindhoven 17 September—28 November 1944
Terry Dewitt S	Sergeant US Army	Action against the Germans near Nijmegen 30 September 1944
Tucker Reuben Henry	Colonel US Army	Action against the Germans near Nijmegen September—October 1944
Wray Waverly W	First Lieutenant US Army	Action against the Germans near Nijmegen, 21 September 1944

As a result of further modernization of equipment and arms in the early 1960s, the Dutch army had developed into a mobile force which was both strongly mechanized and fully motorized. Changing views in the Dutch armed forces in the 1960s, in regard to the discipline and appearance of the troops, created a stir both inside and outside the country. What had been, as it were, unassailable virtues for centuries were suddenly set aside as obsolete. Saluting disappeared, and hair styles were no longer controlled. Compulsory reveilles and evening parades became things of the past. This process of change did not, of course, take place without shock or incident. Nonetheless, the older and younger generations in the forces have grown closer together, and internal relations have been adapted to civilian life.

Dutch servicemen have also been carrying out a task of some importance in the peacekeeping operations in the Middle East where a Dutch armored infantry battalion has been part of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) since March 1979. Dutchbatt, as it is called, is the heaviest mechanized and best armed unit there. Although the first UNIFIL commander, General Erskine, was at first somewhat doubtful about the military proficiency of "long-haired Dutchmen" who were not volunteers but conscripts, the skill, ability to improvise, dedication and discipline under fire of these Dutch troops place them among UNIFIL's best units.

Due in part to their modern arms and efficient communications, these troops are referred to by many as the backbone of UNIFIL. While exercising strict neutrality, they are attempting to prevent an escalation of the conflict on South Lebanon and, together with the other UNIFIL units, are working in close collaboration with the American members of the Observers Group, Lebanon.

In 1782, of course, it was not possible to predict the development of Dutch-American relations and certainly not that their military aspect would have a relatively dominant role. Adams had no illusions at the time about the military power of the republic which was "overshadowed on all sides by more powerful neighbors" according to a dispatch he sent to Congress in 1781. The Netherlands, however, was of the greatest importance as a trading partner and source of loans. In this regard, too, Adams achieved substantial successes in The Hague when, shortly after his appointment as ambassador, he was able to conclude a loan and, later in the year, a trade agreement. Late in life, he again referred to the importance of the Netherlands' cooperation with the rebellious American colonies when he stated:

Holland's separation from England, union with France and Spain and their treaty with us was the event which ultimately turned the scale of the American Revolutionary War and produced the Peace of 1783. MR

Major Hans L. Zwitzer, Royal Netherlands Army, is with the Historical Section, Army Headquarters, The Hague, where he deals principally with the history of the former Dutch East Indies and with 17th and 18th-century Dutch military history. He is a graduate in history of the University of Utrecht. He previously served with the Paymaster Corps.

The Royal Netherlands Army Today

Lieutenant Colonel A. J. van Vuren, Royal Netherlands Army

THIS article is intended to provide a survey of the Royal Netherlands Army as it is today. It deals only with features that are considered to be of major interest to American readers. These features include a brief description of the Dutch mobilization system that attracts increasing professional attention from abroad.

MISSIONS AND ORGANIZATION

The geopolitical situation that developed after World War II had a decisive influence on the missions and organization of the Royal Netherlands Army. Important factors were the War-

saw Pact threat, the NATO Alliance, and the geographical situation of Western Europe and, in particular, that of the Netherlands.

The first two factors are well-known and will not be elaborated here. The geographical position of the Netherlands is shown in Figure 1. Because France withdrew from the integrated military structure of NATO, the lines of communication to the Central Region of Allied Command Europe lead through Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. These three countries are often referred to as the Benelux.

Major ports from north to south are Amsterdam and Rotterdam in the Netherlands and Antwerp in Belgium. Furthermore, there are the large international airports of Schiphol near Amsterdam and Zaventem near Brussels. These sea and airports, together with the extensive and excellent road, rail and inland waterway systems in the Benelux and the Federal Republic of Germany (GE), form the lines of communication to the American and British forces in the latter country.

These lines of communication also play a vital role in the reception and forward movement of reinforcements from the United States, Britain and Canada destined for the Central Region. The economies of the GE and the Benelux and, in a sense the forces of these countries, also depend on the same lines of communication. The safeguarding and continuous functioning of these lines are, therefore, of vital interest to NATO.

NATO strategy calls for the forward defense of NATO territory. The relevant NATO territory in this case is formed by



Figure 1

the North German Plain, the northern part of the GE. The North German Plain is a wide and excellent avenue of approach that leads directly from Warsaw Pact territory, extending west of the river Elbe, to the area west of the Ruhr, the industrial heart of the GE. A high-speed, successful attack by Warsaw Pact forces through the North German Plain would result in the envelopment of the Ruhr and control of the Benelux sea and airports. The GE would be paralyzed militarily, economically and politically, and the vital lines of communication would be cut.

Missions

The missions of the Royal Netherlands Army are related directly to the geographical situation shown in Figure 1:

- The North German Plain must be defended against a Warsaw Pact attack. This is the task of NATO's Northern Army Group (NORTHAG). The Royal Netherlands Army has assigned the 1st Netherlands Army Corps (1 (NL) Corps) to NATO. This corps is one of the forward deployed corps of NORTHAG.
- Netherlands territory must be defended, and, in this way, the lines of communication leading through the Netherlands can be secured. External reinforcements must also be received, moved forward and deployed. For this purpose, the Netherlands will provide so-called host nation support to US and other NATO forces. The National Territorial Command is responsible for the execution of these tasks.
- Finally, reference must be made to the commitment of the Royal Netherlands Army to the United Nations (UN). Forces may be deployed for UN peacekeeping operations and for assistance in case of disasters. Arising out of this commitment, a mechanized infantry battalion has been deployed in Lebanon for the past three years.

Contribution to NATO

The contribution of the Royal Netherlands Army to NATO consists primarily of the 1 (NL) Corps (see Figure 2). The brigades and other units are directly under the corps. In the corps organization, there are three divisional staffs. To each of these, the corps commander can attach a number of brigades and combat support units, depending on the mission given to the division. Thus, unlike a US division, a Dutch division has no fixed organization.

The wartime organization of the 1 (NL) Corps comprises six mechanized brigades, three armored brigades, and one infantry brigade. The brigades have a fixed organization and have sufficient logistic resources to continue operations for at least 48 hours.

A mechanized brigade has two mechanized infantry battalions and one tank battalion. It also has a mechanized artillery battalion, an armored reconnaissance troop, an armored antitank company, an armored engineer company, an armored air defense battery and a logistic battalion. The organization of an armored brigade is similar. However, there are two tank battalions and one mechanized infantry battalion, and there is no armored antitank company. The infantry brigade has three infantry battalions and only one tank company. There is no antitank company or air defense battery. The remainder of the infantry brigade is an unarmored copy of the other brigades. The normal task of the infantry brigade is rear area security.

All combat support and combat service support units which are not part of a brigade belong to the corps; elements



Figure 2

may be attached to the divisional staffs. There are three reconnaissance squadrons, two engineer groups with a total of seven engineer battalions, four field artillery groups with a total of 13 artillery battalions, an air defense group with six air defense battalions, an aviation group, a combat service support command and other corps units.

All logistic support resources are concentrated in the combat service support command at corps level except for 10 logistic battalions which are organic to the brigades. A divisional staff may receive a logistic battalion from the corps combat service support command to support the units, other than the brigades, attached to the division—for example, a reconnaissance squadron, an engineer battalion, a field artillery group, and so forth.

Thus, the logistic support virtually bypasses the divisional level—the corps directly supports the brigades and other units placed under the command of a divisional staff. The divisional staff coordinates the logistic support to units and establishes priorities in order to ensure a balance between operations and logistic support.

Territorial Defense and Protection of Lines of Communication

The National Territorial Command (Figure 3) is responsible for the defense of Netherlands territory and for securing and operating the lines of communication. To accomplish this task, the command has, at its disposal, two infantry brigades, four independent infantry battalions, about 50 independent infantry companies and more than 100 independent infantry platoons.

The National Territorial Command covers the whole of the Netherlands. It is subdivided into 11 regional commands. The independent platoons, consisting of local volunteers, safeguard important installations, while the independent companies are used as local reserves (within the regional commands) to reinforce as required. The battalions safeguard very large and important installations vital to the lines of communication and to NATO. The two brigades are directly under the command of the National Territorial Command and are committed when a serious threat develops—for example, in the case of a large-scale airborne attack. The National Territorial Command also has an engineer group at its disposal which is primarily intended to keep the lines of communication open.

Training and Logistic Support

The Royal Netherlands Army has a Training Command which is responsible



Figure 3

for all training conducted outside the 1 (NL) Corps and the National Territorial Command. The formation and training system of the Royal Netherlands Army is dealt with in more detail later on in this article. Training in an army dependent on conscription is of the utmost importance, as is the Training Command. Each year about 40,000 conscripts enter one of the Training Command centers. Regular personnel are also trained by the Training Command. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Training Command conducts about 1,400 different types of training to provide the army with personnel possessing the required skills.

The Training Command has about 5,500 regular personnel at its disposal for instruction and staff duties. In the event of mobilization, the regular personnel of the Training Command are one of the main sources of regular personnel for the reserve units.

The National Logistic Command is tasked with the logistic support of the 1 (NL) Corps, the National Territorial Command, the Training Command and other commands. Similarly, there are commands at the national level for communications, medical support, and so forth.

MAJOR EQUIPMENT

At the beginning of the 1960s, the Royal Netherlands Army was, to a large extent, infantry-oriented and in need of modernization. The budget available at that time allowed only for an investment in capital equipment amounting to less than 20 percent of the budget. By rationalizing the organization and increasing the defense budget, it has been possible, in recent years, to increase investment in capital equipment to about 30 percent of the budget. This has allowed significant procurement programs to be carried out. A survey of equipment, either recently introduced into the forces or presently on order, follows.

Infantry

The Netherlands has selected an armored vehicle that, in close cooperation with the Royal Netherlands Army, was developed by the Food Machinery Corporation in California. This vehicle, called the *YPR*, combines fighting power, agility and maneuverability with technical and logistic complexity that can be managed by an army dependent on conscription. For the same reason, Belgium has selected this vehicle, and other allied and friendly nations are considering it for procurement. The Royal Netherlands Army placed orders for some 2,100 of these vehicles, of which approximately 1,000 have already entered service. There are several versions of the *YPR*: command, antitank, infantry, mortar, medical, transport, observation, radar, and so on.

It is not only the mechanized infantry that is equipped with the *YPR*. Antitank companies are also receiving this vehicle as are tank battalions, brigade and divisional headquarters, and other units. The armored infantry fighting vehicle is equipped with a 25mm cannon. There is also the *YPR*-mounted *TOW*, of which the mechanized infantry battalion will receive 12 and each armored antitank company 24. Because the *YPR* is used for a variety of functions, each mechanized infantry battalion will eventually have 88 *YPRs*. This generous allotment will make the mechanized infantry battalions somewhat heavy.

▲ *YPR*

YPR-mounted *TOW* ▼



Tanks

Currently, the Royal Netherlands Army has two types of tanks: the obsolete *Centurion* and the *Leopard 1*. An improvement program is in hand for the *Leopard 1* that comprises the application of additional armor, improved fire control, improved ammunition and thermal imaging. The *Centurion* tank will be replaced by 445 *Leopard 2* tanks, the first of which was handed over to the army in September 1981.

Both the delivery of the *Leopard 2* and the improvement program for the *Leopard 1* are scheduled for completion by 1986. The Royal Netherlands Army will then have well over 900 modern tanks. The tanks are mainly organized in tank battalions, of which there are, at the present time, 12 in the 1 (NL) Corps. The reconnaissance units of both corps and brigade are also equipped with the same types of tanks.

Cavalry

The reconnaissance squadrons at corps level and reconnaissance troops at brigade level resemble US reconnaissance units in organization and equipment. The Netherlands' reconnaissance units are equipped with the *M113* series vehicles. The basic unit is the platoon with five *M113* command and reconnaissance vehicles, one *M106* with 4.2-inch mortar and one *M113A1* with an infantry squad. Each platoon also has two *Leopard 1* or *Leopard 2* tanks.

Artillery

The 1 (NL) Corps is well-equipped with artillery; in all, there are 23 battalions. There is a rather large variety of calibers at present—namely, 105mm, 155mm, 175mm, 8-inch and *Lance*. The remaining 105mm and 175mm calibers are in the process of being replaced by 155mm and 8-inch calibers. Thus, all 1 (NL) Corps' tube artillery will be standardized with 155mm and 8-inch calibers.

When current programs have been completed in 1984, there will be 10 battalions equipped with *M109A2s*, seven battalions equipped with the towed, 155mm *M114* howitzer, five battalions equipped with *M110A2s* and one *Lance* battalion. Part of the artillery is dual capable.

Air Defense

The armored air defense batteries of the mechanized and armored brigades each have nine modern twin-barreled cannon systems on *Leopard* chassis. The six air defense battalions at corps level are equipped with 40mm cannon systems. An order for *Stinger* self-defense, air defense weapons is under consideration.

Well-Equipped Force

Mention cannot be made here of all the equipment that has been ordered or has already been introduced into the forces. However, from what has been described so far, it should be obvious that the 1 (NL) Corps, considering its current equipment, as well as the equipment that is now on order, is a modern, well-equipped force that compares favorably with other NATO forces.

The infantry brigade of the 1 (NL) Corps, as well as the brigades, battalions, companies and platoons of the National Territorial Command, are lightly equipped. The main components are light infantry and artillery. Only the infantry brigade of the 1 (NL) Corps has a tank company; apart from this, there are no armored or mechanized units.



Leopard 2 ▲

M109A2 ▼

Photos courtesy of autho

***Leopard* chassis with twin-barreled cannon system**

PLANS

The present planning aims at correcting current deficiencies and reducing operational risks. As far as equipment is concerned, short and mid-term plans are aimed at the improvement of command and control, the introduction of a modern corps trunk system, the establishment of an electronic warfare battalion, the replacement of the towed 155mm *M114* howitzer of the seven nonmechanized artillery battalions, and the improvement of air defense capabilities by acquiring light systems guided weapons, *Stinger* self-defense systems and by replacing the 40mm cannon systems of the air defense battalions at corps level. The procurement of antitank helicopters is also planned. In the longer term, programs provide for improving battlefield surveillance and target acquisition.

An important plan deals with the malstationing of the 1 (NL) Corps. Only one reinforced armored brigade is currently located in the GE near its battle positions. The remainder of the forces, of which a sizable portion must first be mobilized, have to move from the Netherlands to their wartime positions. This situation, in view of the erosion of warning time, causes concern among NATO commanders who urge reduction of deployment time, preferably by stationing additional units in the GE. The Netherlands, however, is planning to improve the reaction time of the entire 1 (NL) Corps rather than the readiness of only a few selected units. The army intends to take a number of cost-effective measures to accelerate the mobilization and movement of the entire 1 (NL) Corps to its wartime positions.

These planned measures include:

- The procurement of flatcars for the railways to enable fast transportation of tracked vehicles, thus avoiding wear and tear.
- The early completion of forward storage sites.
- The acquisition of additional equipment for the Training Command to enable the equipment in use with the Training Command to be returned to the reserve

units to which it actually belongs.

- The stationing of some additional troops in the GE.
- The forward storage of equipment of a few selected reserve units in Germany in order to reduce deployment time.

THE ARMY FORMATION SYSTEM

The Royal Netherlands Army enlists both regular personnel and conscripts. The conscripts are on active duty for either 14 or 16 months. In this period, they are trained for either four or six months. During the remaining 10 months, they serve in active units. After this first period of active duty, conscripts can be recalled for short training periods, in periods of tension or in the case of full mobilization. This causes a rapid turnover of conscripts and necessitates an enormous training effort.

Figure 4 shows the wartime strength of the Royal Netherlands Army. As it is, of course, quite impossible to maintain such a force in peacetime, the peacetime organization is much smaller. For example, only six of the 10 brigades of the 1 (NL) Corps are active. The same applies to the other units of the 1 (NL) Corps.

The National Territorial Command is made up of reserve units to an even larger extent. The Training Command is abolished in wartime; almost all the regular personnel of this command join reserve units. In wartime, the remainder of the Training Command is reorganized into the Replacement Command which is tasked with the provision of replacements.

The difference between peacetime and wartime organization highlights the great importance of a quick and effective mobilization system. The Royal Netherlands Army's mobilization system combines the two requirements mentioned above—the continuous intake of conscripts that causes an intensive training effort but yields a vast reserve of trained personnel, and the need to expand the army speedily and effectively in times of tension. A brief explanation of the training and mobilization system follows.

Training

The training of regular personnel in the Royal Netherlands Army does not differ greatly from practices in other countries and requires no further discussion. The training of conscripts is closely related to the formation of a unit. This will be fur-

Military Strength \ Units	1 (NL) Corps	National Territorial Command	Training Command	All Other Units	Total Strength
Wartime	87.000	40.000	—	76.000	203.000
Peacetime	35.000	5.500	21.000	6.500	68.000

Figure 4

ther explained using a mechanized infantry battalion as an example. Figure 5 shows the organization of an infantry battalion. In the battalion, there are three identical infantry companies, three identical mortar platoons (each with three 120mm mortars) and three identical *TOW* platoons (each with four *TOWs*). There is only one headquarters and support company and also only one headquarters in the combat support company.

The units, of which there are three in the organization of the battalion, are trained and replaced in their entirety. This unit-type system of training and replacement is called the Unit Replacement System (URS). This system applies neither to the headquarters and support company nor to the headquarters of the combat support company. Replacement in these units takes place on an individual basis. Every two months, a number of trained conscripts enter the unit and the same number leave the unit. This system is termed the Individual Replacement System (IRS).

A company filled according to the IRS consists of conscripts of seven or eight different drafts. A company filled according to the URS consists of conscripts of the same draft. An advantage of the URS is high unit cohesion. However, the URS cannot, for example, be applied to the headquarters and support company in order not to disrupt the continuous command and control and support of the battalion.

Conscripts are trained in two different ways in accordance with the two replacement systems:

- Conscripts who enter service immediately form companies or, as the case may be, troops, batteries or platoons. During the first four months, such a company is known as a training company. After four months, it achieves active



Figure 5

status. The training company is normally part of the battalion it will join as an active unit. The company is not part of the Training Command. This ensures the continuous interest of the battalion commander and his staff in the training of the company.

The battalion has a special group of instructors (regulars) to conduct the training. The company commander, his second in command and a number of noncommissioned officers (NCOs) stay with the company after it becomes part of the active battalion. The other instructors move on to the next training company.

- Conscripts who enter service join one of the training centers of the Training Command. They stay there, depending on the type of training, for two, four or six months. When they have finished training, some join units which are filled according to the IRS, while others join the training companies of the URS. This is how the training companies obtain conscripted personnel who require a form of training which is too specialized to be provided by the training company itself—for example, mechanics, drivers, 25mm gunners, cooks, and so forth.

The latest moment at which such specialists can enter a training company is when the training company becomes an active unit. Thus, the training of a conscript either with the Training Command or with a training company may never last longer than four or six months for conscripts with 14 or 16 months of active duty, respectively. The conscripts stay together for the remaining 10 months of their period of active duty, during which time the company is active.

Formation of Active Units

Figure 6 shows that every four or six months a new training company enters the battalion and starts its training (mortar and antitank platoons are no longer mentioned separately). The active battalions in peacetime consist of three trained companies, one of which is on so-called short leave. Short leave means that the company still belongs to the battalion, but that the conscripts have been sent home. The conscripts' period of active duty would otherwise need to be four or six months longer (Figure 6).

In addition, the battalion has a training company. The equipment of the short-leave company is in use with the training company. When the short-leave company is recalled in times of tension, the instructors and equipment of the training company are transferred to the recalled short-leave company which is immediately combat-ready. The minister of defense has the authority to recall short-leave units and does not require parliamentary approval for this.

System for Direct Intake Into Reserve Units

The immediate combat readiness of short-leave units when recalled results from the fact that these units have a high degree of cohesion and have recently completed a period of intensive training. Practice shows that this cohesion can also be exploited after the short-leave period has ended. This leads to a phenomenon peculiar to the Royal Netherlands Army: the Direct Intake Into Reserve Units System (DIRUS). Essentially, it is a system in which an active "parent unit"—for instance, a battalion—fills a designated reserve unit.

Figures 6 and 7 show how the system works. The parent battalion is mainly filled in accordance with the URS. When a company enters the battalion after completion of the training period, the oldest active company becomes a short-leave



Figure 6

company. The previous short-leave company is no longer needed in the active battalion.

The entire previous short-leave company enters the reserve battalion (DIRUS). Since there were already three companies in the reserve battalion, the oldest company leaves the reserve battalion. Thus, the unit cohesion of the company is maintained for another 18 months after the short-leave period has ended, and the reserve battalion has conscripted personnel who left the service no longer than two years previously.

Units filled in accordance with the IRS follow the same procedure although changes occur more frequently.

The DIRUS can be used only when the parent unit and the reserve unit are identical in organization and equipment. In the event of an emergency, a reserve battalion filled in accordance with this system can be recalled, equipped and deployed without additional training. The recall of units is exercised frequently, and results are satisfactory. A reserve unit can be ready for forward movement and subsequent deployment within 24 hours.

Further conditions for quick mobilization and deployment of these units are:

- The short traveling distances in a country like the Netherlands.
- The maintenance of unit cohesion.
- The measures taken to ensure the

quick drawing of equipment. For example, radios remain installed in vehicles, the equipment of an infantry squad is stored in or near its vehicle and so on.

- The measures taken to ensure quick employment of the unit. For example, all personnel know where and how the equipment is stored; officers and certain NCOs know how the unit moves to its wartime position, have been briefed about their individual missions and have reconnoitered, in detail, the terrain where they must execute their tasks.

Mobilization of the Remaining Reserve Units

The DIRUS can be used only within limits. One parent unit can fill only one identical reserve unit. However, the system provides personnel for almost all combat units and most of the combat support units of the 1 (NL) Corps. Because of a lack of parent units or because of different organizations or equipment, the system can neither be applied to a sizable part of the combat service support units of the 1 (NL) Corps nor to most of the units of the National Territorial Command.

For these units, a more commonly applied mobilization system is used. The principle of keeping units together, also after they have left direct intake reserve units, is applied to the maximum extent. However, the passing of time causes unavoidable changes in the manning of



Figure 7

units, and unit cohesion diminishes. When such units are recalled, it takes time to organize the unit, and additional training is required. Refresher training enables the time thus required for mobilization to be kept to a minimum.

National Conditions

The entire system of forming the army, training, the ratio between active and reserve units and the mobilization system, including short leave and direct intake, is also influenced by conditions which typify the Netherlands. These conditions include short travel distances, an extensive road and railway system, and the high density of radio and television sets.

Consideration was given to the possibility of converting the Royal Netherlands Army into a regular army. However, huge recruiting problems were foreseen in obtaining motivated and intelligent personnel in the required numbers, and it appeared that it would be impossible to maintain the current defense strength. The current system will, therefore, be continued. The initial period of service time for conscripts of 14 or 16 months compares favorably with other NATO countries. The time available is used in a most efficient way. Intensive training is demanding for regular personnel, but it keeps them on their toes.

The large number of conscripts also results by tradition in the strong integration of the army in civil society. One of these traditions is the military "unions." The first was founded in 1898, and the legal recognition and pertaining rules were established around 1920. In these rules, the absence of the right to strike is counterbalanced by the obligation of the minister of defense to discuss matters related to salary and fringe benefits with the delegates of these associations, thus lifting the burden of these matters from the military chain of command. Some aspects of this integration, like long hair and a more recently founded "union" of conscripts, attracted a great deal of attention in the 1970s. It seems, however, that a certain balance is emerging. Professional leadership has adapted and done away with certain habits and rules that were definitely not very functional. Consequently, society at large does not press for further reforms or changes.

Both General Bernard W. Rogers and General Alexander M. Haig, the current and previous supreme allied commanders, Europe, respectively, have praised the attitude, training and combat readiness of Dutch soldiers. This, together with the massive procurement programs currently in hand, ensures that the Royal Netherlands Army is capable of executing its missions. MR

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Scorched-Earth Policy: Soviets in Afghanistan

Major John M. Hutcheson,
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Soviet operations in Afghanistan continue. Here, we examine those actions in an effort to determine if the Soviets have established a "doctrine of internal defense and development." Soviet actions are also considered in light of this country's Internal Defense and Development concept.

Scipio unleashed the Roman Legions who razed the city to the ground, sold the surviving inhabitants into slavery, and sowed the ground with salt.

—Polybius, 146 B.C.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense or any other government office or agency.—Editor.

IN REVIEWING Soviet actions in Afghanistan, a pattern emerges which strikingly parallels the Roman treatment of Carthage in the Third Punic War. Livestock and grain are systematically destroyed. Villages suspected of providing support to the insurgents are razed.[1] Surviving male villagers are conscripted for the Afghan army, armed, moved immediately to the front and forced to assault rebel strongholds at gunpoint. Atrocities are commonplace.[2] While the Western nations and the Third World express a common outrage, longtime observers of the Soviet Union see the Soviet method as entirely consistent with Soviet history.

The Soviets have never been hesitant to use force to impose their will on others. In the 1920s, the Red army crushed the Muslim Basmachi movement in the Soviet Central Asian republics. In the 1940s, the Soviets faced particularly stiff guerrilla resistance in the Ukraine and Baltic, particularly Lithuania. Opposition was eventually crushed in both cases by the combined use of armor, aircraft and infantry troops by the thousands.[3] There has been no deviation from this historical approach in the recent Soviet venture in Afghanistan.

While the Soviets have the ability to suppress the insurgency in Afghanistan, as they have historically done elsewhere, their ability to control the insurgents completely is in question. This dilemma provides a unique opportunity to study Soviet actions in Afghanistan in order to determine if these actions constitute a Soviet "doctrine of internal defense and development"[4] and to review those actions in light of US Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) doctrine.

US IDAD Doctrine

The US IDAD concept is based on a strategy of simultaneous programs in internal defense and development. Field Manual 100-20, *Low Intensity Conflict*, places the US concept in useful perspective by viewing IDAD strategy as being composed of three interdependent components—*balanced development, mobilization* and *neutralization*. Insurgency is viewed as preventable or defeatable by a visible, balanced, development program that provides individuals or groups the opportunity to progress toward the attainment of popular expectations; by adequate surveillance and subsequent neutralization of the insurgent organization; and by organizing and channelizing the populace and its resources into positive programs which mobilize support for the government.

Implied by the very definition of the term "internal development" is an

underlying US principle—to build viable institutions (political, economical and social) that meet the needs and desires of the people. In executing this principle, US planners observe four fundamental "guidelines"—maximize intelligence, unify effort, improve administration and, most importantly, *minimize violence.*

By comparison, the Soviets in Afghanistan appear to ignore balanced development and mobilization of popular support in favor of a singular strategy of *neutralization* through unlimited violence. The question immediately arises as to whether the harsh approach detailed in this article is truly representative of Soviet IDAD doctrine or peculiar to the intervention in Afghanistan? To answer the question requires that we review Soviet methods in Afghanistan in light of the Soviet reasons for intervening, the roots of the insurgency, the nature of the insurgent and his base of support.

Nature of Afghanistan

Afghanistan has a political character which over the span of centuries remains obstinate, defiant, inward-looking and unconsciously hostile to all foreigners.[5] Illiteracy and a rural population, which is practically all Muslim,[6] contribute to a fierce sense of nationalism. The land itself is harsh with an infant mortality rate of 50 percent before age five and a per capita income of $150 per year.[7]

The 20 million inhabitants occupy an arid landmass roughly the size of Texas and are more than accustomed to hardship. It should not, therefore, be surprising that the Soviets, in Arnold Toynbee's words, have found "a still unbroken people whose spirit and capacity for resistance takes them by surprise."[8]

Soviet Intervention

There are a number of theories as to why the Soviets intervened. These include the historical desire for a warm-water port, the fear of an Islamic awakening within its own borders and the necessity to prop up a Marxist regime with a show of force which backfired. Undoubtedly, Moscow did consider the impact on its own Muslim minorities of the Muslim proclamation that the insurrection was against "atheistic communism."[9]

As former US Secretary of Defense Harold Brown noted, the invasion could be a natural outgrowth of a recent development of a Soviet power projection capability.[10] A close examination of events reveals another plausible reason for intervention.

In April 1978, the Soviets established a Marxist government under President Nur Muhammad Taraki. Hafizullah Amin succeeded in September and initiated a campaign to indoctrinate the Afghan population in Communist ideology.[11] The campaign included a redistribution of lands which forced many households to move hundreds of miles away from where families had lived for generations. They moved to regions of the country dominated by other tribes that spoke other languages.[12] There was a resultant shortfall of wheat.[13]

The government campaigns to reduce illiteracy, curb the powers of feudal lords and eliminate the bride price went against centuries of tradition.[14] Despite the religious significance of the green flag of Islam, the Amin government adopted a red flag which became the symbol of tyranny.

These ill-conceived attempts to reform

a conservative society, almost overnight, caused resentment and led to an insurgency. The Amin government was unable to repress the now widespread insurgency which developed into a holy war or *jihad*. By December 1979, the rebels, or *mujahidin*, controlled 21 of 28 provinces.[15]

A case can be made that the Soviets, seeing the danger that a popular revolt against the Amin style of "progressive" communism could turn into a popular, religious and nationalistic anti-Communist crusade that would imperil the Soviet state and its own Islamic minorities, intervened to restore stability by "tempering" the Marxist revolution and putting an end to the rebellion by force.[16] Thus, control of a border state was maintained, and the spread of Islamic fundamentalism was prevented.

The Insurgent

Afghan nationalism focuses on the date of 1919 which marks its independence from Great Britain after King Amanullah fought a month-long war. For the rebels, the king was a great patriot who freed Afghanistan from an imperial yoke. Today's insurgents see themselves fighting to evict the Russians much as King Amanullah expelled the British.[17]

The *mujahidin* number from 150,000 to 200,000 and occupy mountain positions and redoubts in the valleys.[18] While there is no nationally accepted leadership and centers of resistance are independent, this very disunity appears to have become a strategic advantage.[19] Since there is little or no coordination between the different insurgent groups, it is more difficult for the Soviets to plan any coherent line of attack. This same political disunity serves as a handicap in achieving international recognition and foreign aid. It also prevents a challenge in the United Nations of the legitimacy of the government of President Babrak Karmal.

The Base of Support

The insurgent base of support is largely internal to Afghanistan. In November 1980, the Soviets annexed the Wakhan Corridor—that narrow strip between the Soviet Union and Pakistan—and forced the Muslim Kirghiz tribesmen into Gilgit, Pakistan.[20] Thus, the narrow corridor linking China with Afghanistan was severed.

The logical base of support for arms would then appear to be Pakistan with its lengthy contiguous border. However, mountainous terrain, mined passes and Pakistan's reluctance to accept aid from the United States (partly for fear of Soviet reprisals and largely for want of a better offer)[21] prevent Pakistan from being a major supplier. Despite assurances by the Chinese of support, few weapons have reached the insurgents. After a quick look at Iran, one would surmise that the Muslim revolutionaries would be anxious to assist, but three factors inhibit any tangible aid:

- A costly war with Iraq.
- Fear of the Soviets garrisoned at the border.
- The fact that, while most of Afghanistan is of the Sunni sect, the majority of Iran is Shiite.

To date, the most tangible external support of the Afghan rebels has come from Mawlavi Abdol-Aziz Mollazadeh,[22] religious leader of a half-million Sunni Muslim Baluchis in the province of Baluchistan in southwest Afghanistan. It is an easy task to generate a scenario of

Soviet intervention in Baluchistan on the excuse of protecting the "established government" of Afghanistan against outside intervention. Were this to occur, the long-held desire for a port on the Arabian Sea would be realized.

The rebels enjoy a wide base of support from the people, with merchants virtually funding the rebellion. In Kandahar province alone, each town has a well-organized system for collecting and smuggling out the contributions.[23] Politically, the Karmal government is split on the issue of Soviet intervention. Of the two main Communist Parties, the Khalq and the Parcham, the Khalqis oppose an indefinite Soviet presence.[24]

President Karmal, who heads the Parcham faction, is heavily purging the Khalqis. Karmal's purges have not driven the Khalqis to join the *mujahidin*, but Khalqi followers in significant numbers have crossed over. As the base of the Communist Party narrows with purges, there seems to be little Moscow can do to strengthen the regime apart from using its military might.

Soviet Forces

The number of Russian divisions involved has been estimated at eight to 10, with a total strength of between 90,000 to 130,000. Tanks have been estimated at 1,850 and armored personnel carriers at 2,700. Air support consists of at least five squadrons of *MIG21s*.[25] The lines of communication are virtually nonexistent, but Soviet airlift has so far overcome the logistical problems.

After widespread desertion and mutiny, the Afghan army is virtually ineffective, and the Soviets have assumed the brunt of any fighting. Casualties have been estimated as high as 15,000.[26] Even if this figure is higher than the actual count, we may surmise that the cost of the intervention is higher than the Soviets are willing to report to their own people. Casualties are now being evacuated to East Germany, and the practice of burial of Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan has become more widespread.

Soviet Methods

Because of the Soviet propensity to use force, it is difficult to differentiate between those measures which would normally be classified as purely tactical and those which are classified as internal defense measures. The initial strategy in all the zones has been to control the major population centers, establish security zones along the lines of communication, drive the rebels into the mountains and eliminate the centers of resistance. This strategy has been further extended to denying the rebels any external base of support.

In October 1980, the Soviet army reportedly divided Afghanistan into seven geographical zones, each under the command of a Soviet military officer and an Afghan political commissar. These men were given authority to adopt specific tactics suitable to their districts.[27] While the tactics and techniques may vary irrespective of which geographical zone is analyzed, there is evidence of a common doctrine of unrestricted force.

The Scorched Earth

Search-and-destroy operations are conducted on a wide scale in the Andarab

Valley north of Kabul. In the Logar province south of Kabul, the Soviets use bombs, napalm and artillery fire to destroy the livestock, grain and buildings of villagers "suspected" of abetting the rebels.[28] Consider the following single incident which occurred in Tangi Canyon, Wardack province:

The Soviet force with tanks and armored personnel carriers, entered the narrow canyon and blocked escape routes. Search parties directed by Afghans who remained hidden in armored personnel carriers, but used loud speakers, rounded up rebel sympathizers and crushed twelve men to death by running over them with tanks.[29]

Following such an attack, the Soviet force takes away all the cattle (there is already a serious shortage of beef caused by the exodus of some 1.4 million cattle with the refugees who have migrated to Pakistan), presumably to remove both the incentive for the inhabitants to return and the source of food for the resistance fighters.[30] We may surmise that, as the families of the victims in Tangi Canyon were required to watch the "reprisal," the Soviet commander of that geographical zone is not waging a campaign to "win

Photo courtesy of Soldier of Fortune IV. M. Martinoval

Soviet troops in Afghanistan

the hearts and minds of the people."

Having forced the populace to desert the fields, the Karmal regime took the next logical step and issued a directive ordering that no land should be left uncultivated and gave cooperative and state farms the right to take over land "abandoned" by the owners. At a high-level meeting on 20 July, it was announced that all surplus wheat crops would be purchased by the government through cooperatives, with the aim of "stabilizing prices for the farmer and ensuring adequate grain supplies to essential recipients"[31] (ostensibly the Soviet army and with the apparent intent to deny the same resource to the insurgent).

The effect this has had on the insurgent movement is best expressed by Abdul Rasul Sayof, leader of the Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan, an organization representing five resistance groups, based in Peshawar, Pakistan:

You must know that beside the military conflict we are also fighting an economic war. We have inflicted heavy losses on them (Soviets) but they too have bombed our fields and burned our crops, forcing a famine in our country Besides arms and ammunition, we also need food, not only for the freedom fighters but for the common people who are supporting them and giving them refuge. Unless we meet the food requirements of our people, the war cannot be continued in the countryside.[32]

It appears that starving the population in the areas of greatest resistance through destruction of the region's agriculture is a calculated Soviet strategy of internal defense and may prove to be successful in the short run.

The Soviets are attempting other, more subtle, measures comparable to the mental image we invoke of US IDAD activities. New Afghan schools are devoted to ideological training of Afghan youth, mass training of Afghan students is conducted inside the USSR and weekly publications oriented at youth are disseminated.[33]

In an effort to mediate the political power of the Islamic revival, the Kabul government has changed its all-red flag to the Islamic green. An office of "Islamic teachings" and a national conference of "religious scholars and clergy" were initiated to persuade the population that communism and Islam are compatible. The success of the latter venture is unknown. One innovative approach saw the import of 5,000 Soviet Muslim troops who were to work on a Soviet "hearts and minds" project. But they were just as rapidly exported when they began to show signs of having more in common with the insurgent point of view than with the Soviets'.[34]

There has been an attempt to exploit conflicts between tribal leaders, primarily between the eastern and central tribes. Cubans have been reported by a number of sources to have been imported to capitalize on their skills in guerrilla warfare.[35] There is an ongoing effort to rebuild the Afghan army based on a nucleus of noncommissioned officers trained in the Soviet Union on the Soviet model.[36] The strategy of occupying the cities and training local forces to garrison the countryside is somewhat different from the US IDAD doctrine but may be peculiar to Afghanistan as the insurgents own the countryside.

The picture of Soviet IDAD doctrine is admittedly incomplete. On 18 January 1980, the US press was accused of "bias and interference" and deported by the Karmal government.[37] Thus, the information flow is virtually nil. Nonetheless, the impression that so clearly comes through all sources of information is one of a doctrine of "unlimited force." As a final il-

lustration, the use of soman or a similar nerve agent has been reported. (As the United States has been unable to verify the allegation, no formal condemnation has been issued.[38])

What has emerged is a doctrine that incorporates:

- A willingness to use any level of force required.
- A willingness to ignore world opinion.
- A policy of scorched earth to deny food and shelter to both the population and the insurgent.
- The use of guerrilla warfare experts.
- A somewhat flexible approach authorized by the subordinate commander.
- A limited range of psychological operations to include propaganda, school reform, news media, use of ethnic agents and exploitation of conflict between insurgent factions.

Are the actions of the Soviets in Afghanistan peculiar to that intervention alone, or do they represent a duly constituted IDAD doctrine? The similar range of measures which each of the autonomous military zone commanders has employed argues for a common predisposition to a doctrine of "unlimited force."

Thus, it may well be that, regardless of the options available, the Soviet commander because of historical precedent, training and predisposition will resort to force in order to achieve an immediate, tangible result whenever it is possible to use force with impunity. It may, therefore, be that the situation in Afghanistan can be generalized to the Soviet doctrine as a whole only in regard to this "predisposition."

There are other factors which restrict the extent to which actions in Afghanistan may be generalized to a universal Soviet IDAD doctrine. The very location of Afghanistan, contiguous to the Soviet landmass, causes a different outlook by Soviet planners. The threat to Soviet well-being is at least "perceived" as high, and the risk of superpower confrontation is perceived as low. The ability to project forces, as noted by former Defense Secretary Harold Brown, is high. Actions in a distant African adventure might, therefore, be quite different.

In any case, the Soviet doctrine is quite divergent from US doctrine. The single aspect of public opinion alone which ultimately may spell success or failure for a US venture does not appear to be even an operative factor for the Soviet planner.

But what of Afghanistan? In the long term, the Soviet doctrine in Afghanistan may have one or more of the following outcomes:

- A Soviet-dominated Afghanistan.
- A protracted war.
- A neutral Afghanistan.
- The spread of conflict to Pakistan.

It is evident that the Soviets intend to stay. They are constructing underground facilities for fuel and ammunition, a permanent bridge over the Amu Darya River at Termez, lengthened airfields, enlarged maintenance shops, permanent troop billets and a railroad into Afghanistan.[39]

Undoubtedly, the Soviet Union has the will and the means to subdue Afghanistan completely. However, the subjugation of a country the size of Texas with an alienated population of roughly 20 million will be a long and costly process. Unlike the United States' concept of success in counterinsurgency operations, which equates to the withdrawal of conventional forces concurrent with stable self-rule, the Soviets have a different concept and may simply elect to occupy Afghanistan permanently as they have East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary.

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36 "Soviets Take Root in Afghanistan" *The New York Times* 9 October 1980 p A 23

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

STRATEGIC CONCEPTS FOR THE 1980s

Part II

Colonel William O. Staudenmaier, US Army

In Part I of this two-part review of contemporary strategic concepts, the author discussed the interrelated concepts of national purpose, national interests, national goals or objectives, national strategy and military strategy. He defined three levels of military strategy—national military strategy, coordinative military strategy and operational military strategy—and discussed the impact of strategic constraints on the development of military strategy. Here, in Part II, the strategic trends of the midterm are examined for their effect on four fundamental elements of US national interest: survival, preservation of territorial integrity, maintenance or enhancement of the US standard of living and world order. Then, strategic guidelines are developed and used to propose a military strategy that would be relevant to the strategic environment of the 1980s.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense or any other government office or agency —Editor.

A Strategic Model

OF THE three levels of military strategy—national, coordinative and operational—the latter is the least difficult to cope with because it is concerned with either current operations or future short-range contingencies. This means that operational military strategy considers only the existing military capabilities of the United States and its enemies. As the uncertainty is greater, the problem is more complicated when dealing with the other levels of military strategy which look further into the future. The core planning issue is how to come to grips with uncertainty.

There are basically two ways that the military attempts to cope with uncertainty: Either the planner can attempt to predict the future, or he can postulate a range of alternative futures. Both have been used in the Joint Strategic Planning System. The Joint Long-Range Estimative Intelligence Document (JLREID) attempted to predict the factors and trends that would affect world power relationships in the long-range planning period (10 to 20 years). The Joint Long-Range Strategic Appraisal, which replaced both the JLREID and the Joint Long-Range Strategic Study, outlines four distinctly different and discrete future worlds which collectively represent a spectrum of possible future worlds.

Regardless of which method is used, the requirements posed by the future strategic environment must somehow be translated into strategic decisions that will impact on today's program or budget process. Without such impact, long-range planning becomes an interesting, but largely sterile, exercise. Basically, what has been said of long-range planning is also true of midrange planning (3 to 10 years).

Most military planners would agree that an examination of the future strategic environment is necessary to develop strategies that will be useful in fighting future wars and in making the force structure decisions that will provide the necessary military capabilities for such wars. To determine where the United States might use military force, the issue of what the United States will fight for must necessarily be considered.

Analysis of the strategic environment points to significant challenges to some fundamental US interests in the midterm. Four categories of US national interests will be used as a focal point here: survival of the United States (with its national values intact), preservation of the territorial integrity of the United States, maintenance and enhancement of the US standard of living and maintenance of a favorable world order.[1]

The regional matrices shown in Figures 1 through 7 summarize challenges to US interests in the Western Hemisphere, Western Europe, the Mediterranean Basin, sub-Saharan Africa, the Indian Ocean region, East Asia and the Pacific, and the Soviet Union and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact area. A discussion of the major strategic trends suggested by these regional appraisals follows.

[1] Part I of this article appeared in the March 1982 *Military Review*.

Strategic Trends

The United States, in the opinion of most strategic analysts, is no longer superior to the Soviet Union in strategic nuclear power. Proponents of this view are concerned that, if the present adverse trends in the strategic nuclear balance continue, the United States will be in a "period of maximum peril from 1983-1987."[2] Comparisons of the strategic nuclear forces by the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reveal that the Soviets lead the United States in missile throw-weight and equivalent megatons and the trends favor the USSR in hard target kill potential. The decline in the US advantage in number of deployed warheads that leveled off in the mid-1970s with the fielding of the multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle has begun again. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David C. Jones, evaluates the balance in these terms:

There is no question that Soviet momentum has brought them from a position of clear inferiority to their present status of at least strategic equality with the United States and the trends for the future are adverse.[3]

In 1980, then Secretary of Defense Harold Brown echoed these sentiments:

In strategic nuclear forces, the Soviets have come from a position of substantial numerical inferiority 15 years ago to one of parity today—and a potential for strategic advantage if we fail to respond with adequate programs of our own.[4]

Regardless of how one views the political value that may be gained from nuclear superiority, the fact remains that the Soviet Union has progressed from a position of nuclear inferiority in 1962 to one of parity.

The world environment is no longer the simple bipolar milieu of the recent past. The need of major regional powers to assume greater responsibility in intra-regional affairs has been stimulated by two factors. The first is the near institutionalization of conflict avoidance between the United States and the Soviet Union. The second is the reduced credibility of the United States as the protector of the rights of lesser states to self-determination and national sovereignty. The post-World War II gravitation of medium and smaller regional states to either of the superpowers is no longer the dominant trend in national alignments. In contention with the bipolar balance, there is the continuing trend toward greater interdependence among nations, combined with a gradually developed system of regional and subregional centers of power.

Nuclear proliferation is a significant issue in the emerging strategic environment. There were only four nuclear powers 20 years ago: the United States, the Soviet Union, France and the United Kingdom. Today, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has joined these ranks, and India has exploded a nuclear device. Former Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance has estimated that "at least a dozen more [countries] could produce a weapon within a few years of deciding to do so."[5]

While the availability and rising cost of hydrocarbons currently hold the industrialized world's attention, access to other important nonrenewable resources could also become a problem during the next decade. Recent energy problems have served far more than the previous oil embargo of 1973-74 to alert the Western World to the serious consequences of dependence on foreign oil. They highlight the constraints on the use of military force in assuring access to strategic

Basic US National Interests in the Western Hemisphere

Categories of National Interest	Elements of Policy	Military Strategy	Strategic Issues
Survival	Deterrence of nuclear war Nonproliferation	Assured destruction ● Second strike ● Triad *Flexible nuclear options* Withheld reserve Essential equivalence Termination favorable to the United States	Proliferation potential
Territorial Integrity	Prevent hostile power on mainland and sea approaches Protect Caribbean Basin *Defend air and sea approaches to North America* Defend Atlantic lines of communication Defend Panama Canal according to provisions of 1978 treaties	Forward defense in Caribbean and Panama North American Air Defense Command *Collective security* Security assistance Coalition warfare Military-to-military relations Inter-American Defense Board Multinational defense arrangements	Role of Latin America in NATO war US force presence in Panama US response to Caribbean contingency Puerto Rico's status Brazil Inter-American system
Economic Well-Being	Retain access to *critical raw* materials and markets Maintain and expand trade Promote economic interdependence among key regional states	Security assistance *Forward defense in* Caribbean and Panama	Naval requirements to keep Caribbean and Atlantic lines of communication open Mexico's future regional security role
World Order	Peaceful resolution *of conflict through* the Organization of American States Pursue human rights	Security assistance *Multilateral peace-*keeping	Canadian separatism Cuban problem Caribbean instability

Note: Some strategic issues transcend the analytical categories established here. For example, the issues relating to general nuclear war would impact on all categories of national interest. Strategic issues have been listed only once and then under the category which seemed most appropriate.

resources when their denial is caused by governmental collapse, as in Iran, rather than the usually assumed denial scenario involving interdiction of choke points, blockades or embargoes.

Current trends portend, if anything, a worsening of the availability of foreign oil to the Western World in the face of gradually increasing demands. This trend, coupled with forecasts that the

Soviet Union may become an oil importer, indicates strongly that the worldwide energy crisis and its security implications will worsen in the midrange. The availability of a large amount of Mexican oil or access to new resources could, of course, have a leavening effect on the seriousness of US energy-related problems during the next decade, but there is still no certainty as to Mexico's intentions or future production capabilities.

The reassertion of Islamic fundamentalism, exemplified most recently by its contribution to the revolution in Iran, the ongoing counterrevolution in Afghanistan and its influence in affecting certain reforms in Pakistan, is a trend which is likely to continue. The rise in Muslim influence in the Middle East and South and Southeast Asia will provide a platform for criticism of government and national development.

However, the Islamic "movement," while transnational, does not appear to have a coordinated international direction. Universal Islamic resistance to Marxism does serve as a powerful impediment to the spread of communism. Whether Islam can provide the basis for unified government in, for example, Iran and eventually in Afghanistan, remains to be seen. To date, however, it has not provided an alternative to government in these countries, nor is it certain that the movement can deter political separatist sentiment.

At least into the early 1980s, Western Europe, Latin America and the Middle East are likely to continue to bear the brunt of terrorist acts, with business executives and influential government officials the primary targets. High visibility bombings, arson, kidnapping and assassination will remain the main tools of terrorists throughout most of the midrange time period. Acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorist organizations will remain a threat which may become greater as more countries acquire a military nuclear capability. No precedent yet exists for the use of nuclear weapons by terrorists, but it is not likely that, once acquired, nuclear weapons would be used in the same fashion as traditional means.

Since it is difficult to envision even subkiloton nuclear weapons being used discriminately in a noncombat environment, and assuming some discretion continues to be a basic precept of terrorist strategy, it is doubtful that terrorists could arbitrarily detonate a nuclear weapon in a populated area without estranging their cause. In a situation involving terrorist possession of a nuclear weapon, the more likely tactic would be its use as a bargaining device.

Uncertainty over the course of US-China relations, combined with the likelihood of offsetting Soviet maneuverings as a consequence of closer Sino-American ties, casts superpower competition in an increasingly complex setting. The recent record of the US-Soviet relationship shows a considerable increase in tensions, caused in part by the normalization of US relations with China, by Soviet and Cuban activity in Africa, and by the presence of Soviet combat troops in Cuba.

Nonetheless, the basic purposes of détente, as they seemingly have come to be agreed upon by both sides, continue to be fulfilled: the avoidance of direct US-Soviet conventional military conflict and ultimately of a nuclear war. A danger will continue to be the superpower arms race played out against the backdrop of unrelenting competition for worldwide influence. Barring the early commencement of serious Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) negotiations which could lead to progress toward demilitarization of the superpower relationship, this trend

Basic US National Interests in Western Europe

Categories of National Interest	Elements of Policy	Military Strategy	Strategic Issues
Survival	Deterrence of nuclear war Nonproliferation	Assured destruction ● Second strike ● Triad Flexible nuclear options Withheld reserve Essential equivalence Termination favorable to the United States	Nuclear trends Proliferation potential Escalation
Territorial Integrity	Protect US bases and territory Defend air and sea approaches to North America Maintain integrity of NATO countries Maintain air and sea approaches to Europe	Forward defense based on the continent of Europe Protect lines of communication between US and forward deployed forces/ NATO allies	Détente/confrontation Maintain general equilibrium between East and West
Economic Well-Being	Maintain and expand trade and investments Continue free passage over international air/sea routes	US/NATO naval force presence to demonstrate access to lines of communication Forward basing to enhance force presence	Burden sharing Rationalization, standardization and interoperability
World Order	Prevent extension of Soviet influence in Europe and around the world Maintain US credibility and regional influence Prevent the outbreak of hostilities in region threatening US interests	Collective security Maintain credible military posture in Europe Promote Soviet concern with two-front war Security assistance	Strategic flexibility Exploit Soviet vulnerabilities outside NATO Presence/reinforcement

Note: Some strategic issues transcend the analytical categories established here. For example, the issues relating to general nuclear war would impact on all categories of national interest. Strategic issues have been listed only once and then under the category which seemed most appropriate.

Figure 2

will easily continue into the 1990s, with negative domestic implications for both countries, not to mention the increased risks of direct US-Soviet military conflict.

Current trends suggest a number of potentially troubling developments for the United States in the future: the growth in the number of newly independent states whose leadership—as in much of the Third World—will find it impossible to maintain order because of the pressures for and of modernization; the

continuing dependence of the United States and its important allies on raw materials and oil from a capricious Third World; the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as, and probably of greater short-term significance, the spread of high-technology conventional weapons; and the growing strategic importance and role of the developing countries in the continuing East-West struggle for primacy.

The strategic environment that these trends seem to indicate as the most likely is multipolar—a future world that envisions five major power centers (the United States, the USSR, the PRC, Western Europe and Japan), a proliferation of nations, low economic growth and resource availability problems for the United States and a world in which nuclear weapons have been proliferated. While it is by no means inevitable that the world will develop in this way, the United States has an opportunity now to choose a national strategy that will, in some degree, put the country in a favorable position to cope with the serious issues that would accompany such an environment.

From this analysis of the emerging strategic environment, the following conclusions may be drawn regarding the impact of strategic trends on the four fundamental elements of US national interest:

- *Survival.* The Soviet Union, presently and into the 1980s, will be the only nation that will posses the nuclear weapons and delivery means in sufficient quantity to decimate the United States. It may be of little solace, but it is of immense strategic importance that the USSR may be similarly vulnerable to a US nuclear strike. The superpowers have attained a "balance of terror" that must be maintained as a matter of first priority. Proliferation of nuclear weapons in the waning years of the 20th century will complicate this issue.
- *Preservation of territorial integrity.* It does not appear that the United States need be overly concerned regarding the preservation of its territorial integrity. The oceans that separate the United States from the Eurasian landmass, although no longer an obstacle to strategic nuclear attack, are still effective barriers to conventional invasion. So long as the United States maintains relatively strong armed forces, it need not fear for the security of its base area. However, recent developments in the Caribbean must be closely monitored lest instability or Soviet military capabilities in that area hamper our ability to project power elsewhere in the world.
- *Maintenance or enhancement of the US standard of living.* This national interest has two major subelements: access to US trading partners and access to required critical resources, especially energy. Access to the major trading partners of the United States in the Western Hemisphere is not a significant problem. Access to the major markets outside of this hemisphere is assured by maintaining the two main centers of strength in Western Europe and in Northeast Asia and by ensuring freedom of the seas.

Since the United States is primarily a maritime and commercial nation, worldwide stability is also an important US global objective. Maintaining access to energy and critical resources in the Third World at reasonable cost may become more of a problem in the waning years of the 20th century, perhaps even calling for the use of force. In that eventuality, a strategic military reserve, capable of projecting its power from the United States, will be essential. Equally essential, due to the dangers of escalation present in

Basic US National Interests in the Mediterranean Basin

Categories of National Interest	Elements of Policy	Military Strategy	Strategic Issues
Survival	Deterrence of nuclear war Nonproliferation	Assured destruction ● Second strike ● Triad Flexible nuclear options Withheld reserve Essential equivalence Termination favorable to the United States	NATO preparedness for war French nuclear forces and export of technology/materials Avoid Israeli and Arab development and use of nuclear weapons
Territorial Integrity	Control of sea/air approaches to North America	Forward defense Present USSR with multiple threats from multiple directions Presence of US 6th Fleet	Importance of sea and air lines of communication control Importance of defense of Europe and role of the Mediterranean If deterrence fails, what concept for war in the Mediterranean?
Economic Well-Being	Deter attacks on sources of raw materials and associated sea lines of communication Protect access to oil and facilities Promote regional stability Promote trade and investment and free passage/lines of communication	Naval force presence to demonstrate access to lines of communication Increase security relations Deter/offset Soviet efforts to increase presence/power, intervention Security assistance	Importance of lines of communication for access to materials Defense of Saudi Arabia
World Order	Prevent political coercion of US allies and friends Preserve alliance territory Limit Soviet access to allied/client states Revitalize southern flank strategy Firm defense of Israel Settle Arab-Israeli conflict Avoid destabilizing force expansions Combat terrorism	Coalition strategy Present USSR with multiple threats from multiple directions Permanent naval deployment in the Mediterranean Control Soviet access to the Mediterranean through the Turkish Straits, to the Atlantic through Gibraltar	Importance of lines of communication to assist allies/protect security interests Improve mobility, lift, deployability, base systems, Rapid Deployment Force Settle Greek-Turkish dispute More closely integrate Portugal Italy Greece Turkey *and* France Possible roles of Spain Morocco and Tunisia Egypt Greater allied participation

Note: Some strategic issues transcend the analytical categories established here. For example, the issues relating to general nuclear war would impact on all categories of national interest. Strategic issues have been listed only once and then under the category which seemed most appropriate.

Figure 3

superpower conflicts, will be the necessity to ensure that these Third World ventures are not linked to superpower relations.

● *World order.* This is an interest that requires the lessening of tensions throughout the world, especially with regard to superpower relationships. The United States should, so far as it is possible, influence international relations so that it will not become a beleaguered nation in a hostile world. In practical terms, this translates into a policy that will ensure that no single nation or group of nations hostile to the United States can establish hegemony over either Western Europe or Japan, or establish client states in Latin America that could directly or indirectly threaten neighboring states or serve as a base for subversion.

The interaction of the strategic trends with the four fundamental national interests of the United States indicates possible areas where military conflict could erupt. The United States must be prepared to fight in Western Europe and Korea to oppose Communist expansionism. The security of Western Europe will probably remain the pre-eminent world order interest of the United States although outbreak of hostilities there is probably the least likely conflict that could occur during the midterm. A more likely area of conflict is the Korean peninsula though fighting could break out in other areas where interests have been less clearly defined and where adversaries are more willing to probe.

During the midrange, the United States might be required to respond militarily to threats in Southwest Asia because of the confluence of Western resource interests, especially oil, and because of instability—fueled by Islamic religious issues, Arab-Israeli issues and Soviet destabilization efforts—in an already volatile region. A US-Soviet military confrontation could very possibly occur in this region. If such a direct confrontation should occur, it would represent the end of an era in superpower military relations.

Conflict Avoidance

During the post-World War II period, the United States and the USSR have wisely avoided situations that would involve direct military involvement against each other. This mutual, tacit inhibition is based primarily on an assessment of the dangers of escalation inherent in superpower confrontations. The dire consequences of escalation in such a confrontation are potentially so great, particularly in view of the huge nuclear arsenals maintained by the superpowers, that it has been clearly more prudent to avoid such clashes than to attempt to control them should conflict erupt. Moreover, for most of the period, the United States enjoyed a perceived superiority of strategic nuclear weapons and power projection capability.

A nuclear stalemate currently exists because neither superpower has the technological capability to execute a disarming first strike against the other. Implicit in this judgment is the underlying assumption that the US fundamental deterrent concept—assured destruction—will not be invalidated in the midrange because of technological advances. Fully realizing that this concept may not be accepted by the Soviets, who emphasize damage-limiting and warfighting capabilities, the terrible destructiveness, frightening uncertainties and cataclysmic consequences associated with nuclear warfare should continue to convince both

Basic US National Interests in Sub-Saharan Africa

Categories of National Interest	Elements of Policy	Military Strategy	Strategic Issues
Survival	Deterrence of nuclear war Nonproliferation	Assured destruction ● Second strike ● Triad Flexible nuclear options Withheld reserve Essential equivalence Termination favorable to the United States	Nuclear trends Proliferation potential ● South Africa ● Possibly others
Territorial Integrity	Defend air and sea approaches to North America	Protect lines of communication between United States and Western Europe	Soviet bases in sub-Saharan Africa
Economic Well Being	Maintain and expand trade and investments Access to natural resources of region Continue free passage over international air/sea routes Promote economic development in the region	Military access and transit rights Security assistance Limited peacekeeping functions Coalition warfare Protect US personnel and property	Majority rule in Southern Africa Soviet/Cuban presence US military presence
World Order	No hegemony in sub-Saharan Africa hostile to the United States Maintain US credibility and regional influence Prevent the outbreak of hostilities in region threatening US interests Reduce the threat of Communist insurgency in non-Communist countries Promote respect for human rights Prevent regional arms races	Limited peacekeeping functions Security assistance Coalition warfare Protect US personnel and property	Soviet/Cuban presence Majority rule in Southern Africa US military presence

Note: Some strategic issues transcend the analytical categories established here. For example, the issues relating to general nuclear war would impact on all categories of national interest. Strategic issues have been listed only once and then under the category which seemed most appropriate.

Figure 4

sides that the avoidance of a strategic nuclear exchange is by far the best strategy.

Certainly, limited nuclear options to cope with nuclear launches caused by accident or miscalculation, a withheld nuclear reserve for intrawar deterrence and essential equivalence for political purposes are all necessary and useful elements of US nuclear strategy. At bedrock, however, an assured destruction capability is the factor that will continue to underwrite nuclear deterrence. The strategic nuclear triad and new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) basing options will increase the likelihood that technological improvements to Soviet offensive missile accuracy, which could place the US land ICBM force increasingly at risk during the midrange, will not provide the Soviet Union with a disarming first-strike capability.

One consequence of the change in the strategic nuclear equation over the past 15 years has been the flexing of Soviet political and military muscles in areas formerly the preserve of the United States. When the United States had a clear lead in strategic nuclear forces, Soviet military activities throughout the Third World appeared to be restrained. Since the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the Soviet Union has not only built up its strategic nuclear force to its present dimensions, but the Soviets show few signs of slowing their momentum. The USSR has also designed and fielded an improved navy that sails in all of the oceans of the world.

This is not to say that the USSR has achieved a significant power projection capability such that major forces can be moved and sustained in a hostile environment outside of the lands that rim the Soviet Union. In many areas of the world, the United States is still superior in terms of strategic mobility although it is in danger of losing that capability over the next decade.

During the midrange, the Soviet Union will remain unable to compete successfully with the United States across the spectrum on political, social or economic terms, but Soviet military strength may embolden them to use their military capability to achieve strategic objectives in the Persian Gulf and to project either their own, Cuban or possibly other surrogate forces in other more distant areas. Present Soviet capabilities to use force at long range *against significant military opposition* are still limited, but these capabilities will increase in the midrange as improvements to Soviet naval and airlift forces continue.

It should be noted, however, that the Soviet military posture also constrains its politico-military flexibility and ability to project military power beyond its contiguous borders. The preponderance of Soviet combat-ready divisions are already deployed against its two most serious threats—NATO and China. In addition, except for eight airborne divisions, all other Soviet divisions are heavy and, therefore, cannot be rapidly diverted or transported to counter various other contingencies. The degree of difficulty in rapidly diverting or transporting Soviet combat-ready divisions is underscored by the lack of Soviet strategic lift.

Currently, there are only about 50 aircraft in the Soviet military which can lift outsized loads. Range limitations and the lack of adequate in-flight refueling capabilities also restrict Soviet airlift abilities. Moreover, despite significant improvements in Soviet naval capabilities made during the last 20 years, Soviet ship construction remains focused on its two historical areas of interest—strategic nuclear submarines and antisubmarine

Basic US National Interests in the Indian Ocean Region

Categories of National Interest	Elements of Policy	Military Strategy	Strategic Issues
Survival	Deterrence of nuclear war Nonproliferation	Assured destruction ● Second strike ● Triad Flexible nuclear options Withheld reserve Essential equivalence Termination favorable to the United States	Theater nuclear forces Proliferation potential Escalation control
Territorial Integrity	*	*	*
Economic Well-Being	Retain access to oil and other natural resources Continue free passage over international air/sea routes Maintain and expand trade and investments	Maintain rapid reaction force in the Continental United States Naval force presence to demonstrate access to lines of communication in the Indian Ocean Develop theater infrastructure Act as NATO/Japan "executive agent" in Southwest Asia	Rapid deployment force ● Deployability constraints ● Sustainability ● Command and control ● Intratheater swing (Pacific Command/ Southwest Asia) Iraq/Iran Iraq/USSR Multinational naval force Japanese self-defense force increase (naval) Can oil be protected at reasonable cost?
World Order	Maintain US credibility and regional influence Limit Soviet influence in Southwest Asia and the Indian subcontinent Reduce threat of Communist insurgency in non Communist countries Prevent the outbreak of hostilities in region threatening to Western nations Settle Arab-Israeli dispute without losing moderate Arab states Avoid destabilizing force expansions	Deter USSR use of military force in Southwest Asia Security assistance Maintain Pakistan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia as US allies	Arab-Israeli dispute Palestinian question Priority vis-à-vis NATO/Northeast Asia Terrorism

*Not applicable

Note: Some strategic issues transcend the analytical categories established here. For example, the issues relating to general nuclear war would impact on all categories of national interest. Strategic issues have been listed only once and then under the category which seemed most appropriate.

Figure 5

warfare. Suffice it to say that Soviet military forces are primarily oriented toward a European and Asian land warfare contingency and not toward a conflict which would require massive movement of Soviet forces to distant areas. This posture obviously provides Moscow with certain advantages, but it also limits Soviet military flexibility.

The deployment of new conventional weapons in the NATO armies that can accurately acquire targets in the air or on the ground, track them relentlessly and destroy them unerringly, usually with a single shot, introduces a new battlefield calculus. These lethal, sophisticated weapons could make it very difficult for a Soviet attacker to plan the outcome of a battle with confidence, even when the defender is seriously outnumbered. This uncertainty, coupled with the inhibitions arising from the dangers of escalation to nuclear war, should convince Soviet policymakers and strategists that the use of military force in Central Europe would be a losing proposition.

Given an environment in which neither superpower seems likely to achieve a first-strike nuclear capability against the other and in which neither the Warsaw Pact nor NATO can "win" in Europe with any degree of certainty, it would then appear likely that the unarticulated policy of conflict avoidance between the United States and the USSR should continue, at least throughout the midterm. Unfortunately, however, this does not preclude a superpower confrontation brought about either through accident or miscalculation.

The chances for a crisis beginning this way increase as the locus of superpower conflict shifts from Central Europe or Northeast Asia, where the vital interests of both superpowers are immediately engaged, to the more turbulent, gray areas of the Third World, in which the vital interests of only one of the superpowers or neither are involved. The use of coercive diplomacy in these resource-rich areas, where the utility of force is high, particularly in the proxy wars being waged by the Soviets and Cubans, carries the very real danger of uncontrollable escalation. Relations between the United States and the USSR are tense and could easily snap if put to stress by a crisis somewhere in the Third World where it is not in the mutual interest of both of the superpowers to preserve the status quo.

Because the vital interests of both superpowers would not immediately be called into question, there could be room to maneuver, and the crisis might be prolonged. Once this happens, prestige, honor and credibility could replace original, less rigid policy objectives, thereby increasing the chances for accident or miscalculation that might lead to war. If escalation in the local areas failed to provide a solution, the door would be opened for escalation outside of the local area perhaps leading to threats to interests more vital than those initially involved. This scenario is by no means inevitable, but has become more likely considering the convergence of interests, opportunity and activity of the superpowers in the Third World.

Conflict avoidance is not the only change in the strategic environment driven by the destructive power of nuclear weapons. From the time of Napoleon until the end of World War II, the role of the decisive battle was central to operational military strategy. There is evidence now that the importance of the decisive battle is waning. Military confrontations since 1945 reflect a pattern that includes a *desire* to end a crisis or conflict quickly, to stabilize the situation or conflict before it can escalate to some-

Basic US National Interests in East Asia and the Pacific

Categories of National Interest	Elements of Policy	Military Strategy	Strategic Issues
Survival	Deterrence of nuclear war Nonproliferation	Assured destruction ● Second strike ● Triad Flexible nuclear options Withheld reserve Essential equivalence Termination favorable to the United States	Nuclear trends Proliferation potential
Territorial Integrity	Protect Hawaii, Alaska, US bases and territory Defend air and sea approaches to North America	Forward defense based on South Korea and Asian offshore bases Maritime/air oriented—avoid major ground troop involvement on Asian mainland Protect lines of communication between US and forward deployed forces/ Pacific allies	Status of 2d Infantry Division Europe first priority; economy of force in East Asia
Economic Well-Being	Maintain and expand trade and investments Access to natural resources of region Continue free passage over international air/sea routes	Naval force presence to demonstrate access to lines of communication Forward basing to enhance force presence	Possible overextension of US Pacific Fleet between Northeast Asia and Southwest Asia
World Order	No hegemony in North east Asia hostile to the United States Maintain US credibility and regional influence Prevent the outbreak of hostilities in region threatening US interests Reduce the threat of Communist insurgency in non-Communist countries Improve relations with People's Republic of China while pursuing satisfactory resolution of Taiwan issue	Collective security Maintain credible military posture in the Western Pacific to respond to contingencies Promote Soviet concern with two-front war Security assistance	Increase of Japanese self defense force Strategic flexibility regarding Western Pacific contingencies Proper military relationship between United States/People's Republic of China Exploit Soviet vulnerabilities outside NATO

Note: Some strategic issues transcend the analytical categories established here. For example, the issues relating to general nuclear war would impact on all categories of national interest. Strategic issues have been listed only once and then under the category which seemed most appropriate.

Figure 6

thing more dangerous and to end the crisis through negotiation before the stakes and risks become too great. The central battle, which traditionally resulted in the destruction of the enemy army and in peace terms dictated by the winner of that battle, no longer seems relevant in the nuclear era.

The Korean conflict, the Cuban missile crisis, the Vietnam War, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the Sino-Vietnamese War all ended similarly. First, the battlefield was stabilized, and, second, a negotiated settlement to the conflict or crisis was effected. This pattern is rooted in the perception that war between the superpowers or between other major military powers has become too costly in terms of human life and material resources to be pursued to its ultimate Napoleonic end—the destruction of the enemy army.

Few countries have the financial or military resources necessary to sustain modern warfare at the high level of intensity required to destroy an opposing force. The proliferation of the highly accurate and lethal precision weapons produced by the new military technology, as well as the fear of escalation of nuclear warfare on the part of the superpowers, their allies and their client states, has brought about this change in the nature of modern mid-intensity conflict.

The United States, without the capability to launch a disarming first strike, without an adequate active defense which could intercept missiles in flight and without an effective civil defense for protection of its population and economy, has, since 1960, deterred the launching of the USSR's nuclear force by threat of massive retaliation. But nuclear threats cannot be used lightly. In fact, a threat to escalate to nuclear war was used only twice against the Soviet Union—in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War when the United States went on a global military alert.

In situations less critical, the United States has perceived it to be in its best interest not to resolutely pursue a military solution toward its ultimate nuclear end. Rather, it limited the political goals it sought. This lowering of diplomatic and military sights results from the view that the outcome of war is so uncertain and the risks so high that the use of military force by a nuclear power is an unprofitable venture at mid and high-intensity levels.

If either through miscalculation or by accident deterrence fails, this pattern of battlefield stabilization and negotiation could dictate warfare in Central Europe and Northeast Asia, provided that neither NATO nor the Warsaw Pact allows the other side to gain an overwhelming preponderance of combat power. Once the battlefield was stabilized, negotiation would quickly follow to prevent the war from becoming too costly or escalating to nuclear warfare.

Strategic Guidelines

One of the major problems facing contemporary US military planners is that of ensuring that the national, coordinative and operational military strategy are in harmony. This seemed completely beyond our capability during the Vietnam War. During that conflict, General William C. Westmoreland controlled the ground war in South Vietnam; pacification, until 1967, was the responsibility of the American ambassador; the naval war was fought by the commander in chief, Pacific; and the air war over Hanoi was planned from Washington, D.C.

Basic US Interests in the Soviet Union and the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact

Categories of National Interest	Elements of Policy	Military Strategy	Strategic Issues
Survival	Deterrence Nonproliferation	Assured destruction ● Second strike ● Triad Flexible nuclear options Withheld reserve Essential equivalence Termination favorable to the United States Control escalation	Nuclear trends Proliferation potential Arms control
Territorial Integrity	Protect Hawaii, Alaska, US bases and territory	Defend air and sea approaches to North America	
Economic Well-Being	Maintain and expand US standard of living Access to world's natural resources Continued free passage over international air/sea routes	Increased worldwide force pressure to ensure access to lines of communication and raw materials Forward basing to influence events from position of recognized military strength	Quids for access could create conflicts with other interests
World Order	Ensure that region does not become major area of East-West confrontation causing military conflict Encourage independent actions and loosening of economic, political and military ties among non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Nations and USSR Improve US political-economic relations with USSR Encourage USSR to become a more responsible actor in international environment Promote order and stability and peaceful solution of world problems	Containment ● Collective security ● Forward defense Return sufficient military flexibility to counter Soviet worldwide military initiatives Promote Soviet concern for two-front war Ensure Soviet worldwide presence not lead to US allies seeking accommodation with USSR Maintain credible military forces to conduct global operations from position of strength Protect lines of communication to forward deployed troops	Exploit Soviet vulnerabilities outside NATO and terminate strategic initiatives once started Proper balance between Europe first and other US military requirements Reconfirm alliance strategy with proper recognition of benefits and costs Status, positioning of forward deployed units in Europe and Korea

*Not applicable

Note: Some strategic issues transcend the analytical categories established here. For example, the issues relating to general nuclear war would impact on all categories of national interest. Strategic issues have been listed only once and then under the category which seemed most appropriate.

Figure 7

There never was any combined command of US, allied and Republic of Vietnam forces. Instead, there was a policy of cooperation which is a difficult way to run any war and a particularly poor way to conduct a counterinsurgency. The end result of this fragmentation was strategic discord. In seeking unity—the cement which binds the various layers of military strategy—there are several guidelines which may help to produce a more coherent strategy.

The establishment of such guidelines is far from easy, but would be highly desirable because, before any unity of strategic effort can be achieved, there must be common understanding and shared values among strategists and policymakers at all levels. This was not a problem when the ruler was both the policymaker and the military strategist. Today, however, there is a tension between the policymaker and the military strategist, between the strategist and the programmer.

Strategic guidelines could help to ease this tension. This attempt to harmonize the types of military strategy, particularly national military strategy and coordinative military strategy, is not intended to replace the traditional principles of war which are still appropriate to considerations of operational military strategy. Nor is the following listing of strategic guidelines to be considered comprehensive or complete. Rather, it is a first approximation, hopefully, to be refined later.

The first general guideline is *independence of action.*[6] Independence of action implies that the United States must devise its own strategy in terms of its own national interests. While the intentions and capabilities of other nations to threaten our national interests, particularly our vital interests, must be taken into account, they should not be overemphasized. Since 1945, overemphasis has seemingly been the norm. To disregard completely the military capabilities of our enemies would also be foolish, but neither must we conform to them unthinkingly. Herbert Rosinski has stated that military strategists must use.

. . . sufficient realism in assessing our opponents not to be taken again and again by surprise by them and sufficiently consistent so that the strategy can be conducted as a continuous process and not a series of 'crash programs.'

Focusing our national military and national strategy on US national interests also has implications for relations with our allies. We must only surrender that portion of freedom of action to the allied cause that is absolutely necessary. The dilemma, of course, is that, under the realities of the current strategic environment, the United States needs allies to counter the military power of the USSR.

A second, closely associated strategic factor is *flexibility.* This guideline admonishes the strategist not to design military strategies that are based on rigid, single scenarios. Flexibility requires that the United States stay a step ahead of its opponents in sensing trends and in exploiting opportunities. Today, strategy and force programing are tied to the threat to US interests. This is not to say that the threat is not a vital consideration; it is, but it must not be the sole consideration. To make it so, as the United States seemingly has in the Planning, Programing and Budgeting System, is to be condemned to react and not to initiate.

The third guideline is *preparedness* which recalls the more classic term of "security of the base area." Preparedness involves such things as the morale and will of the people, the nation's mobili-

zation capability and the ability of the military to project power globally from the United States. In the past several years, strong evidence suggests that the United States faced the temporary erosion of its base. The weakening of national will and morale during and after the Vietnam War foreclosed strategic options, particularly in Angola, simply because of the public attitudes that existed toward intervention at that time.

In a democracy, a firm, articulated and consensual public opinion can be decisive, and the strategist ignores it at his peril. During the post-Vietnam period, the manpower mobilization system was discarded, and industrial preparedness was in disarray. Currently, strategic analysts are becoming concerned about instability in the Caribbean Basin, which might cause the United States either to divert US military forces to the area or to withhold forces in anticipation of a need to secure its base area to the detriment of the ability of the United States to project military power elsewhere in the world.

The next concept—*integration*—has already been alluded to as strategic unity. It is the need for cohesion and coherence among the elements of the national military strategy, the coordinative military strategy and the operational military strategy. This unity or integration does not come easily. One reason that it does not is the absence of and an urgent need for a comprehensive military theory. Several military theories exist today, but there is no single theory of military power. There are, for example, the continental theory of land warfare (Karl von Clausewitz), the maritime theory (Alfred Thayer Mahan), the air theory (Giulio Douhet) and the revolutionary warfare theory (Mao Zedong). However, each of these theories have limiting assumptions.

The continental theory of land warfare is based on the notion of a decisive battle. The maritime theory assumes that land areas can be controlled from the oceans. Douhet, in the air theory, ignored both the land and the sea by assuming that the enemy nation could be controlled by strategic bombing and command of the air. And Mao believed that a revolution could be based on the rural peasant. While a comprehensive military theory might not solve many practical problems, it would enable the experience of the senior military leaders of all services to be communicated to others. The current divergence of service views is enough to make the development of such theory a matter of first priority.

Another concept that is particularly important at the interface between coordinative military strategy and operational military strategy is *dislocation* or what Clausewitz called center of gravity. This was also the key concept behind B. H. Liddell Hart's strategy of the indirect approach. Dislocation seeks to attack the point that would so psychologically shock the enemy as to cause his defeat. Discerning the enemy's point of dislocation is no easy task as the United States discovered in Vietnam. To further complicate the matter, this point need not even be a military target. For example, many strategic analysts believe that the point of dislocation in today's strategic environment for the Western industrial nations and Japan is access to Persian Gulf oil.

The last guideline, and one appropriate for national military strategy and coordinative military strategy, is *selectivity*. In an era of constrained defense budgets, it is more important than ever that a strategy make the most efficient use of manpower and resources that is possible. There must be no wasted effort in achieving the military and political objectives of the strategy.

Military Strategy in the 1980s

The current military strategy and attendant force structure is the base from which any future change must be measured. A basic element of this strategy is to deter nuclear war through a reliance on a countervailing strategy. The United States maintains a set of flexible nuclear options in order to provide intra-war deterrence, to control escalation and to limit undesired collateral damage. The strategic nuclear triad must also maintain essential equivalence with enemy nuclear forces in order not only to maximize our deterrence posture, but to ensure that all nations perceive that a true nuclear balance exists between the superpowers. Essential equivalence will also help to provide the United States with the flexibility and the influence that it requires in its relations with the Third World. SALT negotiations are aimed at achieving nuclear deterrence at lower force levels.

The United States also hopes to deter conventional war in Europe and East Asia. In order to accomplish this, the United States is committed to a forward deployment, forward basing posture in both the Atlantic and the Pacific. It is also committed to a forward defense in Europe and to an economy-of-force role in Asia should deterrence fail. The strategic reserve in the United States is largely configured to its supporting role in Europe. The military establishment, particularly the Army, is heavily dependent on mobilization and the Reserve components not only for a long war hedge, but for round out of many of its Active forces, particularly with respect to support units.

The United States also maintains theater nuclear forces in Europe and the Pacific for deterrence against both conventional and limited nuclear attack and for warfighting as well. The US employment policy governing these forces does not preclude their first use, thus broadening the range of available options should deterrence fail. However, the thrust of US strategy is to conduct a nonnuclear defense, using theater nuclear forces only if used against the United States or its allies or as a hedge against an uncontainable attack. In broad outline, this is the current US military strategy.

Using the strategic guidelines that were developed earlier, a framework for new strategic directions for the United States may be constructed. Some broad strategic considerations that are relevant mainly at the national military and coordinative military strategy level will be developed. Specific changes to operational military strategy would require a detailed exposition of the higher levels of US strategy.

The concept of independence of action would require a rethinking of the national interests of the United States. If the United States is to pursue its own national interests in a constantly changing international environment, it must reevaluate the relative value of a continued military commitment to NATO of large numbers of US forces. This will require a precisely stated national strategy—something which presidents are either unable or unwilling to provide. The current perception of the overriding value of Europe to US security is long overdue for serious reassessment by the National Command Authority.

The concern of current defense programs with the threat posed by a short-notice Warsaw Pact attack, the need for national mobilization and continuous reinforcement seem to be more appropriate

to the doubts of the 1950s and less relevant to the problems posed for the 1980s. Military strategists seeking to achieve greater independence of action must realistically assess the contribution to overall US national security of the current emphasis on NATO defense. A retreat from NATO is not contemplated here, simply a re-evaluation of its priority, given other competing US interests.

The concept of flexibility presents the United States with its most formidable problems. US strategists are in a dilemma. By preparing to fight a single scenario war in NATO and by committing virtually the entire Army to that rigid defensive scenario, the services in general, but the Army in particular, may be in the early stages of a sort of strategic *rigor mortis*. The most urgent strategic need is to make the Armed Forces more flexible. If we permit the major portion of the Army to be tied down, both physically and *intellectually*, to the static defense of Europe and Northeast Asia, the USSR and its proxies will be free to challenge US interests in the Third World with virtual impunity.

Flexibility also implies that the United States should be free to take advantage of opportunities to advance its interests throughout the world. This is a recognition that, in this imperfect world, there may be times when the United States will be forced by other nations to resort to the use of military force to secure its national interests. If this is so, then the necessary military capability to accomplish this objective must exist. A flexible or multipurpose force will be required because it is unlikely that the specific area in which the force will be needed can be predicted.

In an era of economic austerity, the United States may not be able to afford the expense of continued forward deployments at current levels and to respond to military needs, primarily naval, in other areas of the world. The demanding requirements of forward deployment and forward defense are threatening to bankrupt US strategy now. Because of this, flexibility and selectivity are indissolubly linked.

Selectivity is a guide to the setting of priorities based on the probability of war and the risks or consequences of losing a conflict should deterrence fail. If one accepts the argument advanced earlier, that the fear by both superpowers of the consequences of a nuclear war will lead to conflict avoidance, then the estimation of the risk or probability of war in NATO is lowered. Not to be misunderstood, this is not intended to suggest that the US commitment to NATO is not important or that it should be abandoned. What is suggested is that the United States might be able to preserve its national interest in Western Europe at reduced cost in both dollars and committed troops. The need is for a flexible strategic reserve force that could be used not only to respond to the more likely challenges in the Third World in the future, but in NATO and the Pacific as well.

Dislocation of the strategic center of gravity is also an important concept in this context. The USSR has apparently decided that, under the current conditions, the US center of gravity lies in Western Europe and that the West European's major point of vulnerability is access to Persian Gulf oil. Therefore, the point of dislocation for NATO may be the Persian Gulf. Paradoxically, the United States, in structuring to meet the requirements of NATO, had virtually precluded itself from developing an adequate joint force for the Persian Gulf contingency.

The point to attack to dislocate the Soviet center of gravity is more difficult

to pinpoint. There is some evidence that it may be in the Far East opposite the PRC. It may not even be political or geostrategic at all; it might be psychosocial. The growing populations of eastern Russia, together with their cultural differences from the European Russians, may in the end prove to be the Achilles heel of the Soviet Union. In any event, the interest shown in the past few years in studying the problem of Soviet vulnerability should soon pay dividends and assist in the search for the point that will dislocate the Soviet center of gravity.

Preparedness relates to securing the US base. To secure the US base obviously means continued emphasis on nuclear deterrence; maintenance of a secure and stable North America, with special emphasis on the Caribbean; a sound economy; and the revitalization of the American people. This is a prerequisite to the re-establishment of an effective manpower mobilization system (not necessarily a draft) and an effective industrial mobilization base.

It seems clear that, so long as the United States maintains its global interests, there will be a need for some degree of mobilization to provide the manpower needed to back up the Active force. But manpower mobilization is not only sensitive to the requirements dictated by a more turbulent world. It is even more profoundly sensitive to the current nature of the US social order and the willingness of the US citizen to make sacrifices to preserve the basic American values—not to mention a comfortable standard of living.

In this respect, it is important to think through the type of war that the United States is prepared to fight. Clausewitz indicated that the shorter a war, the more popular it is likely to be. Given the US character, any conflicts or wars in which the United States might participate will have to be relatively short. The United States is preparing to fight a war of singular violence in Europe based on the Napoleonic concept of the decisiveness of the central battle. This orientation is robbing the United States of flexibility in other more volatile areas.

If the view that both superpowers consider escalation to nuclear warfare both inevitable and unacceptable is correct, then battlefield stabilization and negotiation might be the prime factors in a future NATO conflict. If this is the case, more thought and study should be directed to war termination possibilities short of the destruction of the enemy army or unconditional surrender.

The final strategic factor, and one of the most important, is integration. The lack of unity among the types of strategy in Vietnam has already been mentioned. The current European strategy of the United States and its implementing programs display a serious disconnect between fighting the initial stages of NATO war and the ability to sustain that fighting over longer periods of time. However, a greater disconnect is between our more global interests and our ability to protect them.

In an era of constrained economic resources, it does not appear likely that current defense programs projected into the mid-1980s in support of military strategy will be achievable. There must not only be a unity among the levels of military strategy, but also between strategic requirements and available resources. When the military at the coordinative level translates the objectives and broad strategic guidelines determined at the national military level into strategic plans and programmatic requirements, the job is just begun. The secretary of defense must then consider these plans and issue

guidance to allocate the available resources.

Still, the job is not complete. The joint planners then assess the risk associated with the program force as measured against the plans or strategy. Today, this is the end of the cycle, but it need not be. To ensure that there is unity between the strategy and its resources, one further step is needed, and that is that the objectives and strategic concept should be adjusted to be compatible with the resources allocated.

This last step is seldom taken or what is done is ineffectual. If it were taken, then it would be the responsibility of the politicians to decide if the new "strategy," which, of necessity, must eliminate some military capabilities, is adequate. If it is not, the politicians then must allocate more resources or determine which US interests or objectives must be lowered in priority.

Measures such as those outlined above or others like them would go a long way toward the creation of a more flexible military strategy. A more flexible US strategy and force structure would enhance the ability of the United States to secure and protect its vital interests in the emerging strategic environment of this decade.

NOTES

1 Donald E. Nuechterlein, *National Interests and Presidential Leadership: The Setting of Priorities*, Westview Press, Boulder, Colo., 1978, pp. 4-18. The author's categories of basic national interests are defense, economic, world order and ideological.

2 William R. Van Cleave and W. Scott Thompson, *Strategic Options for the Early Eighties: What Can Be Done?* National Strategy Information Center, N.Y., 1979, p. xii.

3 General David C. Jones, *United States Military Posture for FY 81*, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C., 1980, p. iii.

4 Harold Brown, *Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1981*, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., 29 January 1980, p. 3.

5 Statement by the Honorable Cyrus R. Vance, secretary of state, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., 27 March 1980.

6 These guidelines for military strategy were suggested in another context by Herbert Rosinski.

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Topography is often critical to the outcome of battles. This is particularly true for the Sinai Peninsula which is made up of contrasting kinds of terrain. This article describes the peninsula and points out the routes and areas that have historically been used in the wars between Israel and Egypt.

THIS month, the entire Sinai Peninsula is due to be returned by Israel to Egypt as part of the peace agreement between the two countries. Henceforth, the strategists will once more engage with greater intensity in the study of the military options in the peninsula in the event of a new deterioration in the relations between the two states.[1] Will there indeed be new options for the armies?

Arnon Soffer

The Wars of Israel in Sinai: Topography Conquered







This article aims to show how the physical surface of Sinai dictated both to Israel and Egypt the axes of warfare and the key points in the wars of 1948-49, 1956, 1967 and 1973. Further, it intends to prove that the same vulnerable points in the topography that played a part in the earlier wars may be the key points again in a military conflagration in the future. These statements are based on the assumption that, in the future also, in spite of the introduction of new arms, the war will proceed in the Middle East and will be decided along the axes of advance of mechanized vehicles—that is, tanks.[2]

Transport Routes—Basic Assumptions

Wars are largely battles for routes. The ability of an army to move into battle and its mobility in the battle, control of territory, and transfer of men and equipment all depend on control of the network of routes within the battle sector. Throughout history, good transport routes, especially when there was no alternative, have been theaters of battle.

A route having the following characteristics is the most advantageous:

- It connects the starting point to the target by the shortest distance.
- It traverses a plain.
- It has no obstacles such as dunes, sands, marshes, terraces or craters. A route with a hard surface is particularly useful (such as Hamada, the rocky uplands of a desert).
- It does not traverse mountain passes which could become death traps.
- It has water sources. Until recently, this was an essential condition, but this factor has lost some of its importance in modern warfare.

In the following, we shall see how the topography of Sinai dictated unequivocally the routes in it and thus, in fact, determined the axes of warfare there.

The Topography of the Sinai Peninsula

The coastal strip. The northern boundary of the peninsula is the shoreline of the Mediterranean Sea. The section between Gaza and Abu Oudeh (west of El-Arish) is accessible from the sea as the coast is sandy. From Abu Oudeh to the railway station at Rumaneh, the coast is a narrow offshore bar which encloses the Bardawil Lagoon whose greatest width is approximately 20 kilometers. The Rumaneh area is also sandy for a stretch of 10 kilometers and also is accessible from the sea. From Rumaneh to Port Said, a new offshore bar begins which encloses a broad salt marsh. Neither the sector of the swamp nor that of the salt marshes is accessible from the sea.

The south of the peninsula is surrounded by the Red Sea (from the Gulf of Aqaba to the Gulf of Suez), the length of the coast being 643 kilometers. The coastal strip on the Gulf of Aqaba is, for the most part, hilly. In some parts, it is not passable even by foot. Penetration from the sea is also difficult over lengthy sections owing to the coral reefs that protect the shore. Two large silt fans stand out along this coast, one at Nueiba (Neviot) the other at Dhahab (Di-Zahav), but an invader attempting to gain access into the peninsula this way would be caught up in the maze of narrow valleys of difficult passage.

The coastal strip on the Gulf of Suez is constructed differently. For the most part, it is a flat shore, about 15 kilometers wide, and only a small section of it is hilly with almost no possibility of passage.

Here and there, coral reefs separate the shore from the open sea and make penetration by an enemy difficult.

In general, then, this is an area where invasion is possible and it is penetrable over large sections. In part of it, oil fields are found opposite the Egyptian coast. However, an enemy invading on this or any other section of the Red Sea coast would find it difficult to advance toward the interior of Israel as is explained below.

The interior of the peninsula. From the viewpoint of transport, two main topographical units in Sinai may be distinguished: the south of the peninsula and the north.

The southern unit is a high area, fortified by many narrow twisting gullies, their beds covered by sand and difficult for traffic. This region is separated from the northern unit by a system of high cliffs (the Thia cliffs), rising to a height of 400 to 600 meters, which extend from the area of Abu Zneima in the west to the region of Nueiba in the east (see Figure 1). This system of cliffs splits Sinai in half. In the past, it was possible to pass between the two units only along the coast of the Gulf of Suez or through the large riverbeds in eastern Sinai (the Israeli Defense Forces 9th Brigade did this in the Sinai war in 1956) and, more recently, along the new Elath-Ophira road.

For this reason, the southern unit has never served as a theater in the wars between Israel and Egypt, and control of this part was always conditional upon control of the northern unit. However, this does not mean that, in the future, there will be no possibility of control of part of southern Sinai independent of the north. Possibly, this may be because the Elath-Ophira road will allow easy access to the south from the direction of Israel or because of Egyptian control of some part of it with supply routes of equipment and men via the sea. The need to guard the Strait of Tiran, the rich oil fields of southern Sinai and those that are yet to be discovered, and the possibility of tourism that the region offers all impart to this section an importance which it never had before.

The northern unit is divided into two subunits from the viewpoint of passability. The southern subunit is marked by broad Hamada plains and the extensive flood plains of the El-Arish riverbed whose height is, on average, 500 meters. These plains stretch from the region of the Thia cliffs and Jebel Egma to the mountain chain in the north, and from the mountain chain in western Sinai to the Negev and the Arava in the east (Figure 1). The mountain chain in the west crosses from the north of the Thia cliffs to the Bir Gafgafa (Refidim)—Tasa—Ismailia road, and its height varies from 950 meters in the south to 600 to 700 meters in the north. It is broken by several dry rivers running south and north (Figure 2).

The western side of this chain is marked by a line of cliffs (a branch of the Syrian-African rift) which extends for 120 kilometers. The line of these cliffs and the Gulf of Suez coast is separated from the Suez Canal by a plain 15 kilometers wide in the south broadening to about 30 kilometers in the north. This plain is crossed by wadis, sand fans, low hills and sands, especially in its northern part. This area is largely passable for a length of about 80 kilometers, as far as the region of Jebel Haman Faron in the south.

The northern subdivision is composed of several columns of mountains whose general direction is from the east to the west. These are the Jebel Halal, Jebel Yalek and Jebel Um Hashiba which is the connecting point between the east-west

Sinai—Topography



Figure 1

column and the western column. The northern column is composed of Jebel Libni and Jebel Maghra (Figure 1).

From the north of this column extends the widest dune area in Sinai, beginning near the Suez Canal in the west and terminating in the Halutza and Beersheba sands in the Negev. This area is 200 kilometers long, and its maximum width is 40 kilometers. It is interrupted once by the El-Arish riverbed which crosses it. The dunes, for the most part, are steep on their other side, and their ridges look like elongated knife blades. It is, therefore, almost impossible to cross these sand barriers with any kind of vehicle.

To the north of the dune region extends the northern coast plain of Sinai consisting of sand dunes, sand flats, salt marshes and swamps. The area is rich in ground water, both sweet and salty, and there are hundreds of palm trees along its length.

The Route Map of Sinai

From the description of the components of the landscape, the map of the axes of movement in Sinai may be drawn (Figure 2):

- The northern coastal route (the historical sea route) from Gaza through El-Arish to Kantara.
- The route that passes between the two mountain columns mentioned above. It begins at Beersheba, continues through Nizzana, Abu Agheila and Bir Gafgafa, and ends at Ismailia.
- From Nizzana to Kassima, Bir Hasneh and Bir Thmadeh, and thence to the Mitla and Jiddi Passes or the Sudar Pass. From Kassima, the region of the great plains opens where movement is possible in all directions (to Kuntileh and Elath, to Thmad, Nakhl and the Mitla Pass).
- A road from Elath to Thmad, Nakhl, the Mitla Pass or Wadi Sudar at the approaches to the town of Suez.

Connection between the four axes may be made at several points. Between the first and second axes, there is an easy passage via the El-Arish riverbed; between the second and third axes, there are four links (Figure 2); and, between the third and fourth axes, the entire plain is open to traffic.

The Bir Gafgafa—Thmadeh axis is connected to the Suez Canal as follows. The western mountain chain is split by a series of dry valleys which serve as passes. In three of them, traffic is possible, and, in two, it is possible after minor road works. The Jiddi, Mitla and Sudar Passes lead to the Suez Canal and Ras Sudar and the south. The two dry rivers in the south—Wadi Gharandal and Wadi Sumar—are difficult for passage at present, but may be made usable for motor vehicles when necessary.

The network of roads in Sinai has developed along these axes. Every war has served to expedite the building of additional roads to the existing system (Figure 2).

Axes of Fighting in Four Israel-Egypt Wars

A reconstruction of the battle theaters and the axes of advance of the Israeli army in three wars—1948, 1956 and 1967—provides the following picture. In general, it reflects the aim of the Israeli army to move from east to west toward the Suez Canal sector.

The War of Independence (the Horev Campaign, 22 December 1948—8 January 1949). The central problem was the cap-

Sinai—Natural Routes and Roads



Figure 2

The Horev Campaign
22 December 1948—8 January 1949



Figure 3

ture of Nizzana and then the Abu Agheila junction. After the forces had captured Abu Agheila (Figure 3), they moved in three heads: toward El-Arish, toward Bir Hama (the Ismailia axis) and toward Bir Hasneh (the axis to the south of the column of mountains). An additional force moved from Nizzana to Kassima.[3]

The Sinai Campaign (29 October 1956—5 November 1956). The main battle took place at the Abu Agheila junction. After this was taken, the Israeli Defense Forces moved in two main columns: to Bir Gafgafa via Bir Hama and to the Mitla Pass via Bir Hasneh. A third force attacked Rafa and moved along the north-



Figure 4

ern axis to El-Arish and thence toward Kantara (Figure 4). The fourth force made use of the Elath-Mitla route in order to reach Kuntileh and thence Thmad, Nakhl and the Mitla Pass. From here, the force crossed Wadi Sudar and reached the Gulf of Suez (Ras Sudar) and moved on from there to Sharm al-Sheikh. Another force whose target had been Sharm al-Sheikh from the start set out from Elath and made its way via the winding wadis of eastern Sinai.[4]

The Six-Day War (5 June 1967—10 June 1967). To a large extent, this was a repeat of the deployments of the Sinai Campaign. One division fought for the



Figure 5

northern road leading to Kantara. A part of this force went south down the El-Arish—Bir Lahfan axis (Figure 5) and continued west along the Abu Agheila—Ismailia road. A second division by-passed the Abu Agheila junction (Um Katef) and continued along the southern axis toward the Wadi Sudar, Mitla and Jiddi Passes, and thence via the passes to the canal. A third division attacked the Abu Agheila junction and continued to the Hamada plains to the south and from there to the Mitla Pass. A part of this force began its march from the area of Kuntileh, and it too swung toward the Mitla junction. The battle areas in this

war were the following junctions: Jebel Libni, Um Katef, several sections on the Gaza—Rafa—El-Arish axis, and at the entrance to the Mitla Pass.[5]

There is thus a great similarity in the axes and locations of fighting in the three wars.[6] The difference largely lies in the selection of the axis of surprise attack, the size of the forces and the quality of the weapons.

In summarizing these movements, several key points in Sinai stand out:

● *The Abu Agheila junction.* From here, easy routes extend to El-Arish, Nizzana, Kassima and Ismailia. It is almost impossible to emerge from that route owing to the physical conditions. Therefore, when Israeli Defense Forces attacked from east to west, they were obliged, in all three wars, to capture this junction first.

● *Rafa.* Like Abu Agheila, this served as a theater in all three wars.

● *The El-Arish junction.* The roads to Gaza, Kantara and Abu Agheila or Jebel Libni start here. It was a battle theater in two wars and a target in the third.

● *The passes in western Sinai—the Jiddi, the Mitla and the Sudar.* Passage

The southern part of the eastern coast of Sinai—a wadi near Dhahab village



Photos courtesy of author

The landscape along the road between El-Arish to Bir Gafgafa—one of the main battlefields in Sinai

through these from east to west leads to the Gulf of Suez or the southern stretch of the Suez Canal. Passage from west to east leads to the central plain of the Sinai. From there, the way to the Negev and every location in northern Sinai is open.

● *Bir Hasneh, Bir Hama (or the Jebel Libni junction), Bir Thmadeh (or the Mitla Pass from the east) and Bir Gafgafa (Refidim).* These four corners of the block of the Yalek mountains are of secondary importance.

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War (6 October 1973—25 October 1973). This war differed from the previous wars in several ways, two of them topographical. The initiative this time came from the Egyptians who selected the axes of fighting, and the fighting began and was conducted on the western side of Sinai unlike the previous occasions.

In spite of these basic differences, in this case, like the others, it is seen (Figure 6) that the Egyptian effort was concentrated on the axes of advance listed above. As a result, the containing battles waged by Israel developed over a wide portion of the Kantara—El-Arish and

The Western Sinai—
1973 Arab-Israeli War



Figure 6

Ismailia—Tasa—Bir Gafgafa axes. The Egyptians tried to penetrate through the Mitla Pass and to advance toward the coast of the Gulf of Suez.[7]

Conclusions

An examination of the topography of Sinai and the stages in the wars that preceded the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the reconstruction of the Egyptian war aims in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War leads us to the conclusion that the natural routes of Sinai may once again play a part in a future military operation. As in the past, the only axes of advance are likely to be the Kantara—El-Arish—Gaza road; the Ismailia—Bir Gafgafa—Nizzana road; and the southern road on the Suez—Mitla—Kassima axis.

From these facts, a more general conclusion emerges. Basic topographic features that underlie the axes of advance in the distant and recent past are likely to be the principal features in conventional wars in the future also—in spite of the continuous introduction of new types of weapons such as helicopters and amphibious vehicles. In the final analysis, the battle is determined by armor and other mechanized vehicles, and these are, of necessity, bound to easy axes. The war between Iran and Iraq bears out this fact yet again.

Finally, the physical determinism in Sinai will necessarily also shape the deployment of the international force that is to be established after the Israeli withdrawal to safeguard the separation of Israeli and Egyptian troops. This force is bound to be aware of those selfsame sensitive physical elements in northern Sinai which in the case of deterioration will be taken by the confrontation armies and thus cancel out the function of the force.

NOTES

1 On the fears of both sides of renewed warfare in Sinai see J E Moroz, *Beyond Security* International Peace Academy Publication Jerusalem Israel 1980

2 And discounting the possibility of general nuclear war in the region

3 "The History of the War of Independence." *Ma'arachot*, 1966 p 347

4 A Golan *The Battles of Sinai*, Israeli Defense Force Tel Aviv, Israel 1958

5 *Six Days* edited by Mordechai Bar-On, Ministry of Defense, Jerusalem Israel 1968

6 A Ayalon, "The War of Independence: the Sinai Campaign the Six Day War—Lines for Comparison" *Ma'arachot*, Volume LII, 1968, pp 6-13, M Pa'il, Three Battles at Rafa—El Arish 1949 1956 and 1967 " *Ma'arachot* Volume LIII, pp 4-6, and *idem* "IDF Attacks on Abu Aghella in Three Wars. *Ma'arachot* 1970 pp 3-23 The facts as presented contradict the theory put forward by S J Rosen, *Military Geography and the Military Balance in the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations Jerusalem, Israel 1977 p 64 Here, the author states that the northern axis in Sinai is unimportant as a military axis

7 Eliezur Peled "One Year After the Yom Kippur War *Ma'arachot*, special issue, 1974 and Hassnin M Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan* Collins, London, Eng 1975 p 215, in which he states "It is my belief that had the passes been reached and occupied the whole of Sinai would have been liberated

Arnon Soffer is a senior lecturer in geography at the University of Haifa, Israel. He has been a lecturer at the Command and Staff College of the Israeli Defense Forces. He received a B.A. and an M.A. in geography and a Ph.D. from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. He is the author of Atlas of Haifa and Mt. Carmel, Geographical Changes in the Middle East *and* Changes in the Arab Village in Northern Israel.

MR LETTERS

He Cannot Stand It Any Longer

I cannot stand it any longer! Captain Anthony M. Coroalles' article, "Maneuver to Win: A Realistic Alternative" (*Military Review*, September 1981), is the last straw! I have no quarrel with his conclusions, but with the choice of graphics to support his thesis. Coroalles apparently selected his graphics without regard to a realistic portrayal of Soviet tactics.

Although Coroalles' thesis is valid despite his poor selection of supporting graphics, others, I am afraid, have not been so lucky. There are dozens of articles and military publications containing such graphics which follow a general pattern: Soviet units are depicted by a nice neat arrow astride a single road which is conveniently surrounded by a horseshoe-shaped chain of hills forming a fire pocket from which the US combined arms teams engage and annihilate the arrow.

A picture is worth a thousand words. But an incorrect diagram in a presentation of military tactics is worth a thousand wrong words and promotes faulty reasoning, incorrect conclusions and, in the worst case, questionable tactics.

Specifically, Coroalles depicted an entire Soviet division in a space no division commander would be caught dead in, much less physically fit. A single regiment moving in two parallel columns would occupy about 25 kilometers of road space for each column. If it were the lead regiment of the division during a road march, the distance from the lead element of its advance guard to the rear of the main body could be as much as 55 to 80 kilometers. Coroalles depicted a division in a space that a regiment would find cramped and inadequate for maneuver.

In general, a Soviet division will not be moving on a single road; it would stretch farther than 100 kilometers if it did. The road net in Europe, for example, is more than adequate to accommodate several parallel routes of advance for a division. Even if it were moving on a single road, the division would quickly deploy into combat formation after the first engagement. No Soviet commander would continue to push his division forward while US units chewed him up from the fire pocket.

Finally, I question the whole concept of engaging an advancing Soviet force from the fire pocket. I concede that, somewhere at sometime during a battle with the Soviets, this tactic might work—once. If the Soviet commander's reconnaissance elements fail, if all of his other intelligence assets fail, if he fails to analyze the terrain to his front properly and if he has not read Field Manual (FM) 100-5, then, with a little luck and ideal terrain, it might work. We are engaging in wishful thinking if we assume it will work frequently through several days or weeks of battle.

A Soviet regiment or division moves on several parallel march routes with 1 to 5 kilometers between columns. This means that the fire pocket will find itself between two columns and quickly engaged from two directions and likely cut off. FM 100-5 recognizes that the likelihood of being cut off is great and urges US commanders to be prepared to conduct a breakout. However, I believe that we are not prepared for the frequency with which our units will be surrounded—although, as Coroalles points out, we must also avoid being defeated piecemeal. There are other ways of engaging the Soviet flank other than from the fire pocket.

Come on, you tacticians, just how stupid do you think the Soviets are? All too often, it has suited your purpose to believe that they are incapable of flexibility, quick reaction, initiative and innovation. You are flat wrong. Their equipment, tactics and training will give them the capability to see and analyze the battlefield and quickly react in a variety of ways. The unthinking automaton stereotype of the Soviet soldier—especially in the officer corps—is outdated. Employing the fire pocket tactic against the American version of a Soviet advance looks good in the diagrams that Coroalles and others have provided. Now, if we could only get the Soviets to behave as we want, we can win all the battles of the next war.

Maj Donald L. Mercer, *USA*,
Threats Directorate, CACDA
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Bring Back the LRRP

Bravo to Lieutenant Colonel Henry G. Gole and his article, "Bring Back the LRRP" (*Military Review*, October 1981). We not only need to get long-range reconnaissance patrols going again, but we also must emphasize patrolling by our soldiers in line battalions. Human sensing systems are God's creation. I lean toward the human sensing systems for obvious reasons.

Lt Col Joe Blair III, *USA*,
G2, 193d Infantry Brigade, Panama

■ Mention should have been made of D Company, 151st Infantry, Indiana Army National Guard, in Lieutenant Colonel Henry G. Gole's article. I am enclosing a brief abstract from *Indiana's Citizen Soldiers*, edited by William J. Watt and R. H. Spears, State Armory Board, Indianapolis, Indiana, 1980.

Although few Army National Guard units were deployed to Vietnam, those which were achieved high levels of performance there. This was probably due in some measure to the cohesion built up over the years during their monthly drills. Perhaps you would like to share the enclosed account of D Company's performance with *MR*'s readers.

Maj Robert P. Fairchild, *ARNG*,
Fort Hood, Texas

(Although space will not permit the printing of the abstract, MR readers can find the information on pages 188-89 of the above cited reference. Briefly, Company D, which operated in Greenfield and Evansville, Indiana, was activated in April 1968. After several months of intensive training at Fort Benning, Georgia, it was assigned as a part of the II Field Force in Vietnam. The unit, which was designated as an LRRP, had as its mission reconnaissance and intelligence gathering, often behind enemy lines. Before being deactivated in November 1969, the unit members earned 19 Silver Stars, 175 Bronze Stars and 110 Purple Hearts. Two of its members were killed in action, and one died in a helicopter crash.—Editor.)

Fine Recommendation

I often regret that some of my civilian friends who read widely in an effort to be well-informed citizens do not have the opportunity to see articles such as "The Military Significance of Language Competence" by Major Kurt E. Muller and "Will Afghanistan Become the Soviet Union's Vietnam?" by Major Terry L. Heyns (*Military Review*, October 1981).

Americans need to know the military has problems beyond marijuana in the barracks and the poor reading ability of the average 18-year-old. Too bad you cannot circulate a million copies of your fine publication. I appreciate the fact that it turns up in my "In" basket.

Virginia A. Hendrix, *Editor*, Driver Magazine,
Air Force Inspection and Safety Center,
Norton Air Force Base, California

International Terrorism

By Colonel Edgar O'Ballance, British Army, Retired

The Retired Officer, November 1981

Terrorism has become a dark fact of life (or *death*) in virtually every corner of the world. Amnesty International attributes the violent deaths of more than 500,000 people in the world to terrorist activities over the last decade. The increased range of "international" terrorism involving multinational "hit teams" presents potential danger for US cities which have been relatively immune from such calamities to date. Who these terrorists are, what motivates them and how to deal with them are topics discussed in this article.

Edgar O'Ballance, a retired British Army colonel and member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Foreign Affairs Research Institute, categorizes three broad motives for political terrorism: liberation movements demanding independence or autonomy; crusading missionaries who want to impose their own political philosophy on their governments; and political nihilists preaching world revolution of one sort or another without having any idea of what to put in its place.

Terrorists crave attention to their causes and thrive on publicity. Of course, the top international terrorist must have a political cause; otherwise, he or she is a mere criminal. Courage and dedication to the cause are essential since death is a constant risk. Above all, he must have the killer instinct and be devoid of all pity and remorse.

Palestinian terrorism, which gained attention in the early 1970s, attracted a devoted following and served as the model many terrorists tried to emulate. Soon, terrorist groups from several different lands were attending international conventions, pledging mutual aid and planning joint terrorist activities.

Some of the fledgling groups were nourished by the Soviet *KGB* (Committee of State Security). The infamous "Carlos the Jackal," a native Venezuelan educated in Moscow, was hand-picked by the *KGB* as "good terrorist leadership material" and put in charge of the Paris terrorist cell. Carlos was nearly captured in Paris in 1975, but shot his way out. He ended up in Libya where he teamed up with that country's notorious leader, Colonel Muhamed Qadhaafi. Fidel Castro of Cuba and Qadhaafi have been supplying terrorist groups with money, arms and training facilities for years. Given sanctuary and support, the groups have been able to grow and expand their scope of operation enormously.

In combating terrorism, some countries have evolved specially trained antiterrorist squads from their own security forces, and private security firms have provided personal protection to individuals. Increased security and more thorough search procedures have reduced hijacking incidents, and a growing computer file of information is a valuable tool in tracking down terrorists and warning potential victims.

Although improvements have been made in counterterrorist measures, the terrorists continue to gain more expertise. O'Ballance cautions us that international terrorism does not seem to be declining, pointing to several recent in-

cidents. These incidents include the bombing of the US Air Force, Europe, Headquarters, Ramstein Air Base, Germany, and the grenade attack on General Frederick J. Kroesen, commander in chief, US Army, Europe.

The author feels that international cooperation between governments in either extraditing or trying terrorists is an ideal solution, but numerous attempts at treaties along this line have been fruitless. The bottom line is, then, "as long as . . . terrorists can freely cross national frontiers, one must sadly conclude that there is more international terrorism to come."—PRD.

A Rapprochement Between the Two Chinas?

By Hungdah Chiu

and

Solving the Taiwan Question

By Thomas A. Marks

The Military Engineer,
November-December 1981

Will there ever be a solution to the two-China question? Will it ever be possible for the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) to be unified? These are the questions discussed by both Professor Hungdah Chiu and Thomas A. Marks in their contrasting articles on the unification of the PRC and the ROC. Although neither author believes unification will be coming soon or is necessarily inevitable, both gentlemen believe that the status quo now in existence between both countries is neither the final nor even the best solution.

Chiu, who has authored *People's China and International Law: A Documentary Study* (two volumes) and *China and the Taiwan Issue*, and is currently professor of law at the University of Maryland, believes that unification at this time would not be beneficial for Taiwan. He believes that, after 30 years of separation, the ROC on Taiwan has a radically different political, economic and social system from the PRC on mainland China. The Chinese on Taiwan are far better off than the mainland Chinese because the ROC governmental system has demonstrated its superiority to the less than successful Communist system of the PRC.

The ROC, according to Chiu, has developed a society and a living standard for its citizens that can only be envied by the PRC. The country is becoming highly industrialized (the ROC is the 20th largest trading country of the world), and the gap between the rich and the poor is steadily narrowing. All major epidemic diseases have been practically eradicated, the life expectancy of 72 years is among the highest in the world and many of its people are now enjoying modern conveniences and luxury items.

The Chinese on the mainland are not as fortunate. Their government has had a history of power struggles and instability with devastating effects on the lives and welfare of its people. Such campaigns as the "Hundred Flower Campaign" (1957), the "Great Leap Forward" (1958-61) and the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" (1966-76) have brought social chaos and economic disaster to millions of PRC citizens. The standard of living in the PRC is one of the lowest in the world, and nearly 120 million of its young people are officially considered illiterate. And, finally, according to the author, skepticism about the government's ability to solve pressing social and economic problems is increasing.

Chiu does not believe it would be advantageous for the ROC to undertake unification with the PRC at the present time. The Communists, he says, have demon-

strated a lack of trustworthiness by violation of their nonintervention agreement with Tibet, and there is no guarantee that they would honor a similar agreement with the ROC. He believes that the move being made by the United States to pursue closer relations with the PRC is shortsighted and that the Communists are merely using the United States for their own ends.

Marks believes that unification of the two Chinas would be beneficial to both the PRC and ROC. He says that, "A union of the ROC and PRC could result in a China which was truly a world power and which provided adequately for the welfare of its people." He further states that a combination of Beying's "enormous natural and human resources with the technological and management expertise of Taiwan could, in time, produce a modern and powerful nation." He asks the question, Is that what the United States really wants?

Marks, who is a 1972 graduate of the US Military Academy and served five years on active duty before joining the 29th Infantry Brigade, Hawaii Army National Guard, is now a doctoral candidate and teaching assistant in political science at the University of Hawaii, Honolulu. He has spent considerable time in Asia and published numerous articles and monographs on political and military aspects of the region. According to Marks, the US policy toward the PRC must be predicated on the future relationship desired—a strong partner or a weak adversary.

Marks, although no more trusting of the PRC's motives than Chiu, believes accommodation between the two Chinas is not only possible but practical in the long run. For the PRC, he says, the benefits of accommodation are many. For the ROC, this would mean a return to the mainland and the gaining of their one-China goal.

Whereas Chiu believes that the PRC would not be willing to approach the question of ultimate accommodation with the ROC in a manner which would give them some degree of autonomy and freedom, Marks believes that the PRC is now at the point where such accommodations might be forthcoming. Both gentlemen agree, however, that the current status quo that now exists between the two Chinas is unhealthy and adds to the instability of the region. The main cause for optimism on the subject of unification is that at last the PRC is now taking a more conciliatory attitude toward the ROC.

The main concern of Marks is that, "the U.S. must decide where it wants its relationship with the PRC—and a united China—to go." Does the United States desire to help create what inevitably would become a superpower? And Chiu, for his part, warns that "one must realize that, because of fundamental differences in social and political systems, the PRC can never be a true ally of the U.S."—SIK.

A Proposed Step Toward Middle East Peace

By Colonel T. N. Dupuy, USA, Retired

Strategic Review, Fall 1981

There is no end to the many voices in the Middle East proposing immediate, far-reaching solutions to the problems of that region. Each proposal cites the righteousness of a cause and the need to right an obvious wrong. Of course, each proposed solution and the wrong to be righted are colored by a particular perspective and, in itself, invokes more tension than peace.

But, one man, Colonel T. N. Dupuy, US Army, Retired, who has met with a broad spectrum of Israeli and Arab officials while traveling in the Middle East and who is also executive director of the Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, proposes a unique solution.

The key element of his solution is simply "time." He believes that the healing properties of time are needed to bring peace to this region.

His proposal is to defuse the current antagonism in this region by developing a framework which will establish working relationships between the Arabs and Israelis while ensuring them that their interests and security will be safeguarded. The ideal means of doing this, he believes, is to establish two trusteeships: one in the Gaza Strip and the other in the West Bank.

The trusteeships would have three participants. The United States and Israel would participate in both trusteeships, while Egypt would be the third party in the Gaza Strip and Jordan the third party in the West Bank. If Jordan, which now does not have a formal relationship with Israel, refuses to enter into this agreement, Egypt could temporarily act as its surrogate in administering the West Bank. The acceptance of the United States in this process would appear favorable as only the United States could provide the guarantees that would undoubtedly be insisted upon in such an agreement.

In both trusteeships, a tripartite treaty establishing an Administrative Authority would be drawn up among the countries involved. Each of the three member states would appoint a high commissioner as its representative to the authority, the chairmanship of which would rotate among the three members every four months. The authority would have full governmental control of the trusteeships, and the laws in each trusteeship would be the legal code that existed prior to 1967. The trusteeships would be established for a period of five years and could be automatically renewed for an additional five years.

The purpose of the trusteeships would be to expedite the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region; to assure the security of the adjacent states against any threat from within the trust territory or from a neighboring state; to assure the right of the peoples of each trust area to choose their own form of local government; to maintain security by establishing a joint three-power military force; and, at the conclusion of the trusteeship period, to return each trust area to the appropriate country which exercised sovereignty prior to June 1967.

There would be some differences between the administration of each trusteeship. The West Bank trusteeship would be somewhat more complex, especially if Jordan refused to participate in its administration. In addition, it would probably not be feasible to include the administration of Jerusalem within this framework. This issue should be negotiated separately during the trusteeship period.

What are the chances of such a solution bringing peace to the Middle East? According to the author:

Such a trusteeship arrangement will not mean peace. But it could, for the first time, provide a basis and a rationale for a long-term political solution which can be accepted, eventually, by all of the major participants.—SIK.

These synopses are published as a service to the readers. Every effort is made to ensure accurate translation and summarization. However, for more detailed accounts, readers should refer to the original articles. No official endorsement of the views, opinions or factual statements in these items is intended or should be inferred.—Editor

MR NEWS

UNITED STATES



VEHICLE CLEARS MINES

A vehicle equipped with mine-clearing equipment has demonstrated the feasibility of breaching an antitank minefield with an unmanned, remote-controlled system. The test of the system used a modified *M60A2* tank chassis fitted with a mine-clearing roller, a Marine Corps *M58A1* mine-clearing line charge and a Clear Lane Marking System.

The vehicle, operated remotely by personnel located a mile from the site, was used in a simulated combat scenario. The test was successful and demonstrated that the robot vehicle concept could be successfully employed in clearing enemy minefields. Other similar systems will be tested in the future.

MX TRANSPORTER CONTRACT AWARDED

A $3.6 million contract has been awarded for design and assembly of a multiwheeled transporter to move *MX* test missiles among facilities at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, the *MX* flight-test location. The McDonnell Douglas Corporation contract calls for the building of two transporters.

The transporter, which is used exclusively inside the base, is a self-propelled vehicle, 82½ feet in length and 13 feet wide. The *MX* missile, encased in its launch canister, is carried on the transporter's bed which can be raised from 7 to 10 feet. The vehicle has 80 tires mounted to 20 axles, each of which is independently steerable. Power is transferred from the diesel engine to the wheels by hydraulic pumps and lines rather than mechanical drive shafts and gears.

After *MX* test missiles are assembled in their launch canisters, they will be loaded onto the transporter and carried to launch pads a few miles away. With the canister and missile together weighing 288,000 pounds, the combined weight of the vehicle and its load will be about 480,000 pounds.

Delivery of the transporter to Vandenberg Air Force Base is scheduled for this summer. The first use of the transporter will coincide with the first *MX* test flights, scheduled for early 1983. The transporter will be used throughout the operational life span of the deployed *MX* system, when missiles in their canisters will be brought periodically from the deployment sites for testing.





HARRIER II MAKES DEBUT

The first vertical/short takeoff and landing *AV8B Harrier II* (*MR*, Aug 1981, p 83) light-attack aircraft was recently unveiled by the McDonnell Douglas Corporation. The *AV8B* is an advanced version of the *AV8A Harrier* now in service with the US Marine Corps.

The new aircraft is a joint project between McDonnell Douglas and British Aerospace. The US and British governments agreed, in a recent memorandum of understanding, to a coproduction program for the *Harrier II*. The British version of the aircraft is designated the *GR Mark 5*.

The Marine Corps will receive the first pilot production *Harrier II* in 1983 and proceed toward a 1985 initial operational capability. The corps plans to acquire 340 *AV8Bs*. The new aircraft will replace five squadrons of *A4 Skyhawks* and three squadrons of *AV8A* aircraft. The *GR Mark 5 Harriers* are expected to be operational with the Royal Air Force by 1986.

Harrier II aircraft delivered to the Marine Corps will include improved engine inlets and redesigned nozzles, lift improvement devices, a new all-graphite/composite super-critical wing, forward fuselage, horizontal stabilator and rudder, a new *GAU12* 25mm gun and leading-edge root extensions designed to increase the instantaneous turn rate by four degrees per second. The *GR Mark 5* will be equipped with a Martin-Baker ejection seat rather than the Marine Corps' Stencel ejection seat, a moving map display in addition to the Marines' electronic display of data on a cathode ray tube, a thicker windscreen and inlet strengthening against bird strikes, a panoramic camera and a British-built electronic countermeasures suite.

TORPEDO TEST SUCCESSFUL

A full-propulsion system prototype of the US Navy's next generation lightweight torpedo was successfully tested undersea recently in Navy test waters off Keyport, Washington. A team from the Honeywell Defense Systems Division of Hopkins, Minnesota, and the Garrett Pneumatic Systems Division of Phoenix, Arizona, was selected as sole contractor by the Navy last year.

The contract was for research and development of a torpedo to eventually replace the existing lightweight *Mark 46* torpedo. The *Mark 46* was designed to combat conventional and early-generation Soviet nuclear submarines and has been in use since the mid-1960s. Both the *Mark 46* and the new torpedo, designated the *EX50*, can be launched from helicopters, airplanes and surface ships. Additional launch platforms involve submarine and vertical-launched rockets currently in the fleet and under development. The new *EX50* is seen as an important weapon for the Navy in its mission to effectively counter an increasingly sophisticated Russian submarine threat.

The Garrett propulsion system is called SCEPS (Stored Chemical Energy Propulsion System). It uses the reaction or combustion process between lithium, the fuel, and sulfur hexafluoride, the oxidant, to create superheated steam to power a small turbine. Because SCEPS employs a closed Rankine cycle, the power plant emits no exhaust and is, therefore, insensitive to operation depth. This feature also assures a low noise level that could otherwise adversely affect the torpedo's sonar and render the weapon more detectable to its target.

TRUCK CONTRACT AWARDED

The US Army Tank-Automotive Command has awarded a contract for the manufacture of 2,511 trucks to AM General Corporation. The basic contract value is $130 million, with a 100-percent option for an additional 2,511 units.

The contract is for the *M915A1*, 6 × 4, line-haul tractor which is used to haul bulk cargo. This truck is similar to the 6 × 4 tractor AM General built for the US Army under a contract completed in mid-1980.





SIKORSKY MAKES FIRST FLIGHT

The US Army's new *YEH60A* helicopter made its first flight at Sikorsky Aircraft's plant in Stratford, Connecticut. The flight consisted of programed maneuvers to evaluate handling qualities and performance of the aircraft.

The helicopter, called the "quick fix" special electronics mission aircraft by the Army, is a derivative of the Sikorsky/Army *UH60A Black Hawk* utility transport. Its mission will be intercepting, monitoring and jamming enemy radio communications signals.

The basic *Black Hawk* configuration has been modified to accommodate a 1,800-pound electronics package. Four dipole antennas are mounted on the rear of the fuselage, and a deployable whip antenna is mounted underneath the fuselage.

The first flight aircraft, a preproduction prototype, was equipped with the dipole antennas and the deployable whip antenna. After a month of flight testing, the aircraft was to undergo additional modifications prior to being flown to the Electronics Systems Laboratories, Sunnyvale, California, for full instrumentation and testing.

UNITED KINGDOM

MILLIMETRIC RADAR TEST SUCCESSFUL

A series of trials, sponsored by the Royal Navy, has enabled Marconi Radar Systems Ltd. of Britain to demonstrate the effective use of millimetric radar to further improve the *GWS25/Seawolf* antimissile system's performance against low-level targets.

Using a derivative of the *DN181 Blindfire* radar on the same mount as the *Seawolf Type 910* tracker radar, the trials showed that the tracking of targets flying a few feet above the surface is considerably enhanced, ensuring a high probability of successful engagements by the *Seawolf* missile.

At present, this type of low-angle tracking is carried out by a television system. Use of the *DN181* millimetric radar gives an all-weather, around-the-clock capability.—*Journal of Electronic Defense*, © 1981.



NUCLEAR SUBMARINE LAUNCHED

The HMS *Trafalgar*, first of a new class of nuclear-powered submarines, was recently launched from the Vickers' Yard at Barrow-in-Furness, northern England.

The 272-foot-long vessel displaces 4,500 tons and can carry a crew of 98 officers and men. The new submarine has the latest sonar underwater detection equipment and is covered on the outside with specially developed insulating tiles to give it one of the quietest noise reduction systems.

The main armaments include an underwater-launched, air-flight guided missile and torpedoes. The HMS *Trafalgar* is the 13th nuclear-powered fleet submarine and the fifth Royal Navy vessel to bear this name.—*Military Technology and Economics*, © 1981.

AUSTRALIA

F18 HORNET SELECTED

Australia has selected the *F18 Hornet* (*MR*, Oct 1981, p 79) as its new tactical fighter and plans to purchase a total of 75 aircraft for use by the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). The aircraft is made by McDonnell Douglas.

The RAAF expects to receive the first *Hornet* before the end of 1984 with operational training to begin the second half of 1985. The Australian *Hornets* will be assembled and tested in Australia at government aircraft factories at Avalon. These factories are scheduled to turn out three *F18s* every two months by the middle of 1986. Deliveries should be completed in 1990. The engines will be assembled at the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation, Melbourne, Australia.

MALAYSIA



GERMAN FRIGATE CONTRACT

The Malaysian navy has signed a contract with the German Howaldtswerke (HDW) shipyard for the construction of two 1,500-ton corvettes/light frigates.

The corvettes are of the *FS1500* design and have already been adopted by the Colombian navy for a class of four units. The Malaysian frigates, however, will have both a different weapon fit and electronics system than the Colombian vessels.

The HDW *FS1500s* will be powered by two *MTU* 15,600-kilowatt diesels and will be capable of a maximum speed of 26.5 knots. The frigates have a range of 5,000 nautical miles at a speed of 18 knots.

The vessels will be armed with one Creusot-Loire 100mm gun, two 40/70mm Breda/Bofors twin-turret guns, one Emerlec 30mm twin-mounting gun, and six to eight antiship missiles. The vessels will also have six 324mm antisubmarine warfare torpedo tubes and one light helicopter.—*Military Technology and Economics*, © 1981.

Army Helicopter Improvement Program Underway. A $148 million contract to develop the new near-term scout helicopter has been awarded to Bell Helicopter Textron, Fort Worth, Texas. Development of the new helicopter is part of the Army Helicopter Improvement Program which provides for modification of 720 *OH58A* helicopters.

The near-term scout helicopter will provide the Army with a combat support target acquisition/designation system which will operate day and night and in periods of reduced visibility. The helicopter will be used to conduct reconnaissance, gather target information, direct and adjust indirect artillery fire, designate targets for precision guided munitions, select battle positions and provide local security.

MR BOOKS

THE VICTORS. Edited by Brigadier Peter Young Foreword by General Omar N Bradley 256 Pages Rand McNally & Co Chicago Ill 1981 $24 95

Acceptance of a basic thesis is essential to full appreciation of *The Victors*. The thesis is that history has shown that every great general earned his reputation on the basis of one great victory. Military historians and students of the art of leadership will find Brigadier Peter Young's book to be an absorbing treatment of that notion. Those of pedantic bent will, however, search in vain for a commonality of approach to battlefield success among the 16 principals who share the pages of *The Victors*. In the timespan covered (1805-1950), it would be difficult, if not impossible, to select 16 other leaders with more divergent attitudes and practices under the stress of command.

Among the 16 whose instant of glory is chronicled in this fast-paced presentation are four Germans (Von Moltke, Hindenburg, Guderian and Rommel); three Englishmen (Wellington, Haig and Montgomery); three Frenchmen (Napoleon I, Joffre and Pétain); one Russian (Zhukov); and five Americans (Lee, Grant, Meade, Patton and MacArthur). Within the spectrum of personal and professional traits displayed by this group are brilliance and plodding conservatism, creativity and blind luck, flamboyance and reticence, arrogance and humility—all in vast disproportion within the grouping.

Informed readers will question the selection of some of the subjects included in *The Victors*. For example, the selection of Hindenburg is debatable. As Young makes clear, Hindenburg "merely supplied the backbone and personality for his chief of staff (Ludendorff)." Similarly, the distinction accorded Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig for his contribution to Germany's defeat in World War I is of questionable merit.

In both cases, however, these commanders exercised ultimate responsibility in critical engagements and, therefore, perhaps are fully deserving of inclusion. Final choices in the winnowing process would be formidable considering the galaxy of deserving great captains who served during the period covered.

The Victors is not a book about great captains. It is a thought-provoking treatment of military command put to test during moments of delicate balance between success and failure. Unique in concept, it adds a new perspective to the chronicles of military history.

Differing though each of the principals were in their styles of leadership, there were similarities as well. Chief among these were self-confidence, boldness and a willingness to take the large gamble in the high-risk environment of forces engaged. These traits in common are dramatically illustrated by Napoleon's daring flexibility at Austerlitz, Wellington's steady coolness at sunset at Waterloo, Rommel's slashing defeat at dawn of the British at Tobruk, Patton's swift and decisive assault on the southern flank of the Bulge, Zhukov's relentless hammering into submission of the fanatical defenders of Berlin and MacArthur's aloof concentration on the tides of Inchon to turn failure into victory in Korea. These and other exciting examples in Young's superb historical anthology maintain reader interest to the last page.

Young's credentials as the editor of *The Victors* are impressively solid. His sensitive portrayal of commanders under supreme trial reflects the objectivity of a professional soldier, the astuteness of a postwar director of war studies (Sand-

hurst) and the talent of a splendid writer who has had published more than a score of books on various military subjects. The liberal use of hundreds of action photographs, historical paintings and finely structured maps and diagrams adds great depth to the book.

The Victors will be a valued addition to the bookshelves of the dedicated student of military lore and neophyte reader alike.

Maj Gen Stan L McClellan, *USA, Retired*

THE USSR AND AFRICA: Foreign policy Under Khrushchev by Dan C Heldman 187 Pages Praeger Publishers, N Y 1981

This excellent book delivers much more than its subtitle, *Foreign Policy Under Khrushchev*, implies. Much of Dr. Dan C. Heldman's analysis of Soviet policy is as valid today as it applied to circumstances in 1956. The author distills the most commonly accepted explanations of Soviet policy into four recurring elements: ideology, institutions, events and personalities. In a carefully reasoned analysis, Heldman concludes that ideology is more symbolic than driving Soviet foreign policy.

The Soviet attempt to mold and influence the newly independent states of Africa offers a case study in the accommodation by a rigid bureaucracy and ideology to an erratic, opportunistic clientele. The Soviet experience proved similar to that of the West in many ways, most notably that foreign aid buys influence only so long as the benefactor's aims serve his client's national interest. Heldman's regression analysis of sympathetic United Nations voting suggests that Russian policies toward Africa have proved more successful and durable than those of the United States despite often spectacular setbacks.

The decidedly academic style and complex input-output analysis of acquired interest will limit this book's appeal to serious students of Soviet policy or the application of mathematical analysis to the field of political science. Heldman has assembled a comprehensive bibliography that must be considered a definitive work of scholarship. This book should be read by all those professionals charged with anticipating and countering Soviet policy.

Col John W Messer, *USAR*

EL SALVADOR Central America in the New Cold War. Edited by Marvin E Gettleman Patrick Lacefield Louis Menashe David Mermelstein and Ronald Radosh 397 Pages Grove Press N Y 1981 $7 50

Stories about Central America have traditionally occupied the back pages of US newspapers. Short, terse articles, often describing cataclysmic bus crashes or routine coup d'états, usually appeared next to the crossword puzzle or under the used-car advertisements. This treatment accurately reflected the importance that most readers attached to events in the so-called "banana republics."

Recent events in Central America have changed this. Salvadoran issues are now frequently on the front pages of major newspapers or the lead stories of network news broadcasts. This sharp turnaround in the level of media attention has left many people confused about the conflict in Central America. They now receive daily reports about the situation there, but, because of the earlier lack of coverage, they do not have the background information needed to understand and interpret events.

The individual seeking to gain insight and understanding could spend weeks poring over the microfiche of old articles from the back pages of newspapers. Fortunately, this is not necessary. A group of scholars and journalists, many of whom are associated with universities in New York, have assembled a useful collection of articles, position papers, news dispatches and essays pertaining to El Sal-

vador, Central America and US foreign policy.

The editors make no pretenses about their personal beliefs: They are opposed to many of the policies of our government. This book is not, however, a polemical tract railing against the perceived evils of US overseas activities. It is, instead, a discussion of the present policy —a debate in print. It contains the views and articles of both the administration's staunchest supporters and its shrillest opponents. It is an excellent presentation of the ideologies and philosophies of the groups engaged in the Central American struggle for power.

While describing the psychological and spiritual factors, the book does not ignore the more concrete and practical elements of the struggle. Much historical information is given. Military professionals will be especially interested in the genesis and evolution of the various guerrilla groups active in the region.

The book is extremely timely. Mention is made of events occurring as late as August 1981. There is a good bibliography and a listing of organizations and magazines that are concerned with the region.

As Central America moves off of the back burner of US foreign policy concern and out of the back pages of US newspapers, military professionals will be expected to be increasingly knowledgeable about events there. This book will help the military reader meet this expectation. It deserves a place in the libraries of all those interested in Central America.

2d Lt William R Meara, *New York ARNG*

DEFENDING THE WEST by Winston S Churchill II M P 256 Pages Arlington House Publishers Westport Conn 1981 $14 95

If American political realists and military hardliners are seeking a friend in the British court, they have found him in Winston S. Churchill II. In the same manner that his grandfather's "iron curtain" speech in Fulton, Missouri, more than 30 years ago alerted the West to Soviet designs in Europe, this Conservative Party member of Parliament has sounded the alarm for today. He identifies the Soviet threat, strategy and method of operation for the dangerous decade of the 1980s.

Churchill's critical barbs are directed not only at the United States for abdicating its position of responsibility as leader of the free world. He also criticizes his own United Kingdom for failing to see the growing Communist juggernaut and increasing British vulnerability. France is upbraided for aiding and abetting in the spread of nuclear weapons to Iraq. The Nixon-Ford-Carter decade of détente caused the free world to slip dangerously behind the Soviet Union in force development.

The author's arguments are built around statistical comparisons of forces, weapons systems, combat ratios, types of weapons systems and Soviet strategic intent as witnessed by their actions over the last 35 years. The time has come for the NATO nations to face Soviet intentions squarely and make the necessary sacrifices to build a strong military force which can oppose the Soviet rising tide.

Churchill's thesis centers around Leonid Brezhnev's 1973 speech to the Warsaw Pact heads, when he said, "Come 1985, we will be able to exert our will wherever we need to." The author reminds the reader that Soviet will is solidly based on the power of the Red army. That power has increased disproportionately to alleged Western aggression. It is currently held in check only by a diminishing US strategic nuclear equivalence and the army of the People's Republic of China. Giant technological advances by Russia in its new series of missiles, bomber production, naval force development and the sheer numbers of men under arms will soon eclipse the

potential of American nuclear constraints.

Military readers will enjoy this book. Churchill gives a British perspective to the events of the last three decades and identifies himself unmistakably as a hard-line opponent of the Soviet Union. At last a clear-minded politician with a sense of history has said what needed to be said, and military advisers have been saying, for three decades. The enemy is real, identified and potent. The time to confront him is now.

Churchill's closing words should disturb those who face the hard decisions the free world must face in this decade:

Up to the time of writing there is no evidence that the Western democracies are willing to make even the modest sacrifices required to safeguard the future.

Maj William L Hufham, *USA, USACGSC*

THE WEHRMACHT AND GERMAN REARMAMENT by Wilhelm Deist Foreword by A J Nicholls 151 Pages University of Toronto Press, Buffalo N Y 1981 $30 00

Wilhelm Deist's, concise volume, containing a series of his lectures at St. Antony's College, Oxford, England, presupposes some earlier reading on the development of German armaments production in the Nazi era. Students of that period, already familiar with the classics of Alan Milward, Berenice Carroll and Berton Klein, will recognize that Deist has used all of them to good effect. He has supplemented them by comparing the successive overall German arms plans and the specific service programs with the political programs Adolf Hitler was pursuing at the same time. Deist concludes that, at no time after 1932, when General Wilhelm Groener evolved the last Weimar armament program, were national policy and arms production plans in phase with each other.

On one hand, this conclusion raises questions over the indictments of Nuremberg blaming German military figures for planning aggressive war. More substantive are the revelations on how army, navy and *Luftwaffe* plans led Hitler to new and more expansive political goals at an accelerated pace, all with new demands for arms.

In his examination of the *Luftwaffe's* astounding development, Deist shows how the untimely death of the competent air strategist, General Walter Wever, in 1936, permitted decisions that predisposed the air arm to its later decline. The lack of a truly strategic German air force also grew in large measure from this happenstance. Still less fortunate was the German navy whose fate under the "land-minded" Hitler was, in Deist's words, crossed heavily by the lack of any realism in the building program of 1938.

An official historian at the German Military Historical Research Office, Deist goes beyond the common clichés about German military economic planning of the 1930s in this thoughtful—if overpriced—book. As is often the case with sound analyses of bygone foreign military policies, he forces a sober reconsideration of our own. The balance between national strategy and logistical possibilities remains one of the most critical questions in American policy today.

Alfred M Beck, *US Army Center of Military History*

THE ROAD TO CONFRONTATION: American Policy Toward China and Korea, 1947-1950 by William Whitney Stueck Jr 326 Pages University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, N C 1981 $20 00 clothbound $10 00 paperbound

The impact of Chinese Communist intervention in the Korean War in November 1950 resounded far beyond the battlefield. In the United States, news of China's "aggression" fueled McCarthyism and increased the political vulnerability of the Truman administration. In broader terms, the "entirely new war" cast the die for two decades of Sino-American enmity as vitriolic rhetoric,

threats of war and the eschewal of formal diplomatic ties became durable features of the relationship between the two countries.

The Truman administration neither sought nor desired an armed contest with Chinese forces in Korea. Yet, as William Whitney Stueck Jr. points out in this excellent new book, American policies toward East Asia between 1947 and 1950 contributed significantly to that outcome. In the case of China, the restraint demonstrated by American officials in rejecting a course of all-out intervention in that country's civil war was largely vitiated by their unwillingness to curtail economic and military aid to Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist regime and by their refusal to explore constructive approaches to the Chinese Communists. The success of Communist arms in China led directly to a deeper US involvement in Korea.

Accused of "losing" China, concerned about America's international image and determined to "hold the line" against further Communist expansion in Asia, the Truman administration, for essentially political reasons, committed itself in vague terms to the survival of the American-sponsored Republic of Korea. Following North Korea's invasion of the South in June 1950, that commitment would be backed by military force. The ill-fated attempt by the United Nations Command to unify Korea by military means would, in turn, provoke Chinese intervention in the war.

Stueck's analysis of the factors that shaped American policy toward the Chinese revolution and the volatile situation in Korea is thorough and, on most points, persuasive. Drawing upon recently released Truman era documents, the author provides fresh insights into such overworked themes as the influence of domestic political pressure (the China bloc and China lobby) on executive branch decisionmaking; the Truman administration's fixation with Europe, and the interplay between Soviet-American conflict in Europe and an assertive US policy in Asia; the interaction of key American policymakers; official concern and confusion over the precise nature of Soviet-Chinese Communist relations; and the effect of budgetary constraints on diplomatic flexibility and military capabilities.

On occasion, Stueck stretches his evidence or offers unsubstantiated judgments. His conclusions, for example, that the Truman administration should have let the Soviet Union occupy all of Korea at the end of World War II, or that direct contacts between American and Chinese Communist officials in the summer of 1949 might have altered the course of Sino-American confrontation, will not go undisputed. Still, controversial as these arguments may be, they do provide food for thought and in no way detract from what is one of the best and most important works to appear for some time on the origins of the Cold War in the Far East.

Lawrence A Yates.
Combat Studies Institute USACGSC

THE CRUCIBLE OF WAR Western Desert, 1941 by Barrie Pitt
506 Pages Jonathan Cape Ltd London Eng 1980 $24 95

This book covers far more than its title suggests. In it, the author, Barrie Pitt, focuses mainly on ground campaigns in Libya and Egypt from June 1940 to February 1942. However, he also analyzes the British Middle East Command's operations in East Africa, Iraq and Syria, as well as the Royal Navy's raid on Taranto and the impact of the fall of Greece and Crete on the Middle East Command's plans.

Pitt, best known for his works on World War I and his editorship of Ballantine's series on World War II, intends this to be the first of a three-volume work that will span the North African war through the Axis capitulation in Tunisia. Based on the impressive quality of this first

volume, his completed set should become the standard unofficial account of the war in North Africa. His masterful knowledge of this huge and complicated subject and his deft ability in moving from strategy to small-unit exploits make his book a pleasure to read.

Since the period prior to Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's arrival in March 1941 is the least known to most readers, this volume is particularly valuable in the light it sheds on the earlier British-Italian encounters. During that phase, as well as through Rommel's first two offensives, both sides would experience painful lessons in evolving strategy and tactics in desert warfare. Pitt terminates this volume with the stalemate at Al-Gazala in early 1942 after Rommel's brilliant counteroffensive that recaptured much of Cyrenaica, leaving the British duly impressed by his leadership and frustrated by their own shortcomings.

Pitt relies perhaps too heavily upon published materials, especially accounts by British participants and historians. Nevertheless, this book is strongly recommended for its readability, perceptiveness and authority. Pitt's lucidity and vividness succeed in bringing to life again the critical struggle for North Africa, and indeed the Middle East, in 1940-42.

D Clayton James, *Mississippi State University*

"WAR" AND THE MILITARY COURTS Judicial Interpretation of Its Meaning by Dorothy Schaffter 184 Pages Exposition Press Smithtown N Y 1981 $20 00

The author of this useful compendium, Dorothy Schaffter, served for many years in the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress. With admirable professionalism, she has compiled relevant excerpts from the legal opinions affecting the definition of "war," particularly as regards the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam. Those with a professional interest in the military legal system will find her research very helpful.

As everyone acquainted with the Uniform Code of Military Justice knows, it matters greatly whether a specific act occurred during "a time of war." But when has war broken out? Only Congress can declare war, but has not done so, even when we were obviously at war.

In the absence of formal declarations, the judges have to rely on appeals to common sense and common knowledge. Their opinions indicate that the United States is at war when large forces are deployed and substantial casualties are sustained. But how much force and how many casualties make a war? There is no good answer to this question, and the Court of Military Appeals will probably continue making ad hoc judgments. The War Powers Act of 1973 might clarify the situation in the future for conflicts extending beyond 60 days, if indeed this legislation turns out to be constitutional.

Schaffter makes no comment on the wider implications of her topic. Our last two wars were fought without any formal declaration—not because the presidency is gaining power at the expense of Congress, but because the Congress had no clear idea when to declare war or against whom.

From some points of view, it would have appeared ludicrous for a superpower such as the United States to declare war against a small state such as North Vietnam. Had we done so, what would have been the status of the Soviet Union which consistently supplied war material to a belligerent?

The legal anomalies of Vietnam only reflect deeper ambiguities in American policy. And there is not much hope that our situation will become clearer in the future. If recent history is any indication, our next conflict is likely to be as poorly defined as the last two. Then, this book will have great practical value.

Maj Bruce R Pirnie, *USA, AFSC*

PROSPECTS OF SOVIET POWER IN THE 1980S. Edited by Christoph Bertram 126 Pages Archon Books, Hamden Conn 1980 $19 50

This is a concise but informative book composed of 15 essays by members of the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS). The essays include an examination of a host of factors which will undoubtedly impact on Soviet policy in the 1980s. The factors covered include the role of ideology, power and policies in the Third World; the question of leadership succession; security concerns; and economic and population resources.

The editor, Christoph Bertram, who is director of the IISS, London, acknowledges that any attempt to explore the nature of Soviet policy—or, for that matter, Soviet behavior—is a "risky affair." However, the primary contribution of these essays, he contends, is to point out the limits of Soviet power. It is evident that formidable problems will confront the next generation of Soviet leaders. But, regardless of these problems, which range from defense spending to satisfying consumer demands to reconciling the new technocrats' desire for greater efficiency within the party apparatus, major changes in Soviet policy appear unlikely. In short, according to Bertram, "continuity remains the catchword."

Prospects of Soviet Power in the 1980s is a comprehensive overview of Soviet policy. The authors of the essays include a number of well-known academic scholars—for example, Alexander Dallin and John Erickson. In addition, a very interesting essay regarding the Soviet Union's military potential in the 1980s is presented by Andrew Marshal, director, Net Assessment, Department of Defense.

This is a book which will provide valuable insights to the general reader as well as the student of Soviet politics. It is highly recommended as professional reading.

Col James B. Motley, *USA, National Defense University*

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR: The Philippine Years by Carol Morris Petillo 301 Pages Indiana University Press Bloomington, Ind 1981 $17 50

Professor Carol Morris Petillo does not attempt to recreate William Manchester's *American Caesar* or Dr. D. Clayton James' *The MacArthur Years.* Instead, her purpose is to study the story of General Douglas MacArthur's many years in the Philippines to gain a better understanding of his personal motivation and lifelong behavioral patterns observed there. Toward this end, her study provides an added dimension to the many MacArthur works without becoming just another chronological biography. While she does cover the general's life in some detail from his birth through World War II, it is with an eye toward explaining his values, fears, strengths and weaknesses.

Certainly, the influence of his hero-father and dominant mother are analyzed throughout the work. So, too, are his patterns of "excessive, premeditated bravery, spontaneous conflict with authority, and an exaggerated quest for attention." Petillo attempts to analyze the psychological impact of the other women in MacArthur's life: his first wife, Louise; his secret Philippine companion, Isabel; and his second wife, Jean.

The author lays bare the specifics of the MacArthur-Eisenhower split in the Philippines in the late 1930s. Of particular interest is her discussion of the $500,000 gift presented to MacArthur by Philippine President Manuel L. Quezon immediately after the start of World War II. The analysis for Quezon's offering of the gift and Washington's approval cannot but color the potential impetus of MacArthur's desire to recapture the Philippines regardless of overall Pacific strategy.

Petillo concludes that MacArthur was deeply unsure of himself throughout his life. His parents' expectations caused him to strive continuously for greater success. Once achieved, it was necessary to seek

even greater accomplishments. MacArthur judged himself inadequate to this task, but was unable to escape its influence for fear of failure.

The Philippines represented a safe haven that MacArthur turned to throughout his first 60 years. Its influence is a major factor in understanding MacArthur, the man. Petillo offers an interesting insight for MacArthur scholars that uniquely supplements the many works done on this towering figure of American military history.

Capt Arthur L Bradshaw, *USA, USACGSC*

VICTORY AT GUADALCANAL by Robert Edward Lee 260 Pages Presidio Press, San Rafael Calif 1981 $15 95

Seize and invest the islands of Tulagi and Guadalcanal. This concise tactical mission of monumental strategic importance was destined to carry the 18,722 Marines of the 1st Marine Division into history.

Through the summer of 1942, the Japanese forces in the Pacific were virtually unopposed and were feverishly building air and sea bases from which to launch new thrusts toward Australia. The war in the Pacific had been relegated second place to the Allied preparations for the assault on Fortress Europe. Yet a mandate from the American public called for President Franklin D. Roosevelt to exact retribution for the Pearl Harbor attack and to stop the Japanese in their Pacific conquest. Reluctantly, orders were issued from the War Department. Preparations were made, and the 1st Marine Division, embarked on the 23 ships of Task Force 62, set sail.

History written by a participant is sometimes clouded with the perceptions and feelings of the times. This is not so with Robert Edward Lee's *Victory at Guadalcanal.* Lee was a member of the 160th Infantry, 40th Infantry Division, and served on Guadalcanal following the relief of the Marines in December 1942. His account of the epic battle is an excellent one and presents the whole of the fight, linking the separate parts of the island combat with the air and sea battles.

Guadalcanal is often thought of as a struggle for an island in the Solomons chain—a single invasion in the transitional sense. In fact, it was a series of related attacks and defenses on land, sea and air. It lasted six months and two days—the longest battle in American history—and blunted the Japanese Pacific offensive.

Victory at Guadalcanal is an easy-reading history. It gives one the sense of being there, experiencing the naval shore bombardment, the rain and the humidity of the jungle, the onslaught of Japanese soldiers. It is a book worth reading.

Maj Paul A Bigelman, *USA, Combined Arms Combat Development Activity*

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS SINCE MAO by Dr C G Jacobsen 170 Pages Praeger Publishers N Y 1981 $23 50

C. G. Jacobsen's book, *Sino-Soviet Relations Since Mao,* is an update on the Sino-Soviet conflict in the 1970s and early 1980s. It is Jacobsen's contention that, while the foreign policy of all nations are colored to a degree by the personalities of their leaders, Beijing's foreign policy has been "hostage to the vagaries of a continuing and fundamental struggle for power" within the Chinese government. The Sino-Soviet relationship has been a victim of Chinese domestic politics.

Using this as his thesis, Jacobsen explores several different aspects of the Sino-Soviet conflict. He begins by examining the "realities of the Sino-Soviet balance of power" and by outlining recent growth and developments in the forces of both sides. He plays down the Chinese forces vis-à-vis their Russian counter-

parts, claiming that many earlier analyses used too narrow a focus. Chinese might does not seem as formidable when considering all aspects of military power.

Next, Jacobsen looks at Sino-Soviet relations from Mao Zedong's death until the Sino-Vietnamese War. As Deng Xiaoping began to establish his position in the Chinese government, Moscow looked for an opportunity to relax Sino-Soviet tensions. However, Beijing was as recalcitrant as before. Accordingly, the Soviet Union began to consolidate its position around China's periphery. A major part of that effort included drawing Hanoi closer into the fold. With the Soviet-Vietnamese pact, Moscow was able to put pressure on Beijing from two fronts and even draw China into a "proxy war" in Southeast Asia.

Jacobsen points out that the Chinese failed in their incursion into Vietnam in that they were unable to change events in Southeast Asia or to weaken the Moscow-Hanoi alliance. The Soviets, on the other hand, had shown themselves much more resolute in their support of Vietnam than Beijing had expected.

Before drawing his conclusions and making his prediction for the future, Jacobsen digresses for a look at the role of Japan in the Sino-Soviet foreign policy equation. He discusses historical cultural and territorial conflicts between Japan and its two largest continental neighbors. He then takes an in-depth look at current security and economic issues.

In his conclusions, Jacobsen sees improvement in the future of Sino-Soviet relations. As Deng broadens his base of power, his pragmatic world view will continue to dominate Chinese foreign policy, and Beijing will move to a more balanced stance between Moscow and Washington. Jacobsen writes off Deng's recent anti-Soviet rhetoric as a tactical response to internal power struggles. He reminds us that Deng has:

. . . *lifelong familiarity with and preference for Soviet socio-political and economic structures and a consequent belief that Sino-Soviet negotiations could and should be conducted as between people who at least speak the same language. . . .*

China wants to develop and needs outside help to do it. Deng would feel more comfortable if help came from a government committed to similar international and ideological goals than from one which stands opposed to those goals.

Sino-Soviet Relations Since Mao provides an excellent update on the Sino-Soviet conflict. Jacobsen's style is enjoyable, and the organization of the book makes it easy to follow. While it will not make the reader an expert on Sino-Soviet relations (it was never meant to), it serves as an excellent companion to previous works by Zagoria, Griffith, An and others.

Capt Robert H. Van Horn Jr., *USA*
North Carolina State University

BETWEEN PEACE AND WAR The Nature of International Crisis by Richard Ned Lebow 350 Pages Johns Hopkins University Press Baltimore Md 1981

The true test of a presidency is how the president handles the international crises he confronts. President Ronald Reagan, at this writing, has yet to be faced with a crisis. But it will come, and he will be challenged.

There have been a number of books on crisis decisionmaking. Most have examined single events such as the Cuban missile crisis. Others have analyzed the differences between or among a number of events. The bottom line of such studies is ultimately to improve the quality of crisis decisionmaking.

Richard Ned Lebow has written an outstanding book. Its objective is to improve crisis decisionmaking, as well as to sensitize scholars and hopefully policymakers to some of the pitfalls of crisis decisionmaking. This extremely well-documented study is an attempt to in-

tegrate history and political science. The data for his analysis is drawn from 26 historical cases of crisis dating from 1898 (Cuba) to 1967 (Arab-Israeli). The author has divided his study into three specific areas of investigation: origins of crisis, outcomes of crisis, and crisis and international relations.

Lebow's masterful examination of the many facets of crisis decisionmaking is seldom seen on such a grand scale. The manner in which he weaves the historical discussion of his 26 crisis events throughout his detailed analysis is fascinating reading. Particularly interesting is his discussion of the MacArthur-Truman controversy during the Korean War and how MacArthur manipulated intelligence reports to support his view of Chinese intentions. In another section, he takes exception to those who have praised the quality of decisionmaking by President John F. Kennedy during the Cuban missile crisis. He states:

The reality of the Executive Committee (Ex Com) does not measure up to the myth propagated by Kennedy's admirers. The Ex Com proved a relatively pliant tool of the President. . . . In the final analysis the Ex Com could be described as a superb example of promotional leadership.

Lebow concludes that successful crisis management is "a function of cultural, organizational, and personal behavioral patterns established long before the onset of any crisis."

This book is highly recommended for the student of history as well as political science. The National Security Council may find it especially useful.

Maj Robert R. Ulin, *USA*
Department of Joint and Combined Operations, USACGSC

NEW BOOKS RECEIVED

This listing is provided to bring recently published professional books to the attention of readers. Reviews of these books have already been solicited from our current reviewers. Other books are available for review by qualified professionals. For information about the Book Review Program contact Mr. Phillip R. Davis, Books Editor, at (913) 684-5642 or AUTOVON 552-5642.

Books are not offered for sale through the *Military Review*.

THE MYTH OF THE NATION AND THE VISION OF REVOLUTION: The Origins of Ideological Polarization in the Twentieth Century by J. L. Talmon. 632 Pages. University of California Press, Berkeley, Calif. 1980. $35.00

FORT BLISS: An Illustrated History by Leon C. Metz with photographs from the collection of Millard G. McKinney. 180 Pages. Mangan Books, El Paso, Texas. 1981. $34.95

SAME TIME NEXT WEEK? How to Leave Your Therapist by Paul Neimark. Introduction by Stanford R. Gamm, M.D. 168 Pages. Arlington House Publishers, Westport, Conn. 1981. $12.95

THE MIDDLE EAST, Fifth Edition by Michael O. Wormser. 275 Pages. Congressional Quarterly, Washington, D.C. 1981. $8.95

CURTISS: The Hammondsport Era, 1907-1915 by Louis S. Casey. 235 Pages. Crown Publishers, N.Y. 1981. $19.95

THE PLEDGE BETRAYED: America and Britain and the Denazification of Postwar Germany by Tom Bower. Doubleday & Co., N.Y. 1981. $17.95

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: Regional Perspectives. Edited by Morris Janowitz. 288 Pages. Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, Calif. 1981. $22.50

MAHAN ON SEA POWER by William E. Livezey. 427 Pages. University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Okla. 1981. $15.95

MESSERSCHMITT BF 109 by Robert Grinsell. Illustrations by Rikyu Watanabe. 46 Pages. Crown Publishers, N.Y. 1980. $15.95

HELLCAT by David A. Anderton. Illustrations by Rikyu Watanabe. 56 Pages. Crown Publishers, N.Y. 1981. $15.95

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THE HISTORY OF THE U.S. AIR FORCE by David A. Anderton. 255 Pages. Crown Publishers, N.Y. 1981. $15.95

KENNEDY, KHRUSHCHEV, AND THE TEST BAN by Glenn T. Seaborg and Benjamin S. Loeb. Foreword by W. Averell Harriman. 320 Pages. University of California Press, Berkeley, Calif. 1981. $16.95

THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD AIR POWER: The World's Most Comprehensive Military Aviation Encyclopedia. Consultant Editor Bill Gunston. 384 Pages. Crown Publishers, N.Y. 1981.

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