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1 (NL) Corps
Eerste Legerkorps (1 Lk)


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    101 Marbat105 Verkbat102 VerkbatGPLV53 Ltverkbat101 Midcie104 Verkbat104 Wrnverkcie111 Cidet103 VerkbatSt 1 LkStcie 1 LkStstcie Admcen 1 Lk1 Lk101 Vbdgp

Unit Location Peace Strength War Strength
Staff 1 (NL) Corps Apeldoorn 117/86/126/9 (338) 168/132/217 (517)
Staff Company 1 (NL) Corps Apeldoorn 4/18/71 (93)
6/30/220/2 (258)
Staff and Staff Company Administrative Centre 1 (NL) Corps
62/82/298/8 (450)

101 Military Intelligence Company Apeldoorn 23/8/24 (55) 84/15/82 (181)
111 Counter Intelligence Detachment Apeldoorn 9/29/10 (48) 18/46/15 (79)
   
104 Observation and Reconnaissance Company Roosendaal 11/40/142 (193) 13/49/199 (261)
   
103 Reconnaissance Battalion [a] Seedorf (GE) 27/96/402 (525) 30/127/573/2 (732)
104 Reconnaissance Battalion [b] Nunspeet 27/96/403 (526) 31/126/575/2 (734)
102 Reconnaissance Battalion [c] 32/126/575/2 (735)
105 Reconnaissance Battalion [d] 32/126/574/2 (734)
   
53 Light Reconnaissance Battalion [e] 31/92/418/2 (543)
   
Light Aviation Group Deelen 159/272/279 (710) 228/347/454 (1029)
   
101 Signal Group Stroe 145/450/1710 (2305) 190/744/2853/10 (3797)
   
101 Military Constabulary Battalion
Wezep 20/132/487 (639) 40/201/964 (1205)

Notes
 

a. Under command of 4 Division in peacetime.1 Probably also under that command in wartime.2 
b. Under command of 1 Division "7 December" in peacetime.3 Probably also under that command in wartime.2 Formed between November 1983 and March 1984.4
c. RIM battalion, filled by mobilisable squadrons that had fulfilled their active-duty period in 104 Reconnaissance Battalion between four and twenty months prior to mobilisation.5 33 Likely to operate in the Corps Rear Area in wartime.2
d. RIM battalion, formed between November 1983 and March 1984. Filled by mobilisable squadrons that had fulfilled their active-duty period in 103 Reconnaissance Battalion between four and twenty months prior to mobilisation.6 33 Likely to operate in the Corps Rear Area in wartime.2
e. Filled by mobilisable personnel from 102 Reconnaissance Battalion (RIM) after their fourteen to sixteen-month RIM period in that unit had expired, up to six years prior to mobilisation. The battalion was disbanded after the formation and equipping of 105 Reconnaissance Battalion (November 1983-August 1985) was completed. Disbandment started in September 1985 and was completed in January 1986, in which period equipment and stocks were reassigned to other units or added to the general inventory (landsvoorraad).5 7



Part I | Part II | Part III | Operational Corps and Divisional Command StructuresOperational Role | Maldeployment

Conltr Sdf/Ho/Lmhof1 Lka101 Luagp101 Infbrig53 Painfbrig52 Painfbrig43 Painfbrig42 Painfbrig12 Painfbrig11 Painfbrig51 Pabrig41 Pabrig13 PabrigStstcie 5 DivStstcie 4 DivStstcie 1 Div "7 Dec"

Command of Netherlands Troops in Seedorf, Hohne, Langemannshof
Seedorf (GE) 29/113/159/69 (370) 10/29/19 (58)
   
Staff and Staff Company 1 Division "7 December" Arnhem 28/30/80 (138) 52/43/134 (229)
Staff and Staff Company 4 Division Harderwijk 28/30/80 (138) 52/43/134 (229)
Staff and Staff Company 5 Division [a] Stroe 8/9/10 (27) 52/44/133 (229)
 
13 Armoured Brigade Oirschot 169/476/1897 (2542) 222/571/2953/12 (3758)
41 Armoured Brigade Seedorf (GE) 237/673/2938 (3848) 217/575/2971/12 (3775)
51 Armoured Brigade Stroe 2/2/1 (5) 229/561/2890/12 (3692)
   
11 Armoured Infantry Brigade Arnhem 204/550/2358 (3112) 233/608/3311/12 (4164)
12 Armoured Infantry Brigade Vierhouten 178/465/2044 (2687) 233/603/3286/12 (4134)
42 Armoured Infantry Brigade Assen 203/555/2393 (3151) 234/603/3272/12 (4121)
43 Armoured Infantry Brigade Darp 169/451/1986 (2606) 240/616/3360/12 (4228)
52 Armoured Infantry Brigade Arnhem 2/2/1 (5) 234/602/3209/12 (4057)
53 Armoured Infantry Brigade Harderwijk 2/2/1 (5) 242/617/3334/12 (4205)
   
101 Infantry Brigade 255/687/3914/14 (4870)

101 Antiarcraft Artillery Group Stroe 63/173/527 (763) 265/715/2852/12 (3844)
   
1 (NL) Corps Artillery Stroe 158/421/1583 (2162) 511/1425/6875/28 (8839)

Note


a. Filled out by mobilisable personnel that had fulfilled their active-duty period in the staff and staff companies of 1 and 4 Division up to four years prior to mobilisation.5



Part I | Part II | Part III | Operational Corps and Divisional Command StructuresOperational Role | Maldeployment




101 Engineer Combat Group Wezep 99/263/1304 (1666) 177/504/3019/10 (3710)
201 Engineer Combat Group 130/350/2202/8 (2690)
   
Corps Logistic Command [a] Ermelo 214/750/2738/5 (3707) 548/1758/8402/30 (10738)
102 Medical Group [a] Ermelo 37/53/264 (354) 555/616/3412/26 (4609)
       
1 (NL) Corps Driving School Vierhouten –/6/10 (16)
     
Johan Willem Friso Band Assen 3/54/25 (82) 3/54/28 (85)
 
1 (NL) Corps Peace Strength: 2375/6305/24053/83 (32816)
1 (NL) Corps War Strength: 5659/13867/67727/266 (87519)

Note


a. 102 Medical Group was part of Corps Logistic Command. The personnel strengths for Corps Logistic Command as given here exclude those of 102 Medical Group.

 
Operational Corps and Divisional Command Structures

Although 1 (NL) Corps included three divisions, these were not fixed formations as for instance in the British or US Army. During operations Commander, 1 (NL) Corps would allocate brigades and corps level assets to the divisional staffs depending the tactical situation, reallocating them as circumstances required. The three divisional staffs thus were pure tactical headquarters, each commanding between two and five brigades and whatever units they would receive from corps level. The brigades were the main operational elements, designed to be able to operate independently for up to forty-eight hours, each having their own artillery, engineers and logistic support.8 Within this adaptable command structure the brigades were the only fixed formations, retaining their composition as much as possible. 1 (NL) Corps command structure is illustrated in the organisational chart below, with brigades assigned as in peacetime.9
 
52 Painfbrig12 PainfbrigStstcie 4 DivStstcie 5 Div42 PainfbrigStstcie 1 Div "7 Dec"1 (NL) Corps41 Pabrig43 Painfbrig11 PainfbrigGPLV51 PabrigLegerkorpstroepen53 Painfbrig4 Divisie1 Divisie "7 December"13 PabrigLLC101 Gnggp101 Vbdgp1 Lka201 Gnggp101 Luagp5 Divisie101 Marbat102, 105 Verkbat (RIM)103, 104 VerkbatSt 1 Lk

As a further illustration, the chart below shows possible wartime configurations for 1, 4 and 5 Division, including attachments from corps level. These configurations have been derived from published works and materials, partly regarding established supporting roles during divisional exercises and partly regarding the outlines of operation plans for the main defensive battle, in particular those for the period 1979-1985 (see further below).10 < 


102 Verkbat104 Vagp5 Div118 Afdva51 Maresk54 LkvzgbatStstcie 5 Div150 Divvbdbedcie53 Painfbrig52 Painfbrig51 Pabrig35 Afdpalua103 GnbatStstcie 1 Div "7 Dec"41 Maresk41 Gnbat114 LkvzgbatStstcie 4 Div42 Painfbrig15 Afdpalua11 Gnbat299 Sq Ltvltgn25 Afdpalua111 Lkvzgbat13 Pabrig12 Painfbrig11 Maresk41 Pabrig101 Vagp11 Painfbrig103 Verkbat104 Verkbat102 Vagp103 Vagp4 Div116 Divvbdbedcie115 Divvbdbedcie43 Painfbrig1 Div "7Dec"298 Sq Ltvltgn

Operational Role

The map below shows the area in West Germany that was to be defended by 1 (NL) Corps in the event of an armed conflict between NATO and Warsaw Pact. In such an event 1 (NL) Corps would be placed under operational command of NATO's Northern Army Group (NORTHAG). Itwar assignment, as formulated by Commander, Northern Army Group (COMNORTHAG), would be to

a. Assume responsibility for its corps sector and relieve 1st German Corps forces as soon as possible.
b. Fight the covering force battle in accordance with COMNORTHAG's concept of operations.
c. In the main defensive battle: (1) hold and destroy the forces of the enemy's leading armies conventionally as far east as possible, maintaining cohesion with I (GE) Corps; (2) in the event of a major penetration affecting 1 (NL) Corps sector, be prepared to hold the area between the roads A7 and B3 and to conduct a counterattack according to COMNORTHAG's concept of operations.
d. Maintain cohesion with LANDJUT and secure NORTHAG's left flank in the Forward Combat Zone.11

As the map shows, 4 and 1 Division would take up positions around Lüneburg and Uelzen respectively, with 5 Division further to the rear as corps reserve. In front of the two divisional sectors the covering force would operate, of which force 41 Armoured Brigade formed the nucleus. The Corps Rear Area would be secured by 101 Infantry Brigade, probably in conjunction with 102 and 105 Reconnaissance Battalion.12 The main thrust of an enemy attack was expected to fall upon the southern part of the corps sector, which is reflected in COMNORTHAG's instruction to hold the area between the A7 and B3 roads (shaded on the map below).13


1 (NL) Corps Sector in West Germany, 1979-1989 14

Between 1979 and 1985 the corps concept of operations for the main defensive battle emphasised defence at the FEBA (Forward Edge of Battle Area), with five armoured infantry brigades deployed in first line behind the Ilmenau and the Elbe-Seitenkanal (ESK). Lying on the expected main axis of the enemy attack, 1 Division would be assigned three field artillery groups comprising up to fourteen field artillery battalions, whilst 4 Division would get one field artillery group with up to six battalions. The first-line brigades were to counter or limit enemy penetrations, whilst 41 and 51 Armoured Brigade would be kept in reserve to participate, if necessary, in a corps-level counterattack led by the commander of 5 Division. It was thought that such a counterattack in all likelihood would require the release of tactical nuclear weapons in order to be succesfull.15

In July 1985 a new concept of operations came into force which prescribed a more fluid, terrain-oriented defence in depth. No longer was the enemy to be halted as far east as possible; he was now to be denied passage through the corps sector. Four rather than five armoured infantry brigades would be deployed in first line, tasked to hold the vital grounds west of the line Lüneburg-Uelzen, about halfway the divisional sectors. Reserves would no longer be used primarily to support these defensive operations, but rather to execute counterattacks in which the armoured brigades would be used to strike at weak points in the enemy's deployments. Such counterattacks would not so much serve to restore the initial FEBA but to maintain possession of the aforementioned vital grounds. Should this first stage of the main defensive battle fail then the defence would be continued deeper into the corps sector, further west, if necessary with the support of tactical nuclear weapons.16

To the north of the Netherlands corps sector, across the Elbe river, lay the area that was to be defended by Allied Land Forces Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland (LANDJUT), a joined Danish-German force that did not fall under NORTHAG but under Allied Forces Baltic Approaches (BALTAP), which was subordinate to Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH), whereas NORTHAG fell under Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT).17 This meant that 1 (NL) Corps formed the left flank of both NORTHAG and AFCENT. Adjoined on its right was I (GE) Corps, of which 3 (GE) Armoured Division had the vital role of (temporarily) fleshing out the covering force in case of alarm; a role necessitated by 1 (NL) Corps's maldeployment. <

Maldeployment

In response to the Warsaw Pact's growing military capability to mount a surprise attack,18 NATO operation plans since 1969 prescribed a minimum military warning time of forty-eight hours. This meant that 1 (NL) Corps had to be able to deploy to its corps sector and take up battle positions within such time. Meeting this requirement was no small challenge.19 Apart from its forward-deployed element the corps was based in the Netherlands, about 350 kilometres from its sector of responsibility (see the map below). It is worth noting that this included the corps staff, located in Apeldoorn, which made 1 (NL) Corps the only corps in NORTHAG not headquartered in West Germany. In NATO circles this maldeployment of forces caused serious doubts about the ability of the Netherlands corps to deploy to its wartime positions in time, doubts that were compounded by its high dependence on mobilisation.20 The efficiency of the Dutch reserve and mobilisation systems notwithstanding, the fact remained that about sixty percent of 1 (NL) Corps had to be mobilised before being able to begin deployment.21 "The greatest problem facing the Dutch," an observer concisely noted, "will be getting to the war." 22

 
1 (NL) Corps Maldeployment 23

Of course the maldeployment of 1 (NL) Corps was not merely "the greatest problem facing the Dutch" but, moreover, a substantial operational risk for NATO commanders, as both Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Europe (CINCENT) and COMNORTHAG saw their left flank potentially 'hanging in the air'. In wartime this could ultimately result in an early request for the release of tactical nuclear weapons by Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).24 In 1977 both SACEUR and CINCENT had tried to persuade the Netherlands government to station at least one more brigade in West Germany, as others had done before them. The Dutch however remained reticent, mainly because of the financial consequences.25 Instead several measures were undertaken to improve the reaction time of 1 (NL) Corps. These included:
  • Increasing the readiness of the forward-deployed element by bringing 41 Armoured Brigade and 41 Engineer Battalion up to near war strength and forward-storing the materiel for its remaining Short Leave components, which measures were effectuated between 1983 and 1986; 26
  • Upgrading the rail transport plan for tracked vehicles and logistic support by expanding the specialised rail stock from 75 to 478 special flatcars and building four military rail yards with loading ramps in the Netherlands. The complement of flatcars, the delivery of which was completed in 1986, enabled the tank and armour-heavy units to arrive in the area of operations twenty-four hours earlier. The first rail yard, at 't Harde, was completed in 1987; 27
  • Establishing nine Forward Storage Sites (FStS) for military supplies (such as combat rations, fuel and ammunition) in the corps sector, as part of a common-funded NATO project. By 1985 four FStS were operational: at Sehlingen (completed in 1980), Töpingen (1980), Dünsen (1983 or 1984) and Hellwege (1984 or 1985); 28
  • Implementing an improved mobilisation plan which advanced the mobilisation of 5 Division by calling up one brigade in each of the three mobilisation phases, rather than mobilising all three brigades in the last phase as previously had been the case. This was put into effect in 1979; 29
  • Forming a new Corps Command (Legerkorpscommando) in Germany, which would include a forward-deployed detachment of 1 (NL) Corps Staff whose main task would be to guide the approach march and deployment of 1 (NL) Corps in wartime. Also integrated in this command would be the Command of Netherlands Troops in Seedorf, Hohne, Langemannshof, 201 Support Command and Corps Rear Area Command. Preparations began in 1989 but were cancelled in 1990.30
Effective though these measures were, they did not negate the fact that 1 (NL) Corps remained unable to meet the forty-eight hour minimum reaction time set by NATO.31 This inability to immediately defend the corps sector would continue to be a cause for concern in NATO until the end of the Cold War.32 <

_________________________________________________

1. Elands, Harderwijk, 151, 154. Rens, Huzaren van Boreel, 363, 365, 373. Felius, Einde oefening, 161. <
2. Hoffenaar en Schoenmaker, Met de blik, 388. <
3. Elands, Van Gils en Schoenmaker, Geschiedenis 1 Divisie, 232, 233. Schulten, Zwitzer en Hoffenaar, 1 Divisie, 153, 154. <
4. NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr. 514, Planningsmemorandum Reorganisatie Tank- en Verkenningseenheden d.d. 1 november 1982, Bijlage I-B. Rens, op. cit., 402-403. <
5. NIMH 205A/10, Aflossing van mobilisabele eenheden en -aanvullingen d.d. 27 mei 1980. Ibid., d.d. 11 november 1983. Ibid., d.d. 17 juni 1985. <
6. Unit filling: ibid. Formation: NL-HaNA 2.13.182, loc. cit. <
7. SSA-MvD, CLAS/BLS 7486, Memorandum Realisatie Legerplan 149-9B d.d. 13 februari 1986. <
8. In NORTHAG, Belgian and, to a lesser extent, West German brigades were organised similarly. Isby and Kamps, Armies, 63, 64, 177, 182. Dragoner, Bundeswehr, Teil 2.1 (passim). Forty-eight hours: Roozenbeek, In dienst, 224. Isby and Kamps, op. cit., 325. <
9. Felius, op. cit., 161. Hoffenaar en Schoenmaker, op. cit., 234. Isby and Kamps, op. cit., 325-327. Cornelese, De 1 Divisie, 394-395. Miller (in Cold War, 239) oddly equates the command structure of 1 (NL) Corps with the results of a reorganisation in the British Army in the late 1970s, in which the brigades were disbanded to form task forces of variable composition within the divisions, a reorganisation that turned out to be fundamentally flawed and had to be reversed in the early 1980s (Miller, op. cit., 234; also described in Isby and Kamps, op. cit., 240-241). This is not to say that there weren't any doubts about whether the perceived flexibility of 1 (NL) Corps command would indeed result in actual operational flexibility; see for instance Van den Doel, Divisiestaf. <
10. Elands, Van Gils en Schoenmaker, op. cit., 237. Felius, op. cit., 161. Hoffenaar, Van Hoof en De Moor, Vuur in beweging, 233. Schulten, Zwitzer en Hoffenaar, op. cit., 153. The corps concept of operations (Operatieplan nr. 1) specified that in wartime 12 Armoured Infantry Brigade would be assigned to 4 Division, and 43 Armoured Infantry Brigade to 1 Division, at least initially. Felius, op. cit., 218, 231, email from the author 30.07.2008. On a similar note, Elands (in Harderwijk, 168) mentions that 102 Reconnaissance Battalion was to be placed under command of 4 Division in wartime. <
11. a-d quoted from Felius, op. cit., 305. The Forward Combat Zone ran in a north-south direction across West Germany. The Netherlands corps sector effectively formed the northernmost part of this zone in NORTHAG's area of responsibility. VR 2-1386, I-25. <
12. In wartime Commander, 101 Infantry Brigade would be double-hatted as Commander, Corps Rear Area Command. See also 101 Infantry Brigade, Operational Role. <
13. Expected main thrust of the enemy attack: Elands, Van Gils en Schoenmaker, op. cit., 213, 249-250. Hoffenaar en Schoenmaker, op. cit., 355. <
14. VS 2-1380, 6-1. VR 2-1386, loc. cit. Elands, Van Gils en Schoenmaker, op. cit., 249-250. Hoffenaar en Schoenmaker, op. cit., 356. Isby and Kamps, op. cit., 15De Jong en Hoffenaar, op. cit., 82. <
15. Elands, Van Gils en Schoenmaker, op. cit., 213. Hoffenaar en Schoenmaker, loc. cit. De Jong en Hoffenaar, Op herhaling, 115Also of interest is this map, found on the fok.nl forum in a thread about the Netherlands Army during the Cold War. Its exact provenance, though evidently military, is unclear; it appears to have been made for a presentation. Somewhat puzzling is the combination of the year 1978 and the appearance of 104 and 105 Reconnaissance Battalion, which were only formed between November 1983 and March 1984. <
16. Elands, Van Gils en Schoenmaker, op. cit., 238-239, 249. Hoffenaar en Schoenmaker, op. cit., 384-385. De Jong en Hoffenaar, op. cit., 116. <
17. NATO Handbook, 56-57. Martin, Before The Day After, 14-15. Mechtersheimer und Barth, Militarisierungsatlas, 20-21. For an overview of NATO's military command structure, see NATO Commands. <
18. Hoffenaar en Schoenmaker, op. cit., 342. From 1977 the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) began to anticipate the possibility of an attack by the Warsaw Pact's large standing forces, without prior mobilisation, if Soviet leaders for whatever reason would feel war to be inevitable. Ibid., 378. In the 1980s eighty-five percent of the East German army (Nationale Volksarmee, NVA) maintained what basically amounted to a permanent state of alert, with units able to deploy from their barracks in full combat readiness within two hours after alarm; Soviet units stationed in East Germany (the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, GSFG) maintained a similar combat readiness. Diedrich, German Democratic Republic, 179. Naumann, NVA, 88-89, 340. For a detailed and contextual account of NVA operational war plans for 1983-1985, which involved extensive offensive operations against 1 (NL) Corps, see Lautsch, Zur Planung, 20-33. < 
19. Hoffenaar en Schoenmaker, op. cit., 230-231, 343-344. Roozenbeek, op. cit., 203. It will be noted that, apart from deploying forces to their battle positions, an effective defence would require these positions to be prepared. A NATO study from the late 1970s concluded that "the time needed for deployment of covering forces into position should be measured in days rather than in hours. For absolute readiness, which includes digging in, erecting obstacles, zero-ing in pre-planned artillery fires in front of positions, cutting down trees, cratering roads, placing charges on bridges, laying mines, and other defensive preparations, at least the better part of a week would be needed subsequent to authorisation." Betts, R.K., Surprise Attack (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1982), 173; quoted in Golden, Clark and Arlinghaus, Conventional Deterrence, 116. See also 101 Engineer Combat Group, Operational Role and 41 Armoured Brigade, Operational Role: The Corps Covering Force. <
20. Serious doubts: see for instance HTK 1982-1983, kamerstuknr. 17704 ondernr. 3 (stenographic report of SACEUR and others being heard by the Dutch parliament's standing committees for foreign affairs and defence), 7-8, 13; Cordesman, Central Region Forces, 120-121; Isby and Kamps, op. cit., 318; Hoffenaar en Schoenmaker, op. cit., 343-344, 385; De Jong en Hoffenaar, op. cit., 122. <
21. Selles, Personele vulling, 456. Of the Royal Army's war strength more than two thirds was mobilisable in some form. HTK 1983-1984, kamerstuknr. 18169 ondernr. 2 (Defensienota 1984-1993), 106-107. Hoffenaar en Schoenmaker, op. cit., 343-344. Kuyt, Nederland mobiliseert, 19. The minimum time scheme for the Royal Army's entire mobilisation plan was ninety-six hours. Hoffenaar en Schoenmaker, op. cit., 346. <
22. My italicisation, HB. Golden, Clark and Arlinghaus, op. cit., 142; also quoted in Hoffenaar en Schoenmaker, op. cit., 385. <
23. HTK 1983-1984, kamerstuknr. 18169 ondernr. 2 (Defensienota 1984-1993), 107. Hoffenaar en Schoenmaker, op. cit., 344. The peacetime locations in the Netherlands are only roughly indicated. <
24. HTK 1982-1983, op. cit., 8, 13. The release of nuclear weapons would, ultimately, be decided upon by the president of the United States. See also
1 (NL) Corps Artillery, Dual Capable Artillery. <
25. Hoffenaar en Schoenmaker, op. cit, 258-259, 344-345. <
26. SSA-MvD, CLAS/BLS 7643, Memorandum Realisatie Legerplan 120-B d.d. 22 maart 1985. See further 41 Armoured Brigade, note a and footnote 8; also 101 Engineer Combat Group, note c. <
27. Hoffenaar en Schoenmaker, op. cit, 385. Roozenbeek, op. cit., 206-208. The remaining three military rail yards (in Dutch: raccordementen), at Assen, Amersfoort and Eindhoven (Oirschot), were not built before 1990. HTK 1990-1991, kamerstuknr. 21991 ondernr. 2 (Defensienota 1991), 124. Website Forten Info, Koude Oorlog Landmacht. 478 special flatcars enabling tanks and armour-heavy units to arrive twenty-four hours earlier: in the 1970s, when the army had 75 special flatcars, it would take seventy-two hours to transport all tanks of 1 (NL) Corps to the area of operations. Roozenbeek, op. cit., 168. <
28. See also Corps Logistic Command, Forward Storage Sites. <
29. Hoffenaar en Schoenmaker, op. cit., 346. De Jong en Hoffenaar, op. cit., 115. The new mobilisation plan followed the mechanisation and restructuring of 5 Division ,which took place between 1975 and September 1979 (Operatie Omega). Schoenmaker, 5 Divisie, 304-305. <
30. HTK 1988-1989, kamerstuknr. 20800 X ondernr. 43. Ibid., ondernr. 185b, 17. HTK 1989-1990, kamerstuknr. 21300 X ondernr. 48, 3. Hoffenaar en Schoenmaker, op. cit., 385. <
31. For example, in 1979 and 1986 43 Armoured Infantry Brigade was brought up to war strength within twenty-four hours during the (virtually) annual mobilisation exercise "Donderslag," but it took up to another twenty-four hours for the brigade to be ready for deployment to the corps sector. De Jong en Hoffenaar, op. cit., 120-121; this is also mentioned in Felius, op. cit., 275-276. Schoenmaker, op. cit., 305, also notes fourty-eight hours as the maximum time span for the RIM units of 5 Division to be mobilised and made combat-ready. <
32. Ibid., 122. <
33. RIM was the Dutch acronym for Direct Influx into Mobilisable Units (Rechtstreekse Instroming in Mobilisabele Eenheden). For an overview of the Army's unit filling and reserve system see Gijsbers, Blik in de smidse, 2222-2231; Selles, op. cit.; Berghuijs, Opleiding, 14-23; Isby and Kamps, op. cit., 341-343. <


Gebied beveiligende strijdmacht4 Div1 Div "7 Dec"5 Div101 InfbrigSt 1 LkLegerkorpsachtergebiedAchterste deel gevechtszoneArea between the A7 and B3 roadsVoorste deel gevechtszone St 41 PabrigSt Conltr Sdf/Ho/LmhfSt 1 LkFEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANYBELGIUMNETHERLANDSGERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC1 (NL) Corps sector 101 Gnggp201 GnggpLLC102 GnkgpJWFKRS 1 Lk